Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a two-day trial, a jury determined that defendant Daniel Brazas, was not legally at fault for the injuries sustained by plaintiff Tamara Dukette when she slipped and fell on ice at her apartment, which was owned by the defendant. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in preventing counsel from addressing and examining the jury panel during attorney-conducted voir dire. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dukette v. Brazas" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant Thomas Jur, was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while certified as a habitual offender. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by denying his pretrial request for an interpreter, thus violating his right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel under both the State and Federal Constitutions. In the alternative, defendant argued that the trial court’s failure to appoint an interpreter at trial sua sponte was error. Defendant was from Sudan, and his primary language is Dinka. He stated he had difficulty understanding the English language. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the record showed defendant did have a sufficient command of English. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in failing to appoint an interpreter during the trial. View "New Hampshire v. Jur" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (DES) Appellate Board (board) appealed a decision that respondent Norman Coulombe was an employee of petitioner, Niadni, Inc. (d/b/a Indian Head Resort Motel) who was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. Coulombe appeared as a musical entertainer at the resort in both solo and group performances beginning in approximately 1980. He also performed at other venues but testified that he performed at the resort nearly three hundred times in the last two years that he worked there. The resort and Coulombe negotiated a pay rate for Coulombe’s services, and he was paid weekly for his performances. He provided his own instruments and selected the songs he would play in his performances, though the resort asked him to perform new material prior to the end of his relationship with the resort. He reported that his last booking with the resort was in the summer of 2012, after which the relationship terminated. He subsequently filed for unemployment benefits with DES. Finding none of the Resort's arguments persuasive to reverse the Appellate Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Niadni, Inc. d/b/a Indian Head Resort Motel" on Justia Law

The Town of North Hampton appealed the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board's (PELRB) finding that the Town engaged in unfair labor practices in dealing with respondent North Hampton Professional Fire Fighters, Local 3211, IAFF (Union). The CBA contained wage scales for firefighters and lieutenants, respectively, each consisting of five steps. It provided that "[m]ovement through [the] steps is dependent on achieving certain professional certifications." During bargaining over the CBA, the Union submitted a wage proposal that provided for, among other things, a "[s]tipend for paramedic level EMT [that] will be 5% over actual step (base pay) whether hired as or a current employee has received the certification." The Town rejected the proposal and the parties put the paramedic program issue on hold. The Town remained interested in a paramedic program, however, and the Union informed the Town in June 2011 that it was willing to resume negotiations over the program. The Town responded that a vacancy on the selectboard was delaying the process. Nevertheless, in August 2011, the Town adopted a paramedic program that was not produced through bargaining with the Union. The program established a wage schedule and conditions of employment similar to those previously proposed by the Union and rejected by the Town. On appeal, the Town argued that the PELRB erred in: (1) finding that the Town was required to bargain over its paramedic program when the adoption of that program was within the Town’s "managerial prerogative"; (2) finding that the Town had previously created a paramedic program; (3) finding that the Town was required to bargain over the wages, hours, and working conditions of a position before the parties agreed to, and the PELRB ordered, the inclusion of that position in a bargaining unit; and (4) finding, on insufficient evidence, that the Town violated its duty to bargain and/or was motivated by anti-union animus. The Supreme Court concluded the Town failed to demonstrate that the PELRB made an erroneous ruling of law or to demonstrate, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that its order was unjust or unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court declined to set aside the PELRB’s decision. View "Appeal of Town of North Hampton " on Justia Law

Petitioner David Montenegro appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for injunctive relief seeking to compel the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV), to issue him a personalized vanity motor vehicle registration plate reading "COPSLIE." He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the DMV’s denial of his request violated his right to free speech. Because the Court found that the regulation relied upon by the DMV in denying petitioner’s request was unconstitutionally vague, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Montenegro v. New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles " on Justia Law

Respondent, the father of G.G., appealed a superior court order which, after de novo review, upheld a finding by the 10th Circuit Court – Portsmouth Family Division that the respondent had abused and neglected G.G. Respondent challenged the superior court’s denial of his request to cross-examine or subpoena G.G. after the court admitted her videotaped interview into evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that given the plain language of the pertinent statutes and the court’s inherent authority to control the proceedings before it, trial courts have the discretion in abuse and neglect proceedings to determine whether any witness, including the child, should be compelled to testify. The record was unclear as to whether the trial court adequately considered the competing interests of respondent and the child. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded this case for further proceedings: "[w]hen the court is considering whether to compel G.G. to testify in this case, the court may wish to consider whether she testified at the respondent's criminal trial and, if so, whether her testimony in the criminal proceeding would suffice for the instant proceeding." View "In re G.G." on Justia Law

Defendant Gregory Collins appealed a superior court order that denied his motion for a new trial on three counts of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), four counts of AFSA by individual acts, and one count of misdemeanor sexual assault, based upon the court's conclusion that his trial attorney's performance was not constitutionally deficient. Defendant challenged his counsel's failure to object to improper expert witness opinion testimony by the complainant's therapist, Robert Fusco. On direct examination, without objection, Fusco testified that the complainant's behaviors "fit perfectly into the same kind of behavioral symptoms that we would see for a child who had been sexually abused." Fusco testified that, as a result of the complainant's January 2008 disclosure to him about the 2007 sexual assaults, he realized that "we were no longer dealing with . . . a major depressive disorder," but rather "a post[-]traumatic stress disorder on a child who had – who – who allegedly had been sexually abused." The trial court stated that it could not conclude that it was objectively reasonable to allow Fusco to so opine. The trial court explained that "Fusco's testimony is the type of expert testimony that the Supreme Court has held may not be offered to prove that a particular child has been sexually abused." The trial court was correct. Defense counsel failed to object to Fusco's testimony that the fact that the complainant's disclosure "came out of the blue . . . added to its credibility." Such testimony "cross[ed] the line into the impermissible realm of vouching for the [alleged] victim's credibility." Counsel's failures to object, in the Supreme Court's view, "were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." View "New Hampshire v. Collins" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Brookline appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB), based upon stipulated facts and exhibits, which found that the Town engaged in an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the petitioner, AFSCME, Council 93 (Union). On appeal, the Town argued that the PELRB erred by ruling that the Town had a duty to bargain with the Union even though the bargaining unit in question, originally certified in 2001, currently contains fewer than ten employees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Town of Brookline" on Justia Law

Defendant Hillman Blesdell-Moore appealed his convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana and psilocybin (mushrooms), arguing that the Superior Court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence seized during a stop for a motor vehicle violation. Enfield police stopped defendant's truck for defective taillights. The officer did not observe an erratic behavior to suggest that defendant was driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The officer allowed defendant to step out of his truck to attempt to fix the taillights while he conducted a license check in his cruiser. Upon returning to defendant's truck, the officer asked to see defendant's tongue to see if it was coated consistent with marijuana use. While defendant initially denied smoking marijuana that day, he admitted he had smoked the day before. Concerned that defendant was becoming agitated, the officer obtained consent to perform a pat-down search. That search netted two wads of cash in defendant's pockets. The officer was about to conclude the stop when he hesitated and asked defendant one last question: whether defendant had marijuana in his truck. Defendant denied that he did, and the officer's subsequent request to search the vehicle. The officer stated that defendant was free to leave, but then asked whether a drug canine would indicate whether there were drugs in the vehicle. At this point, defendant looked to the ground and replied that he did not think so. The officer dispatched a canine unit to search defendant's truck. Ultimately the canine discovered drugs in defendant's vehicle. Defendant was arrested for possession with intent to distribute. He moved to suppress evidence of drugs the canine found, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Asking to examine defendant's tongue impermissibly expanded the scope of the initial traffic stop. Therefore, the trial court erroneously denied suppression of all evidence obtained following the unlawful expansion of the stop. View "New Hampshire v. Blesdell-Moore" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire certified a question to the New Hampshire Supreme Court: Whether RSA 507-B:2 and RSA 507-B:5 were constitutional under Part I, Article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution, to the extent they prevented recovery for Plaintiff's claim for civil battery and damages against the Town of Sanbornton under a theory of respondeat superior. This case arose from a municipal police officer's use of a stun gun during a field sobriety test. Plaintiff Dennis Huckins alleged that the police officer, defendant Mark McSweeney, used his stun gun on him "multiple times." McSweeney claimed he used it only once when plaintiff began to run away before completing the field sobriety test. Plaintiff sued McSweeney and his employer, defendant Town of Sanbornton for damages, alleging, among other claims, a battery claim against McSweeney for his use of the stun gun and a claim that the Town was liable for battery under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The defendants sought summary judgment on both claims. The court denied McSweeney’s motion because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, did not establish that McSweeney fired only once, and because "[n]o reasonable police officer could have believed that the encounter . . . justified firing the [stun gun] a second time." Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case and the implicated statutes, the New Hampshire Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Huckins v. McSweeney" on Justia Law