Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In consolidated cases, petitioner Gregory DuPont, appealed: (1) a circuit court order affirming the revocation by the respondent City of Nashua (City), through its chief of police, of his license to carry a loaded pistol or revolver; and (2) a Superior Court order denying his motion for preliminary injunctive relief in a proceeding brought against respondents Peter McDonough, Sean Haggerty, Christopher Casko, and John Barthelmes, challenging the denial of his request for an armed security guard license. In 1998, the petitioner was convicted in Massachusetts of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor, a misdemeanor that carried a potential maximum prison sentence of two and a half years. Petitioner’s 1998 conviction rendered him ineligible, under Massachusetts law, to possess or carry a firearm, at least as of the 1998 amendments to the Massachusetts firearms laws. In 2005, upon the petitioner’s petition for review, the Massachusetts Firearm Licensing Review Board (FLRB) found that the petitioner was “a suitable person to possess a license to carry firearms, and his right to possess a firearm therefore is fully restored in the Commonwealth.” In 2007, the City’s chief of police issued the petitioner a license to carry a pistol or revolver, and that license was renewed in 2012. In 2009, the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) issued the petitioner an armed security guard license. Sometime prior to June 29, 2010, Sergeant Lobrano of DOS became aware of the 1998 conviction and determined that it disqualified the petitioner, under federal law, from possessing firearms. Accordingly, Lobrano notified the petitioner that he was revoking the petitioner’s armed security guard license. On the same day, Lobrano issued the petitioner an unarmed security guard license. The petitioner appealed Lobrano’s decision to a hearings examiner, who upheld it. In 2011, while the parties were awaiting decision on their cross-motions for summary judgment, DOS’s attorney, respondent Casko, offered the petitioner a settlement. The petitioner agreed to the terms of the offer and the case was non-suited. In February or March 2013, petitioner applied to the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for a Curios and Relics License. The Nashua Police Department conducted a background check on the petitioner in 2013 and, in doing so, learned of the 1998 conviction (why the City had not discovered the 1998 conviction previously, despite having conducted at least two prior background checks on the petitioner, was not explained in the record). Nashua Police determined that the 1998 conviction disqualified the petitioner from both the federal license for which he had applied and his state license to carry, and advised that the ATF deny petitioner his federal Curio and Relics license, and that his state license to carry be revoked. Petitioner appealed the revocation to the circuit court, and, following that court’s affirmance of the DOS' decision, he appealed to the Supreme Court court. On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial courts erred in: (1) upholding the revocation of his license to carry; (2) upholding the DOS’s decision to rescind the 2011 settlement; (3) failing to find that the City was bound by the 2011 settlement; (4) misinterpreting 18 U.S.C. sections 921(a)(20) et seq.; (5) disregarding the findings and conclusions of the FLRB’s decision restoring his right to possess firearms; and (6) failing to “give full faith and credit to the provisions of the public acts, records and judicial proceedings in Massachusetts.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that its interpretation of section 921(a) better fulfilled Congress’s purpose of “defer[ring] to a State’s dispensation relieving an offender from disabling effects of a conviction.” Here, Massachusetts acted clearly and directly to remove the restriction the petitioner’s 1998 conviction had placed upon his civil right to keep and bear arms. The Court held that Massachusetts restored the petitioner’s civil rights within the meaning of 921(a)(20). The Court reversed both trial courts’ decisions resting upon the contrary conclusion and remanded for further proceedings. View "DuPont v. Nashua Police Department" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason McGill appealed his conviction by jury of felony delivery of an unlawful article to a prisoner On appeal, he argued that the superior court erred in its instructions to the jury that in order to convict, it had to find that defendant acted "knowingly." Defendant argued the proper mens rea for the crime was "purposely." The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. McGill" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Dean and Suzanne Ingram appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendants Michael Drouin and Drouin Builders, Inc. on plaintiffs' claims for damages. The dispute arose over the sale of a house in Laconia. Drouin Builders originally purchased the property on which the house was built, and Michael Drouin lived there prior to selling the property to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contended that the didn't notice any problems with the house until several years had passed since the sale of the house. Plaintiffs then brought a write seeking damages against defendants for failing to "properly construct" the house. Defendants countered that an eight-year statute of limitations had passed, and plaintiffs' claims were therefore barred. The trial court agreed, and plaintiffs appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ingram v. Drouin" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Doe appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to the State on his declaratory judgment action. In that action, petitioner sought a ruling that RSA chapter 651-B was unconstitutional as applied to him, because it violated the prohibition against retrospective laws and the due process clause of the State constitution. Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault which occurred in 1983 and 1984. On January 1, 1994, the petitioner became subject to registration as a sex offender. According to the petitioner, he was not aware of this requirement until 2004, but since then he has complied with all of the registration requirements. Since an injury in 2006, the petitioner has been permanently disabled. He must use a cane to get around and he must use a scooter to travel any significant distance. Due to his injury and subsequent disability, the petitioner’s physicians have recommended that he obtain public housing in order to meet his medical needs. The petitioner sought housing through the Manchester Housing Authority and was initially approved. However, his approval was revoked because of his status as a registered sex offender. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that RSA 651-B was intended by the Legislature as regulatory, but due to petitioner's disability and difficulties with housing, the statute exceeded "simply burdening or disadvantaging the petitioner, and we can no longer find that the effects are 'de minimus.'" "Absent the lifetime-registration-without-review provision, [the Supreme Court] would not find the other effects of the act sufficiently punitive to overcome the presumption of its constitutionality." The Supreme Court further concluded that the act could be enforced against petitioner consistently with the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws only if he was promptly given an opportunity for either a court hearing, or an administrative hearing subject to judicial review, at which he was permitted to demonstrate that he no longer posed a risk sufficient to justify continued registration. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "John Doe v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Brian Craig on one count of criminal threatening, one count of witness tampering, and one count of stalking. The convictions arose from a series of messages defendant posed on his Facebook page that were directed towards his victim. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss all three charges, and on appeal, argued that the trial court erred in not dismissing the charges as to witness tampering and stalking (defendant did not appeal criminal threatening). Finding the evidence was sufficient to sustain the charges against him, and that the trial court did not err in its judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Craig" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Towle was convicted by jury on four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault for engaging in fellatio and anal penetration with his minor son, and on four counts of criminal liability for the conduct of another for encouraging his wife and another adult to engage in sexual acts with his minor son. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 57 to 114 years in prison and ordered defendant to have no contact with the victim, the reporting witness, and his other minor son. On appeal, defendant raised two challenges to his convictions and one challenge to his sentence: (1) the trial court erred by permitting the State to use prior statements to refresh the victim's recollection when the victim had not demonstrated an inability to recall the relevant event; and (2) the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce testimony referring to inadmissible photographic evidence. In addition, defendant argued that the trial court erred by imposing the no-contact order. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Towle" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, defendant Kevin Balch was convicted on two counts of burglary, six counts of receiving stolen property, and six counts of violating the armed career criminal statute. On appeal, defendant challenged the sentence imposed pursuant to the armed career criminal statute, and argued that the trial court erred by construing it to: (1) permit a conviction and sentence for each individual firearm he possessed on a single occasion; (2) require that each sentence be served consecutively rather than concurrently; and (3) prohibit the trial court from deferring some or all of said sentences. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Balch" on Justia Law

B.C. (a juvenile) was fourteen years of age when she was arrested for shoplifting merchandise from "Claire's," a discount jewelry store in the Rockingham Mall. She was transported, in handcuffs, to the Salem Police station. The arresting officer telephoned the juvenile's mother to pick her up. While in the booking room, the juvenile asked if she could use the bathroom. An officer allowed her to use the bathroom in one of the holding cells. Another officer observed her via a closed circuit monitor in the supervisor's office flush the toilet. The arresting officer asked the juvenile "what she had flushed down the toilet." The juvenile told the arresting officer "that it was a necklace that she had taken and . . . had concealed in her pants." The officer did not inform the juvenile of her Miranda rights before questioning her or at any other time. The juvenile remained at the police station until her mother picked her up. After she admitted to flushing the necklace down the toilet, the juvenile was charged with falsifying evidence. After a hearing in August 2011, she was found delinquent. During the merits hearing, she moved to suppress her admission on the ground that it was the product of custodial interrogation and that she was not advised of her Miranda rights before making it. The court denied her motion, and the juvenile appealed. The State appealed the circuit court's grant of the juvenile's motion to suppress. But finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re B.C. " on Justia Law

Defendant Taneal Broadus was convicted by jury on one felony count each of possession of oxycodone and codeine, and one misdemeanor count of possession of marijuana. She challenged only the felony convictions, arguing on appeal that the superior court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence of the oxycodone and codeine obtained after an unconstitutional search. Defendant did not dispute the legality of the initial traffic stop for littering. Upon review of the facts in the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that from the totality of the circumstances, the frisk in this case was not supported by particularized and objective facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and presently dangerous: neither defendant nor the driver was suspected of having committed, or being about to commit, a violent offense. Further, defendant had no outstanding warrants, complied with the officer's requests during the stop, and made no threatening or furtive movements during the stop. Moreover, the stop did not occur in a high crime area. Therefore, the Court held that that the trial court erroneously concluded that the frisk was valid. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court found only that Locke “could have” arrested her; it did not decide how likely it was that the officer “would have” arrested her. Nor did it appear that the parties fully litigated in the trial court how probable the defendant’s arrest would have to be in order to satisfy the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the likelihood defendant would have been arrested. On remand, even though defendant did not appeal her conviction for marijuana possession, she may argue, as she did on appeal, that the oxycodone and codeine would not have been “inevitably discovered,” in part, because there was no probable cause to arrest her for possession of marijuana. View "New Hampshire v. Broadus" on Justia Law

Defendant Justin Roy was convicted by jury on two counts of kidnapping, on count of first degree assault, four counts of second degree assault, one count of criminal restraint, and two counts of simple assault. These charges stemmed from a night of drinking; that night defendant allegedly failed to take his prescription medications for depression and alcoholism. The night would end with one of his live-in girlfriend's three children having been seriously injured: the child had extensive bruising all over his body, especially in his abdominal area. His pancreas was severely injured, and he had lost approximately half of his blood due to internal bleeding. Part of his bowel was torn, which had caused the contents of his bowel to spill into his abdomen. Doctors performed multiple surgeries on him. During his recovery, he required the use of a feeding tube for 11 months. On appeal, defendant argued the Superior Court erred by denying: (1) motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cellular telephone; (2) motions in limine to both admit and exclude certain evidence; (3) motion to dismiss during trial based upon the State’s alleged failure to timely disclose exculpatory evidence; and (4) subsequent motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict in which he alleged that there was insufficient evidence to convict. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Roy" on Justia Law