Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Richard Scott was convicted by jury on one count of attempted murder, and one count of being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon. Defendant confronted his eventual victim over alleged money owed. Defendant raised multiple issues of alleged error from the trial court proceedings. Reviewing each one, but finding none were reversible in defendant's favor, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "New Hampshire v. Scott" on Justia Law

Petitioners P.B. and S.B. appealed a Circuit Court order approving a Judicial Referee’s recommendation that their petition for visitation with their grandson C.W. be denied. Respondents T.W. and S.W. cross-appealed the order denying an earlier motion to dismiss the petition. C.W. was born to M.M. and K.B. in 2011. His birth parents died tragically on January 11, 2012. Since then, respondents, M.M.’s sister and brother-in-law, have cared for C.W., initially as guardians and, since June 24, 2013, as adoptive parents. Petitioners, K.B.’s mother and father, had "consistent - but not extensive - contact" with C.W. before his birth parents died and approximately 16 visits between January 17, 2012, and September 1, 2012, after C.W. began residing with respondents. On appeal, petitioners argued that the trial court erred in balancing the factors regarding the best interests of the child. In their cross-appeal, respondents argued that the trial court erred in interpreting RSA 461-A:13 (Supp. 2014) to permit petitioners to maintain their petition for grandparent visitation after the respondents adopted C.W. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of P.B. & T.W." on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Road Toll Law imposed a road toll “upon the sale of each gallon of motor fuel sold by distributors thereof.” On multiple occasions between June 2008 and March 2011, Marco Petroleum Industries, Inc., contracted with Irving Oil Terminals, Inc. (Irving) for the purchase of diesel fuel. These purchases totaled 603,138 gallons. Each purchase included the transfer of fuel by Irving, at its facility located in Revere, Massachusetts, into trucks operated by P.S. Marston, LLC (Marston). Marston and Marco shared a business address in North Hampton. Marston transported the fuel from Revere to Marco’s facility in North Hampton; Marston invoiced Marco for the deliveries; and Marco paid those bills. The bill of lading issued by Irving for each sale was identical except for the date of sale, amount of fuel purchased, and the invoice amount. Also in connection with each purchase, Marco paid the Massachusetts fuel tax to Irving, and Irving then forwarded the funds to Massachusetts. In 2012, the Department of Safety (DOS) audited Marco’s “Motor Fuel Distributor” account and concluded that Marco imported motor fuel into New Hampshire without a license and therefore failed to report and pay the required New Hampshire road toll on the 603,138 gallons of fuel purchased from Irving. The DOS calculated that Marco owed the State $155,070.71. Marco challenged the DOS audit, arguing that the DOS and the trial court erred by finding that Marco was required to pay the road toll because: (1) it was not a “distributor” of motor fuels under RSA 259:21 (2014); (2) it did not “sell” motor fuel under RSA 260:32 (2014) (amended 2014); and (3) it would be unfair to require Marco to pay the New Hampshire road toll because it had already paid the Massachusetts fuel tax. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Marco Petroleum Industries, Inc. v. Comm'r, New Hamp. Dept. of Safety" on Justia Law

Defendant Alex Ducharme was convicted of driving under the influence after a bench trial. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred: (1) in ruling police had probable cause to arrest him for DUI; (2) in concluding that a valid arrest for DUI had occurred and, therefore, that the implied consent statute applied; (3) admitted evidence obtained after he had invoked his Miranda rights and failed to consider the “confusion doctrine”; and (4) found the evidence sufficient to convict him of DUI. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Ducharme" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Francis appealed his conviction of possessing heroin with the intent to dispense. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that: (1) the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of a vehicle; and (2) the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based upon insufficient evidence that he possessed the heroin found in the vehicle. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Francis" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Bacon appealed a circuit court order that found he violated RSA 206:26-bb (2011) (amended 2014) by acting negligently while hiking, so as to require a search and rescue effort by the plaintiff, the New Hampshire Fish and Game Department, and that he, thus, was responsible to the Department for the reasonable costs associated with the search and rescue. defendant began a five-day solo hiking trip in the White Mountains, during which he planned to hike several mountains with summits over 5,000 feet. At the time of the hike, defendant was fifty-nine years old, had undergone four hip surgeries since 2005, and had an artificial hip that had dislocated on five occasions, twice during the prior year. Defendant also had a “bad back” and was taking a variety of medications for multiple ailments. During the hike, defendant encountered a waist-high rock ledge that he needed to traverse in order to continue on the trail. He attempted to jump backward up onto the ledge and, in the process, fell and dislocated his hip. Approximately one hour later, a Conservation Officer received an alert that a hiker had dislocated his hip and needed assistance. He responded immediately and eventually located the defendant on the trail between Little Haystack and Lincoln Mountains. The Officer testified that when he found defendant his left leg was flexed and internally rotated, the very position that defendant’s orthopedic surgeon had warned him to avoid due to his hip replacement. Approximately fifteen Department personnel and thirty-five volunteers participated in defendant’s rescue. The trial court found for the Department “for all of the reasons cited in the plaintiff’s closing memorandum,” and awarded the Department $9,334.86 in damages. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, to which the Department objected. The court denied defendant’s motion, stating that “[t]he actions of the defendant were a gross deviation from those of a reasonable person that surpasses the [negligence] standard required.” After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "New Hampshire Fish & Game Dept. v. Bacon" on Justia Law

Respondent New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services (appealed a Superior Court order that granted summary judgment in favor of petitioner CaremarkPCS Health, LLC (Caremark). In 2010, the Department issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) for pharmacy benefit management services for the State of New Hampshire’s health plan. In response to the RFP, Caremark submitted a bid, which ultimately led to a final negotiated contract with the Department. The Governor and Executive Council approved the contract on November 17, 2010. Both the bid and final contract included statements to the effect that certain information set forth in those documents is proprietary and constitutes trade secrets of Caremark. In 2011, the Department received multiple requests to inspect and copy Caremark’s bid and the final contract. Two of the requests were made by Caremark’s competitors. Caremark, after being informed by the Department of the requests, responded that certain confidential information contained in the bid and final contract was exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. The parties disputed whether certain information was subject to disclosure. The trial court ruled that certain information constituting trade secrets under the New Hampshire Uniform Trade Secrets Acts (UTSA) was exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. Specifically, the trial court ruled that disclosure of Caremark’s trade secrets by the Department would constitute a “misappropriation” under the UTSA and, therefore, that the subject information is exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. On appeal, the Department argued that the trial court erred in finding that the UTSA prohibited the Department from disclosing Caremark’s trade secrets under the “otherwise prohibited by statute” exemption in RSA 91-A:4, I. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "CaremarkPCS Health, LLC v. New Hampshire Dept. of Admin. Svc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Valentina Conant appealed, and respondent William Faller, cross-appealed, the final parenting plan issued by the Circuit Court. Respondent also cross-appealed the trial court’s order concerning child support arrearages and other expenses. The parties were the unmarried parents of a daughter born in March 2012. Petitioner lived in Nashua with her teenage son from a prior marriage, and respondent lived in Massachusetts. In March 2013, the court issued a temporary parenting plan, directing that: (1) petitioner had sole decision-making responsibility for the child; (2) the child would reside primarily with petitioner; (3) respondent would have regularly scheduled parenting time; and (4) the exchanges of the child would take place in Nashua. After the final hearing in October 2013, the court issued the final parenting plan. Because both parties were “mature, well-educated, financially stable . . . [and] capable of providing nurturing support and opportunities to [the child],” the court awarded them joint decision-making responsibilities, as this would “only serve to assure that the child’s best interests are met.” The court awarded petitioner primary residential responsibility, and provided respondent with parenting time during the first, second, and fourth weekends of each month. Respondent argued on appeal of that order that the trial court violated RSA 168-A:1 and :3-a by ordering him to pay petitioner: (1) $4,587 in child support arrearages, accrued from the date of the child’s birth to June 2012 (two months before petitioner filed a motion to establish paternity); and (2) $2,303 for petitioner’s lost time from work because of prenatal care and illness and delivery of the child. The Supreme Court agreed with the respondent that the trial court erred by requiring him to pay child support arrearages dating from the child’s birth to June 2012. The Court reversed with regard to the support arrearages, and affirmed in all other respects. View "In the Matter of Conant & Faller" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant Michael Addison was convicted of the 2006 capital murder of Manchester Police Officer Michael Briggs and sentenced to death. The New Hampshire Supreme Court subsequently affirmed defendant’s conviction for capital murder, concluding that his sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s findings of aggravating circumstances. As part of its compulsory review, the Supreme Court addressed “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” The Court concluded that the defendant’s sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate and, accordingly, affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Addison" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Doug and Gayle Mellin brought a declaratory judgment action asserting, in relevant part, that their homeowner’s insurance policy with defendant Northern Security Insurance Company, Inc. required Northern to reimburse them for losses to their condominium caused by cat urine odor. Plaintiffs' downstairs neighbor kept two cats in her condominium. They surmised that the smell entered their unit from the downstairs condominium through an open plumbing chase servicing the kitchen. In December 2010, plaintiffs filed a claim under their homeowner’s insurance policy, which was denied. Epping's building/health inspector examined the unit and sent a letter to plaintiffs stating that they "have a health problem existing" and the odor "is such that [they] need to move out of[] the apartment temporarily and have a company terminate the odor." Remediation proved unsuccessful. Plaintiffs continued to reside in the unit until February 1, 2011. They claimed that, after that time, they "could [not] have tenants," although they occasionally occupied the unit. Ultimately, they sold their condominium. They claimed that the sale price for the unit was significantly less than that for a comparable condominium in the area which was unaffected by cat urine odor. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Northern. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment: plaintiffs were not required to demonstrate a "tangible physical alteration" to the unit to prove that the unit was rendered permanently uninhabitable. "Rather, to demonstrate a physical loss under Coverage A, they must establish a distinct and demonstrable alteration to the unit." The Court also reversed with regard to a "pollution exclusion clause" found in plaintiffs' policy: "pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous when applied to the facts of this case and, as such, does not preclude coverage for the plaintiffs’ claims." And with regard to "Coverage D," the Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting Northern judgment as a matter of law. This was vacated, and the entire case remanded for further proceedings. View "Mellin v. Northern Security Insurance Company, Inc." on Justia Law