Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a jury trial, defendant Steven Collins was convicted on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), and two counts of felonious sexual assault (FSA). All three charges involved the same victim: the AFSA charge alleged a “pattern” of sexual assaults occurring on or between January 1, 2009, and November 30, 2009; and the two FSA charges alleged specific instances of sexual assault occurring within that same time period. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the pattern AFSA charge for insufficient evidence that the sexual assaults occurred “over a period of 2 months or more;” (2) overruling the defendant’s objection to the State’s closing argument, which allegedly advocated for the use of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence; and (3) imposing a sentence on one of the FSA convictions to run consecutively to the sentence on the pattern AFSA conviction in violation of the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in sentencing defendant, and agreed that double jeopardy would have been violated had defendant been convicted of two discrete acts of FSA and convicted of a pattern AFSA that relied upon the same discrete acts. Defendant requested only that the Supreme Court vacate the consecutive sentence imposed for one of the FSA convictions. He did not ask that the Supreme Court vacate the sentence imposed for the other FSA conviction nor that the Court vacate the FSA convictions themselves. Accordingly, the Court vacated only the sentence on the FSA conviction which was imposed to run consecutively to the AFSA sentence. View "New Hampshire v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant Steven Collins was convicted by jury on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), and two counts of felonious sexual assault (FSA). The three charges involved the same victim. The AFSA charge alleged a "pattern" of sexual assaults and the two FSA charged alleged specific instances of sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the pattern AFSA charge for insufficient evidence that the sexual assaults occurred “over a period of 2 months or more” as required by RSA 632-A:1, I-c (2007); (2) overruling the defendant’s objection to the State’s closing argument, which allegedly advocated for the use of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence; and (3) imposing a sentence on one of the FSA convictions to run consecutively to the sentence on the pattern AFSA conviction in violation of the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court as to defendant's first two alleged errors on appeal. With regard to his Double Jeopardy claim, in the absence of a jury instruction, the Court had no way of knowing whether defendant was being punished twice for the same act. Accordingly, since the Court could not exclude the possibility that defendant was subjected to multiple punishments for the same act, it concluded that defendant’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution were violated. Defendant requested only that the Supreme Court vacate the consecutive sentence imposed for one of the FSA convictions. He did not ask that the sentence imposed for the other FSA conviction or the FSA convictions themselves. Accordingly, the Court vacated only the sentence on the FSA conviction which was imposed to run consecutively to the AFSA sentence. View "New Hampshire v. Collins" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Kempton appealed, and respondent Peggy Kempton cross-appealed their final divorce decree. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred by denying his request for a fault-based divorce. He also challenged the trial court's alimony award and property distribution. In her cross-appeal, respondent also challenged the trial court's alimony award and property distribution. In addition, she argued that the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process by denying her request for a continuance and "forc[ing] her to appear at the parties' two[-]day divorce trial by telephone." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Robert Kempton & Peggy Kempton" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jonathan Duchesne, Matthew Jajuga, and Michael Buckley, appealed a superior court decision denying their request for a declaratory judgment and an injunction to remove their names from the so-called "Laurie List." The petitioners were officers of the Manchester Police Department. In 2010, while off duty, petitioners were involved in an incident at a bar in Manchester. The incident was widely reported in the media, and the Manchester chief of police ordered a criminal and internal affairs investigation. Following the investigation, the chief found that the petitioners had violated several departmental policies, including a prohibition against the unnecessary use of force, and each officer was suspended for a period of time. Pursuant to protocol, the chief sent letters to the Hillsborough County Attorney's Office stating that petitioners had "engaged in conduct (excessive use of force) that may be subject to disclosure under [New Hampshire] v. Laurie." Consequently, the county attorney placed the petitioners' names on the "Laurie List," which the trial court described as "an informal list of police officers who have been identified as having potentially exculpatory evidence in their personnel files or otherwise." Pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the petitioners' union and the City of Manchester, the petitioners filed grievances regarding the discipline imposed by the chief. After a hearing, an arbitrator found that "the City of Manchester did not have just cause to take disciplinary action against [the petitioners] for actions taken or not taken" during the incident. As a result of this decision, petitioners were compensated for lost earnings and information regarding the incident was removed from their personnel files. While this process was occurring, the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office conducted an independent criminal investigation into the incident. Its final report concluded that the petitioners' conduct "was justified under New Hampshire law and no criminal charges are warranted." The chief again wrote to the then Hillsborough County Attorney, this time requesting that, pursuant to the arbitrator's award, petitioners be removed from the "Laurie List." The county attorney declined. Petitioners also asked the attorney general to direct the county attorney to remove the petitioners from the "Laurie List" which the attorney general also declined. After a hearing, the trial court denied petitioners relief. Although the "Laurie List" is not available to members of the public generally, placement on the list all but guarantees that information about the officers will be disclosed to trial courts and/or defendants or their counsel any time the officers testify in a criminal case, thus potentially affecting their reputations and professional standing with those with whom they work and interact on a regular basis. Here, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion and that petitioners were entitled to be removed from the "Laurie List." Therefore, to the extent that the petitioners' names appear on the "Laurie List" maintained by the Hillsborough County Attorney's Office, we hold that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in failing to order that their names be removed from said list. In light of this ruling, the Court did not address the other relief requested. View "Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney" on Justia Law

Respondent D.H. appealed a circuit court order that granted the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families' petition (DCYF) to terminate his parental rights over his son, K.H., on the ground that he failed to correct, within 12 months, the conditions leading to a finding of neglect. On appeal, respondent argued that: (1) the trial court admitted hearsay evidence in violation of RSA 170-C:10 (2014); and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that he failed to correct the conditions leading to the original neglect finding and its determination that terminating his parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re K.H. " on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Forster, d/b/a Forster's Christmas Tree Farm & Gift Shoppe, appealed a superior court decision to uphold a zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) determination in favor of respondent the Town of Henniker that "weddings [and] like events are not accessory uses" to the petitioner's farm, and that hosting such events was not a permitted use in the farm's zoning district. Because the Supreme Court concluded that petitioner has not established, as he argued, that he had a right to conduct commercial weddings and similar events on his farm, without obtaining either a special exception or a variance, it affirmed. View "Forster v. Town of Henniker" on Justia Law

Petitioner City of Keene appealed a superior court order dismissing its claims of tortious interference with contractual relations, negligence, and civil conspiracy, and denying its request for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The City filed suit against respondents James Cleaveland, Garrett Ean, Kate Ager, Ian Bernard (a/k/a Ian Freeman), Graham Colson, and Pete Eyre, because they followed closely behind the City’s parking enforcement officers (PEOs) on their daily patrols through downtown Keene, videotaping them, criticizing their work, and "saving" cars by putting money into expired parking meters before a parking ticket was issued. Respondents testified that they engaged in these activities to protest parking enforcement because they believed that parking was not a criminal act, and that parking tickets were a "threat against [the] people." After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the action, ruling that the City’s claims were barred by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; the trial court also denied the City’s petition for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. On appeal, the City does not challenge the trial court’s conclusions that the content of the respondents’ speech is protected by the First Amendment because it relates to a matter of public concern, and that the respondents’ activities take place in a traditional public forum. The City nonetheless asserts that specific aspects of the respondents’ conduct — “following closely, chasing, running after, approaching quickly from behind, lurking outside bathrooms, yelling loudly, and filming from close proximity” — is not protected by the First Amendment, and had a tortious impact on the PEOs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the trial court erred when, solely because it had dismissed the underlying tortious interference claim, it denied injunctive relief without considering all the factual circumstances of the case. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Keene v. Cleaveland" on Justia Law

Respondent City of Nashua appealed a Superior Court order ruling that it could properly consider a tax abatement for the 2012 tax year for petitioner-taxpayer Nashua Coliseum, LLC. On appeal, the parties proposed contrary interpretations of RSA 76:17-c, II (2012), the statutory provision that addressed the effect of a successful abatement appeal on subsequently assessed taxes. The City argued that, under the plain language of the statute, Coliseum had not satisfied all of the prerequisites for the statute to apply. The City further argued that the statute was inapplicable because of the parties’ settlement agreement, which stated that the abated value would not be deemed to be the correct assessment value for purposes of the statute. Based upon a plain reading of the statutory language, the Supreme Court agreed with the City that the statute required the superior court to find that the assessment value was incorrect in order for the taxpayer to be excused from complying with the filing deadlines otherwise applicable to tax abatement requests. Accordingly, the trial court's order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Nashua Coliseum, LLC v. City of Nashua " on Justia Law

Defendant Armando Lisasuain was convicted by jury of, among other offenses, two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, the argued that the trial court: (1) erred by finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove lack of consent by the victim on the aggravated felonious sexual assault charges; (2) may have erred by not disclosing more documents from its in camera review of certain of the victim’s records; and (3) erred by not allowing cross-examination of a police officer as to the nature and duration of his interrogation of the defendant. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lisasuain" on Justia Law

In June 2012, after the parties had been married for more than 30 years, petitioner Susan Achille filed for a no-fault divorce. At the time, the parties lived in separate residences at the same address. One night in early 2012, respondent George Achille, Jr. went to petitioner's home with a box that contained a gun and told her that he was going to use it. Respondent yelled at petitioner, pursued her through the home, grabbed her by the hair, threw her against a counter, choked her, slammed a door on her, and pushed her to the floor. According to petitioner, respondent had also “hit [her] plenty of times” in the past, including in June 2012 when the respondent had “hit [her] across the face and dislocated [her] jaw.” Respondent denied that the abuse occurred, and testified that, on December 4, the petitioner hit him with an umbrella and fell after tripping over a pair of boots. The next day, petitioner reported the incident to the police. At that time, she did not tell the police about the gun, press criminal charges against the respondent, or seek a protective order. Later that day, the parties had dinner together at a restaurant. On December 6, they drove together to Manchester for mediation regarding the divorce. On December 7, petitioner filed a domestic violence petition in which she described the incident that occurred in her home days earlier. The court issued a temporary domestic violence protective order and scheduled a final hearing for later that month. On December 27, petitioner wrote to police seeking to press charges against respondent arising out of the early December incident. Criminal charges were subsequently filed against respondent. During the next year, at respondent's request, the trial court repeatedly continued the final hearing in the domestic violence case. In December 2013, the trial court ordered that the hearing be rescheduled for “after October 1, 2014” when “[respondent's] criminal matters have been resolved.” Nonetheless, on January 24, 2014, sua sponte, the trial court vacated its earlier scheduling order and ordered that the matter be set for a final hearing, which happened to be the same day as the hearing on the merits in the parties' divorce. Respondent appealed several orders the domestic violence court made, specifically: (1) when the court vacated its earlier order continuing the final hearing in the domestic violence proceeding; (2) when the court denied respondent's motion to recuse the presiding judge from the proceeding, despite having granted the respondent's motion to recuse in the parties' divorce proceeding; and (3) when the court entered a final domestic violence protective order. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Achille v. Achille" on Justia Law