Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Elizabeth Cloutier was convicted by jury on one count of burglary. The defendant was a friend of the victim and had recently helped the victim locate a safe that had been stolen from her home. Defendant went to the Berlin Police Department to take a voluntary polygraph test in connection with the investigation with that burglary. The defendant then signed a form acknowledging that she had read the enumerated rights and understood them. She also signed a form stating that she agreed to take the polygraph test. She was advised of her Miranda rights. Before the test began, defendant was asked if she had any involvement with the burglary. She denied any involvement. After four hours of questioning, defendant admitted her involvement in the burglary, explaining how she and two others took the safe, opened it and stole the contents. On appeal of her conviction, defendant argued the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress her confession. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Cloutier" on Justia Law

This case involved a four-unit condominium located on Boston Avenue in Hampton, known as the Boston Four Condominium. Each unit was a free-standing residential building. The four units are arranged in a rectangle; units 7 and 9 are adjacent to one another bordering Boston Avenue, and units 7R and 9R are rear units located behind units 7 and 9 respectively. In addition to the residential buildings, the condominium also includes certain property around the four units that the declaration designates as either “common area” or “limited common area.” Common area is property in which each unit owner has “an equal one-fourth (25%) undivided interest.” In the mid-2000s, the unit owners had several disagreements relating to the operation of the condominium. The issues included allocation of costs relating to the units’ connection to new sewer lines, the propriety of additions made to units 7R and 9R, and use of the common area. Pursuant to a clause in the declaration requiring the arbitration of disputes between and/or among unit owners, the parties submitted their dispute to a neutral arbitrator. Respondent Richard Holt filed a petition in superior court seeking to confirm the arbitrator's decision. Petitioners Gary and Katherine Keer and Frederick Guthrie filed a separate action appealing the arbitrator's decision. The trial court consolidated the two actions, held no hearing, granted Holt's petition and denied the Keers' and Guthrie's petitions. The court then confirmed the arbitrator’s award and “required [all parties] to comply with its terms.” On August 28, 2012, the condominium association recorded an amendment to the declaration and bylaws (2012 amendment). This amendment changed the designation of certain condominium property from common area to limited common area, to the benefit of units 7R and 9R, and to the detriment of the remaining units. In response to the amendment, the Keers filed a “Motion to Bring Forward to Enforce the Court Order/Contempt” with the trial court. In the motion, the Keers alleged numerous violations of the arbitrator’s 2009 decision. The trial court denied this motion. In April 2013, the condominium association recorded another amendment to the condominium instruments. This amendment inserted language into the declaration providing that written consent of three-fourths of the unit owners is sufficient to waive certain restrictive covenants. The amendment also inserted language into the bylaws that specifically allows condominium association meetings to take place if three-fourths of the unit owners attend. In May 2013, the Keers filed a “Motion for Contempt/Enforce the Court Orders” with the trial court. Among other things, the Keers alleged that the 2012 amendment violated the terms of the Condominium Act. The Keers also alleged that both amendments to the declaration were not legally effective because they had not been signed by a majority of the owners. The trial court denied the Keers’ motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the 2012 amendment was unlawful. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court either misconstrued the nature of the Keers’ request, or that it simply failed to address their statutory claims: the trial court erred when it stated that the Keers were only challenging "the court’s past decisions regarding the Condominium rules," and when it failed to address the Keers’ statutory argument. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s ruling on the Keers’ motion for contempt and remanded the case for further consideration. View "Holt v. Keer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs George Maroun, Sr. and Edith Maroun filed a petition seeking to enjoin defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company from foreclosing on property owned by Mrs. Maroun. The Superior Court denied plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion and granted the bank’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed, and after careful consideration of the Superior Court record, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "Maroun, Sr. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company" on Justia Law

The respondents, Shared Towers VA, LLC and NH Note Investment, LLC, appealed, and petitioner Joseph Turner, individually and as trustee of the Routes 3 and 25 Nominee Trust, cross-appealed, Superior Court orders after a bench trial on petitioner’s petition for a preliminary injunction enjoining a foreclosure sale and for damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. The parties’ dispute stemmed from a commercial construction loan agreement and promissory note secured by a mortgage, pursuant to which petitioner was loaned $450,000 at 13% interest per annum to build a home. Respondents argued the trial court erred when it: (1) determined that they would be unjustly enriched if the court required the petitioner to pay the amounts he owed under the note from November 2009 until April 2011; (2) applied the petitioner’s $450,000 lump sum payment to principal; (3) excluded evidence of the petitioner’s experience with similar loans; (4) ruled that, because the promissory note failed to contain a "clear statement in writing" of the charges owed, as required by RSA 399-B:2 (2006), respondents could not collect a $22,500 delinquency charge on the petitioner’s lump sum payment of principal; and (5) denied the respondents’ request for attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner argued that the trial court erroneously concluded that respondents’ actions did not violate the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded: contrary to the trial court’s decision, petitioner’s obligation to make the payments was not tolled. Because the loan agreement and note remained viable, it was error for the trial court to have afforded the petitioner a remedy under an unjust enrichment theory. The trial court made its decision with regard to the payment of $450,000 in connection with its conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to a remedy under an unjust enrichment theory. Because the Supreme Court could not determine how the trial court would have ruled upon this issue had it not considered relief under that equitable theory, and because, given the nature of the parties’ arguments, resolving this issue requires fact finding that must be done by the trial court in the first instance, it vacated that part of its order and remanded for further proceedings. In light of the trial court’s errors with regard to the attorney’s fees and costs claimed by respondents, the Supreme Court vacated the order denying them, and remanded for consideration of respondents’ request for fees and costs. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s rejection of petitioner’s CPA claim. View "Turner v. Shared Towers VA, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1973, defendant was convicted of murdering Susan Randall. At the time of the murder, the police obtained fingernail clippings from Randall. Between 2000 and 2008, by various motions to the trial court, defendant obtained multiple rounds of DNA testing on the fingernail clippings; however, none of these tests led to post-conviction relief because defendant could not be excluded as the DNA contributor. In 2012, defendant, with the State’s consent, obtained further DNA testing on the remaining clippings. This most recent testing, which used new and more sensitive technology, produced results which, for the first time, showed that the clippings contained DNA material from two different males. Defendant could not be excluded as a contributor of one of the male DNA profiles, but was excluded as a contributor of the second. Based on the 2012 test results, defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that RSA chapter 651-D empowered the court to order a new trial when a defendant has obtained favorable DNA test results. The trial court determined that defendant was not entitled to relief. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred by determining that RSA 651-D:2, VI(b) did not apply to DNA testing obtained with the State’s consent. After review, the Supreme Court agreed. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Breest" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Gunderson was a New Hampshire resident who worked as a self-described "export buyer’s agent:" he purchased specific motor vehicles from retail dealers across the country and exported them to buyers in foreign countries. Prior to exporting the vehicles, petitioner obtained title to the vehicles in New Hampshire and held himself out as the owner. Petitioner was then paid to transfer ownership of the vehicles to the foreign purchasers. Petitioner neither owned a retail motor vehicle sales location nor operated a lot to display vehicles, but performed his services as an export buyer’s agent from his Moultonborough home. The vehicles are never listed online or in any publications or classified advertising. In 2012, petitioner purchased two luxury vehicles from out-of-state retail dealers for the purpose of selling them in China and Russia. When petitioner applied for titles for the vehicles, however, the New Hampshire Bureau of Title and Anti-Theft denied the applications and the New Hampshire Department of Safety determined that he needed to obtain a state-issued motor vehicle dealer’s license to export motor vehicles. Petitioner appealed a court order finding that he was a "Retail Vehicle Dealer" as defined by RSA 259:89-a (2014), and that he had to obtain a license in accordance with RSA 261:103-a (2014) to engage in his motor vehicle business. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gunderson v. New Hampshire Dept. of Safety" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Superior Court ruling that legislative changes increasing the contribution rates paid by members of the New Hampshire Retirement System violated the Contract Clauses of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs and the intervenors cross-appealed the court’s ruling that members’ rights to retirement benefits did not vest until they accrued ten years of creditable service. On appeal, the State argued (among other things) that the trial court erred by ruling that NHRS members had a contractual right to a fixed contribution rate. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that there was no indication that in enacting RSA 100-A:16 the legislature unmistakably intended to bind itself from prospectively changing the rate of NHRS member contributions to the retirement system. Because the Federal Constitution afforded plaintiffs no greater protection than did the State Constitution in these circumstances, the Court reached the same conclusion under the Federal Constitution as under the State Constitution. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the 2011 amendment to RSA 100-A:16, I(a) violated the Contract Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. View "Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Petitioners K.L.N. Construction Company, Inc., Cormier & Saurman, LLC, and Brian Soucy, and the intervenor, Gerald Gagnon Sr. (collectively, petitioners), appealed a Superior Court order dismissing their petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus seeking the return of impact fees paid to the respondent, the Town of Pelham. In its order, the trial court ruled that it was within the Town’s statutory authority to adopt an ordinance that allowed current property owners to seek a refund of unencumbered impact fees. The trial court ruled that the petitioners had no standing to seek the return of the impact fees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "K.L.N. Construction Company, Inc. v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Glenn, Jr. appealed his convictions by a jury of second degree murder, criminal threatening, attempted armed robbery, falsifying physical evidence, and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the attempted armed robbery, criminal threatening, and unlawful possession charges on statute of limitations grounds; (2) instructing the jury that, if it found him guilty of attempted armed robbery, it could presume the requisite mens rea for the second degree murder charge; and (3) sentencing him separately for second degree murder and attempted armed robbery. He also argued that the trial court committed plain error when it did not dismiss the attempted armed robbery indictment on collateral estoppel grounds. Finally, he argues that under the doctrine of common law joinder that the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied in "New Hampshire v. Locke," 166 N.H. 344, 348-49 (2014), all of his non-homicide convictions must be vacated because they arose out of the same criminal episode as the second degree murder charge. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction of second degree murder and vacated his other convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Carter filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court because the Superior Court denied his motion for pre-indictment discovery on the ground that the statutory authority (RSA 604:1-a (2001)), violated the separation of powers provision of Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution because it conflicted with Superior Court Rule 98. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Because RSA 604:1-a granted an accused only such rights to pre-indictment discovery as exist post-indictment, the statute preserved the court’s power to regulate pre-indictment discovery, tailoring it to the facts and circumstances of the particular case, in the same manner as it regulated post-indictment discovery. To the extent that there was any residual tension between the statute and the rule (insofar as Rule 98 can be viewed as implicitly establishing a default position that generally disallows discovery to a felony defendant until after indictment, whereas RSA 604:1-a establishes the default position of allowance of pre-indictment discovery), the Supreme Court concluded that the statute trumped the rule: "[J]ust as the legislature possesses the power to enact laws that override this court’s common law and statutory construction precedents, . . .so also do its statutory enactments prevail over conflicting court rules, unless those enactments compromise the core adjudicatory functions of the judiciary." View "New Hampshire v. Carter" on Justia Law