Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband Marcus Hampers and Wife Kristin Hampers challenged a post-divorce circuit court on the husband’s motion to modify his child support and alimony obligations and on the wife’s petition for contempt. The husband asserted the trial court erred by: (1) applying a standing order requiring him to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the wife for any proceeding or matter related to the divorce decree and subsequent amendments; and (2) failing to calculate "gross income" for child support purposes under RSA chapter 458-C by using "net" figures for investment income to account for losses and expenses as well as gains. Wife asserted the trial court erred by: (1) calculating child support based upon the husband’s 2009 income and tax return when his 2010 income information and tax return were available; and (2) ordering her to repay sums that she had received in excess child support. Because "[i]t is for the trial judge to determine whether claimed expenses meet [established] criteria," and the trial court did not address the claimed expenses in this case, the Supreme Court remanded this case for the trial court to make that determination. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court erred by using the husband’s 2009 income for purposes of calculating his "present income." Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Marcus Hampers & Kristin Hampers " on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Stompor petitioned the Supreme Court for review of a probate court decision that granted him and his brother Stan access to an attorney's file who drafted estate plan documents for their parents. In 2001 and 2002, the parents met with the attorney regarding their estate plans. The attorney drafted plan documents for them, however, due to a conflict, the attorney withdrew from representing them, and the estate plan documents were not executed. In 2004, petitioner wrote to the attorney to inquire whether the attorney would again represent the parents with regard to their estate plans. The attorney declined. Petitioner then helped his parents prepare certain estate plan documents, and the parents executed those documents in October 2004. In October 2007, the respondent filed a petition on the parents' behalf, to determine the legality of certain acts of petitioner and requesting, among other things, an accounting of the petitioner's handling of all of the parents' funds either personally or as a trustee of his father's living trust. In June 2009, respondent successfully moved to amend his petition to allege that, in 2004, the petitioner, as the parents' fiduciary, exercised undue influence over the parents when they lacked the capacity to understand the estate plan documents that gave the petitioner and his family exclusive inheritance rights to the parents' assets to the exclusion of the parents' other children. The parents passed away during the late summer of 2009. In February 2010, while his petition was still pending, the respondent sought disclosure from the Attorney of any information he had regarding his contact with the parents in connection with the challenged 2004 estate plan. Petitioner objected, arguing that the attorney-client privilege prohibited disclosure of any documents the attorney had relating to his consultations with his parents. The court ruled that the attorney's entire file was discoverable because it was relevant to a dispute among the decedents' children and to whether the petitioner unduly influenced the parents' decisions regarding their estate plan. The Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the probate court's ruling. View "Petition of Stephen Stompor" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Carrier petitioned the Supreme Court to review a New Hampshire Retirement System Board (NHRS) of Trustees ruling that as fire chief for Hampstead, he was required to be a member of NHRS. Petitioner worked in Londonderry as a full-time firefighter and later as the town’s fire chief. While working in Londonderry, petitioner was enrolled in the NHRS. He retired from his Londonderry position in July 2007, and began receiving retirement benefits. In January 2009, petitioner became the full-time fire chief for Hampstead. However, he did not re-enroll in the NHRS. Instead, he received both his NHRS retirement benefits and his Hampstead fire chief salary. In February 2010, the NHRS notified the petitioner that his Hampstead employment was subject to NHRS mandatory enrollment. Petitioner retired from his Hampstead position in May 2010. Petitioner appealed the February 2010 decision with the board. The board determined that, because petitioner collected his benefits while still employed full-time by Hampstead, he was overpaid pension benefits and medical subsidy benefits. The board ordered petitioner restored to service and required that those amounts be recouped from his future benefit payments. Although petitioner moved for reconsideration, his motion was denied. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Petition of Michael Carrier" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Durgin appealed after a jury convicted him of second degree assault and negligent homicide. He argued that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his request to admit evidence of alternative perpetrators; (2) precluding him from cross-examining a witness about using his electronic benefits (EBT) card without his permission; and (3) denying his motion to set aside the verdict as conclusively against the weight of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "New Hampshire v. Durgin" on Justia Law

Defendant William Gaudet appealed his convictions on one count of felonious sexual assault, two counts of misdemeanor sexual assault, one count of attempted aggravated felonious sexual assault, and one count of attempted incest. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erroneously: (1) determined that he "opened the door" to certain otherwise inadmissible evidence; (2) denied his motion for a mistrial during the State’s opening statement; (3) denied his two motions for a mistrial during the State’s closing argument; and (4) failed to conduct an adequate inquiry after excusing one of the deliberating jurors. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Gaudet" on Justia Law

Defendant Stephen Stangle was convicted by jury on one count of theft by deception. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in admitting a surveillance video without proper authentication. Finding no reversible error in the trial court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Stangle" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2008, defendant Eli and Bessie Cohen Foundation, doing business as Cohen Camps, hired Michael Feld to serve as a counselor at Camp Tel Noar on Sunset Lake in Hampstead, as it had done the previous summer. Prior to employing him each summer, defendant performed a criminal background check on Feld, and each time his record was clear. During the beginning of his second summer at the camp, other counselors noticed a change in Feld's personality from the prior year, including that he was more outgoing and eccentric, and that he behaved inappropriately at times. Feld has suffered from bipolar disorder for years. Feld's father spoke with the camp director and informed him that Feld could become "manic" and should be taking his medication. On the evening of July 6, Feld and a group of counselors went to a doughnut shop. While there, Feld became increasingly agitated, expressed a desire to return to the camp, and began throwing away the other counselors' unfinished food and drinks in an attempt to compel them to leave. Upon their return to the camp around midnight, Feld’s roommate reported Feld’s behavior to the boys' head counselor. Feld and his roommate then conversed with one another in their room for several hours, during which time Feld’s behavior became increasingly erratic and he demonstrated mood swings, paranoid thoughts, and delusions of grandeur. At approximately 5:00 a.m., Feld forced his way into a private residence immediately adjacent to the camp. The homeowner's wife telephoned the police and Feld ran from the premises. Plaintiff Kathleen Boulter, a Hampstead police officer, was dispatched "to detain, question and/or arrest the suspect as a result of his alleged conduct, and to investigate the home invasion complaint." As the plaintiff was interviewing the homeowner, they observed Feld running down the road naked. Plaintiff ran after Feld, repeatedly telling him to "get down on the ground." When Feld charged at her, plaintiff discharged her taser, but Feld tackled her and began to strangle her, nearly causing her to lose consciousness. The homeowner knocked Feld off plaintiff and plaintiff locked herself and the homeowner in her police cruiser to wait for backup. Feld was subsequently apprehended following a struggle with the plaintiff and two other officers who had been called to the scene. Plaintiff sued defendant and Feld to recover for injuries she suffered as she was attempting to arrest Feld, alleging negligent, reckless, and intentional misconduct. All four of the counts in her writ that pertained to defendant were based upon the assertion that defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care. According to plaintiff, "as a direct, proximate, and foreseeable result of the negligence of the Defendant, . . . [she] sustained painful, serious and permanent injuries." Because the injury giving rise to plaintiff's negligence claims directly arose from the alleged "negligent conduct which created the particular occasion for [her] official engagement," the Supreme Court concluded that such claims were barred by the Firefighter's Rule. View "Boulter v. Eli & Bessie Cohen Foundation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kenneth England appealed a Superior Court order that dismissed his negligence action against defendant Maria Brianas. For several months in 2009, defendant and Allen Bryson had an intimate relationship, which ended when Bryson moved out of state. After Bryson returned to New Hampshire in 2010, he contacted defendant several times, attempting to resume their relationship; he "became enraged" when she refused. Although the defendant told Bryson that she did not believe that they were "compatible," he nevertheless persisted in an abrasive and angry manner. Plaintiff and defendant met during the summer of 2008 and later began socializing and communicating through text messages. Defendant never told plaintiff about her relationship with Bryson or his behavior after he returned to New Hampshire. On February 13, 2010, while they were together at the Eagles Club, defendant invited plaintiff to spend the night at her house. Both were unaware that Bryson had broken into defendant's house through the basement and was waiting for her to return home. When plaintiff left defendant's living room to get a drink in the kitchen, Bryson stabbed him multiple times, causing serious injuries. Plaintiff argued that the trial court should have found that special circumstances existed that would support a finding of a legal duty owed to him by defendant and, therefore, should have denied defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant countered that the trial court was correct in granting her motion to dismiss because plaintiff's writ of summons did not allege special circumstances or a special relationship sufficient to impose a duty to warn or protect plaintiff from Bryson's assault. "[C]lose friends, neighbors and extended family [would] find themselves at risk of civil liability for situations they did not create and over which they exercise no control." Because the Supreme Court concluded that defendant did not owe plaintiff a duty to warn him "that she had a potentially dangerous stalker who had been harassing her," the Court upheld the Superior Court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss. View "England v. Brianas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Diana Martinez (formerly Camire), appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant The Gunstock Area Commission, on claims for damages for negligence and recklessness. Plaintiff, a snowboarder, visited Gunstock's ski and snowboard area. Posted on the wall of the ticket kiosk was a thirty-five inch by forty inch sign that recited, in part the language of RSA 225-A:24 and also stated: "By purchasing and/or affixing a ticket to use our facilities, you are agreeing to accept, as a matter of law, all inherent risks of winter sports activities and agree not to sue Gunstock for NEGLIGENCE or any other legal claim." In addition, the back of the lift ticket purchased by plaintiff included language stating that, as a condition of using the ski area, the purchaser or user of the ticket agreed to release Gunstock, and its employees and agents from any legal liability, including, but not limited to, claims for negligence. Plaintiff was injured when she was snowboarding on a ski trail and another snowboarder struck her from behind. The snowboarder was employed by Gunstock during the 2009-2010 season as a snowboard instructor. At the time of the collision, he was snowboarding prior to his scheduled 11:45 a.m. "lineup" in anticipation of a 12:00 p.m. lesson. Plaintiff sued Gunstock, asserting three counts based upon vicarious liability for the instructor's alleged negligent and reckless conduct, and one count alleging that Gunstock was directly liable for negligently hiring, training, and supervising the instructor. The trial court granted Gunstock's motion for summary judgment on all of the claims. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by determining that the liability releases barred her claims "in the absence of some evidence that [she] expressly agreed to [the] exculpatory language." She also contended that the trial court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, the instructor was not in Gunstock's employ at the time of the collision. She further asserted RSA 225-A:24, I, "[did] not bar recovery for [a ski area] operator's negligent supervision of its employees and the negligence of its agents in violation of their duties as employees." The Supreme Court concluded after review that RSA 225-A:24, I, barred plaintiff's vicarious liability claims as a matter of law, and that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Gunstock on those claims. In light of this holding, we need not decide whether the instructor was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the collision or whether the claims are also barred by Gunstock's liability releases. View "Camire v. Gunstock Area Commission" on Justia Law

This case involved a petition for injunctive and declaratory relief brought by plaintiffs Harbor Homes, Inc. and Gary Dube, Thomas Taylor, Cynthia Washington, and Arthur Furber against defendants the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the Commissioner of DHHS, the Associate Commissioner of DHHS, and the Administrator of the Bureau of Behavioral Health seeking, in part, to enjoin DHHS from denying the individual plaintiffs the right to obtain Medicaid-funded services from their chosen provider, Harbor Homes. The individual plaintiffs received Medicaid-funded rehabilitative services from Harbor Homes. Since 1991, Harbor Homes participated in New Hampshire's Medicaid program pursuant to a Medicaid Provider Enrollment Agreement. On June 23, 2008, Harbor Homes entered into an interagency agreement (IAA) with a community mental health program, Community Council of Nashua, NH, now known as Greater Nashua Mental Health Center (GNMHC), which authorized Harbor Homes to provide certain Medicaid-funded rehabilitative services to GNMHC patients. In February 2011, Harbor Homes learned that GNMHC did not intend to renew its IAA and that the Medicaid reimbursable services provided by Harbor Homes would be transitioned to GNMHC. This was done pursuant to Administrative Rule He-M 426.04(a)(2), which meant that Harbor Homes would no longer have an IAA with a community mental health provider, and it would no longer be permitted to provide Medicaid funded mental health services to approximately one hundred and forty of its clients, including the individual plaintiffs in this case. Plaintiffs filed a petition for injunctive and declaratory relief, seeking a court order enjoining DHHS from "terminating or limiting Harbor Homes' status as a qualified Medicaid provider" and to direct the State to allow the individual plaintiffs to obtain community mental health services from Harbor Homes, the provider of their choice. Following two hearings, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. Thereafter, all parties moved for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim that DHHS's reliance upon the IAA requirement as a reason to terminate Harbor Homes' status as a qualified Medicaid provider was improper because the requirement was invalid both on its face and as applied in this case. Plaintiffs appealed rulings of the Superior Court that denied their summary judgment motions and granting the defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment on two counts in the plaintiffs' petition. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's ruling that New Hampshire Administrative Rules, He-M 426.04(a)(2) did not violate the federal Medicaid Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Dube v. New Hampshire Dept. of Health & Human Svcs." on Justia Law