Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Robert Gunderson was a New Hampshire resident who worked as a self-described "export buyer’s agent:" he purchased specific motor vehicles from retail dealers across the country and exported them to buyers in foreign countries. Prior to exporting the vehicles, petitioner obtained title to the vehicles in New Hampshire and held himself out as the owner. Petitioner was then paid to transfer ownership of the vehicles to the foreign purchasers. Petitioner neither owned a retail motor vehicle sales location nor operated a lot to display vehicles, but performed his services as an export buyer’s agent from his Moultonborough home. The vehicles are never listed online or in any publications or classified advertising. In 2012, petitioner purchased two luxury vehicles from out-of-state retail dealers for the purpose of selling them in China and Russia. When petitioner applied for titles for the vehicles, however, the New Hampshire Bureau of Title and Anti-Theft denied the applications and the New Hampshire Department of Safety determined that he needed to obtain a state-issued motor vehicle dealer’s license to export motor vehicles. Petitioner appealed a court order finding that he was a "Retail Vehicle Dealer" as defined by RSA 259:89-a (2014), and that he had to obtain a license in accordance with RSA 261:103-a (2014) to engage in his motor vehicle business. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gunderson v. New Hampshire Dept. of Safety" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Superior Court ruling that legislative changes increasing the contribution rates paid by members of the New Hampshire Retirement System violated the Contract Clauses of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs and the intervenors cross-appealed the court’s ruling that members’ rights to retirement benefits did not vest until they accrued ten years of creditable service. On appeal, the State argued (among other things) that the trial court erred by ruling that NHRS members had a contractual right to a fixed contribution rate. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that there was no indication that in enacting RSA 100-A:16 the legislature unmistakably intended to bind itself from prospectively changing the rate of NHRS member contributions to the retirement system. Because the Federal Constitution afforded plaintiffs no greater protection than did the State Constitution in these circumstances, the Court reached the same conclusion under the Federal Constitution as under the State Constitution. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the 2011 amendment to RSA 100-A:16, I(a) violated the Contract Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. View "Professional Fire Fighters of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Petitioners K.L.N. Construction Company, Inc., Cormier & Saurman, LLC, and Brian Soucy, and the intervenor, Gerald Gagnon Sr. (collectively, petitioners), appealed a Superior Court order dismissing their petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus seeking the return of impact fees paid to the respondent, the Town of Pelham. In its order, the trial court ruled that it was within the Town’s statutory authority to adopt an ordinance that allowed current property owners to seek a refund of unencumbered impact fees. The trial court ruled that the petitioners had no standing to seek the return of the impact fees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "K.L.N. Construction Company, Inc. v. Town of Pelham" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Glenn, Jr. appealed his convictions by a jury of second degree murder, criminal threatening, attempted armed robbery, falsifying physical evidence, and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the attempted armed robbery, criminal threatening, and unlawful possession charges on statute of limitations grounds; (2) instructing the jury that, if it found him guilty of attempted armed robbery, it could presume the requisite mens rea for the second degree murder charge; and (3) sentencing him separately for second degree murder and attempted armed robbery. He also argued that the trial court committed plain error when it did not dismiss the attempted armed robbery indictment on collateral estoppel grounds. Finally, he argues that under the doctrine of common law joinder that the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied in "New Hampshire v. Locke," 166 N.H. 344, 348-49 (2014), all of his non-homicide convictions must be vacated because they arose out of the same criminal episode as the second degree murder charge. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction of second degree murder and vacated his other convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Carter filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court because the Superior Court denied his motion for pre-indictment discovery on the ground that the statutory authority (RSA 604:1-a (2001)), violated the separation of powers provision of Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution because it conflicted with Superior Court Rule 98. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Because RSA 604:1-a granted an accused only such rights to pre-indictment discovery as exist post-indictment, the statute preserved the court’s power to regulate pre-indictment discovery, tailoring it to the facts and circumstances of the particular case, in the same manner as it regulated post-indictment discovery. To the extent that there was any residual tension between the statute and the rule (insofar as Rule 98 can be viewed as implicitly establishing a default position that generally disallows discovery to a felony defendant until after indictment, whereas RSA 604:1-a establishes the default position of allowance of pre-indictment discovery), the Supreme Court concluded that the statute trumped the rule: "[J]ust as the legislature possesses the power to enact laws that override this court’s common law and statutory construction precedents, . . .so also do its statutory enactments prevail over conflicting court rules, unless those enactments compromise the core adjudicatory functions of the judiciary." View "New Hampshire v. Carter" on Justia Law

Petitioners Susan and Peter White appealed a superior court order denying their petition for a declaratory judgment that respondent Charles Matthews was covered under a homeowner's insurance policy issues to his mother by respondent Vermont Mutual Insurance Company. Matthews' dog bit Mrs. White while Matthews was staying with friends at the mother's home in Moultonborough. The policy defined an "insured" to include "residents of your household who are… your relatives." Matthews’s mother also owns a home in Naples, Florida, where she lives for approximately half of the year, and where Matthews usually visits only at Christmas. The petitioners and Matthews claim that the Florida residence is Matthews’s mother’s primary residence, but they do not claim that Matthews is a resident of the Florida home. Matthews testified that he lived in Massachusetts for 80% or more of the year. However, he had not changed his voting registration since he first registered to vote when he was eighteen, and he was still registered to vote in Moultonborough (he voted in Moultonborough in the 2012 election, a month before the hearing in this case). Matthews also held a New Hampshire driver’s license and his vehicle was registered in New Hampshire (his decision to register his car in New Hampshire was motivated by his desire to avoid buying automobile insurance, which is required in Massachusetts). Matthews typically notifies his mother in advance of using the Moultonborough house for permission to stay there. Following the 2011 incident involving Matthews' dog, petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that Vermont Mutual was responsible for any damages that might recover from Matthews. After a bench trial, the court denied the petition and the subsequent motion for reconsideration, finding that the policy did not contemplate Matthews as a resident of the Moultonborough house. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "White v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, employer-petitioner Ichiban Japanese Steakhouse, Inc. appealed superior court orders upholding the determinations of the state Department of Labor (DOL) that employees-respondents Kymberly Rocheleau and Samantha Greaney were entitled to lost wages and attorney's fees because the employer's tip pooling arrangement violated RSA 279:26-b (2010) (amended 2012). When Rocheleau told the manager of the restaurant that she disagreed with the tip pooling agreement, the manager told her that if she failed to sign the agreement, she could not work at the restaurant. At Greaney's hearing, the employer's attorney conceded that if Greaney had not signed the tip pooling agreement, she would not have been hired as wait staff, but might have been employed in another position. Both employees left their jobs at the restaurant in 2011. Upon leaving their positions, each filed a wage claim with the DOL, seeking to recover lost wages. Finding no reversible error in the DOL's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ichiban Japanese Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rocheleau" on Justia Law

At the time of her death, decedent Muriel Mills she owned property in Manchester. She had granted a "home equity conversion mortgage" on the property to Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corporation. The mortgage deed was recorded at the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds. The terms of the mortgage included a statutory power of sale that allowed Financial Freedom to foreclose upon the property under certain enumerated circumstances, including the death of the borrower. The terms also provided that the "Borrower shall have no personal liability for payment of the debt secured by this Security Instrument" and that the "Lender may enforce the debt only through the sale of the Property." Petitioner was appointed executor of the estate. By letter, counsel for petitioner notified Financial Freedom of the decedent's death and of the opening of the administration of her estate. Counsel also requested the current balance due on the mortgage debt as well as any information regarding "any assignment of the mortgage." Thereafter, Financial Freedom did not file notice of a claim or present a demand to the petitioner pursuant to RSA 556:1, :3 (2007). Later that year, counsel for Financial Freedom sent a letter to the estate explaining that she had been instructed to foreclose on the mortgage in the name of respondent under the power of sale contained in the mortgage. The letter also informed the estate that the note had been accelerated and the entire balance was "due and payable forthwith," and included the total amount of the balance due on the debt. In response, petitioner's counsel wrote to Financial Freedom claiming that it, "or any of its related entities, abandoned any interest[] that it may have had in the property" because it failed to file a claim within six months after the grant of administration of the estate. The next month, the mortgage was assigned to respondent and thereafter recorded at the Hillsborough County Registry of Deeds. Petitioner then filed a petition to quiet title in the circuit court, asserting that Financial Freedom had "waived, lost, or abandoned any interest that it would have had in the property" and, therefore, the circuit court could issue an order quieting title to the property so that the beneficiary named in the decedent's will could receive the property. Financial Freedom appeared at the hearing and moved to dismiss the quiet title action. The trial court ruled in Financial Freedom's favor, and petitioner appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision to dismiss, the Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal. View "In re Estate of Muriel R. Mills " on Justia Law

Intervenors Scott Kukesh, Eric Kulberg, Jeremiah Murphy, and Gregory Turner, appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of petitioner Amica Mutual Insurance Company. Amica filed a declaratory judgment action that against respondent Beverly Mutrie. The intervenors were four police officers who served on a drug task force. They executed a search warrant at a property in Greenland where Mutrie's son lived. The property was owned by a trust, of which Mutrie was the trustee. The warrant was issued because there was probable cause that Mutrie's son was engaged in criminal activity. During the execution of the search warrant, Mutrie's son opened fire, wounding the intervenors. Mutrie's son then turned the gun on himself. The intervenors filed a civil suit against Mutrie, alleging that Mutrie was responsible for their injuries because, "with the knowledge, information, and belief" that her son was engaged in criminal activity, she "did recklessly and wantonly allow . . . criminal activity and conduct to take place at the subject property and otherwise directly and indirectly and wantonly and recklessly supported and facilitated [her son's] criminal activity at the subject property." Amica assigned counsel to defend Mutrie, subject to a reservation of rights. In September 2012, Amica filed a petition for declaratory judgment, requesting a ruling that Amica has no duty to defend and indemnify Mutrie because the "reckless and wanton misconduct" alleged by the intervenors in their writ did not constitute an "occurrence" under the Policies. Subsequently, Amica moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of Amica. On appeal, the intervenors argued the trial court erred when it concluded that the reckless and wanton acts alleged by the intervenors constituted "inherently injurious" or "intentional" conduct on the part of Mutrie and, therefore, the conduct did not constitute an "occurrence" under the Policies. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Amica Mutual Insurance Company v. Mutrie" on Justia Law

This case came before the New Hampshire Supreme Court as a certified question from the First Circuit Court of Appeals: under sections 500-A:7-a(V) and 651:5 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes and the undisputed facts of this case, is a felon whose conviction is eligible for annulment (that is, not categorically disqualified from jury service) but who has not applied for or received an annulment of that conviction qualified to sit as a juror? Defendant Ryan Howe was indicted under federal law in 2012 for possession of a firearm by a felon, based upon a prior state felony conviction. He moved to dismiss that count on the ground that he was not a felon under section 922(g)(1) pursuant to an exception provided in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20). The United States conceded that defendant's rights to vote and to hold public office were restored by operation of state law before the date of the federal offense, September 15, 2011. The parties disagreed as to whether defendant was eligible, as of September 15, 2011, to serve on a jury under our juror qualification statute. The New Hampshire Court responded to the certified question in the affirmative: "A juror shall not have been convicted of any felony unless the conviction has been annulled." View "United States of America v. Howe" on Justia Law