Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Jennifer Pike appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to respondent Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (as Trustee), in her action to enjoin the foreclosure sale of real property located in New London. On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court erred when it determined that she lacked standing to challenge the assignment of the mortgage to the Trust, and when it declined to enjoin the foreclosure, notwithstanding her assertion that she had a homestead right. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pike v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co." on Justia Law

In 2013, defendant Louise Pinault was involved in two motor vehicle accidents in Hollis. She was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) and with violating the “conduct after an accident” statute. Following a bench trial, during which defendant represented herself, she was acquitted on the DUI charge, but was convicted on a conduct after an accident charge. As part of her sentence, she was ordered to pay $525 in restitution for property damage. Defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that the complaint alleging conduct after an accident was insufficient and that the restitution order was improper. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal followed. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court improperly ordered restitution because the only offense for which she was convicted did not cause any economic loss; and (2) the complaint against her was insufficient to support her conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part. The Court found: (1) the plain language of the restitution statute clearly and unambiguously required a causal connection between the criminal act and the economic loss or damage, and the crime for which the defendant was convicted necessarily occurred afterward. As the damage was already done, the defendant’s criminal conduct did not cause the economic loss suffered; and (2) the alleged deficiency in the complaint did not affect the outcome of the case, therefore failing to demonstrate plain error. View "New Hampshire v. Pinault" on Justia Law

On June 7, 2012, Joseph Jennings was arrested on drug-related charges and released on personal recognizance bail to the custody of defendant. That day, he was also served with a temporary order of protection that prohibited him, and third parties acting on his behalf, from contacting a certain woman. Approximately 45 minutes after Jennings was released, the woman reported that defendant Amy Mouser was contacting her on Jennings’s behalf, in violation of the protective order. Police went to the woman’s residence, where he retrieved drug paraphernalia that the woman said belonged to Jennings. Defendant was ultimately charged with and convicted by jury on one count of possession of a controlled drug (cocaine). On appeal, she argued that the Superior Court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence after a search of her vehicle. After review of the specific facts entered in the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no error in denying her motion, and affirmed the Superior Court. View "New Hampshire v. Mouser" on Justia Law

Respondent Jerry Roberts was convicted of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) and sentenced to four-to-ten years at the New Hampshire State Prison. Respondent also received a sentence of one-to-two years for related conduct; that sentence was suspended. Respondent began serving his four-to-ten year sentence in 2008. On April 1, 2013, the respondent was classified as a C-1 inmate and resided in a halfway house at the prison. While at the halfway house, respondent was arrested and consequently returned to general population status in the prison. Following his arrest, the State moved to impose his one-to-two year suspended sentence. The Superior Court partially granted the State’s motion: it imposed the one-year minimum sentence, which was to be served consecutively to the four-to-ten year sentence, but suspended the two-year maximum of the sentence. In August 2013, respondent appeared before the Adult Parole Board (APB) after he had served the minimum four years of his AFSA sentence. At that time, he was “approved for parole to consecutive,” and his parole hearing paperwork indicated that he must have “review prior to release consideration” with the Administrative Review Committee (ARC). Upon completion of his one-year consecutive sentence in August 2014, the respondent was not released from the prison into the community. Instead, he continued serving his original four-to-ten year sentence. The State asserted that the respondent was not released because he had not yet completed the required sexual offender treatment program. The respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was entitled to immediate release from the prison because he had been paroled from his four-to-ten year sentence to his one-year consecutive sentence, and he had completed the one-year sentence. The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the respondent was not entitled to immediate release because the APB had not granted him “parole to release” from prison, but instead had merely granted him “parole to a consecutive sentence,” and thus the APB retained the authority to determine whether he should be released upon completion of the consecutive sentence. Following a hearing, the court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, granted the respondent’s petition, and ordered that the respondent be released from prison. Thereafter, the State sought certiorari review of the trial court’s order, arguing the Adult Parole Board (APB) exceeded its authority or otherwise violated respondent's rights when it paroled him to a consecutive sentence but then refused to release him from prison upon his completion of the minimum term of that sentence. The Supreme Court held that the APB’s actions were not improper and therefore reversed the Superior Court's order granting respondent habeas relief. View "Petition of Warden, New Hampshire State Prison " on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant Steven Collins was convicted on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), and two counts of felonious sexual assault (FSA). All three charges involved the same victim: the AFSA charge alleged a “pattern” of sexual assaults occurring on or between January 1, 2009, and November 30, 2009; and the two FSA charges alleged specific instances of sexual assault occurring within that same time period. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the pattern AFSA charge for insufficient evidence that the sexual assaults occurred “over a period of 2 months or more;” (2) overruling the defendant’s objection to the State’s closing argument, which allegedly advocated for the use of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence; and (3) imposing a sentence on one of the FSA convictions to run consecutively to the sentence on the pattern AFSA conviction in violation of the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in sentencing defendant, and agreed that double jeopardy would have been violated had defendant been convicted of two discrete acts of FSA and convicted of a pattern AFSA that relied upon the same discrete acts. Defendant requested only that the Supreme Court vacate the consecutive sentence imposed for one of the FSA convictions. He did not ask that the Supreme Court vacate the sentence imposed for the other FSA conviction nor that the Court vacate the FSA convictions themselves. Accordingly, the Court vacated only the sentence on the FSA conviction which was imposed to run consecutively to the AFSA sentence. View "New Hampshire v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant Steven Collins was convicted by jury on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), and two counts of felonious sexual assault (FSA). The three charges involved the same victim. The AFSA charge alleged a "pattern" of sexual assaults and the two FSA charged alleged specific instances of sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the pattern AFSA charge for insufficient evidence that the sexual assaults occurred “over a period of 2 months or more” as required by RSA 632-A:1, I-c (2007); (2) overruling the defendant’s objection to the State’s closing argument, which allegedly advocated for the use of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence; and (3) imposing a sentence on one of the FSA convictions to run consecutively to the sentence on the pattern AFSA conviction in violation of the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court as to defendant's first two alleged errors on appeal. With regard to his Double Jeopardy claim, in the absence of a jury instruction, the Court had no way of knowing whether defendant was being punished twice for the same act. Accordingly, since the Court could not exclude the possibility that defendant was subjected to multiple punishments for the same act, it concluded that defendant’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution were violated. Defendant requested only that the Supreme Court vacate the consecutive sentence imposed for one of the FSA convictions. He did not ask that the sentence imposed for the other FSA conviction or the FSA convictions themselves. Accordingly, the Court vacated only the sentence on the FSA conviction which was imposed to run consecutively to the AFSA sentence. View "New Hampshire v. Collins" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Kempton appealed, and respondent Peggy Kempton cross-appealed their final divorce decree. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred by denying his request for a fault-based divorce. He also challenged the trial court's alimony award and property distribution. In her cross-appeal, respondent also challenged the trial court's alimony award and property distribution. In addition, she argued that the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process by denying her request for a continuance and "forc[ing] her to appear at the parties' two[-]day divorce trial by telephone." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Robert Kempton & Peggy Kempton" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jonathan Duchesne, Matthew Jajuga, and Michael Buckley, appealed a superior court decision denying their request for a declaratory judgment and an injunction to remove their names from the so-called "Laurie List." The petitioners were officers of the Manchester Police Department. In 2010, while off duty, petitioners were involved in an incident at a bar in Manchester. The incident was widely reported in the media, and the Manchester chief of police ordered a criminal and internal affairs investigation. Following the investigation, the chief found that the petitioners had violated several departmental policies, including a prohibition against the unnecessary use of force, and each officer was suspended for a period of time. Pursuant to protocol, the chief sent letters to the Hillsborough County Attorney's Office stating that petitioners had "engaged in conduct (excessive use of force) that may be subject to disclosure under [New Hampshire] v. Laurie." Consequently, the county attorney placed the petitioners' names on the "Laurie List," which the trial court described as "an informal list of police officers who have been identified as having potentially exculpatory evidence in their personnel files or otherwise." Pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the petitioners' union and the City of Manchester, the petitioners filed grievances regarding the discipline imposed by the chief. After a hearing, an arbitrator found that "the City of Manchester did not have just cause to take disciplinary action against [the petitioners] for actions taken or not taken" during the incident. As a result of this decision, petitioners were compensated for lost earnings and information regarding the incident was removed from their personnel files. While this process was occurring, the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office conducted an independent criminal investigation into the incident. Its final report concluded that the petitioners' conduct "was justified under New Hampshire law and no criminal charges are warranted." The chief again wrote to the then Hillsborough County Attorney, this time requesting that, pursuant to the arbitrator's award, petitioners be removed from the "Laurie List." The county attorney declined. Petitioners also asked the attorney general to direct the county attorney to remove the petitioners from the "Laurie List" which the attorney general also declined. After a hearing, the trial court denied petitioners relief. Although the "Laurie List" is not available to members of the public generally, placement on the list all but guarantees that information about the officers will be disclosed to trial courts and/or defendants or their counsel any time the officers testify in a criminal case, thus potentially affecting their reputations and professional standing with those with whom they work and interact on a regular basis. Here, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion and that petitioners were entitled to be removed from the "Laurie List." Therefore, to the extent that the petitioners' names appear on the "Laurie List" maintained by the Hillsborough County Attorney's Office, we hold that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in failing to order that their names be removed from said list. In light of this ruling, the Court did not address the other relief requested. View "Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney" on Justia Law

Respondent D.H. appealed a circuit court order that granted the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families' petition (DCYF) to terminate his parental rights over his son, K.H., on the ground that he failed to correct, within 12 months, the conditions leading to a finding of neglect. On appeal, respondent argued that: (1) the trial court admitted hearsay evidence in violation of RSA 170-C:10 (2014); and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that he failed to correct the conditions leading to the original neglect finding and its determination that terminating his parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re K.H. " on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Forster, d/b/a Forster's Christmas Tree Farm & Gift Shoppe, appealed a superior court decision to uphold a zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) determination in favor of respondent the Town of Henniker that "weddings [and] like events are not accessory uses" to the petitioner's farm, and that hosting such events was not a permitted use in the farm's zoning district. Because the Supreme Court concluded that petitioner has not established, as he argued, that he had a right to conduct commercial weddings and similar events on his farm, without obtaining either a special exception or a variance, it affirmed. View "Forster v. Town of Henniker" on Justia Law