Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, petitioner Diana Wolters, and respondent John Wolters, appealed circuit court orders pertaining to their divorce proceeding. Diana argued the original trial judge erred by denying her motion to recuse the trial judge and that all orders issued by that judge should have been vacated; and erred by considering tax consequences when determining the value of the parties' property. John argued the subsequent trial judge erred by denying his motion to dismiss the petitioner's motion to correct property distribution and by awarding a certain percentage of eminent domain litigation proceeds to Diana. Diana cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred by not awarding her a greater percentage of the eminent domain litigation proceeds. Upon review of the parties' arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Supreme Court concluded that because sale or transfer of the properties at issue was neither required by the trial court's order, nor certain to occur within a short time after the divorce decree, the trial court erred to the extent that, when valuing the properties for distribution, it reduced the value of those properties to account for estimated taxes that would be due by the parties in the event of a sale or transfer of the properties. Accordingly, the trial court's distribution order was vacated and the case remanded for distribution of assets consistent with the Court's opinion. Because the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's entire property distribution, it did not address other arguments made about the eminent domain proceeds. View "In the Matter of Diana Wolters & John Wolters" on Justia Law

While riding on a school bus, Morgan Graveline was involved in an altercation with a another student, A.M. A.M. punched Morgan in the face. The bus driver reported the incident three days later. The school principal, Barry Albert, downloaded the bus driver’s report on February 8 and met with Morgan the next day. Morgan minimized the incident, told Albert she did not know the name of the other student involved in the altercation, and asked Albert not to notify her mother. Although Albert informed Morgan that he would have to notify her mother, he did not do so. Albert met with A.M. ten days after the incident whereby A.M. admitted to hitting Morgan. A.M. received a three-day suspension. Meanwhile, Morgan received threatening Facebook messages from another student, A.A., days before A.M.'s suspension. On the day Albert learned about the messages, he went to the cafeteria to ask A.A. to see him after lunch. After Albert left the cafeteria, a fight broke out. Morgan was hit several times, sustaining injuries to her head, face, and mouth. She was transported to the emergency room. Albert met with Morgan’s mother, plaintiff Danielle (Graveline) Gauthier, in the emergency room and, for the first time, told her about the bus incident and the threatening Facebook messages. Plaintiff brought suit to recover for Morgan's injuries. The trial court granted Albert's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiff argued that Albert was negligent for failing to notify plaintiff on the alleged bullying. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gauthier v. Manchester School District, SAU #37" on Justia Law

Respondent Frank Ball appealed a circuit court order denying his motion to terminate his child support obligation as to his and Glenda Ball's eldest child. Respondent argued as grounds for termination the child having turned 18 and graduating from high school. In July 2005, the parties entered into a separation agreement in Massachusetts requiring respondent to pay petitioner weekly child support until the "emancipation" of the parties' children. The agreement's definition of "emancipation," consistent with Massachusetts law, required child support to continue after a child had attained the age of 18 or had graduated from high school provided that certain conditions were met. Under the agreement, respondent was obligated to pay support for a child until the child reached age 23 if the child was "attending a post-secondary accredited educational training school or a two-year or four-year accredited college program as a full-time student" and was "domiciled in the home of a parent and . . . principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance due to enrollment in the educational program." According to respondent (and not disputed by petitioner), the parties and their children relocated from Massachusetts to New Hampshire in 2008, and the Massachusetts divorce decree was registered in New Hampshire. At that time, the parties requested the New Hampshire court to approve a partial stipulation modifying their Massachusetts decree. In the modification, they agreed that the definition of "emancipation" contained in the Massachusetts decree was "stricken" and that New Hampshire law would apply. The parties also agreed that the respondent's child support obligation would "be payable in accordance with New Hampshire law . . . until the parties' youngest child reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school whichever is later." In her argument before the Supreme Court, petitioner relied upon RSA 546-B:49, III, which provided in pertinent part: "A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state." Petitioner contended that, pursuant to this provision, because Massachusetts law would not shorten the duration of the respondent's child support obligation under these circumstances, the New Hampshire court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that petitioner waived the alleged error by entering into the 2008 stipulation and by not arguing in the 2008 proceedings that applying New Hampshire law to the duration of the respondent's child support obligation was error. Because the 2008 New Hampshire order was not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and because the petitioner waived any legal error in the 2008 order approving the parties' stipulation, the trial court erred by not extinguishing respondent's obligation to support the parties' eldest child as required by the court's 2008 order. View "In the Matter of Glenda J. Ball and Frank A. Ball " on Justia Law

Plaintiff-landlord, Mountain View Park, LLC appealed a circuit court decision in which the court declined to approve an agreement concerning, in part, rent arrearages owed by defendant-tenant Gerald Robson, Jr., and issued a writ of possession. In June 2013, the parties entered into a rental agreement, whereby defendant rented a mobile home owned by plaintiff. Defendant eventually fell behind in his rent payments. In May 2014, plaintiff served defendant with a demand for rent and an eviction notice. When defendant failed to pay the rent arrearages, plaintiff filed this possession action. In June 2014, the parties entered into an agreement to cure defendant’s arrearages and avoid eviction. The agreement was submitted to the trial court for approval; however, the court declined to approve it. In its denial of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the court explained that the “agreement provides for issuance of a writ of possession for an indefinite period of time in the future for the nonpayment of future rent not yet due, in addition to the unpaid rent which forms the basis of this eviction action,” and that RSA 540:13-c, II (2007) “does not include authority of the court to issue a writ of possession at some indefinite time in the future for the nonpayment of future rent not yet due.” Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Mountain View Park, LLC v. Robson" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Derry appealed a Superior Court decision granting the motion for summary judgment filed by petitioners, Accurate Transport, Inc. and 41 Ashleigh Drive, LLC (Ashleigh Drive), on the basis that an abutter’s appeal to the Derry Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) was untimely. In November 2012, Accurate Transport submitted a preliminary site plan application to the Derry Planning Board for approval to operate a “Dumpster Depot” business on property owned by Ashleigh Drive. The property is located within the Town’s Industrial III zoning district, which permits, among other uses, contractor’s yards and freight and trucking terminals. The Technical Review Committee (TRC) held a meeting to evaluate the proposed site plan and approved the proposed plan. Thereafter, petitioners filed a formal site plan application with the Planning Board. After numerous public meetings, the Planning Board ultimately approved the plan application. Several months later, an abutter to the property at issue, John O'Connor, appealed Planning Board's approval a few weeks after the Board's decision was issued. district, The ZBA concluded that the Town’s zoning ordinance did not permit the proposed use under any classification. After unsuccessfully moving for rehearing, petitioners appealed to the trial court and, subsequently, moved for summary judgment. Both parties moved for reconsideration, agreeing that the court erred by misapplying the time standards contained in the Town’s zoning ordinance. Observing that the written decision of the Planning Board was released on August 28, the court noted that O’Connor’s appeal (filed September 13) would be timely if he was appealing the final Planning Board site plan approval. However, the court concluded that O’Connor’s appeal did not challenge the Planning Board’s approval. Rather, the court found that O’Connor’s appeal challenged only the code enforcement officer’s determination that the proposed use of the subject property was permitted as a contractor’s yard. The court decided that the Planning Board accepted the code enforcement officer’s interpretation on June 19 when it voted to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. Because that vote was published on July 19, the court concluded that O’Connor had 20 days from July 19 to appeal to the ZBA. Given that his appeal was filed in September, the court determined that it was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the ZBA did not err by treating O’Connor’s appeal as an appeal of the August 21 decision. The trial court found, and the parties did not dispute, that the zoning ordinance provided a 20-day appeal period that began on the date of a written decision. Accordingly, the 20-day appeal period as to the August 21 decision began to run upon the issuance of the written decision on August 28. Because O’Connor’s appeal was filed September 13, it was within 20 days of August 28 and was, thus, timely. View "Accurate Transport, Inc. v. Town of Derry" on Justia Law

Petitioners Robert and Katherine Michele, trustees of the Robert C. Michele Revocable Trust (Micheles), appealed a Wetlands Council decision to uphold a decision of the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) to issue a permit allowing respondents Joseph and Linda Bremner to install a seasonal dock in water adjacent to the Micheles’ pond-front property over which the Bremners had an easement. The Supreme Court affirmed. "Contrary to the Micheles’ argument that the legislature could not have intended easement holders to be able to apply for a permit under the statute, we see no evidence that the purpose of the statute was to change the balance of property rights between fee owners and easement holders from what it was under the common law. [. . .] possession is not a requirement of an 'ownership' interest in land. [. . .] when there is an express grant of an easement, 'a grantee takes by implication whatever rights are reasonably necessary to enable it to enjoy the easement beneficially. This includes the right to make improvements that are reasonably necessary to enjoy the easement.'" View "Appeal of Robert Michele" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Kean appealed a superior court order granting in part and denying in part his motion for return of property. Defendant, while wearing an official but discontinued Manchester Police jacket, was observed by a Manchester Police Officer walking in front of a Manchester Police Department substation. Although the jacket had been discontinued in 1999, it bore a current Manchester Police Department patch. The officer stopped defendant, concerned that a passerby might mistake him for a police officer. Defendant stated that an attorney had confirmed that it was legal for him to wear the jacket, but the officer told him that continued wearing of the jacket would likely subject him to arrest for impersonating a police officer. Defendant was not arrested at that time. The next day, defendant, wearing the same jacket, was again observed walking past the Manchester Police Department substation, this time by a different Manchester Police Officer. Aware of the prior encounter, defendant was placed under arrest for impersonating a police officer. At trial, the case was dismissed, in part because of the Stateís inability to produce a material witness to the alleged crime. Defendant then moved for the return of the jacket. Following a hearing, the court found that the jacket, and implicitly the patch, were "at all times the property of the City of Manchester." However, the trial court ordered that the jacket be returned to defendant, subject to the condition that the Manchester Police patch be removed from the jacket sleeve. The court found that forfeiture of the patch best served the public interest. This appeal followed. Defendant contended that: the State had the burden of disproving his ownership; the State did not meet its burden; and that the trial court, therefore, erred in finding that defendant was not the rightful owner of the patch. The Supreme Court found, after review, that the trial court did not err in finding that the State had demonstrated ownership of the jacket and patch by the City of Manchester. The trial court did err, however, in ordering that the jacket be returned to the defendant, finding that the trial court may have ordered forfeiture to the State without first providing notice to the City of Manchester. As such the trial court's order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Kean" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Eldridge was a resident and condominium owner at the Whip-Poor-Will Condominium Complex in Hudson. The condominium complex was governed by two different entities: the Condominium Owners' Association (COA) and the Rolling Green at Whip-Poor-Will Townhouse Owners' Association (TOA). Each association had separate and distinct legal obligations as set forth in the Condominium Declaration. Plaintiff has several disabling impairments that impact his mobility. When a walkway had not been repaired as he requested, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against the COA with the New Hampshire Human Rights Commission (HRC). Shortly thereafter, the COA repaired the plaintiff's walkway. The HRC, which continued to investigate the matter despite the repair, determined that there was probable cause to support a finding of discrimination and notified the COA that it had scheduled a public hearing on the complaint. The COA subsequently removed the case to superior court and filed a motion to dismiss on numerous grounds. As relevant to this appeal, the COA argued that plaintiff's discrimination complaint should be dismissed because the HRC had not commenced proceedings within twenty-four months after the filing of the charge of discrimination, as required by statute. The Superior Court denied the COA's motion to dismiss, concluding that the twenty-four month limit specified in the statute was not jurisdictional. The COA then filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that: (1) the case was moot because the walkway had been repaired; (2) the COA was not an entity covered by the Human Rights Act; (3) the plaintiff's claim was time-barred; (4) there was no dispute that the COA had accommodated the plaintiff; and (5) the COA had no legal obligation or authority to replace the walkway because it was located in a Townhouse Limited Common Area. The Superior Court (Temple, J.) granted the COA's motion for summary judgment on the ground that, under the plain language of the Declaration, the COA lacked authority over plaintiff's walkway and, as such, plaintiff had pursued the wrong party in seeking an accommodation. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration in which he asserted, for the first time, that because the COA had arranged for the walkway to be repaired, it had authority to repair the walkway. The court denied plaintiff's motion, reaffirming its earlier determination that the TOA, not the COA, had sole control over the walkway, and refusing to consider both plaintiff's theory regarding the COA's "assumed" authority over the walkway and any "new evidence" in support thereof. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. The Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff's complaint was untimely under RSA 354-A:21, III, and as such, affirmed dismissal of his case. View "Eldridge v. Rolling Green at Whip-Poor-Will Condo. Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were four police officers who served on a drug task force who received reports that defendant’s 29-year-old son was engaged in illegal drug activity at a property in Greenland where he lived. The property was owned by the Beverly P. Mutrie Revocable Trust, of which defendant was trustee. During the execution of a search warrant at the Greenland property, defendant’s son shot and injured the plaintiffs. He then took his own life. Plaintiffs sued defendant, individually and in her capacity as trustee to recover for their injuries, alleging that she was responsible for their injuries because, “with the knowledge, information and belief” that her son was engaged in criminal activity, she “did recklessly and wantonly allow . . . criminal activity and conduct to take place at the subject property and otherwise directly and indirectly and wantonly and recklessly supported and facilitated [her son’s] criminal activity at the subject property.” The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiffs’ claim is barred by the Firefighter’s Rule. The trial court explained that the allegations that defendant had provided her son with housing, cars, and financial assistance, and also paid his legal defense costs were insufficient to support a finding of reckless or wanton conduct because that assistance did not “enable [her son] to shoot the police,” nor did it “contribute to his decision to do so.” Therefore, the trial court concluded, the defendant could not “reasonably be considered to have created or contributed to an unjustifiable risk of harm to others,” and that no exception to the Firefighter Rule applied. Plaintiffs appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kukesh v. Mutrie" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Deborah and Matthew Hogan appealed a Superior Court decision granting defendant Pat’s Peak Skiing, LLC's motion to dismiss their case. On February 4, 2012, both plaintiffs fell from a ski chairlift while skiing at defendant’s premises. Plaintiffs were evaluated that day by a member of defendant’s ski patrol and incident reports were completed. Both plaintiffs reported injuries from the fall. In May, plaintiffs sent notice to defendant by certified return receipt mail, stating that they had retained counsel regarding the February incident. The letter of notice was dated May 3, 2012, arrived at the Henniker post office on May 5, 2012, and was delivered to defendant May 10, 2012. Plaintiffs filed a complaint on December 3, 2013, seeking damages for negligence, recklessness, and loss of consortium. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs did not provide notice by May 4, 2012 (ninety days from the date of the injury) as required by RSA 225-A:25, IV (2011). Defendant asserted that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the statute because the notice did not arrive until, at the earliest, May 5, 2012, the ninety-first day. In response, plaintiffs countered that mailing the notice on May 3, 2012, the eighty-ninth day, satisfied the statutory requirement. Alternatively, plaintiffs contended that they adhered to the notice provision by completing incident reports and giving verbal notice on the day of the incident and also by giving verbal notice on a later visit to the ski area. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to give proper notice. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the statutory phrase “shall be notified,” as it appeared in RSA 225-A:25, IV, was satisfied upon dispatch of notice or upon receipt of notice. Plaintiffs argued that the Court adopt the common law “mailbox rule” in interpreting the notice provision; defendant argued the Court interpret the provision to require actual receipt of notice. The Court concluded that both the plaintiffs’ and the defendant’s proffered constructions were reasonable. Because RSA 225-A:25, IV’s language was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the Court would normally resolve the ambiguity by determining the legislature’s intent in light of legislative history. In this case, however, the legislative history was not helpful. "In accordance with the principles of uniformity and certainty," the Court held that notice given pursuant to RSA 225-A:25, IV was effective upon mailing. In doing so, the Court narrowly applied the common law mailbox rule to RSA 225-A:25, IV," in consonance with holdings from other jurisdictions." View "Hogan v. Pat's Peak Skiing, LLC" on Justia Law