Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant david Pyles was convicted by jury on three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements allegedly obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Pyles" on Justia Law

Defendant Dennis Sulloway appealed his conviction by jury of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the thirteen-year-old victim's examining doctor and the victim's stepfather. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Sulloway " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kenneth Lahm appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendants, Detective Michael Farrington and the Town of Tilton. Plaintiff sued defendants for negligence. Farrington interviewed an alleged victim who was recovering from severe burns and bruises at Concord Hospital, and who stated that she believed she had been sexually assaulted. The alleged victim claimed that, three days earlier, she had gone home with plaintiff after drinking approximately four beers at a bar. She claimed that, upon arriving at plaintiff's house, plaintiff gave her two drinks containing Red Bull, after which she "passed out" and did not remember anything until waking three days later in plaintiff's bed, without any clothes, and discovering severe burns and bruises on her body. Following plaintiff's arrest and the search of his house, an evidentiary probable cause hearing was held, at which a judge found probable cause that plaintiff had committed second-degree assault. Plaintiff hired private investigators, who interviewed, among other people, neighbors who recalled seeing the alleged victim outside plaintiff's house during the time she claimed to have been passed out. The investigators also interviewed a friend of plaintiff, a medical doctor who said that he spoke to the alleged victim by phone about her injuries, and that she told him they had been caused by her having accidentally fallen onto a wood stove. Plaintiff claimed that, once the prosecution received this and other "exculpatory information," which he provided to the court, it dropped the pending charge against him. Plaintiff sued Farrington and the Town, alleging that Farrington had conducted a negligent investigation prior to his arrest, and that the Town was vicariously liable. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis, among other grounds, that Farrington "did not have a legal duty to investigate beyond establishing probable cause before arresting and bringing a criminal charge against [Lahm]." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that immunizing police officers from "extended liability" was an interest that outweighs plaintiff's claimed interest in requiring a "reasonable investigation beyond just finding probable cause" prior to arrest. Because Farrington owed no duty to plaintiff, he could not be found liable for negligence on these facts. Absent tortious conduct by Farrington, the Town could not be vicariously liable for his conduct. View "Lahm v. Farrington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff William O'Brien appealed a Superior Court order that granted summary judgment in favor of the New Hampshire Democratic Party and Raymond Buckley, Chairman of the New Hampshire Democratic Party, and denied plaintiff’s motion. The trial court ruled that plaintiff, who was a Republican candidate for re-election to the New Hampshire House of Representatives, did not have standing to file an action for damages under RSA 664:14-a (2008), the "Robocall Statute." In light of the fact that the Democratic party had fewer candidates than it had spaces on the November ballot, plaintiff sought "Democratic write-in votes in the September 14, 2010, primary so that he could appear on the ballot in the November cycle for elections as both (R)epublican and (D)emocrat." The day before the primary, defendants called 394 households with a prerecorded political message. Plaintiff received the highest number of votes in the Republican primary, winning a place on the general election ballot as a Republican. He did not secure enough votes in the Democratic Primary to also appear on the November ballot as a Democrat. In the general election, plaintiff won a seat in the House of Representatives. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the office of the Attorney General, alleging that defendants violated the Robocall Statute, because they were "responsible for calls containing a prerecorded political message that lacked the statutorily required disclosures." In August 2011, the Democratic Party entered into a consent agreement with the attorney general to resolve claims for the alleged violation of the statute; the agreement was not an admission that defendants violated the statute. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the lawsuit and denying his motion for summary judgment. He contended that the plain language of the statute was broad and intended to include candidates who are the subject of a prerecorded political message. Alternatively, he claimed that, even if the statute was deemed to be ambiguous, the legislative history did not support the trial court’s interpretation. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that plaintiff did not allege an injury flowing from the alleged statutory violation. Therefore, he did not have standing. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "O'Brien v. New Hampshire Democratic Party " on Justia Law

Petitioners, Barbara and George G., appealed a circuit court that denied their petitions to terminate the parental rights of the mother, Amelia T., over her three children, Faith T., Arom T., and Jacoby T. They argued that the trial court erred in: (1) concluding that they failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother substantially and continuously neglected to pay for necessary subsistence, education, or other care; (2) failing to balance the best interest of the children and the totality of the circumstances; and (3) dismissing their petitions. Finding that the trial court did not err in denying the termination petitions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Faith T." on Justia Law

Defendant City of Portsmouth (City), appeals a jury verdict awarding $128,111 as just compensation for the defendant’s taking by eminent domain of easement rights in property of plaintiff Houston Holdings, LLC. Defendant challenged the Superior Court’s ruling on a motion in limine and the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to set aside the verdict. Finding no error in the Superior Court's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Houston Holdings, LLC v. City of Portsmouth" on Justia Law

Defendant Matthew Tabaldi appealed his convictions for the sale of narcotics, possession of narcotics, being a felon in possession of an electronic defense weapon, and for receiving stolen property. He argued the superior court erred in denying his motion to strike a prospective juror, and by denying his motions to dismiss the weapon-possession and narcotics-possession charges. Additionally, defendant claimed the court erred in admitting certain evidence over his objection. Finding no errors, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Tabaldi" on Justia Law

Respondent Sophia-Marie H's father appealed a circuit court order that terminated his parental rights. He argued the evidence presented at trial did not support the court's findings that (1) he failed to support, educate and care for the child; and (2) that termination of his rights was in Sophia-Marie's best interests. Sophia-Marie’s guardian ad litem (GAL) submitted a detailed final report that recommended that the termination petition be denied. At the hearing, the GAL testified that this was not an easy decision: the father appeared to be a changed man and "made an effort to turn his life around [and] he want[ed] to be involved in [his] daughter's life." To the extent that the court relied upon the father's failure to pay child support during his incarceration as evidence that the mother met her burden, the Supreme Court concluded this was error. The GAL testified that if termination was ordered, Sophia-Marie would miss out on having a relationship with her father. For these reasons, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in finding termination of the father's parental rights was necessary. View "In re Sophia-Marie H." on Justia Law

Defendants Leisure Life Industries a/k/a Leisure Life Industries, Inc. a/k/a Leisure Life Industries, LLC (Leisure Life) and Knothe Apparel Group, Inc. appealed a superior court order that denied their motion for summary judgment and granted the cross-motion for entry of final judgment on the issue of indemnity filed by plaintiffs, JoAnne Gray, Jeffrey Gray, Jeffrey J. Gray, and Jonathan Gray. The defendants also appealed the trial court’s order denying their motion for summary judgment on successor liability. Jeffrey Gray purchased a robe from The Orvis Company (Orvis) for his wife, JoAnne. Orvis purchased the robe from the manufacturer, Leisure Life. Mrs. Gray was wearing the robe when she added a piece of firewood to her wood stove and the robe caught fire. As result, she was severely burned and suffered extensive injuries. Plaintiffs sued the defendants and Orvis along with other parties involved either in the design and distribution of the robe or the manufacture and sale of the wood stove. Leisure Life argued that it was not liable for the plaintiffs" injuries because it was no longer the same entity that manufactured the robe, and the circumstances of the purchase did not support holding Knothe liable as a successor. The trial court denied the motion. Orvis claimed that it "had no involvement in the design and manufacturing of the robe" and that it "was simply a 'pass-through' entity." As a result, Orvis sought indemnity or contribution from the defendants for any damages it ultimately owed to the plaintiffs, including the amount of any judgment against, or settlement by, Orvis. Immediately prior to the scheduled start of the trial, all parties except Leisure Life settled with the plaintiffs. The parties involved in the sale and manufacture of the wood stove settled the claims against them for five million dollars. Orvis settled the claims against it for one million dollars and assigned to the plaintiffs "any and all rights to indemnity" that Orvis had against the defendants. The settlement did not extinguish the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants. The plaintiffs, as Orvis's assignees, subsequently moved for summary judgment against the defendants on the indemnity claim. On appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of indemnity. They further contend that there is no basis for the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs and that, therefore, the award must be set aside. Finally, the defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding Knothe liable as a successor to Leisure Life. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs' indemnity claim failed because when Orvis settled with the plaintiffs, it extinguished its own liability, but not that of the defendants. The trial court's order addressing the settlement stated that "[t]his case has been settled as to all defendants except Leisure Life Industries." In consideration for the receipt of one million dollars and the assignment of Orvis's indemnity rights against the defendants, the plaintiffs released Orvis from all claims of liability asserted against it. In contrast, there was no release of liability running to the defendants, and the defendants remained potentially liable to the plaintiffs under the theories of direct liability asserted against them, including the strict liability claim. The Court reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs’ indemnity claim. View "Gray v. Leisure Life Industries " on Justia Law

Petitioner Dr. Kevin Boulard, D.M.D. appealed a New Hampshire Board of Dental Examiners (Board) finding that he committed professional misconduct and suspending indefinitely his “moderate sedation – unrestricted” permit. The Supreme Court concluded that because the Board was in the process of conducting other investigations of petitioner’s practice, without more, it was error for the Board to continue the suspension of petitioner's permit based on the other facts presented on the record. The Court vacated a portion of the Board's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Dr. Kevin D. Boulard, D.M.D." on Justia Law