Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was presented with a case involving the mental health of the respondent, D.E. In the case, the Circuit Court had denied D.E.'s motion to dismiss and granted New Hampshire Hospital’s (NHH) petition for guardianship. It also granted NHH’s petition for involuntary admission. D.E. appealed these decisions, arguing that his due process rights were violated by the simultaneous hearing of both the guardianship and involuntary admission petitions, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions as he was not a resident of New Hampshire nor was he lawfully detained there.The Supreme Court held that D.E.'s due process argument regarding simultaneous hearings was not preserved as it was not raised in the trial court and was therefore not eligible for review. However, the court found that at the time the non-emergency involuntary admission petition was filed, D.E. was not lawfully detained and thus the trial court did not have jurisdiction on this basis. The question of whether D.E. resided in New Hampshire, giving the court jurisdiction, was remanded to the trial court for determination.In relation to the guardianship order, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's findings that D.E. was incapacitated and that a guardianship was the least restrictive form of intervention were supported by the evidence. The court also found no error in the trial court's appointment of D.E.'s brother as guardian, despite D.E.'s preference for an independent, professional guardian. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision on guardianship, vacated the decision on involuntary admission, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of D.E." on Justia Law

In this case, a group of New Hampshire voters challenged the constitutionality of the state's new boundaries for state senate and executive council districts. The plaintiffs claimed that the legislature violated the New Hampshire Constitution by drawing districts that unfairly benefitted one political party at the expense of another. They sought a declaration that the districts violated various parts of the state constitution and an injunction preventing the implementation of the new boundaries.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the issue of partisan gerrymandering raised a non-justiciable political question because the New Hampshire Constitution committed the task of redistricting to the legislature and did not provide any legal standard for the courts to review such decisions. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not claim that the redistricting plans violated any mandatory requirements of the state constitution.The court also rejected the argument that the constitution's guarantees of free speech, equal protection, and association were violated by the alleged gerrymandering. The court found that these constitutional provisions did not provide clear and manageable standards for adjudicating claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering.The court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that the challenge to the constitutionality of the districts based on claims of excessive political gerrymandering presented non-justiciable political questions. View "Brown v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Petitioner Liberty Utilities (EnergyNorth Natural Gas) Corp., d/b/a Liberty (Liberty), appealed a New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission order denying Liberty’s request to recover development costs related to a proposed natural gas pipeline and tank system, the Granite Bridge project. This case arose from an unrealized construction project. Liberty relied solely on Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., LLC (Tennessee Gas Pipeline) for its gas supply in southern and central New Hampshire. Liberty executives testified that Liberty sought more supply from Tennessee Gas Pipeline because Liberty was facing increased demand. Liberty and Tennessee Gas Pipeline agreed to an arrangement whereby Liberty would receive additional gas from a second pipeline, but Tennessee Gas Pipeline cancelled that arrangement. In response, Liberty began to explore other options, and eventually decided to construct its own pipeline and tank system, the Granite Bridge project. Liberty estimated that $7.5 million of that amount consisted of engineering, environmental, consulting, internal labor, commission related costs, and land costs. Despite those costs, according to Liberty, it would have been years before Liberty broke ground on Granite Bridge. Later, Tennessee Gas Pipeline offered Liberty more space on its pipeline at a cheaper rate than the projected cost of Granite Bridge. Liberty accepted that offer, and then cancelled the Granite Bridge project. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded Liberty could not recover its costs when it cancelled the project and consumers derived no benefit. The Commission's order was thus affirmed. View "Appeal of Liberty Utilities (EnergyNorth Natural Gas) Corp., D/B/A Liberty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jason Boucher appealed a superior court order granting defendant Town of Moultonborough's (Town) motion to dismiss. He contended that: (1) the court erred in finding that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies under RSA 41:48 (Supp. 2022); and (2) he has stated a claim for which relief may be granted. Plaintiff served as a police officer for the Town for nineteen years, mostly in a full-time capacity. At the time he filed his complaint, he most recently held the rank of sergeant. Up until the final four months of his employment, no formal disciplinary actions had been taken against him while employed by the Town’s police department. Due to his past involvement in assisting local officers to form a union, and his previous support of a candidate for police chief that the Board of Selectmen (Board) opposed, plaintiff believed the Board did not support him. In early 2020, the police chief retired and was replaced by an interim police manager “who was under the direct control of the [Board].” Shortly thereafter, plaintiff became “the subject of serial internal investigations orchestrated by” the interim manager and the lower-ranking officer “for simply attempting to conduct the ordinary business of a police Sergeant.” In total, plaintiff was subjected to four investigations over six weeks. According to plaintiff, the interim manager’s conduct “was very clearly aimed at undermining and isolating him.” In May 2021, plaintiff filed suit alleging one count of “Constructive Termination in Violation of RSA 41:48.” The court reasoned that if plaintiff “considers himself a terminated officer in violation of RSA 41:48, even if only constructively, it logically follows that he is required to follow the procedures contained within RSA 41:48.” The Town represented at oral argument that there were several processes plaintiff could have followed to attempt exhaustion, including requesting a hearing before the Board, articulating the issue to the Board, or “engaging” with the Board informally. Yet, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found none of these processes were set forth in the plain language of RSA 41:48. Accordingly, the Court found the trial court erred in its dismissal of plaintiff's case, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Boucher v. Town of Moultonborough" on Justia Law

Respondent, the mother of J.H. (Mother), appealed a circuit court order finding that she neglected her son, J.H. On appeal, Mother argued the trial court erred because, as a matter of law, she could not be found neglectful when another person was the legal guardian of J.H. In the alternative, she contended the evidence in the record was insufficient to support the neglect finding. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re J.H." on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Paul was convicted by jury of attempted murder and of being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon. Defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) granting the State’s motion in limine to admit evidence of his prior convictions under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 609; and (2) failing to disclose additional portions of the victim’s mental health records submitted for in camera review. the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in either respect and therefore affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Paul" on Justia Law

Respondent, the mother of H.C., appealed a circuit court order that terminated her parental rights after the court found that she had been convicted of a felony assault which resulted in injury to H.C.’s sibling. The issues this case presented to the New Hampshire Supreme Court were: (1) whether RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applied in this case when H.C. was born after the date of the felony assault; (2) whether RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applied to convictions obtained outside the State of New Hampshire; and (3) whether the trial court erred in finding that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in H.C.’s best interest. Because the Supreme Court concluded RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applied and that the trial court did not err in ruling that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in H.C.’s best interest, the Court affirmed its decision. View "In re H.C." on Justia Law

Defendant Julie Hellinger was tried on charges of disobeying a police officer (class A misdemeanor), and driving after suspension (violation-level offense). Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the motor vehicle stop by the police was unlawful. Her motion was denied, and defendant was convicted on both charges. She appealed her conviction for disobeying an officer to the superior court, and appealed her conviction for driving after suspension directly to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In superior court, defendant again moved to suppress. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant then filed an interlocutory appeal of that ruling. The Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals. After review, the Supreme Court reversed her circuit court conviction for driving after suspension, vacated the superior court order denying her motion to suppress, and remanded both matters. The State conceded the trial court erred with respect to the driving after suspension charge, agreeing that the officer did not have the reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to support a motor vehicle stop of defendant. If the stop was illegal, then the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not make findings "sufficient to purge the taint" with regard to the remaining charge. View "New Hampshire v. Hellinger" on Justia Law

Defendant Keith Chandler was convicted by jury on five counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault, two counts of attempted aggravated felonious sexual assault, and two counts of felonious sexual assault. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion in limine to preclude the admission of a printed image of electronically stored information; (2) denied his motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) failed to disclose records following in camera review. THe New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed in part, but remanded for the trial court to review the confidential records in accordance with the standard set forth in New Hampshire v. Girard, 173 N.H. 619 (2020). "When the trial court conducted its in camera review, it did not have the benefit of our opinion in [Girard]. We agree with the parties that this case should be remanded for the purpose of having the trial court review any undisclosed records again, in accordance with the standard set forth in Girard. If the trial court concludes that the records do contain evidence that should have been disclosed to the defense, the court may release that evidence to the parties with any necessary protective order, taking into account the victim’s rights ... If the court releases any evidence to the parties, the court should then provide the parties with an opportunity to make arguments as to whether a new trial is warranted." View "New Hampshire v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Petitioners James Beal, Mary Beth Brady, Mark Brighton, Lenore Weiss Bronson, Nancy Brown, William R. Castle, Lawrence J. Cataldo, Ramona Charland, Lucinda Clarke, Fintan Connell, Marjorie P. Crean, Ilara Donarum, Joseph R. Famularo, Jr., Philippe Favet, Charlotte Gindele, Julia Gindele, Linda Griebsch, Catherine L. Harris, Roy W. Helsel, John E. Howard, Nancy B. Howard, Elizabeth Jefferson, Cate Jones, Robert McElwain, Mary Lou McElwain, Edward Rice, April Weeks, Michael Wierbonics, and Lili Wierbonics, appealed a Housing Appeals Board (HAB) order that reversed a decision of the Portsmouth Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA), which, in turn, had reversed certain approvals granted by the Portsmouth Planning Board (Planning Board) to respondent, Iron Horse Properties, LLC (Iron Horse). Iron Horse owned real property at 105 Bartlett Street in Portsmouth. In 2021, it requested various approvals from the Planning Board in connection with its proposed redevelopment of the site: three multi-family apartment buildings with a total of 152 dwelling units. Iron Horse sought a site review permit, lot line revision permit, conditional use permit (CUP) for shared parking, and a wetland CUP. The Planning Board granted the approvals, and the petitioners, describing themselves as “a group of abutters and other concerned citizens,” then filed an appeal with the ZBA. The ZBA granted the appeal, effectively reversing the Planning Board’s site plan and CUP approvals. Following denial of its motion for rehearing, Iron Horse then appealed the ZBA’s decision to the HAB. The HAB reversed the ZBA’s findings as to six of the petitioners’ claims and dismissed the remaining three claims. Petitioners took their appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, raising a number of issues that were consolidated under two overarching questions: (1) whether Iron Horse’s proposed project met the six criteria for a wetland CUP set forth in section 10.1017.50 of the Portsmouth Zoning Ordinance; and (2) whether Iron Horse’s permit requests were barred under the doctrine of Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980). Finding no reversible error in the HAB’s decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Beal, et al." on Justia Law