Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, defendant Michael Addison was convicted of the 2006 capital murder of Manchester Police Officer Michael Briggs and sentenced to death. The New Hampshire Supreme Court subsequently affirmed defendant’s conviction for capital murder, concluding that his sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s findings of aggravating circumstances. As part of its compulsory review, the Supreme Court addressed “[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” The Court concluded that the defendant’s sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate and, accordingly, affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Addison" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Doug and Gayle Mellin brought a declaratory judgment action asserting, in relevant part, that their homeowner’s insurance policy with defendant Northern Security Insurance Company, Inc. required Northern to reimburse them for losses to their condominium caused by cat urine odor. Plaintiffs' downstairs neighbor kept two cats in her condominium. They surmised that the smell entered their unit from the downstairs condominium through an open plumbing chase servicing the kitchen. In December 2010, plaintiffs filed a claim under their homeowner’s insurance policy, which was denied. Epping's building/health inspector examined the unit and sent a letter to plaintiffs stating that they "have a health problem existing" and the odor "is such that [they] need to move out of[] the apartment temporarily and have a company terminate the odor." Remediation proved unsuccessful. Plaintiffs continued to reside in the unit until February 1, 2011. They claimed that, after that time, they "could [not] have tenants," although they occasionally occupied the unit. Ultimately, they sold their condominium. They claimed that the sale price for the unit was significantly less than that for a comparable condominium in the area which was unaffected by cat urine odor. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Northern. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment: plaintiffs were not required to demonstrate a "tangible physical alteration" to the unit to prove that the unit was rendered permanently uninhabitable. "Rather, to demonstrate a physical loss under Coverage A, they must establish a distinct and demonstrable alteration to the unit." The Court also reversed with regard to a "pollution exclusion clause" found in plaintiffs' policy: "pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous when applied to the facts of this case and, as such, does not preclude coverage for the plaintiffs’ claims." And with regard to "Coverage D," the Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting Northern judgment as a matter of law. This was vacated, and the entire case remanded for further proceedings. View "Mellin v. Northern Security Insurance Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Heilan Grimes appealed a Circuit Court order granting a writ of possession for property located in Nashua to plaintiff JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA. The sole issue on appeal was whether, under RSA 540:2, II(e) (Supp. 2014), a property owner’s desire to market, sell and/or convey property in a vacant condition constituted “other good cause” for purposes of terminating a tenancy. In the absence of evidence of selective eviction or other acts of bad faith, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that under the circumstances of this case, plaintiff’s stated reason for eviction satisfied the statute. View "JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA v. Grimes" on Justia Law

Petitioner Terry Ann Bartlett was injured in a motor vehicle accident in New York in August 2004, when the motorcycle owned and operated by Jeffrey Vilagos on which she was a passenger, was struck by a motor vehicle operated by Myroslaw Mykijewycz. Mykijewycz was insured by Allstate Insurance Company under a policy that provided liability insurance coverage up to $100,000 per person. Vilagos's motorcycle, which was registered and garaged in New Jersey, was insured by respondent Foremost Insurance Company. The Foremost policy was issued in New Jersey and provided uninsured/underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage up to $250,000 per person. Petitioner also owned a motorcycle, which was registered and garaged in New Hampshire, and which was insured by respondent Progressive Northern Insurance Comapny under a policy that also provided UIM coverage up to $250,000 per person. Petitioner's other vehicles, which were both registered and garaged in New Hampshire, were insured by respondent Commerce Insurance Company under a policy that provided UIM coverage up to $250,000 per person. Petitioner's home was also insured by Commerce under a policy that contains a personal umbrella endorsement that provides $1,000,000 of single limited UIM coverage. Petitioner's New York attorney requested coverage information from Foremost, which Foremost provided. In April 2005, petitioner's attorney informed Progressive and Commerce that the petitioner intended to pursue UIM claims. Allstate offered petitioner its policy limit ($100,000). Petitioner's attorney notified Foremost, Progressive and Commerce of this fact and advised the respondent-insurers that, pursuant to New York law, they were either "required to grant [petitioner] permission to collect" the $100,000 from the Allstate policy "or to pay [her] [that] amount] within thirty (30) days." However, the New York law to which the attorney referred did not govern any of the insurers. Only Commerce responded to petitioner's attorney, granting petitioner permission to settle with Allstate. Allstate was thereafter released from liability. Petitioner sued Foremost, Progressive, and Commerce in New York in January 2011, more than six years after the accident. That lawsuit was eventually dismissed. While the insurers' motions to dismiss were pending, petitioner filed the underlying petition in this case for declaratory judgment. She moved, and the insurers cross-moved, for summary judgment. Commerce appealed, and petitioner cross-appealed the Superior Court's order partially granting and partially denying petitioner's summary judgment motion, denying Commerce's cross-motion for summary judgment, and granting cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Foremost and Progressive. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determination that petitioner forfeited her right to recover primary insurance coverage under the Foremost policy and her right to recover excess insurance coverage under the Progressive policy and reversed its conclusion that Commerce had to "drop down" to provide primary coverage. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bartlett v. Commerce Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners Raymond and Pamela Choquette filed separate petitions against respondents Phillippe Roy (P.E. Roy), individually and as trustee of the Roy Family Trust, Jason Roy and Thomas and Kelly Robichaud. Consolidated case related to the transfer of, use o and access to certain parcels of land originally owned by petitioners and currently owned by respondents. Petitioners appealed, and respondents cross-appealed the superior court's order resolving the dispute. Because the trial court found that P.E. Roy had no right to maintain a road that access the parcels in question, the court did not reach the issue of whether P.E. Roy's specific acts of maintenance interfered with the rights of petitioners or other users of the easement. The Supreme Court, therefore, held only that the trial court erred in ruling that P.E. Roy did not have the right and duty to maintain the easement over "Sugar Shack" Right of Way. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling on this issue and remanded for further proceedings as the trial court might deem warranted, including, if necessary, determination of whether P.E. Roy's actions interfered with the rights of the petitioners or other users of the easement. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Choquette v. Roy" on Justia Law

Defendants, Keith McNamara, Shirley Benton, and Jerel Benton, appealed: (1) a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, Richard and Mary Murray, on their claim that the defendants breached the implied warranty of workmanlike quality; (2) a Superior Court order denying their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim; and (3) a Superior Court order finding that the defendants violated the CPA when they built the plaintiffs' home with latent structural defects that caused mold growth. Defendants argued that, because plaintiffs' claim was exempt from the CPA, the trial court erred by denying their motion to dismiss. Defendants added that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the plaintiffs breach of implied warranty claim. There is no dispute that the transaction at issue here is the defendants alleged construction of the house with latent structural defects, not any representations that the defendants made to others during or after construction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, finding that because the house was completed in 2004 and was purchased by the plaintiffs five years later and the allegedly wrongful transaction occurred more than three years before the plaintiffs "knew or reasonably should have known" of it, the construction of the house was an exempt transaction pursuant to RSA 358-A:3, IV-a and that plaintiffs' CPA claim should have been dismissed. Thus, the Court reversed the trial court's ruling on the CPA claim. However, the Court was not persuaded that defendants were insulated from liability on the breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike quality claim. Because the Court reversed the trial court's judgment on the CPA claim, defendants failed to show that they were prejudiced with respect to the breach of warranty claim. View "Murray v. McNamara" on Justia Law

Defendant Makenzy Thelusma was convicted by jury of possession of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) an inculpatory statement he made to the police should have been suppressed; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his heroin and cocaine convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Thelusma" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brandon Kelly challenged a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits for severe injuries he sustained while driving between a job site and his place of employment. The CAB ruled that the injuries did not arise out of his employment as required by RSA 281-A:2, XI (2010). Petitioner was an employee of Advanced Sheet Metal in Hudson. His job involved traveling to job sites in a company truck. After working at a job site in Massachusetts, petitioner left for the company shop in Hudson where he intended to unload the truck. While driving, he fell asleep and hit a utility pole. As a result of the accident, his lower leg was amputated. Petitioner sought workers' compensation benefits. After respondent Arbella Insurance Company denied his claim, a hearing was held before the New Hampshire Department of Labor, which awarded benefits. Respondent appealed to the CAB, which, in a 2-1 decision, denied the petitioner's claim. The CAB found that it was undisputed that the petitioner was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident, and that the accident occurred because he fell asleep while driving. However, the CAB ruled that the injuries did not arise out of his employment. The CAB found that the injury was caused by a "mixed risk," and that petitioner failed to prove that "whatever abnormal weariness, if any, [he] might have been suffering that day was caused by his employment." Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, then appealed the CAB's decision. In "Margeson," the New Hampshire Supreme Court instructed the CAB that, in all future cases, it should make a finding regarding the cause of the claimant's injury: if the cause is a neutral risk, the increased-risk test applied; if the cause was a non-neutral risk, the claimant must prove legal and medical causation under the "Steinberg I" test. In this case, after concluding that the injury-causing risk was a mixed risk, the CAB ruled that, to be compensated, petitioner had to prove that his weariness was work-induced, and that petitioner failed to do so. The Supreme Court did not agree with the CAB that petitioner had to prove work-induced weariness as a prerequisite to receiving compensation in this case. "There can be no question that the injurious effects of falling asleep were increased by the environment in which the petitioner found himself at the time he fell asleep behind the wheel of a moving truck. We have no difficulty concluding on this record, as a matter of law, that the petitioner's employment was 'a substantial contributing factor to the injury.'" View "Appeal of Brandon Kelly " on Justia Law

In this declaratory judgment proceeding, respondents, David and Joanne Hodges, appealed a Superior Court order ruling that they must contribute to the maintenance and repair of an easement they hold over property owned by the petitioner, Village Green Condominium Association (Village Green). The Hodgeses objected, arguing: (1) that the plain language of the easement deed "addressed the issue of maintenance and improvement of the right of way" and "gave [them] the affirmative right, but not the corresponding obligation, to improve and maintain the right of way;" (2) Village Green's claim was barred by waiver and laches; and (3) because Village Green "never made any demand upon [them] to contribute to the cost of the maintenance and improvement of the right of way," and because they "did nothing to maintain, repair or improve the easement," the course of dealing of the parties was such that they are under no obligation to contribute to the easement's maintenance and repair. Following the trial court's ruling, the parties entered into a settlement agreement regarding the nature and extent of the Hodgeses' contribution obligation. In the agreement, the parties acknowledged that the Hodgeses intended to appeal the trial court's ruling as to their obligation to contribute to easement maintenance and repair, and established an agreed-upon procedure for determining the past and future maintenance obligations should the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirm the trial court's ruling. This appeal followed. The Supreme Court, finding no reversible error, affirmed. View "Village Green Condo. Ass'n v. Hodges" on Justia Law

Defendant Stanley West, II was convicted by jury on three counts of simple assault and one count of resisting arrest or detention. At trial, defendant objected to the trial court's proposed jury instruction on the defense of premises. The trial court overruled the defendant's objection. At the close of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss the resisting arrest or detention charge, arguing that the State presented no evidence that the police officer attempted to arrest or detain the defendant. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, defendant argued that the trial court erred: (1) by instructing the jury that the defendant must exhaust all non-violent alternatives before using force in defense of premises; and (2) by denying his motion to dismiss the resisting arrest or detention charge for insufficient evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. West" on Justia Law