Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
In the Matter of R. Eric Bloomfield, DVM
Respondent R. Eric Bloomfield, DVM, appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Board of Veterinary Medicine which reprimanded respondent based upon its findings that he failed to do a physical examination of a puppy prior to demonstrating a restraint technique, that his restraint of the puppy was excessive, and that he failed to respect the opinion of the puppy's owners. A couple took their five-month old puppy to respondent for a routine checkup. Respondent determined that the male puppy was "dominant" and proceeded to demonstrate a dominance-submission technique, which included picking the dog up by the scruff of the neck and pinching his snout. The dog responded by urinating on the examination table, then defecating, struggling briefly, then laid still. The dog was pronounced dead later that day. The couple filed a formal complaint against respondent regarding his treatment of their puppy. The Board found that respondent did not engage in misconduct, but that he failed to respect the couple's opinion to demonstrate the submission technique. On appeal, respondent argued that the evidence did not support the Board’s finding that he failed to do a physical examination of the puppy prior to demonstrating a restraint technique, and that his restraint of the puppy "was excessive, especially given the breed." He also argued that RSA 332-B:14, II(c) was "impermissibly vague," and, therefore, violates his procedural due process rights. Finally, he argued that the Board erred by not requiring expert testimony on the standard of care. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.
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New Hampshire v. Brouillette
Defendant Heidi Brouillette was charged with one count each of: burglary, second degree assault, and criminal mischief. At the time of her arraignment, defendant applied for appointed counsel. Based upon her financial affidavit, the trial court determined that she was indigent and qualified for appointed counsel. However, prior to February 2013 defendant retained private counsel and appointed counsel withdrew from the case. In that month, defendant stated her intent to plead not guilty by reason of insanity, and filed a motion for services other than counsel requesting funds for an expert psychological evaluation. She attached a financial affidavit to her motion to support her claim of indigence. In denying the defendant's motion, the trial court noted that defendant retained private counsel: "the appearance of current counsel, an ability to pay is presumed." The record did not show that the trial court reviewed the defendant's attached financial affidavit in reaching its conclusion. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. With the trial court’s approval, defendant then sought interlocutory review of the court's ruling, and the Supreme Court granted her request to answer the question of whether RSA 604-A:6 (Supp. 2013) violated the State and Federal Constitutions' right to assistance of counsel, due process of law and equal protection if an indigent defendant not represented by appointed counsel was not provided with funding for necessary services other than counsel. The Supreme Court concluded that RSA 604-A:6 could not be read as prohibiting a court from authorizing necessary services to indigent criminal defendants who are self-represented, or who have pro bono, reduced fee, or retained counsel. With this conclusion, the Court did not reach whether the statute violated defendant's rights under the State or Federal Constitutions.
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Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Hampshire v. Socci
Defendant Stephen Socci appealed a superior court order that denied his motion to suppress evidence that lead to his convictions for manufacturing a controlled drug (marijuana) and possession of a controlled drug with intent to sell. He argued that the trial court erred because the evidence resulted from: (1) an unlawful search of his property; and (2) a subsequent search involuntarily given or tainted by the prior unlawful search. Contrary to the State’s assertions, however, the trial court made no finding that the officers confronted the defendant solely with the odor of marijuana detected in this manner. Although the trial court found that one of the arresting officers "told the defendant that one of the officers could smell marijuana and asked [him] for consent," this statement did not indicate that defendant was also not confronted with other evidence. Because its findings were unclear, the Supreme Court remanded this case for the trial court to determine whether, prior to his consent, defendant was confronted with evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search of the area surrounding his garage, and whether the evidence obtained following defendant’s consent "has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court failed to make particularized factual findings with regard to several critical allegations underlying defendant’s voluntariness argument. The trial court's order was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.
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Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Hampshire v. Botelho
Defendant Jessica Botelho appealed her convictions of manslaughter, negligent homicide, and reckless conduct. She argued on appeal that the trial court erred: (1) by admitting into evidence the name and description of a particular website that she visited while leaving her children unattended in her bathtub; and (2) by excluding certain portions of a recorded police interview. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "New Hampshire v. Botelho" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Hampshire v. Lantagne
Defendant David Lantagne appealed a superior court decision that denied his motion to suppress evidence leading to his conviction on three counts of possessing images of child sexual abuse. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred when it found that the police had probable cause to arrest him for disorderly conduct that eventually lead to the discovery of the images. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "Photographing properly-attired children in an open and public portion of Canobie Lake Park, regardless of whether the photographs were of the children’s backsides, were taken surreptitiously, or would be uploaded to a computer, would not have warranted a reasonable belief that the photographer posed a threat of imminent harm to any patrons, including the children. [. . .] viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant."
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Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Hampshire v. Thompson
Defendant Daniel Thompson appealed a circuit court decision that denied his request for permission to appeal a superior court decision that denied his petition to allow a misdemeanor appeal. Defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated. He argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior offenses, and but for that admission, he would have been convicted of a class B misdemeanor instead of a class A misdemeanor. The Supreme Court found that neither the trial court nor the circuit court erred in their decisions.View "New Hampshire v. Thompson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Audette & v. Cummings
Defendant, Suzynne D. Cumminngs and S.D. Cummings & Co., PC, appealed a Superior Court order awarding $44,403 to plaintiffs, Robert Audette and his company, H&S Construction Services, LLC (H&S), for breach of contract. Defendants provided various accounting and business services to Audette and his then-partner, Paul Fogarty, including helping them to start their construction business partnership, as well as preparing tax returns for both the business and Audette and Fogarty personally. In 2007, defendants helped Audette and Fogarty dissolve their partnership. One of the final acts defendants worked on for H&S was the placement of a mechanic's lien on a property on which H&S worked: the municipality halted construction on the project when H&S was approximately ninety-five percent complete. The lien placed on the property was for $44,403. Ultimately, plaintiffs’ 120-day statutory lien had not been timely secured or recorded, therefore it had lapsed. Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants in November 2009 for failing to secure the lien. The trial court found for plaintiffs and awarded damages in the amount of $44,403. Finding no error in the Superior Court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed.
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In re Guardianship of Madelyn B.
Appellant Susan B. and appellee Melissa D. became romantically involved in 1997 and "considered [them]selves to be as fully committed to one another as any married couple." Melissa took Susan's last name as her own (at that time, same-sex marriage became legal until 2010). Melissa became pregnant by sperm donor in 2002, and gave birth to Madelyn. When Madelyn was six years old, Susan and Melissa's relationship ended. Melissa and Madelyn moved in with Eugene D., who Melissa later married. Susan and Melissa agreed upon a schedule for regular visitation. Susan continued to be actively involved in Madelyn's life. Susan paid weekly child support and, in addition, helped with the cost of Madelyn's extracurricular activities. She also provided Madelyn with food, clothing, and gifts. In February 2013, Melissa stopped cashing Susan's child support checks. Susan averred that she nevertheless continued to send them. When Susan attempted to pick up Madelyn for her weekly visitation, she was informed that Madelyn no longer wanted a relationship with her. Melissa did not return Susan's subsequent phone calls, and Susan was unable to contact Madelyn directly through online social media because Madelyn's settings had been changed. Melissa filed a motion to terminate Susan's guardianship over Madelyn, asserting that the guardianship was "no longer necessary because Madelyn no longer wishe[ed] to have a relationship with Susan." Represented by counsel, Susan moved for an immediate hearing. Melissa objected, noting, "We have begun the process of my husband, Madelyn[']s stepfather, adopting her." The court denied the motion and Susan's subsequent motion to reconsider. On appeal, Susan argued, in part, that the family division erred by: (1) terminating the guardianship without a hearing or opportunity to conduct discovery; (2) ruling that the legal standard for termination of a guardianship had been satisfied; (3) dismissing her parenting petition; and (4) denying her motion to intervene in the adoption case. Melissa counters that the guardianship was created to allow Susan to provide health insurance for Madelyn and to further "the daily practicalities of child-rearing." She argued that since "Madelyn's sustenance is being adequately met by her new family," the guardianship was no longer necessary. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's termination of Susan's guardianship over Madelyn, and reversed the dismissal of Susan's parenting petition. The Court vacated the trial court's motion to intervene in the adoption proceedings, and stayed the adoption proceedings until the matter of guardianship was resolved. The Court then remanded the case for further proceedings.
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Posted in:
Family Law
Ettinger v. Pomeroy Limited Partnership
Petitioners Thomas and Margaret Ettinger, and Ettinger Family Holdings, Inc., appealed a Superior Court order denying their summary judgment motion and granting summary judgment to respondents Pomeroy Limited Partnership and The Nature Conservancy (TNC), on the petitioners’ petition for declaratory judgment. The parties owned real property on or around Silver Lake in Madison. The Ettingers owned the servient estate identified on Madison Tax Map 121 as Lot 4; the original dominant estate, Lot 160, was separated from Lot 4 by lots owned parties not named in this litigation. There was no dispute that Lot 160 had an easement to use "Winter Road Extension." In 2010, Pomeroy Limited conveyed 31.63 acres of its property to TNC. The conveyance included land that comprised most of Lot 161 and a portion of Lot 160. Pomeroy Limited retained a 7.4-acre parcel that included the physical terminus of Winter Road Extension. The deed to TNC conveyed the "right of way over Winter Road Extension" and a "right of way over the remaining land of [Pomeroy Limited]." The deed to TNC also stated that the 31.63 acres conveyed are "not to be considered a separate lot of record," but were to "merge with the abutting land of [TNC]." The reference to "the abutting land" owned by TNC referred to TNC's nature preserve, known as Ossipee Pine Barrens Preserve. Following the conveyance, the Ettingers filed suit claiming the easement conveyed to TNC could benefit only Lot 160, and could not benefit Lot 161 or any of the rest of TNC's land with which Lots 160 and 161 have merged. The issue presented to the Supreme Court in this case was the interpretation of the deeds in Lot 160's chain of title. After review, the Court was unable to rely upon the language of the language of the 1930 deed that created the Winter Road Extension easement. The Court found that language was ambiguous. To the extent that the trial court relied solely upon the language of the 1930 deed to determine the intent of the parties creating the easement, it erred. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ettinger v. Pomeroy Limited Partnership" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Real Estate & Property Law
Eaton v. Eaton
Petitioner Daniel Eaton appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of his mother Mary Louise Eaton and her guardian Michael Eaton. This appeal arose from petitioner's attempts to be paid legal fees he incurred in guardianship proceedings involving his mother and other siblings. He alleged that he was entitled to the fees because he acted as his mother's attorney-in-fact pursuant to a durable general power of attorney. The trial court ruled that an acknowledgement-requirement of RSA 506:6, VII(a) was mandatory and therefore petitioner could not have been acting as Mary Lou Eaton's attorney-in-fact when he undertook the acts for which the legal fees were claimed] as a matter of law. Finding no error in the circuit court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision.View "Eaton v. Eaton" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Trusts & Estates