Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Hellen Couture appealed a probate court decision to grant petitioner Thomas Couture's petition to impose a constructive trust for the benefit of the decedent's heirs over certain life insurance proceeds paid to respondent upon the decedent's death. After review of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the probate court's decision, and affirmed. View "In re Estate of Lucien Couture" on Justia Law

Defendant Osahenrumwen Ojo appealed after a jury convicted him of theft by deception in Superior Court. The conviction followed a previous jury trial for a related charge, which ended in a mistrial based upon a hung jury. On appeal, he argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the New Hampshire Constitution barred the second trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Ojo" on Justia Law

The parties were divorced in 2004 and had a son, who was fourteen years old at the time of the hearing on petitioner's motion to modify child support. As part of the property settlement in the parties' divorce, respondent was awarded Squam Lakeside Farm, Inc. (SLF), a campground consisting of 119 sites with trailer hook-ups for water, electricity, and sewer. SLF was a S-corporation; respondent was the sole shareholder. SLF's profits, losses, and capital gains were reported on respondent's personal federal income tax returns as shareholder. In 2010, respondent altered his business plan and, after expending almost $400,000 in legal bills and surveying costs and obtaining the necessary permits from the State, began marketing the campsites as condominiums, rather than as seasonal rentals. Based upon the sale of many of the condominiums, respondent reported capital gains on his 2011 personal tax return. Furthermore, respondent restructured a loan that he owed to SLF, converting it to a line of credit. Since that time, he used the line of credit for various expenses, both personal and business-related. Respondent never made any payments toward the outstanding principal or interest. In November 2011, petitioner moved to modify child support, asserting that three years had passed since the previous support order and that circumstances had materially changed, warranting a new support order. At the hearing, the parties disagreed about what comprised respondent's "gross income" for the purpose of determining child support. The trial court determined that the capital gains generated by the sale of the condominium units were "irregular" income that should be considered as part of the respondent's gross income for the purpose of establishing his child support obligation. Petitioner argued that the net profits from the sales of SLF condominium units were "gross income" for purposes of calculating child support. Respondent countered that, because several neighboring states include capital gains in the definition of "gross income," but New Hampshire did not, the legislature intended to exclude capital gains from "gross income" when calculating child support. The New Hampshire Supreme Court was not persuaded by respondent's argument that, because some states included capital gains in the definition of "gross income" the New Hampshire legislature specifically intended to exclude them. "Our task here is to interpret our child support statute, RSA chapter 458-C; the definition of "gross income" in other states' statutes does not control our analysis." The Court concluded that capital gains from SLF were "gross income" for the purpose of determining child support. Because the trial court erroneously relied upon respondent's adjusted gross income, the Court vacated and remanded for a redetermination of his child support obligation. View "In the Matter of Maves and Moore" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendants K. William Clauson and the law firm of Clauson, Atwood & Spaneas, represented plaintiff James Yager in an action against D.H. Hardwick & Sons, Inc. (Hardwick), which alleged that Hardwick was the party who "trespassed on Plaintiff's land and cut timber belonging to Plaintiff." The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hardwick because the action was filed more than three years after the timber cutting ceased and, therefore, was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court also concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the discovery rule applied to toll the statute of limitations. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, and the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. Plaintiff subsequently filed a malpractice action against defendants, alleging that they "breached the duty of care owed to [plaintiff] by failing to file the D.H. Hardwick action within the timeframe allowed by the applicable statute of limitations, and by otherwise failing to represent [plaintiff's] interests with reasonable professional care, skill, and knowledge." Defendants moved to dismiss the case, alleging that plaintiff: (1) failed to provide requested discovery information; and (2) failed to disclose the experts required to prove his case. The trial court granted the defendants' motion. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that expert testimony was not required to prove legal malpractice where defendants failed to file a claim within the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. In granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court did not examine the specific facts of the case to determine whether the nature of the case was such that expert testimony was required. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's dismissal order and remand for further proceedings. View "Yager v. Clauson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Eddie Nash & Sons, Inc. appealed a circuit court order ruling that respondent the Estate of Jack Michael Bergquist (the estate), owed petitioner $544.21, and excluding the petitioner's claim for post-judgment interest. In November 2001, petitioner brought a small claims complaint against the decedent for $5,000.00 owed pursuant to an agreement to purchase logging equipment. In February 2002, the court entered a default judgment for the petitioner for $5,136.99, including costs and interest. After the decedent failed to make any payment on the judgment, petitioner filed a motion for periodic payments. In 2003, the district court entered a periodic payment order requiring monthly payments of $50 to begin in May 2003 until the "judgment and all costs are paid in full." The order listed the total due as $5,394.26, but did not indicate why that total had increased more than $250 in the thirteen months following entry of the original judgment. Neither the 2002 judgment nor the 2003 order made explicit reference to the petitioner's entitlement to continuing post-judgment interest. The decedent made payments under the order each month until May 2011; petitioner was made aware of his death in June 2011. Petitioner filed a creditor's claim against the estate that included $3,697.57 for "Balance of Court Judgment," and requested the total claim "Plus Interest." The estate objected to the claim, which petitioner later amended to consist only of the $3,697.57 for the remaining balance on the court judgment, "plus statutory post[-]judgment interest on that amount." At a hearing on the objection, Susan Nash (counsel for petitioner), stated her belief, based on her own extensive experience in small claims court, that judgments in small claims actions always included continuing post-judgment interest. The estate agreed that petitioner was owed $544.21 as the remaining balance due on the $5,394.26 specified in the periodic payment order, but argued that post-judgment interest had not been awarded, and should be excluded from the claim, because the periodic payment order was silent on the subject. The probate division agreed, and entered judgment for the petitioner for $544.21. On appeal, petitioner argued that the probate division erred when it excluded its claim for statutory post-judgment interest. The estate countered that petitioner's claim for post-judgment interest was barred by res judicata and was an attempt to retroactively modify the 2003 periodic payment order. Because petitioner was entitled, as a matter of law, to continuing post-judgment interest, the Supreme Court concluded the probate division erred in excluding its claim for that interest. View "In re Estate of Jack Michael Bergquist" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Eskeland began work at the New Hampshire Department of Fish and Game in 1990 and, accordingly, became a mandatory member of the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS). On October 1, 2010, he retired from the Department of Fish and Game with twenty years and three months of creditable service, at which point he began receiving his service retirement pension. After he retired, a friend told the petitioner that he should have retired on a disability retirement allowance rather than on a service retirement allowance. As a result of this conversation, and three months after he retired, petitioner filed an application for accidental disability retirement based upon work-related injuries he sustained in 2002 and 2004. In December, 2011, the board accepted the hearings examiner's recommendation to deny the petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement. The recommendation was based upon a medical certification that the petitioner was not permanently incapacitated by a work-related injury because he had worked full-time, without accommodation, for six years following his most recently accepted workers' compensation injury. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, and the board referred the request to the hearings examiner. In reviewing the request for reconsideration, the hearings examiner became aware of a potential jurisdictional issue and notified petitioner that, because he "was a beneficiary when he applied for disability retirement, his membership appears to have terminated and the Board of Trustees appears to lack jurisdiction to award him a disability retirement." After a three-day hearing, the hearings examiner recommended that the board find that it did not have jurisdiction to grant accidental disability retirement benefits. The board accepted the recommendation. Finding no reversible error with the Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Petition of David Eskeland" on Justia Law

Appellant Kerry McCarty, as executrix of the Estate of Ruth C. McCarty, appealed a circuit court order denying her motion to dismiss the claim of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for repayment of medical assistance provided to the decedent through the State's Medicaid program. She argued the court erred by concluding that DHHS's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Estate of Ruth C. McCarty" on Justia Law

Defendants Catherine Bailey, Rhylan Bruss, Benjamin DiZoglio, Elizabeth Edwards, Elizabeth Grunewald, Charlene Higgins, William Hopkins, Michael Joseph, Brian Kelly, Matthew Lawrence, Keith Martin, Christian Pannapacker, Tara Powell, Matthew Richards, Katheryn Talbert, and Leah Wolczko, appealed a circuit court ruling that they violated a City of Manchester ordinance establishing a park curfew of 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. In October 2011, defendants were participating in a movement known nationally as "Occupy Wall Street." One defendant explained that "[o]ccupy is a tactic. Occupy means staying in one place until your grievances are addressed." On October 19, shortly after 11 p.m., the Manchester police told the people present in the park that the police would enforce the park curfew ordinance and asked those present to leave. The defendants declined to do so and received summonses for violating Manchester City Ordinance 96.04. Defendants moved to dismiss the charges against them, arguing, in part, that the "application of the criminal law to their protected rights to free speech" violated the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions. The court denied defendants' motion after a hearing, and found the defendants guilty. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling. View "New Hampshire v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Appellant, Century Indemnity Company (CIC) appealed a Superior Court order that granted Respondent Roger Sevigny, Commissioner of Insurance and Liquidator of the Home Insurance Company (Home) an award of statutory prejudgment interest on certain monies owed to Home by CIC. Home is an insurance company, organized under the laws of New Hampshire, which was declared insolvent and placed in liquidation in 2003. CIC is an insurance company organized under the laws of Pennsylvania. CIC and Home have a set of co-insurance and reinsurance relationships. In prior litigation, the Supreme Court held that an asserted $8 million setoff claim by CIC, which had been waived and then reacquired by CIC in a pair of settlement agreements with PECO, was impermissible under New Hampshire law. The New Hampshire Court explicitly declined, without prejudice, to decide the issue at issue here: whether Home’s estate was entitled to prejudgment interest on the payments CIC wrongfully withheld based upon setoff. The Court denied CIC’s motion for reconsideration in the "Home IV" appeal; after remand, the Liquidator filed a motion in superior court for interest on amounts withheld by CIC based upon improper setoff, to which CIC objected. CIC removed the PECO setoff from its monthly statement to Home and paid the previously withheld $8 million to the Liquidator. The trial court entered an order granting the motion and finding that Home was entitled to prejudgment statutory interest under RSA 524:1-a (2007) accruing from October 2007 (the date of the Liquidator’s letter notifying CIC of his determination to disallow the PECO setoff). This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the Superior Court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "In the Matter of the Rehabilitation of the Home Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Defendant Adam Wells was indicted on four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and one count of felonious sexual assault against his minor daughter. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss one of the indictments alleging aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA). Defendant appealed his convictions on the remaining three AFSA charges and the charge alleging felonious sexual assault (FSA). On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) failing to grant a mistrial after the child testified to uncharged acts; and (2) admitting testimony regarding out-of-court disclosures made by the child. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Wells" on Justia Law