Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Deborah and Matthew Hogan appealed a Superior Court decision granting defendant Pat’s Peak Skiing, LLC's motion to dismiss their case. On February 4, 2012, both plaintiffs fell from a ski chairlift while skiing at defendant’s premises. Plaintiffs were evaluated that day by a member of defendant’s ski patrol and incident reports were completed. Both plaintiffs reported injuries from the fall. In May, plaintiffs sent notice to defendant by certified return receipt mail, stating that they had retained counsel regarding the February incident. The letter of notice was dated May 3, 2012, arrived at the Henniker post office on May 5, 2012, and was delivered to defendant May 10, 2012. Plaintiffs filed a complaint on December 3, 2013, seeking damages for negligence, recklessness, and loss of consortium. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs did not provide notice by May 4, 2012 (ninety days from the date of the injury) as required by RSA 225-A:25, IV (2011). Defendant asserted that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the statute because the notice did not arrive until, at the earliest, May 5, 2012, the ninety-first day. In response, plaintiffs countered that mailing the notice on May 3, 2012, the eighty-ninth day, satisfied the statutory requirement. Alternatively, plaintiffs contended that they adhered to the notice provision by completing incident reports and giving verbal notice on the day of the incident and also by giving verbal notice on a later visit to the ski area. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to give proper notice. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the statutory phrase “shall be notified,” as it appeared in RSA 225-A:25, IV, was satisfied upon dispatch of notice or upon receipt of notice. Plaintiffs argued that the Court adopt the common law “mailbox rule” in interpreting the notice provision; defendant argued the Court interpret the provision to require actual receipt of notice. The Court concluded that both the plaintiffs’ and the defendant’s proffered constructions were reasonable. Because RSA 225-A:25, IV’s language was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the Court would normally resolve the ambiguity by determining the legislature’s intent in light of legislative history. In this case, however, the legislative history was not helpful. "In accordance with the principles of uniformity and certainty," the Court held that notice given pursuant to RSA 225-A:25, IV was effective upon mailing. In doing so, the Court narrowly applied the common law mailbox rule to RSA 225-A:25, IV," in consonance with holdings from other jurisdictions." View "Hogan v. Pat's Peak Skiing, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jillian Bergeron appeals a Superior Court order lifting a preliminary injunction on the foreclosure sale of her home and dismissing her case. Plaintiff executed a promissory note in favor of Drew Mortgage Associates, Inc. The Mortgage identified Drew Mortgage as the lender, plaintiff as the mortgagor, and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the mortgagee. MERS later assigned the Mortgage to defendant New York Community Bank. The Note was also apparently transferred a number of times, because an allonge with a number of endorsements appears in the record. Defendant notified plaintiff of the foreclosure sale. On or about April 15, 2013, plaintiff filed a verified petition to enjoin the foreclosure sale and for an ex parte restraining order. She admitted falling behind on her payments, but challenged defendant’s authority to foreclose because “[i]t appears that at the very least, [the defendant] does not own the note.” Following denial of plaintiff’s loan modification application, defendant requested that the court lift the injunction and allow the foreclosure sale to proceed. The court did so, ruling, in relevant part, that defendant “has the authority to foreclose whether it actually holds the note or is merely acting as an agent for the entity which holds the note.” On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in: (1) ruling that the entity foreclosing a mortgage need not hold both the mortgage and the note; (2) finding that plaintiff clearly intended that the Note and Mortgage be held by separate entities; and (3) failing to make the necessary finding that defendant was entitled to enforce the Note. These specific arguments, however, were largely subsumed within plaintiff’s more general contention that because “the mortgage and note are not severable,” a mortgagee must be entitled to enforce the promissory note in order to conduct a foreclosure sale pursuant to RSA chapter 479. The Supreme Court affirmed. Because the Mortgage evidenced an agency relationship between the lender (Drew Mortgage) and the mortgagee (MERS), and the Mortgage contemplated that both the lender and MERS could assign their interests, and plaintiff did not challenge the validity of the assignment of either the Note or the Mortgage, the Court concluded that defendant has the authority, as agent of the noteholder, to exercise the power of sale. Therefore, the Court held that the trial court did not err in lifting the injunction and dismissing the action. The Court did not address whether defendant could foreclose if the agency relationship was irregular or legitimately challenged by the plaintiff. We also need not decide whether, absent an agency relationship between the noteholder and the mortgage holder, a party who holds only the mortgage has the authority to foreclose. View "Bergeron v. New York Community Bank" on Justia Law

Respondent Shane Rokowski appealed the final decree in his divorce from petitioner Tammy Rokowski. On appeal, he argued that the Circuit Court erred by: (1) conducting its own internet research to ascertain the value of the marital home; (2) inequitably distributing the parties' assets and debts; (3) awarding the petitioner permanent lifetime alimony of $750 monthly; and (4) requiring him to pay certain expenses while the divorce was pending. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in relying upon internet research to ascertain the marital home's value. The Court found that the accuracy of the trial court's sources in this regard could have reasonably been questioned, and as such, failed to meet the standard for judicial notice. Because the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's distribution of marital property, it declined to address respondent's arguments that the trial court improperly: (1) referred to, and allegedly considered when distributing the property, his drinking, hiding income, domestic violence, and alienation of the parties' children; (2) divided the parties' debts unequally; and (3) awarded the petitioner any interest in his businesses. For the same reason, the Court also declined to address respondent's arguments about the alimony award. Because the trial court based its alimony award in part upon 'the asset distribution,' and because that distribution was vacated, the alimony award was also vacated. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings on valuation and distribution of the marital property. View "In the Matter of Rokowski" on Justia Law

The parties were married in August 2005 and were divorced by a New Hampshire court in 2009. When they divorced, both parties lived and worked in New Hampshire. The parties had two children. The parenting plan entered with their divorce decree gave the parties joint decision-making responsibility for the children, who resided primarily with petitioner Mary Sheys. In January 2013, petitioner notified respondent Eric Blackburn that she had to relocate from Manchester to Natick, Massachusetts, because she had been unemployed since November 2012 and had obtained a new job in Natick. After petitioner moved to Natick, respondent filed a motion in which he argued that he should be awarded primary residential responsibility for the children and that petitioner should have been found in contempt for having relocated in violation of the parties’ parenting plan. The trial court denied this relief, finding that although petitioner did not provide respondent with the 60-day notice required by the parties’ parenting plan, she provided him “at least 40-45 days” notice before relocating, which afforded him “ample time to . . . request . . . a hearing as provided by statute.” The court entered a new parenting plan, pursuant to which the parties again had joint decision-making responsibility for the children, who again were to reside primarily with petitioner. Respondent again asked the court to modify the parenting plan and to hold petitioner in contempt. At a scheduled hearing on the contempt allegation, petitioner moved to dismiss, arguing that because she and the children had been Massachusetts residents for a year, and because she had a motion pending in a Massachusetts court regarding the divorce decree and parenting plan, the New Hampshire court lacked jurisdiction. The New Hampshire court dismissed respondent's motion. Respondent appealed the New Hampshire trial court's order granting the motion to dismiss, arguing the trial court’s order was contrary to RSA 458-A:13, I (Supp. 2014), a provision of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Because the Supreme Court agreed with respondent, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Sheys & Blackburn" on Justia Law

The City of Laconia owned and maintained Opechee Park. In May 2012, plaintiff Margaret Dolbeare was enjoying the playground equipment at the park with her granddaughter. As plaintiff approached the park swings, her foot caught under the edge of a mat. She fell and suffered injuries. This case was an interlocutory appeal by the City when the Superior Court denied its motion to dismiss negligence and nuisance claims. The trial court transferred two questions for the Supreme Court's review: (1) did the trial court err in finding that the City owed Plaintiff a duty, despite RSA 212:34, II; and (2) did the trial court err in holding that the City was not immune from suit under RSA 508:14, I, because “using playground equipment is not . . . recreation within the meaning of RSA 508:14”? After review, the Court answered both questions in the affirmative as they related to plaintiff’s negligence claim. Plaintiff argued that, notwithstanding either RSA 212:34, II or RSA 508:14, I, the City was liable for its alleged negligence under RSA 507-B:2 (2010). Because the trial court did not address this argument, the Supreme Court declined to do so in the first instance. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court’s order denying the City’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s negligence claim. View "Dolbeare v. City of Laconia" on Justia Law

In 2012, Logan Lamb, a student at a school operated by defendant, the Shaker Regional School District, was playing football on the playground during the lunch recess when another student tackled him and “slammed him to the ground,” causing injury to his head. Logan did not return to class after lunch, and none of the school’s staff reported the incident on the playground or that Logan was missing from class. Logan was later found wandering the halls, disoriented. He was taken to the nurse’s office, where he remained for approximately fifty minutes, at which point the nurse contacted plaintiff to pick him up. The nurse did not call for an ambulance. Plaintiff took Logan to the emergency room, where she learned that he had possibly suffered a concussion. In 2014, plaintiff filed her complaint alleging defendant “acted in a special relationship to [Logan], taking responsibility for [his] health, safety, and [well-being] while he was under its care, custody, and control,” and that it had breached its duty leading to Logan’s injuries. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that RSA 507-B:5 immunized it from plaintiff’s negligence claims and that those claims did not fall within the exception to immunity created by RSA 507-B:2. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by failing to apply the exception to general immunity pursuant to RSA 507-B:2 (2010). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lamb v. Shaker Regional Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioner Jennifer Pike appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to respondent Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (as Trustee), in her action to enjoin the foreclosure sale of real property located in New London. On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court erred when it determined that she lacked standing to challenge the assignment of the mortgage to the Trust, and when it declined to enjoin the foreclosure, notwithstanding her assertion that she had a homestead right. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pike v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co." on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant Louise Pinault was involved in two motor vehicle accidents in Hollis. She was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) and with violating the “conduct after an accident” statute. Following a bench trial, during which defendant represented herself, she was acquitted on the DUI charge, but was convicted on a conduct after an accident charge. As part of her sentence, she was ordered to pay $525 in restitution for property damage. Defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that the complaint alleging conduct after an accident was insufficient and that the restitution order was improper. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal followed. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court improperly ordered restitution because the only offense for which she was convicted did not cause any economic loss; and (2) the complaint against her was insufficient to support her conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part. The Court found: (1) the plain language of the restitution statute clearly and unambiguously required a causal connection between the criminal act and the economic loss or damage, and the crime for which the defendant was convicted necessarily occurred afterward. As the damage was already done, the defendant’s criminal conduct did not cause the economic loss suffered; and (2) the alleged deficiency in the complaint did not affect the outcome of the case, therefore failing to demonstrate plain error. View "New Hampshire v. Pinault" on Justia Law

On June 7, 2012, Joseph Jennings was arrested on drug-related charges and released on personal recognizance bail to the custody of defendant. That day, he was also served with a temporary order of protection that prohibited him, and third parties acting on his behalf, from contacting a certain woman. Approximately 45 minutes after Jennings was released, the woman reported that defendant Amy Mouser was contacting her on Jennings’s behalf, in violation of the protective order. Police went to the woman’s residence, where he retrieved drug paraphernalia that the woman said belonged to Jennings. Defendant was ultimately charged with and convicted by jury on one count of possession of a controlled drug (cocaine). On appeal, she argued that the Superior Court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence after a search of her vehicle. After review of the specific facts entered in the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no error in denying her motion, and affirmed the Superior Court. View "New Hampshire v. Mouser" on Justia Law

Respondent Jerry Roberts was convicted of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and sentenced to four-to-ten years at the New Hampshire State Prison. Respondent also received a sentence of one-to-two years for related conduct; that sentence was suspended. Respondent began serving his four-to-ten year sentence in 2008. On April 1, 2013, the respondent was classified as a C-1 inmate and resided in a halfway house at the prison. While at the halfway house, respondent was arrested and consequently returned to general population status in the prison. Following his arrest, the State moved to impose his one-to-two year suspended sentence. The Superior Court partially granted the State’s motion: it imposed the one-year minimum sentence, which was to be served consecutively to the four-to-ten year sentence, but suspended the two-year maximum of the sentence. In August 2013, respondent appeared before the Adult Parole Board (APB) after he had served the minimum four years of his AFSA sentence. At that time, he was “approved for parole to consecutive,” and his parole hearing paperwork indicated that he must have “review prior to release consideration” with the Administrative Review Committee (ARC). Upon completion of his one-year consecutive sentence in August 2014, the respondent was not released from the prison into the community. Instead, he continued serving his original four-to-ten year sentence. The State asserted that the respondent was not released because he had not yet completed the required sexual offender treatment program. The respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was entitled to immediate release from the prison because he had been paroled from his four-to-ten year sentence to his one-year consecutive sentence, and he had completed the one-year sentence. The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the respondent was not entitled to immediate release because the APB had not granted him “parole to release” from prison, but instead had merely granted him “parole to a consecutive sentence,” and thus the APB retained the authority to determine whether he should be released upon completion of the consecutive sentence. Following a hearing, the court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, granted the respondent’s petition, and ordered that the respondent be released from prison. Thereafter, the State sought certiorari review of the trial court’s order, arguing the Adult Parole Board (APB) exceeded its authority or otherwise violated respondent's rights when it paroled him to a consecutive sentence but then refused to release him from prison upon his completion of the minimum term of that sentence. The Supreme Court held that the APB’s actions were not improper and therefore reversed the Superior Court's order granting respondent habeas relief. View "Petition of Warden, New Hampshire State Prison " on Justia Law