Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Alex Ducharme was convicted of driving under the influence after a bench trial. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred: (1) in ruling police had probable cause to arrest him for DUI; (2) in concluding that a valid arrest for DUI had occurred and, therefore, that the implied consent statute applied; (3) admitted evidence obtained after he had invoked his Miranda rights and failed to consider the “confusion doctrine”; and (4) found the evidence sufficient to convict him of DUI. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Ducharme" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Francis appealed his conviction of possessing heroin with the intent to dispense. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that: (1) the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of a vehicle; and (2) the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based upon insufficient evidence that he possessed the heroin found in the vehicle. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Francis" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Bacon appealed a circuit court order that found he violated RSA 206:26-bb (2011) (amended 2014) by acting negligently while hiking, so as to require a search and rescue effort by the plaintiff, the New Hampshire Fish and Game Department, and that he, thus, was responsible to the Department for the reasonable costs associated with the search and rescue. defendant began a five-day solo hiking trip in the White Mountains, during which he planned to hike several mountains with summits over 5,000 feet. At the time of the hike, defendant was fifty-nine years old, had undergone four hip surgeries since 2005, and had an artificial hip that had dislocated on five occasions, twice during the prior year. Defendant also had a “bad back” and was taking a variety of medications for multiple ailments. During the hike, defendant encountered a waist-high rock ledge that he needed to traverse in order to continue on the trail. He attempted to jump backward up onto the ledge and, in the process, fell and dislocated his hip. Approximately one hour later, a Conservation Officer received an alert that a hiker had dislocated his hip and needed assistance. He responded immediately and eventually located the defendant on the trail between Little Haystack and Lincoln Mountains. The Officer testified that when he found defendant his left leg was flexed and internally rotated, the very position that defendant’s orthopedic surgeon had warned him to avoid due to his hip replacement. Approximately fifteen Department personnel and thirty-five volunteers participated in defendant’s rescue. The trial court found for the Department “for all of the reasons cited in the plaintiff’s closing memorandum,” and awarded the Department $9,334.86 in damages. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, to which the Department objected. The court denied defendant’s motion, stating that “[t]he actions of the defendant were a gross deviation from those of a reasonable person that surpasses the [negligence] standard required.” After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "New Hampshire Fish & Game Dept. v. Bacon" on Justia Law

Respondent New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services (appealed a Superior Court order that granted summary judgment in favor of petitioner CaremarkPCS Health, LLC (Caremark). In 2010, the Department issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for pharmacy benefit management services for the State of New Hampshire’s health plan. In response to the RFP, Caremark submitted a bid, which ultimately led to a final negotiated contract with the Department. The Governor and Executive Council approved the contract on November 17, 2010. Both the bid and final contract included statements to the effect that certain information set forth in those documents is proprietary and constitutes trade secrets of Caremark. In 2011, the Department received multiple requests to inspect and copy Caremark’s bid and the final contract. Two of the requests were made by Caremark’s competitors. Caremark, after being informed by the Department of the requests, responded that certain confidential information contained in the bid and final contract was exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. The parties disputed whether certain information was subject to disclosure. The trial court ruled that certain information constituting trade secrets under the New Hampshire Uniform Trade Secrets Acts (UTSA) was exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. Specifically, the trial court ruled that disclosure of Caremark’s trade secrets by the Department would constitute a “misappropriation” under the UTSA and, therefore, that the subject information is exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. On appeal, the Department argued that the trial court erred in finding that the UTSA prohibited the Department from disclosing Caremark’s trade secrets under the “otherwise prohibited by statute” exemption in RSA 91-A:4, I. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "CaremarkPCS Health, LLC v. New Hampshire Dept. of Admin. Svc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Valentina Conant appealed, and respondent William Faller, cross-appealed, the final parenting plan issued by the Circuit Court. Respondent also cross-appealed the trial court’s order concerning child support arrearages and other expenses. The parties were the unmarried parents of a daughter born in March 2012. Petitioner lived in Nashua with her teenage son from a prior marriage, and respondent lived in Massachusetts. In March 2013, the court issued a temporary parenting plan, directing that: (1) petitioner had sole decision-making responsibility for the child; (2) the child would reside primarily with petitioner; (3) respondent would have regularly scheduled parenting time; and (4) the exchanges of the child would take place in Nashua. After the final hearing in October 2013, the court issued the final parenting plan. Because both parties were “mature, well-educated, financially stable . . . [and] capable of providing nurturing support and opportunities to [the child],” the court awarded them joint decision-making responsibilities, as this would “only serve to assure that the child’s best interests are met.” The court awarded petitioner primary residential responsibility, and provided respondent with parenting time during the first, second, and fourth weekends of each month. Respondent argued on appeal of that order that the trial court violated RSA 168-A:1 and :3-a by ordering him to pay petitioner: (1) $4,587 in child support arrearages, accrued from the date of the child’s birth to June 2012 (two months before petitioner filed a motion to establish paternity); and (2) $2,303 for petitioner’s lost time from work because of prenatal care and illness and delivery of the child. The Supreme Court agreed with the respondent that the trial court erred by requiring him to pay child support arrearages dating from the child’s birth to June 2012. The Court reversed with regard to the support arrearages, and affirmed in all other respects. View "In the Matter of Conant & Faller" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant Michael Addison was convicted of the 2006 capital murder of Manchester Police Officer Michael Briggs and sentenced to death. The New Hampshire Supreme Court subsequently affirmed defendant’s conviction for capital murder, concluding that his sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s findings of aggravating circumstances. As part of its compulsory review, the Supreme Court addressed “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” The Court concluded that the defendant’s sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate and, accordingly, affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Addison" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Doug and Gayle Mellin brought a declaratory judgment action asserting, in relevant part, that their homeowner’s insurance policy with defendant Northern Security Insurance Company, Inc. required Northern to reimburse them for losses to their condominium caused by cat urine odor. Plaintiffs' downstairs neighbor kept two cats in her condominium. They surmised that the smell entered their unit from the downstairs condominium through an open plumbing chase servicing the kitchen. In December 2010, plaintiffs filed a claim under their homeowner’s insurance policy, which was denied. Epping's building/health inspector examined the unit and sent a letter to plaintiffs stating that they "have a health problem existing" and the odor "is such that [they] need to move out of[] the apartment temporarily and have a company terminate the odor." Remediation proved unsuccessful. Plaintiffs continued to reside in the unit until February 1, 2011. They claimed that, after that time, they "could [not] have tenants," although they occasionally occupied the unit. Ultimately, they sold their condominium. They claimed that the sale price for the unit was significantly less than that for a comparable condominium in the area which was unaffected by cat urine odor. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Northern. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment: plaintiffs were not required to demonstrate a "tangible physical alteration" to the unit to prove that the unit was rendered permanently uninhabitable. "Rather, to demonstrate a physical loss under Coverage A, they must establish a distinct and demonstrable alteration to the unit." The Court also reversed with regard to a "pollution exclusion clause" found in plaintiffs' policy: "pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous when applied to the facts of this case and, as such, does not preclude coverage for the plaintiffs’ claims." And with regard to "Coverage D," the Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting Northern judgment as a matter of law. This was vacated, and the entire case remanded for further proceedings. View "Mellin v. Northern Security Insurance Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Heilan Grimes appealed a Circuit Court order granting a writ of possession for property located in Nashua to plaintiff JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA. The sole issue on appeal was whether, under RSA 540:2, II(e) (Supp. 2014), a property owner’s desire to market, sell and/or convey property in a vacant condition constituted “other good cause” for purposes of terminating a tenancy. In the absence of evidence of selective eviction or other acts of bad faith, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that under the circumstances of this case, plaintiff’s stated reason for eviction satisfied the statute. View "JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA v. Grimes" on Justia Law

Petitioner Terry Ann Bartlett was injured in a motor vehicle accident in New York in August 2004, when the motorcycle owned and operated by Jeffrey Vilagos on which she was a passenger, was struck by a motor vehicle operated by Myroslaw Mykijewycz. Mykijewycz was insured by Allstate Insurance Company under a policy that provided liability insurance coverage up to $100,000 per person. Vilagos's motorcycle, which was registered and garaged in New Jersey, was insured by respondent Foremost Insurance Company. The Foremost policy was issued in New Jersey and provided uninsured/underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage up to $250,000 per person. Petitioner also owned a motorcycle, which was registered and garaged in New Hampshire, and which was insured by respondent Progressive Northern Insurance Comapny under a policy that also provided UIM coverage up to $250,000 per person. Petitioner's other vehicles, which were both registered and garaged in New Hampshire, were insured by respondent Commerce Insurance Company under a policy that provided UIM coverage up to $250,000 per person. Petitioner's home was also insured by Commerce under a policy that contains a personal umbrella endorsement that provides $1,000,000 of single limited UIM coverage. Petitioner's New York attorney requested coverage information from Foremost, which Foremost provided. In April 2005, petitioner's attorney informed Progressive and Commerce that the petitioner intended to pursue UIM claims. Allstate offered petitioner its policy limit ($100,000). Petitioner's attorney notified Foremost, Progressive and Commerce of this fact and advised the respondent-insurers that, pursuant to New York law, they were either "required to grant [petitioner] permission to collect" the $100,000 from the Allstate policy "or to pay [her] [that] amount] within thirty (30) days." However, the New York law to which the attorney referred did not govern any of the insurers. Only Commerce responded to petitioner's attorney, granting petitioner permission to settle with Allstate. Allstate was thereafter released from liability. Petitioner sued Foremost, Progressive, and Commerce in New York in January 2011, more than six years after the accident. That lawsuit was eventually dismissed. While the insurers' motions to dismiss were pending, petitioner filed the underlying petition in this case for declaratory judgment. She moved, and the insurers cross-moved, for summary judgment. Commerce appealed, and petitioner cross-appealed the Superior Court's order partially granting and partially denying petitioner's summary judgment motion, denying Commerce's cross-motion for summary judgment, and granting cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Foremost and Progressive. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determination that petitioner forfeited her right to recover primary insurance coverage under the Foremost policy and her right to recover excess insurance coverage under the Progressive policy and reversed its conclusion that Commerce had to "drop down" to provide primary coverage. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bartlett v. Commerce Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners Raymond and Pamela Choquette filed separate petitions against respondents Phillippe Roy (P.E. Roy), individually and as trustee of the Roy Family Trust, Jason Roy and Thomas and Kelly Robichaud. Consolidated case related to the transfer of, use o and access to certain parcels of land originally owned by petitioners and currently owned by respondents. Petitioners appealed, and respondents cross-appealed the superior court's order resolving the dispute. Because the trial court found that P.E. Roy had no right to maintain a road that access the parcels in question, the court did not reach the issue of whether P.E. Roy's specific acts of maintenance interfered with the rights of petitioners or other users of the easement. The Supreme Court, therefore, held only that the trial court erred in ruling that P.E. Roy did not have the right and duty to maintain the easement over "Sugar Shack" Right of Way. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling on this issue and remanded for further proceedings as the trial court might deem warranted, including, if necessary, determination of whether P.E. Roy's actions interfered with the rights of the petitioners or other users of the easement. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Choquette v. Roy" on Justia Law