Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a jury trial, defendant Theadore Mitchell, was convicted of one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault, and two class A misdemeanor counts of violation of a protective order. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that he offered to take a polygraph test. Defendant also argued that the trial court plainly erred when it allocated his pretrial confinement credit. The State conceded that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in "New Hampshire v. Edson," defendant's sentence was plainly erroneous. Accordingly, the Court vacated the sentences imposed and remand for resentencing in accordance with "Edson." The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "New Hampshire v. Mitchell " on Justia Law

In 2010, defendant’s ex-wife complained to the Hampstead Police Department that, while using defendant’s computer, she clicked on the browsing history and found disturbing links to websites that potentially contained child pornography. In a follow-up meeting with the police, defendant’s ex-wife explained that she had started checking the defendant’s browsing history six months earlier, and it was at that time that she first noticed child pornography on defendant’s computer. According to the police affidavit for the search warrant, she described the images as depicting “nude young undeveloped girls (well under 18 years of age).” Based upon this information, the police secured a search warrant and seized defendant’s computer. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of the search warrant, arguing, in part, that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause because it did not provide a sufficient description of the alleged child pornography. After hearing, the superior court granted the motion, ruling that the search warrant did not describe the images with sufficient particularity. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Letoile" on Justia Law

Defendant Bryan Maga appealed his conviction for driving with an alcohol concentration of .02 or higher, while he was under the age of twenty-one (DUI). On appeal, he argued that the circuit court erred when it: (1) admitted into evidence a certificate from a state crime laboratory employee attesting that the breathalyzer machine used by the Salem Police Department was in working order; and (2) ruled that the police had probable cause to arrest him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Maga" on Justia Law

Defendant Eugene Roe appealed circuit court decision awarding plaintiffs Leigh Mae Friedline and Zebadiah Kellogg-Roe a writ of possession. In 1959, the defendant purchased property in Greenville. In 1971, he conveyed the property to Brookwood Ecology Center, Inc. Brookwood reconveyed the house and barn on the property to defendant in 1999. In 2004, defendant conveyed the house and barn to his son, plaintiff Kellogg-Roe. In 2009, Kellogg-Roe transferred a twenty percent interest in the buildings to Friedline. That same year, Kellogg-Roe gave Friedline a power of attorney to act as his agent. Defendant has lived on the property since he purchased it. In 2012, Friedline served him with an eviction notice, ordering him to vacate the premises within thirty days. Although the eviction notice stated that the buildings were owned by both Kellogg-Roe and Friedline, only Friedline signed the notice. When defendant did not vacate the premises, plaintiffs filed a landlord and tenant writ. Following a hearing, the district division awarded plaintiffs a writ of possession. On appeal, defendant argued that he properly asserted a plea of title and, consequently, the district division erred by not transferring the case to superior court. He further argued that the court exceeded its jurisdiction by ruling on the issues raised in his plea of title. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the district division had jurisdiction in this case. Rather than providing defendant with the opportunity to enter his action in superior court, the district division held a hearing during which it addressed, among other issues, the merits of his claim to a life estate in the property. Because jurisdiction to resolve questions of title and matters of equity lies with the superior court, the Supreme Court concluded the district division erred by ruling on this claim. Consequently, the Court vacated the district division’s order. View "Friedline v. Roe" on Justia Law

Following a two-day trial, a jury determined that defendant Daniel Brazas, was not legally at fault for the injuries sustained by plaintiff Tamara Dukette when she slipped and fell on ice at her apartment, which was owned by the defendant. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in preventing counsel from addressing and examining the jury panel during attorney-conducted voir dire. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dukette v. Brazas" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant Thomas Jur, was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while certified as a habitual offender. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by denying his pretrial request for an interpreter, thus violating his right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel under both the State and Federal Constitutions. In the alternative, defendant argued that the trial court’s failure to appoint an interpreter at trial sua sponte was error. Defendant was from Sudan, and his primary language is Dinka. He stated he had difficulty understanding the English language. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the record showed defendant did have a sufficient command of English. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in failing to appoint an interpreter during the trial. View "New Hampshire v. Jur" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) Appellate Board (board) appealed a decision that respondent Norman Coulombe was an employee of petitioner, Niadni, Inc. (d/b/a Indian Head Resort Motel) who was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. Coulombe appeared as a musical entertainer at the resort in both solo and group performances beginning in approximately 1980. He also performed at other venues but testified that he performed at the resort nearly three hundred times in the last two years that he worked there. The resort and Coulombe negotiated a pay rate for Coulombe’s services, and he was paid weekly for his performances. He provided his own instruments and selected the songs he would play in his performances, though the resort asked him to perform new material prior to the end of his relationship with the resort. He reported that his last booking with the resort was in the summer of 2012, after which the relationship terminated. He subsequently filed for unemployment benefits with DES. Finding none of the Resort's arguments persuasive to reverse the Appellate Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Niadni, Inc. d/b/a Indian Head Resort Motel" on Justia Law

The Town of North Hampton appealed the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board's (PELRB) finding that the Town engaged in unfair labor practices in dealing with respondent North Hampton Professional Fire Fighters, Local 3211, IAFF (Union). The CBA contained wage scales for firefighters and lieutenants, respectively, each consisting of five steps. It provided that "[m]ovement through [the] steps is dependent on achieving certain professional certifications." During bargaining over the CBA, the Union submitted a wage proposal that provided for, among other things, a "[s]tipend for paramedic level EMT [that] will be 5% over actual step (base pay) whether hired as or a current employee has received the certification." The Town rejected the proposal and the parties put the paramedic program issue on hold. The Town remained interested in a paramedic program, however, and the Union informed the Town in June 2011 that it was willing to resume negotiations over the program. The Town responded that a vacancy on the selectboard was delaying the process. Nevertheless, in August 2011, the Town adopted a paramedic program that was not produced through bargaining with the Union. The program established a wage schedule and conditions of employment similar to those previously proposed by the Union and rejected by the Town. On appeal, the Town argued that the PELRB erred in: (1) finding that the Town was required to bargain over its paramedic program when the adoption of that program was within the Town’s "managerial prerogative"; (2) finding that the Town had previously created a paramedic program; (3) finding that the Town was required to bargain over the wages, hours, and working conditions of a position before the parties agreed to, and the PELRB ordered, the inclusion of that position in a bargaining unit; and (4) finding, on insufficient evidence, that the Town violated its duty to bargain and/or was motivated by anti-union animus. The Supreme Court concluded the Town failed to demonstrate that the PELRB made an erroneous ruling of law or to demonstrate, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that its order was unjust or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court declined to set aside the PELRB’s decision. View "Appeal of Town of North Hampton " on Justia Law

Petitioner David Montenegro appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for injunctive relief seeking to compel the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV), to issue him a personalized vanity motor vehicle registration plate reading "COPSLIE." He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the DMV’s denial of his request violated his right to free speech. Because the Court found that the regulation relied upon by the DMV in denying petitioner’s request was unconstitutionally vague, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Montenegro v. New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles " on Justia Law

Respondent, the father of G.G., appealed a superior court order which, after de novo review, upheld a finding by the 10th Circuit Court – Portsmouth Family Division that the respondent had abused and neglected G.G. Respondent challenged the superior court’s denial of his request to cross-examine or subpoena G.G. after the court admitted her videotaped interview into evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that given the plain language of the pertinent statutes and the court’s inherent authority to control the proceedings before it, trial courts have the discretion in abuse and neglect proceedings to determine whether any witness, including the child, should be compelled to testify. The record was unclear as to whether the trial court adequately considered the competing interests of respondent and the child. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded this case for further proceedings: "[w]hen the court is considering whether to compel G.G. to testify in this case, the court may wish to consider whether she testified at the respondent's criminal trial and, if so, whether her testimony in the criminal proceeding would suffice for the instant proceeding." View "In re G.G." on Justia Law