Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, Suzynne D. Cumminngs and S.D. Cummings & Co., PC, appealed a Superior Court order awarding $44,403 to plaintiffs, Robert Audette and his company, H&S Construction Services, LLC (H&S), for breach of contract. Defendants provided various accounting and business services to Audette and his then-partner, Paul Fogarty, including helping them to start their construction business partnership, as well as preparing tax returns for both the business and Audette and Fogarty personally. In 2007, defendants helped Audette and Fogarty dissolve their partnership. One of the final acts defendants worked on for H&S was the placement of a mechanic's lien on a property on which H&S worked: the municipality halted construction on the project when H&S was approximately ninety-five percent complete. The lien placed on the property was for $44,403. Ultimately, plaintiffs’ 120-day statutory lien had not been timely secured or recorded, therefore it had lapsed. Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants in November 2009 for failing to secure the lien. The trial court found for plaintiffs and awarded damages in the amount of $44,403. Finding no error in the Superior Court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Audette & v. Cummings" on Justia Law

Appellant Susan B. and appellee Melissa D. became romantically involved in 1997 and "considered [them]selves to be as fully committed to one another as any married couple." Melissa took Susan's last name as her own (at that time, same-sex marriage became legal until 2010). Melissa became pregnant by sperm donor in 2002, and gave birth to Madelyn. When Madelyn was six years old, Susan and Melissa's relationship ended. Melissa and Madelyn moved in with Eugene D., who Melissa later married. Susan and Melissa agreed upon a schedule for regular visitation. Susan continued to be actively involved in Madelyn's life. Susan paid weekly child support and, in addition, helped with the cost of Madelyn's extracurricular activities. She also provided Madelyn with food, clothing, and gifts. In February 2013, Melissa stopped cashing Susan's child support checks. Susan averred that she nevertheless continued to send them. When Susan attempted to pick up Madelyn for her weekly visitation, she was informed that Madelyn no longer wanted a relationship with her. Melissa did not return Susan's subsequent phone calls, and Susan was unable to contact Madelyn directly through online social media because Madelyn's settings had been changed. Melissa filed a motion to terminate Susan's guardianship over Madelyn, asserting that the guardianship was "no longer necessary because Madelyn no longer wishe[ed] to have a relationship with Susan." Represented by counsel, Susan moved for an immediate hearing. Melissa objected, noting, "We have begun the process of my husband, Madelyn[']s stepfather, adopting her." The court denied the motion and Susan's subsequent motion to reconsider. On appeal, Susan argued, in part, that the family division erred by: (1) terminating the guardianship without a hearing or opportunity to conduct discovery; (2) ruling that the legal standard for termination of a guardianship had been satisfied; (3) dismissing her parenting petition; and (4) denying her motion to intervene in the adoption case. Melissa counters that the guardianship was created to allow Susan to provide health insurance for Madelyn and to further "the daily practicalities of child-rearing." She argued that since "Madelyn's sustenance is being adequately met by her new family," the guardianship was no longer necessary. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's termination of Susan's guardianship over Madelyn, and reversed the dismissal of Susan's parenting petition. The Court vacated the trial court's motion to intervene in the adoption proceedings, and stayed the adoption proceedings until the matter of guardianship was resolved. The Court then remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of Madelyn B." on Justia Law

Petitioners Thomas and Margaret Ettinger, and Ettinger Family Holdings, Inc., appealed a Superior Court order denying their summary judgment motion and granting summary judgment to respondents Pomeroy Limited Partnership and The Nature Conservancy (TNC), on the petitioners’ petition for declaratory judgment. The parties owned real property on or around Silver Lake in Madison. The Ettingers owned the servient estate identified on Madison Tax Map 121 as Lot 4; the original dominant estate, Lot 160, was separated from Lot 4 by lots owned parties not named in this litigation. There was no dispute that Lot 160 had an easement to use "Winter Road Extension." In 2010, Pomeroy Limited conveyed 31.63 acres of its property to TNC. The conveyance included land that comprised most of Lot 161 and a portion of Lot 160. Pomeroy Limited retained a 7.4-acre parcel that included the physical terminus of Winter Road Extension. The deed to TNC conveyed the "right of way over Winter Road Extension" and a "right of way over the remaining land of [Pomeroy Limited]." The deed to TNC also stated that the 31.63 acres conveyed are "not to be considered a separate lot of record," but were to "merge with the abutting land of [TNC]." The reference to "the abutting land" owned by TNC referred to TNC's nature preserve, known as Ossipee Pine Barrens Preserve. Following the conveyance, the Ettingers filed suit claiming the easement conveyed to TNC could benefit only Lot 160, and could not benefit Lot 161 or any of the rest of TNC's land with which Lots 160 and 161 have merged. The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was the interpretation of the deeds in Lot 160's chain of title. After review, the Court was unable to rely upon the language of the language of the 1930 deed that created the Winter Road Extension easement. The Court found that language was ambiguous. To the extent that the trial court relied solely upon the language of the 1930 deed to determine the intent of the parties creating the easement, it erred. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ettinger v. Pomeroy Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Eaton appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of his mother Mary Louise Eaton and her guardian Michael Eaton. This appeal arose from petitioner's attempts to be paid legal fees he incurred in guardianship proceedings involving his mother and other siblings. He alleged that he was entitled to the fees because he acted as his mother's attorney-in-fact pursuant to a durable general power of attorney. The trial court ruled that an acknowledgement-requirement of RSA 506:6, VII(a) was mandatory and therefore petitioner could not have been acting as Mary Lou Eaton's attorney-in-fact when he undertook the acts for which the legal fees were claimed] as a matter of law. Finding no error in the circuit court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision.View "Eaton v. Eaton" on Justia Law

Husband Marcus Hampers and Wife Kristin Hampers challenged a post-divorce circuit court on the husband’s motion to modify his child support and alimony obligations and on the wife’s petition for contempt. The husband asserted the trial court erred by: (1) applying a standing order requiring him to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the wife for any proceeding or matter related to the divorce decree and subsequent amendments; and (2) failing to calculate "gross income" for child support purposes under RSA chapter 458-C by using "net" figures for investment income to account for losses and expenses as well as gains. Wife asserted the trial court erred by: (1) calculating child support based upon the husband’s 2009 income and tax return when his 2010 income information and tax return were available; and (2) ordering her to repay sums that she had received in excess child support. Because "[i]t is for the trial judge to determine whether claimed expenses meet [established] criteria," and the trial court did not address the claimed expenses in this case, the Supreme Court remanded this case for the trial court to make that determination. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court erred by using the husband’s 2009 income for purposes of calculating his "present income." Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Marcus Hampers & Kristin Hampers " on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Stompor petitioned the Supreme Court for review of a probate court decision that granted him and his brother Stan access to an attorney's file who drafted estate plan documents for their parents. In 2001 and 2002, the parents met with the attorney regarding their estate plans. The attorney drafted plan documents for them, however, due to a conflict, the attorney withdrew from representing them, and the estate plan documents were not executed. In 2004, petitioner wrote to the attorney to inquire whether the attorney would again represent the parents with regard to their estate plans. The attorney declined. Petitioner then helped his parents prepare certain estate plan documents, and the parents executed those documents in October 2004. In October 2007, the respondent filed a petition on the parents' behalf, to determine the legality of certain acts of petitioner and requesting, among other things, an accounting of the petitioner's handling of all of the parents' funds either personally or as a trustee of his father's living trust. In June 2009, respondent successfully moved to amend his petition to allege that, in 2004, the petitioner, as the parents' fiduciary, exercised undue influence over the parents when they lacked the capacity to understand the estate plan documents that gave the petitioner and his family exclusive inheritance rights to the parents' assets to the exclusion of the parents' other children. The parents passed away during the late summer of 2009. In February 2010, while his petition was still pending, the respondent sought disclosure from the Attorney of any information he had regarding his contact with the parents in connection with the challenged 2004 estate plan. Petitioner objected, arguing that the attorney-client privilege prohibited disclosure of any documents the attorney had relating to his consultations with his parents. The court ruled that the attorney's entire file was discoverable because it was relevant to a dispute among the decedents' children and to whether the petitioner unduly influenced the parents' decisions regarding their estate plan. The Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the probate court's ruling. View "Petition of Stephen Stompor" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Carrier petitioned the Supreme Court to review a New Hampshire Retirement System Board (NHRS) of Trustees ruling that as fire chief for Hampstead, he was required to be a member of NHRS. Petitioner worked in Londonderry as a full-time firefighter and later as the town’s fire chief. While working in Londonderry, petitioner was enrolled in the NHRS. He retired from his Londonderry position in July 2007, and began receiving retirement benefits. In January 2009, petitioner became the full-time fire chief for Hampstead. However, he did not re-enroll in the NHRS. Instead, he received both his NHRS retirement benefits and his Hampstead fire chief salary. In February 2010, the NHRS notified the petitioner that his Hampstead employment was subject to NHRS mandatory enrollment. Petitioner retired from his Hampstead position in May 2010. Petitioner appealed the February 2010 decision with the board. The board determined that, because petitioner collected his benefits while still employed full-time by Hampstead, he was overpaid pension benefits and medical subsidy benefits. The board ordered petitioner restored to service and required that those amounts be recouped from his future benefit payments. Although petitioner moved for reconsideration, his motion was denied. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Petition of Michael Carrier" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Durgin appealed after a jury convicted him of second degree assault and negligent homicide. He argued that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his request to admit evidence of alternative perpetrators; (2) precluding him from cross-examining a witness about using his electronic benefits (EBT) card without his permission; and (3) denying his motion to set aside the verdict as conclusively against the weight of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "New Hampshire v. Durgin" on Justia Law

Defendant William Gaudet appealed his convictions on one count of felonious sexual assault, two counts of misdemeanor sexual assault, one count of attempted aggravated felonious sexual assault, and one count of attempted incest. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erroneously: (1) determined that he "opened the door" to certain otherwise inadmissible evidence; (2) denied his motion for a mistrial during the State’s opening statement; (3) denied his two motions for a mistrial during the State’s closing argument; and (4) failed to conduct an adequate inquiry after excusing one of the deliberating jurors. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Gaudet" on Justia Law

Defendant Stephen Stangle was convicted by jury on one count of theft by deception. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in admitting a surveillance video without proper authentication. Finding no reversible error in the trial court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Stangle" on Justia Law