Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Professional Fire Fighters of Hudson, IAFF Local 3154 (Union), appealed a New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) decision that found respondent Town of Hudson (Town), did not commit an unfair labor practice. When each of the four earlier CBAs expired, but before the parties entered into a successor agreement, the Town provided Union members with step increases, despite the absence of an evergreen clause in the expired CBA. After the 2006 CBA expired in 2009, the Town’s budget included monies sufficient to fund step increases for eligible Union members in each of the budget years 2010, 2011, and 2012. All Union members received step increases between July 2009 and August 2011. In August 2011, the Town informed the Union by letter that the Town would no longer pay wage increases, including step increases. In response to the letter, the Union filed a grievance pursuant to the procedures in the 2006 CBA. The matter ultimately proceeded to arbitration. The Town argued that it had a right not to pay the step increases because the 2006 CBA did not have an evergreen clause and, under the applicable state law, a public employer is not required to pay step increases after a CBA has expired. The Union contended that the Town was required to pay the step increases because there was a binding past practice of paying such increases during status quo periods. The arbitrator determined that a public employer may, but is not required to, refrain from paying step increases during the status quo period, and, “[t]herefore, if the employer chooses to fund and pay step increases it is capable, in concert with the Union, of creating a binding past practice.” The arbitrator found that the initiation of step increase payments following the expiration of the parties’ most recent collective bargaining agreement was the continuation of a past practice. Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded that the Town violated the 2006 CBA and past practice between the parties when it failed to pay in accordance with the step schedule, and ordered the Town to pay the increases that had accrued since August 2011. The Town failed to comply with the arbitrator’s award. The Union filed a complaint with the PELRB alleging that the Town’s failure to comply constituted an unfair labor practice. The PELRB ruled in favor of the Town and dismissed the Union's complaint. The Union appealed. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the PELRB's decision. View "Appeal of Professional Fire Fighters of Hudson, IAFF Local 3154" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Paul was convicted by jury on three counts of the sale of an ounce or more of marijuana, one count of possession with intent to distribute an ounce or more of marijuana, and one count of the sale of a substance represented to be LSD. He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial court failed to comply with RSA 519:23-a (Supp. 2013) by declining to give the jury nullification instruction he requested and by giving other jury instructions that effectively contravened his "jury nullification defense." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Paul" on Justia Law

The respondents in this case were fourteen non-residents who were named in a petition filed by the New Hampshire Bank Commissioner, as liquidator for Noble Trust Company (Noble) and Aegean Scotia Holdings, LLC (Aegean Scotia). They appealed a superior court order denying their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Each respondent had signed an individual account application with Noble Trust Company, which had a New Hampshire address. Respondents' accounts were funded with either a check deposit (mailed to New Hampshire) or wired electronically. As respondents tried to check on their accounts, withdraw from or close their accounts, they encountered problems. Respondents' petition alleged Noble was involved in a Ponzi scheme, in which the Bank was using their money to cover losses of other investors. They sought to set aside transfers of money from Noble to the respondents, impose constructive trusts, and recover for unjust enrichment and conversion. The respondents moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the court could exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondents on the basis that: (1) respondents Carlson and the Schweitzers filed proofs of claim in the liquidation proceeding against Noble in New Hampshire; and (2) the remaining respondents had sufficient minimum contacts with New Hampshire. The Supreme Court found no reversible error with the superior court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire Bank Commissioner v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Plaintiff J. Albert Lynch, Trustee of FIN-LYN Trust, appealed a superior court order granting a motion to dismiss his action seeking to enforce restrictive covenants contained in a deed between the Trustee and the Town of Pelham. The trial court ruled that the covenants at issue are appurtenant and personal, and that the Trustee lacked standing to enforce them. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the covenants at issue were gross and enforceable by the Trustee, and that the record established that he had a legitimate interest in enforcing them on behalf of the Trust. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lynch v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Rawnsley was convicted by jury of robbery. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred when it failed to strike certain testimony by defendant's ex-wife. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Rawnsley" on Justia Law

Petitioner Susan Spenard appealed the final circuit court orders in her divorce from respondent David Spenard. She argued that the trial court erred by: (1) imputing income to her of $4,000 per month for purposes of child support and alimony; (2) denying her request to reopen the case based upon newly-discovered medical evidence; (3) not accounting for two promissory notes, one of which the respondent sold prior to the final hearing, in dividing the marital estate; and (4) misidentifying two investment accounts, and awarding the respondent an interest in one of the accounts. Upon review of the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found "ample support" in the record that petitioner's income was $4,000 per month; the trial court did not err in denying petitioner's request to reopen the case (because petitioner was at fault for failing to obtain a medical diagnosis prior to trial); the trial court erred by denying petitioner's request for a property division modification based on the undisclosed promissory notes; and in light of the property distribution modification, the trial court did not address the misidentified investment accounts ("petitioner may raise these issues on remand"). View "In the Matter of Susan Spenard and David Spenard " on Justia Law

In September 2010, the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office received information regarding polling telephone calls made to New Hampshire residents that were described as containing negative content about United States congressional candidate Ann McLane Kuster. The AG investigated, and concluded that the Bass Victory Committee (he authorized campaign committee of former United States Congressman Charles F. Bass) had engaged in “push-polling” as defined in RSA 664:2, XVII (2008) (amended 2014) without complying with the disclosure requirements set forth in RSA 664:16-a. The Attorney General appealed a superior court order that dismissed his petition for civil penalties against the Committee. The AG argued that the trial court erroneously determined that the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) preempted RSA 664:16-a. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire Attorney General v. Bass Victory Committee " on Justia Law

Defendant Myles Webster appealed his conviction by a jury of attempted murder, armed robbery, reckless conduct, and resisting arrest. On appeal, he argued the Superior Court erred by denying his motions to suppress eyewitness identification evidence and for a change of venue. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Webster" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services appealed a superior court order granting the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by petitioner William Bovaird, and denying the Department's motion. The New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) employed petitioner as an Operations Officer I, Labor Grade 20, until it laid him off in 2009. The Department then placed petitioner on its statewide reduction in force list (RIF List). At the time, Chapter 144:65, Laws 2009 (the 2009 Law) governed the rehiring of laid-off state employees. The Department used the RIF List to place qualified laid-off employees into state positions as they became vacant. After petitioner was laid off, a Supervisor III, Labor Grade 23 position became available. According to the Department, no laid-off employees on the RIF List were eligible for the Supervisor III position; therefore, the Department released the position back to DHHS to be filled by an open-recruitment process. Petitioner applied for, and was eventually hired to fill, the Supervisor III position. In August 2012, petitioner requested that the Department restore his previously accumulated and unused sick leave, his prior seniority date, and his leave accrual rates, and that it reinstate his longevity pay. The Department denied the request. Petitioner then filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to require the Department to recognize him as a "recalled employee," rather than as a new hire, and to award him his benefits. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the parties disagreed about whether the petitioner was "recalled" or "rehired" into the Supervisor III position. Petitioner argued that, because he "returned to work performing his prior duties with the same employer," there was "no rational reason to find that he was not" recalled and, thus, entitled to the benefits of a recalled employee. The Department argued that petitioner was not recalled because there are "no facts in the record regarding recalling" the petitioner and because he was not hired into the same classification. The parties also disputed the trial court's interpretation of the 2009 Law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Department that petitioner was rehired and not recalled. To be recalled, petitioner would have had to return to a position in the same classification as the position he held prior to his lay off: Operations Officer I, Labor Grade 20, instead of Supervisor III, Labor Grade 23. With such differences, petitioner did not return to the same classification, and, therefore, he was not recalled. With regard to the 2009 Law, the Supreme Court surmised that if the legislature had disagreed with the Department's longstanding interpretation, it could have altered the language of the 2009 Law. Such a change did not occur. Therefore, under the 2009 Law, the Department was not required to rehire laid-off employees from the RIF List into promotions, even if the employees meet the minimum qualifications for the position. Petitioner contended the legislative history of the 2009 Law mandated the opposite conclusion. Because the Supreme Court determined that the 2009 Law did not require the Department to rehire laid-off employees into promotions, it also conclude that the trial court erred in determining that petitioner was entitled to his previously accumulated and unused sick leave, an adjustment of his seniority date, and the other aforementioned benefits. View "Bovaird v. New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services" on Justia Law

Petitioner Scott Anderson appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to respondents, the Executive Director of the New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) and the State, and denying summary judgment to Anderson and three other petitioners. Anderson was a retired Plaistow police officer who was a member of the NHRS, and the only petitioner who appealed. After retiring, he worked part-time as a police officer in Plaistow, Atkinson, and Hampstead. When he retired, RSA 100-A:1, XXXIV provided that "[p]art-time," for the purposes of employing a NHRS retiree meant, "employment by an [NHRS] employer" of no more than "32 hours in a normal calendar week," or if the work hours in some weeks exceeded thirty-two hours, then no more than "1,300 hours in a calendar year." Anderson understood that provision "to mean [he] could work potentially up to 32 hours per week for Plaistow, up to 32 hours per week for Atkinson, and up to 32 hours per week for Hampstead." In 2012, the legislature amended RSA 100-A:1, XXXIV to provide that "[p]art-time," for the purposes of employing a NHRS retiree, "means employment during a calendar year by one or more employers of the retired member which shall not exceed 32 hours in each normal calendar week," or if the work hours in some weeks exceed thirty-two hours, then no more than 1,300 hours in a calendar year. In August 2012, Anderson and three other NHRS retirees petitioned for declaratory and injunctive relief. Anderson contended that to apply the 2012 amendment to him violated Part I, Article 23 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Specifically, he asserted that, as a result of the 2012 amendment, he would be "restored to service" under RSA 100-A:7 (2013) and, thus, lose his retirement benefits if he worked more than "[p]art-time" as defined in RSA 100-A:1, XXXIV. Under RSA 100-A:7, when a retiree is "restored to service," his "retirement allowance shall cease," and he "shall again become a member of the [NHRS] and . . . shall contribute" to that system. Anderson contended that the 2012 amendment substantially impaired his vested right because its effect is to restore him to service if he works more than thirty-two hours per week or 1,300 hours per year for any combination of NHRS employers, even if he did not work full-time hours for any single NHRS employer. Thereafter, the petitioners moved for summary judgment, and the State cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in the State's favor, and Anderson's appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Anderson v. Executive Director, New Hampshire Retirement System" on Justia Law