Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, the Coos County Commissioners (collectively CCC), on behalf of the unincorporated places of Dixville and Millsfield, appealed a New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) decision which denied the CCC's motion to reconsider and revise downward respondent's, the New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration (DRA), 2012 equalized valuations of Dixville and Millsfield because the CCC did not show that the valuations were unreasonable and disproportionate. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a rehearing. The CCC argued that: (1) the DRA's assessed value of the property, Windpark, was greater than its fair market value and, therefore, the DRA's equalized valuations for Millsfield and Dixville were disproportionate and unreasonable; (2) the BTLA erred by denying its motions to compel production of the Windpark appraisal and to continue the hearing, and by not allowing the CCC's expert witness to testify during the hearing; and (3) the DRA should have been estopped from denying the accuracy of the $113 million PILOT valuation. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the BTLA's determination that it was proper for the DRA to use the utility tax appraisal in performing its statutory duties under RSA 21-J:3, XIII was reasonable, particularly given that neither unincorporated place had fulfilled its own statutory duty to appraise the Windpark for property tax purposes, and that the DRA was statutorily obligated to conduct a utility tax appraisal. The Court agreed with the CCC that the BTLA erred in denying their motion to compel production of the DRA's utility tax appraisal of the Windpark. For those reasons, the BTLA erred in denying the CCC's motion to compel disclosure of the Windpark's utility tax appraisal: "While we agree that the CCC had the burden to prove at the hearing that the equalized valuations were disproportionate and unjust, we find that the BTLA's refusal to compel disclosure of the Windpark appraisal prevented the CCC from having a fair opportunity to meet this burden. Accordingly, we conclude that the CCC did not receive a fair hearing before the BTLA, as it did not have an opportunity to present evidence to challenge or otherwise discredit the valuation arrived at on the utility tax appraisal." The BTLA found that "[n]othing in the minutes of the December, 2007 meeting or anything that occurred thereafter indicates an express or implied promise by the DRA that the Windpark would be valued at any fixed and unchanging amount (such as $113 million) for any purpose or length of time." The BTLA's decision was supported by the evidence, and accordingly the BTLA did not err in finding that this statement could not reasonably have been relied upon by the CCC as a commitment by the DRA that $113 million would be the true market value of the Windpark. Accordingly, the BTLA did not err in rejecting this argument. View "Appeal of Coos County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Defendant David Fischer appealed his convictions on two counts of second degree assault, both of which resulted in extended terms of imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court erred in admitting testimony under the "excited utterance" hearsay exception; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury on "extreme indifference to the value of human life;" (4) that the trial court violated his rights against double jeopardy by sentencing him on both second degree assault convictions; (5) the trial court erred in imposing extended prison terms; and (6) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on unanimously finding "specific bodily injury." Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Effective July 1, 2009, the New Hampshire Legislature imposed a ten percent tax on gambling winnings (Gambling Winnings Tax). The Gambling Winnings Tax was repealed effective May 23, 2011. The repeal was not retroactive, meaning that the tax was assessed on gambling winnings between July 1, 2009, and May 22, 2011. Petitioner Leonard Willey was a New Hampshire resident who, for the three years preceding the filing of this action, derived almost all of his earned income from gambling. For the 2009 tax year, he owed no federal income tax because his gambling losses exceeded his winnings. Petitioner David Eby was not an original party to this action, but was added as a substitute party later in the case. He was a New Hampshire resident who, in May 2011, purchased a scratch ticket and won ten dollars on the ticket, and was required to pay one dollar under the Gambling Winnings Tax as a result. This class action was filed in 2010, by putative class representatives Dean Leighton and Leighton Family Enterprises, LLC and Willey. Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that the Gambling Winnings Tax was illegal and unconstitutional on its face, as applied to pre-enactment lottery winners receiving their winnings through annuities, and as applied to professional gamblers, as well as a refund of all such taxes collected or withheld. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the State and dismissed petitioners' motion for summary judgment and remaining claims challenging the constitutionality of the state's tax on gambling winnings. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court: the Court disagreed with petitioners that a tax on gross gambling winnings was inherently “unfair, unreasonable, and disproportional” under the New Hampshire constitution. Because petitioners could not show that they suffered harm under the Commerce Clause, were professional gamblers, or were gambling winnings annuity recipients, they did not suffer the same injury as the members of the subclasses they claimed to represent, and thus they did not demonstrate their entitlement to act as class representatives for the members of those subclasses. The Gambling Winnings Tax neither lacked uniformity nor was disproportional and unreasonable; and petitioners lacked standing to bring their remaining challenges to the tax. View "Eby v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Jamie Locke appealed her conviction by jury for second degree assault. She argued on appeal that because in her first trial the jury acquitted her of first degree assault, retrying her for second degree assault violated her State and Federal constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. Alternatively, she argued that the State should have been required to join in one trial all charges arising from the same criminal episode. The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to adopt such a rule of compulsory joinder of criminal charges and reversed. View "New Hampshire v. Locke" on Justia Law

Respondent, Cory Lounder appealed a superior court order denying his petition to modify child support. He argued that the trial court erred by concluding that his incarcerated status made him ineligible for a reduction in support. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further consideration. "Because incarceration may cause a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to warrant modification, the trial court must consider incarceration when determining whether to modify a child support order. This does not, however, preclude a court from determining that a parent has remaining sources of income such that modification is unwarranted." There was no evidence in the record from which the trial court could have found that respondent was voluntarily unemployed: he was involuntarily terminated from his employment following his arrest and incarceration. Likewise, there was no evidence that his motive for committing the crime which led to his incarceration was to avoid his child support obligations. "While a trial court has discretion to impute income upon a finding of voluntary unemployment, it cannot impute income without such a finding." View "In the Matter of the State of New Hampshire and Lounder " on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Dupont was convicted by jury of alternative counts of knowing and reckless second-degree murder for the October 2008 stabbing death of his wife. On appeal, he argued: (1) the trial court erred in failing to specifically describe self-defense as an element of the offense that the State was required to disprove; and (2) the trial court instructed the jury in such a way that the jury could not consider whether he acted in self-defense. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Dupont " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stephen Dichiara, Jr. appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendants Sanborn Regional School District and Robert Ficker on municipal immunity grounds. Plaintiff tried out for the high school basketball team; Ficker was the team's coach. At the tryout, plaintiff played in a 'loose ball' drill when he collided with another player and suffered substantial injury to his arm. Plaintiff sued for negligence and respondeat superior liability of the school district. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court misinterpreted the applicable statute when it held that a municipality is only liable for negligence arising out of the ownership, occupation, maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle or premises. Essentially, the plaintiff maintained that, under RSA 507-B:2, a governmental unit is liable for bodily injuries “caused by its fault or by fault attributable to it,” regardless of any connection to a motor vehicle or premises. While most personal injury actions are unlikely to involve a nexus with a premises or vehicle, there are circumstances under which a plaintiff could recover for a personal injury under RSA 507-B:2. This case did not fall within that exception. Therefore the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment.View "Dichiara, Jr. v. Sanborn Regional High School" on Justia Law

Respondent, father of Deven O., appealed a circuit court order that terminated his parental rights to Deven on abandonment and failure to support grounds. The circuit court denied a motion for reconsideration where the father asserted he had no legal obligation to support the child because he was neither listed as father on the child's birth certificate nor had been ordered by a court to pay support. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, finding that the father indeed made efforts to communicate with the child, and even filed a parenting petition to request visitation time. With regard to abandonment, the Court found that the circuit court faulted the father for not instituting the parenting petition when the mother made it difficult for him to do so. As such, the Court concluded the mother failed to prove statutory grounds for termination of the father's parental rights, and reversed the circuit court's termination order. View "In re Deven O." on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Cheney was convicted by jury of aggravated felonious sexual assault, kidnapping, theft by unauthorized taking, aggravating driving while intoxicated, disobeying an officer and reckless conduct. On appeal, he argued the trial court erroneously denied his motions to dismiss the aggravated felonious sexual assault and reckless conduct indictments. Finding the evidence presented a trial sufficient to support those convictions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Cheney" on Justia Law

Respondent-wife Kimberly Lyon (now McConnell) appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment to petitioner-husband John Lyon, and denying her petition to bring forward and modify alimony. On appeal, she argued that the trial court applied the wrong standard to her petition by requiring her to show a substantial change of circumstances. She contended that to prevail on her petition, she must show that she has a continuing need for alimony and that the Husband has a continuing ability to pay. Although the Supreme Court agreed with Wife that the "substantial change of circumstances" test was not the correct one to apply to her petition, the Court disagreed with the standard that she articulated on appeal. Because the trial court did not apply the correct standard when it ruled on Wife's petition, the Court vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter Lyon " on Justia Law