Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Wayne Kassotis appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his complaint, arising from the nonrenewal of his employment contract to remain as the Town of Fitzwilliam's Chief of Police. Petitioner filed a complaint against the Town seeking, among other things, reinstatement as Chief of Police, damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, for the Town’s alleged failure to comply with RSA 105:2-a, which provided procedural protections to appointed chiefs of police who are "dismiss[ed]." The Town moved to dismiss, arguing that, "[b]ecause the Petitioner was not dismissed, RSA 105:2-a does not apply, and he fails to state a claim for relief." The trial court granted the Town’s motion on the basis that "the provisions of RSA 105:2-a are inapplicable to the [Town’s] decision not to renew the employment contract." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kassotis v. Town of Fitzwilliam" on Justia Law

Respondent City of Manchester appealed a Superior Court order denying the City’s motion to dismiss and granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the petitioner, Prolerized New England Company (Prolerized). The City argued on appeal that the trial court erroneously ruled that RSA chapter 322 preempted the City’s ordinances regulating junk and scrap metal dealers. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Prolerized New England Company v. City of Manchester" on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court in this case was appeal and cross-appeal of a Superior Court's order ruling in favor of the petitioners, eight individual New Hampshire residents and taxpayers and LRS Technology Services, LLC (LRS), on their petition for a declaratory judgment that the Education Tax Credit program. The State and several intervenors defended the program. The intervenors were three New Hampshire citizens, who wanted their children to receive scholarship funds under the program, and the Network for Educational Opportunity, a non-profit organization involved with the program. The trial court ruled that the petitioners had standing. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the petitioners’ declaratory judgment petition because it concluded that: (1) the 2012 amendment to RSA 491:22, I, which allowed taxpayers to establish standing without showing that their personal rights have been impaired or prejudiced, was unconstitutional; and (2) absent that amendment, the petitioners had no standing to bring their constitutional claim. Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "Duncan v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Addison moved to disqualify the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office from further participation in his case, and moved for the appointment of a special prosecutor. Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 2008. In August 2009, Attorney Lisa Wolford, who had been employed by the New Hampshire Public Defender for approximately seven years, began working with the New Hampshire Appellate Defender. When Wolford began her rotation, the appellate defender office was preparing a brief regarding the standards applicable to our mandatory review of the defendant’s sentence. In early 2010, Wolford was reassigned from the defendant’s defense team. In March 2012, she submitted her resume to the attorney general’s office, requesting consideration for a position with the criminal justice bureau’s appeals division. Wolford was offered a position with the attorney general’s office; she began employment there in early July 2012. The defendant argued to the Supreme Court that it should "follow a line of cases that requires per se disqualification of an entire prosecutor’s office from a defendant’s case when (a) the defendant’s attorney switches sides and joins the prosecutor’s office in the middle of the case and (b) the defendant does not waive the conflict." The Supreme Court found Wolford had no involvement in the defendant’s case at the pre-trial or trial stages and participated in a limited aspect at one preliminary phase of the defendant’s multi-phased appeal approximately three years before joining the attorney general’s office. As such, the Court rejected defendant's per se argument, and further concluded defendant suffered no prejudice as a result in Wolford's change of employment. Accordingly, the Court denied defendant's motion to disqualify the Attorney General's office.View "New Hampshire v. Addison" on Justia Law

Defendant Tariq Zubhuza was convicted by jury of criminal restraint, and criminal threatening with a firearm all connected with his involvement with a home invasion. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss those charges. Finding the evidence sufficient to support those convictions, and finding no reversible error in the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Zubhuza" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lucien Vincent appealed a Circuit Court's judgment in favor of defendant Davina MacLean on his small claim complaint against her. In late January 2012, while incarcerated at the New Hampshire State Prison, plaintiff filed a small claim complaint against the defendant, his former girlfriend, seeking to recover seven thousand dollars for "[i]dentity theft, personal earnings and [b]enefits." He argued on appeal that the trial court erred by disregarding "overwhelming" evidence in his favor and failing to hold the defendant liable and by denying his motion to appear in person at the hearing on the merits, which he alleges violated his right to due process. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Vincent v. MacLean" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Bulcroft was charged with kidnapping and rape. The trial court accepted his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to New Hampshire Hospital for life, unless or until earlier discharged by court order. Defendant was discharged from the hospital in 1979. In late 2012, defendant filed a petition seeking to have his arrest and indictment record annulled because he was found not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" is not the same as a finding of "not guilty" for purposes of RSA 651:5, II, and, therefore, the defendant is not entitled to have his record annulled. This presented an issue of first impression to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Agreeing with the trial court's reasoning, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Bulcroft" on Justia Law

The parties married in 1988. In 2010, petitioner Cheryl Serodio filed for divorce. In October 2011, respondent Arthur Perkins moved to have a prenuptial agreement enforced. The copy of the agreement accompanying respondent's motion was signed only by him, though he alleged both parties signed it, and petitioner kept the original. In his motion, respondent claimed petitioner was unable to locate the original, and that he possessed a copy to be admitted as evidence. Petitioner objected, stating she did not recall signing the agreement, and that she never held an original signed document. Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's motion to enforce, and the trial court granted it. On appeal, the respondent argues "[t]hat the trial court overlooked the standard of review for a motion to dismiss when it failed to assume the truth of the facts alleged by the [respondent], including the truth of the allegation that a written, executed [prenuptial] agreement was entered into by the Parties." The respondent also argues that the trial court erred because the threshold issue is whether the signed Agreement, in fact, had existed, not, as the trial court ruled, whether the signed Agreement presently exists. The petitioner responds that, since the respondent did not produce a prenuptial agreement signed by the petitioner, the trial court properly concluded that it had no statutory authority to enforce the terms of the Agreement. The Supreme Court observed, "petitioner's arguments regarding the enforcement of an oral or unsigned prenuptial agreement focus on the wrong issue. The respondent is not requesting that the trial court enforce an oral or unsigned agreement; rather, he is seeking to enforce the terms of a written, signed prenuptial agreement, notwithstanding the fact that neither a signed original nor a copy thereof has been produced in court. Accordingly, we turn to the question before us: whether the factual allegations in the respondent's pleadings are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery." Respondent's motion to enforce the Agreement alleged that a written prenuptial agreement existed, and that both parties signed it. Assuming the truth of the respondent's allegations, the Court concluded that the allegations in the respondent's motion are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery, and as such, reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Serodio & Perkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Autofair 1477, L.P. (d/b/a Autofair Honda) appealed a Superior Court order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to defendant, American Honda Motor Company, Inc. (AHM), on plaintiff's petition for attorney's fees. In November 2010, AHM performed a warranty audit at Autofair, after which it proposed $45,733.02 of chargebacks and a potential escrow reversal of $54,571.17 for claimed warranty work that deviated from AHM's policies and procedures. AHM did not debit Autofair's account for these amounts. Autofair contested the escrow reversal and $30,001.51 of the proposed chargebacks. After review, AHM reduced the amount of the proposed chargebacks to $43,957.94. In February 2011, Autofair filed a protest with the New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Industry Board pursuant to the New Hampshire Dealership Act. Even though AHM had neither debited Autofair's account nor held any disputed funds in escrow, Autofair specifically requested a "finding and ruling that the warranty audit charge backs and the [proposed] escrow violate[d] RSA 357-C:4 and RSA 357-C:5, that the audit charge backs be reversed, and the escrow funds released." Prior to a final hearing before the Board, the parties had ongoing discussions and reduced the disputed amount to $29,729.92, and Autofair withdrew its request for relief regarding the proposed escrow. Following a hearing, the Board affirmatively ruled on whether Autofair had reasonably substantiated 123 claims still at issue, and thus whether AHM was entitled to charge back the amounts associated with each claim. In total, the Board determined that AHM was entitled to charge back claims totaling $1,032.13, but not the remaining $28,697.79 of disputed claims. The Board also stated that because "Honda has paid the claims, and not held the funds in escrow, the request in the protest to find a statutory violation due to same is moot." Finally, the Board ordered Autofair to pay $1,032.13 to AHM, with interest. In January 2012, Autofair filed a petition for attorney's fees and costs with the trial court pursuant to RSA 357-C:12, X (2009). Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied Autofair's motion and granted AHM's cross-motion. It based its ruling upon the fact that the Board had not found that AHM committed a violation of the Dealership Act because it had not charged back Autofair, and the court's conclusion that an award of fees would not be consistent with the public policy behind the Dealership Act. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Autofair 1477, L.P. v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1993, John Houlahan and his wife, Theresa, established the "Theresa M. Houlahan Revocable Trust of 1993" containing the marital home. John was named successor trustee of, and granted certain powers over, the Theresa Trust. Upon the deaths of Theresa and John, the real property was to be distributed to their son, petitioner Thomas Houlahan. Theresa died in 1996. In 1997, John established the "John F. Houlahan 1997 Revocable Trust." John named his daughter (respondent) as successor trustee. In November 2002, John conveyed the real property by deed to himself, as trustee of the John Trust. John died in 2009. Under the terms of the John Trust, "[a]ny interest this trust may have in any real estate" was to be distributed in equal shares to four of his children: petitioner, respondent, John F. Houlahan, Jr., and Terrence B. Houlahan. In 2011, petitioner filed a "Petition for Injunction" seeking, among other things, an order that the property be returned to the Theresa Trust and that respondent, as successor trustee of the John Trust, be enjoined from making any attempt to dispose of the property. In late 2011, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that there was "no genuine issue of material fact" that John's "actions in his capacity as Trustee violated the terms of [the Theresa Trust] and specific provisions of the Uniform Trust Code." Following a hearing, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were many disputed factual issues that could not be decided on the pleadings. On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court erred in granting respondent's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the transfer of the real estate in 2002 effectively terminated the trust and the petitioner's interest in the trust. He asserted that "[w]hen John breached his fiduciary duties, the trust gained an additional asset– a cause of action against John or his estate," and, thus, "[n]either [the petitioner's] beneficial interest nor the trust was terminated by John's conveyance." After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Theresa Trust did not terminate in 2002, and neither did the petitioner's interest therein. The trial court's finding, that there were "many disputed issues of material fact" that could not be decided on the pleadings, was not erroneous. Accordingly, the Court affirmed its denial of petitioner's motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "In re Theresa Houlahan Trust" on Justia Law