Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants, Keith McNamara, Shirley Benton, and Jerel Benton, appealed: (1) a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, Richard and Mary Murray, on their claim that the defendants breached the implied warranty of workmanlike quality; (2) a Superior Court order denying their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim; and (3) a Superior Court order finding that the defendants violated the CPA when they built the plaintiffs' home with latent structural defects that caused mold growth. Defendants argued that, because plaintiffs' claim was exempt from the CPA, the trial court erred by denying their motion to dismiss. Defendants added that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the plaintiffs breach of implied warranty claim. There is no dispute that the transaction at issue here is the defendants alleged construction of the house with latent structural defects, not any representations that the defendants made to others during or after construction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, finding that because the house was completed in 2004 and was purchased by the plaintiffs five years later and the allegedly wrongful transaction occurred more than three years before the plaintiffs "knew or reasonably should have known" of it, the construction of the house was an exempt transaction pursuant to RSA 358-A:3, IV-a and that plaintiffs' CPA claim should have been dismissed. Thus, the Court reversed the trial court's ruling on the CPA claim. However, the Court was not persuaded that defendants were insulated from liability on the breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike quality claim. Because the Court reversed the trial court's judgment on the CPA claim, defendants failed to show that they were prejudiced with respect to the breach of warranty claim. View "Murray v. McNamara" on Justia Law

Defendant Makenzy Thelusma was convicted by jury of possession of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) an inculpatory statement he made to the police should have been suppressed; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his heroin and cocaine convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Thelusma" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brandon Kelly challenged a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits for severe injuries he sustained while driving between a job site and his place of employment. The CAB ruled that the injuries did not arise out of his employment as required by RSA 281-A:2, XI (2010). Petitioner was an employee of Advanced Sheet Metal in Hudson. His job involved traveling to job sites in a company truck. After working at a job site in Massachusetts, petitioner left for the company shop in Hudson where he intended to unload the truck. While driving, he fell asleep and hit a utility pole. As a result of the accident, his lower leg was amputated. Petitioner sought workers' compensation benefits. After respondent Arbella Insurance Company denied his claim, a hearing was held before the New Hampshire Department of Labor, which awarded benefits. Respondent appealed to the CAB, which, in a 2-1 decision, denied the petitioner's claim. The CAB found that it was undisputed that the petitioner was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident, and that the accident occurred because he fell asleep while driving. However, the CAB ruled that the injuries did not arise out of his employment. The CAB found that the injury was caused by a "mixed risk," and that petitioner failed to prove that "whatever abnormal weariness, if any, [he] might have been suffering that day was caused by his employment." Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, then appealed the CAB's decision. In "Margeson," the New Hampshire Supreme Court instructed the CAB that, in all future cases, it should make a finding regarding the cause of the claimant's injury: if the cause is a neutral risk, the increased-risk test applied; if the cause was a non-neutral risk, the claimant must prove legal and medical causation under the "Steinberg I" test. In this case, after concluding that the injury-causing risk was a mixed risk, the CAB ruled that, to be compensated, petitioner had to prove that his weariness was work-induced, and that petitioner failed to do so. The Supreme Court did not agree with the CAB that petitioner had to prove work-induced weariness as a prerequisite to receiving compensation in this case. "There can be no question that the injurious effects of falling asleep were increased by the environment in which the petitioner found himself at the time he fell asleep behind the wheel of a moving truck. We have no difficulty concluding on this record, as a matter of law, that the petitioner's employment was 'a substantial contributing factor to the injury.'" View "Appeal of Brandon Kelly " on Justia Law

In this declaratory judgment proceeding, respondents, David and Joanne Hodges, appealed a Superior Court order ruling that they must contribute to the maintenance and repair of an easement they hold over property owned by the petitioner, Village Green Condominium Association (Village Green). The Hodgeses objected, arguing: (1) that the plain language of the easement deed "addressed the issue of maintenance and improvement of the right of way" and "gave [them] the affirmative right, but not the corresponding obligation, to improve and maintain the right of way;" (2) Village Green's claim was barred by waiver and laches; and (3) because Village Green "never made any demand upon [them] to contribute to the cost of the maintenance and improvement of the right of way," and because they "did nothing to maintain, repair or improve the easement," the course of dealing of the parties was such that they are under no obligation to contribute to the easement's maintenance and repair. Following the trial court's ruling, the parties entered into a settlement agreement regarding the nature and extent of the Hodgeses' contribution obligation. In the agreement, the parties acknowledged that the Hodgeses intended to appeal the trial court's ruling as to their obligation to contribute to easement maintenance and repair, and established an agreed-upon procedure for determining the past and future maintenance obligations should the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirm the trial court's ruling. This appeal followed. The Supreme Court, finding no reversible error, affirmed. View "Village Green Condo. Ass'n v. Hodges" on Justia Law

Defendant Stanley West, II was convicted by jury on three counts of simple assault and one count of resisting arrest or detention. At trial, defendant objected to the trial court's proposed jury instruction on the defense of premises. The trial court overruled the defendant's objection. At the close of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss the resisting arrest or detention charge, arguing that the State presented no evidence that the police officer attempted to arrest or detain the defendant. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, defendant argued that the trial court erred: (1) by instructing the jury that the defendant must exhaust all non-violent alternatives before using force in defense of premises; and (2) by denying his motion to dismiss the resisting arrest or detention charge for insufficient evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. West" on Justia Law

The defendants were involved in various aspects of the design, construction, and installation of a ventilation system in a research laboratory at the University of New Hampshire (UNH). By November 2003, the project was substantially complete. In November 2009, plaintiff suffered injuries while working in the laboratory due to a faulty vent pipe that exposed her to toxic fumes. In February 2012, plaintiff filed a negligence action against Oak Point, and in November 2012, she added Ambient as a defendant. Plaintiff also sued UNH, which owned the laboratory where plaintiff was injured, but she eventually settled her claims with UNH. Defendants subsequently filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of repose found in RSA 508:4-b, I. Plaintiff appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lennartz v. Oak Point Associates, P.A." on Justia Law

Defendant Josiah Mayo appealed after a jury convicted him of first degree assault with a deadly weapon, and reckless second degree assault. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) failing to instruct the jury that his use of force in defense of his cousin was justified if he reasonably believed that his cousin was not the initial aggressor or provoker; (2) denying his motion to dismiss the first degree assault charge on the grounds that his shod foot could not constitute a deadly weapon under RSA 625:11, V (2007); and (3) allowing the admission of evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Given that there was some evidence both that the cousin was the initial aggressor or provoker and that defendant was unaware of his cousin’s aggressive and/or provocative actions, the Supreme Court could not conclude that the trial court’s erroneous instructions did not affect the verdict, and therefore were harmless, beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court held that this error required that defendant’s convictions be reversed and that he be granted a new trial. View "New Hampshire v. Mayo" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, petitioner Gregory DuPont, appealed: (1) a circuit court order affirming the revocation by the respondent City of Nashua (City), through its chief of police, of his license to carry a loaded pistol or revolver; and (2) a Superior Court order denying his motion for preliminary injunctive relief in a proceeding brought against respondents Peter McDonough, Sean Haggerty, Christopher Casko, and John Barthelmes, challenging the denial of his request for an armed security guard license. In 1998, the petitioner was convicted in Massachusetts of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor, a misdemeanor that carried a potential maximum prison sentence of two and a half years. Petitioner’s 1998 conviction rendered him ineligible, under Massachusetts law, to possess or carry a firearm, at least as of the 1998 amendments to the Massachusetts firearms laws. In 2005, upon the petitioner’s petition for review, the Massachusetts Firearm Licensing Review Board (FLRB) found that the petitioner was “a suitable person to possess a license to carry firearms, and his right to possess a firearm therefore is fully restored in the Commonwealth.” In 2007, the City’s chief of police issued the petitioner a license to carry a pistol or revolver, and that license was renewed in 2012. In 2009, the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) issued the petitioner an armed security guard license. Sometime prior to June 29, 2010, Sergeant Lobrano of DOS became aware of the 1998 conviction and determined that it disqualified the petitioner, under federal law, from possessing firearms. Accordingly, Lobrano notified the petitioner that he was revoking the petitioner’s armed security guard license. On the same day, Lobrano issued the petitioner an unarmed security guard license. The petitioner appealed Lobrano’s decision to a hearings examiner, who upheld it. In 2011, while the parties were awaiting decision on their cross-motions for summary judgment, DOS’s attorney, respondent Casko, offered the petitioner a settlement. The petitioner agreed to the terms of the offer and the case was non-suited. In February or March 2013, petitioner applied to the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for a Curios and Relics License. The Nashua Police Department conducted a background check on the petitioner in 2013 and, in doing so, learned of the 1998 conviction (why the City had not discovered the 1998 conviction previously, despite having conducted at least two prior background checks on the petitioner, was not explained in the record). Nashua Police determined that the 1998 conviction disqualified the petitioner from both the federal license for which he had applied and his state license to carry, and advised that the ATF deny petitioner his federal Curio and Relics license, and that his state license to carry be revoked. Petitioner appealed the revocation to the circuit court, and, following that court’s affirmance of the DOS' decision, he appealed to the Supreme Court court. On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial courts erred in: (1) upholding the revocation of his license to carry; (2) upholding the DOS’s decision to rescind the 2011 settlement; (3) failing to find that the City was bound by the 2011 settlement; (4) misinterpreting 18 U.S.C. sections 921(a)(20) et seq.; (5) disregarding the findings and conclusions of the FLRB’s decision restoring his right to possess firearms; and (6) failing to “give full faith and credit to the provisions of the public acts, records and judicial proceedings in Massachusetts.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that its interpretation of section 921(a) better fulfilled Congress’s purpose of “defer[ring] to a State’s dispensation relieving an offender from disabling effects of a conviction.” Here, Massachusetts acted clearly and directly to remove the restriction the petitioner’s 1998 conviction had placed upon his civil right to keep and bear arms. The Court held that Massachusetts restored the petitioner’s civil rights within the meaning of 921(a)(20). The Court reversed both trial courts’ decisions resting upon the contrary conclusion and remanded for further proceedings. View "DuPont v. Nashua Police Department" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason McGill appealed his conviction by jury of felony delivery of an unlawful article to a prisoner On appeal, he argued that the superior court erred in its instructions to the jury that in order to convict, it had to find that defendant acted "knowingly." Defendant argued the proper mens rea for the crime was "purposely." The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. McGill" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Dean and Suzanne Ingram appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendants Michael Drouin and Drouin Builders, Inc. on plaintiffs' claims for damages. The dispute arose over the sale of a house in Laconia. Drouin Builders originally purchased the property on which the house was built, and Michael Drouin lived there prior to selling the property to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contended that the didn't notice any problems with the house until several years had passed since the sale of the house. Plaintiffs then brought a write seeking damages against defendants for failing to "properly construct" the house. Defendants countered that an eight-year statute of limitations had passed, and plaintiffs' claims were therefore barred. The trial court agreed, and plaintiffs appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ingram v. Drouin" on Justia Law