Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a jury trial, defendant James Houghton was convicted on 23 charges of possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) 15 of the charges involved depictions of individuals under the age of 18; and (2) one of the charges involved a depiction of “sexually explicit conduct.” After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, as to nine of the charges, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individuals depicted in the photographs were under the age of 18. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. View "New Hampshire v. Houghton" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the court denied plaintiff Celestica, LLC’s request for a declaration that defendant Communications Acquisitions Corporation d/b/a Whaleback Managed Services (CAC) was obligated to pay the balance of a judgment that Celestica had obtained against another business, the assets of which CAC had purchased at public auction. Specifically, the trial court ruled that, when CAC purchased the assets of Whaleback Systems Corporation, the transaction did not amount to a de facto merger between the two companies. On appeal, Celestica argued that the trial court erred by not imposing successor liability upon CAC under the de facto merger doctrine. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Celestica, LLC v. Communications Acquisitions Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant was a Michigan-based company that “assists corporations in complying with regulations associated with the conduct of corporate business by supplying annual corporate consent documents” by way of direct mail. Defendant mailed solicitations to potential customers. Its New Hampshire mailing address was “a private mailbox used as a clearinghouse to receive and bundle orders from New Hampshire customers.” According to defendant, as a result of these direct mailings, it made sales in New Hampshire totaling $12,625. A grand jury indicted defendant on 27 felony violations of the Consumer Protection Act, encompassing three sets of nine charges, all stemming from defendant’s allegedly deceptive use of the New Hampshire mailing address in 2013. The State appealed a Superior Court order dismissing the 27 indictments, ruling that the indictments were defective because they alleged that the defendant acted with the mental state of “knowingly,” and not “purposely.” Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Merriam Farm, Inc. appealed a superior court decision dismissing its appeal of a Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) decision of the respondent, Town of Surry (Town), on the basis that the appeal was barred by claim preclusion. Under the Town's zoning ordinance, to build on its property, petitioner had to establish that the property has at least 200 feet of frontage on a public street, which was defined, in pertinent part, as a Class V or better road. In 2009, petitioner applied to the Town's selectboard for a building permit to construct a single-family home on its property. The selectboard denied the application because the property lacked frontage on a Class V or better road. In 2013, petitioner applied to the ZBA for a variance from the frontage requirement in the Town's zoning ordinance in order to build a single-family residence on the property. The ZBA denied the application. After unsuccessfully moving for rehearing, the petitioner appealed to the trial court. The Town asserted, among other things, that petitioner's application for a variance was barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion and preemption. Petitioner argued, among other things, that the Town waived its claim preclusion argument and that the ZBA improperly applied the statutory criteria governing variances under RSA 674:33, I(b). "If, based upon res judicata, we were to bar a subsequent application for a variance after the denial of a building permit application, we would, as the petitioner notes, effectively require landowners to simultaneously apply for all potentially necessary land use permits, variances, and exceptions. Such would be costly and inefficient, and burden the zoning process by adding complexity to an already complicated process." Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the denial of petitioner's application for a building permit gave rise to a cause of action different from the denial of its variance application, and, thus, res judicata did not preclude petitioner's variance application. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's ruling. View "Merriam Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry " on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Gilley was convicted on one count of class A felony burglary. The burglary statute elevated the offense from a class B to a class A felony when it was "perpetrated in the dwelling of another at night." Before trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the class A felony indictment, arguing that the house he had burglarized was not the dwelling of another and, therefore, did not trigger the felony enhancement under that statute. He contended that the house had ceased to be the "dwelling of another" because its resident had moved out and listed the house for sale. The Superior Court denied the motion. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the house did not lose its character as a dwelling when left vacant and listed for sale, it affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Gilley" on Justia Law

The parties were married in 1985, and defendant filed for divorce in late September 2007. As relevant here, the parties filed joint personal income tax returns for the tax years 2004, 2005, and 2006, and filed separately for the tax year 2007. During their divorce mediation, the parties recognized that tax liabilities might result from returns they jointly filed while married. The parties therefore entered into a separate "side agreement" on October 6, 2008, to allocate any yet-to-be-assessed tax liabilities for their joint tax returns in the event of an audit. The agreement was signed by the parties and their attorneys. The parties did not notify the family division about the side agreement, even though it was formed contemporaneously with the divorce proceedings, and the court thus did not consider the agreement in dividing the marital estate. Following the parties' divorce, plaintiff was audited and found to have a delinquent federal tax obligation in excess of $900,000. As a result, he was prosecuted criminally and pleaded guilty to multiple counts of federal tax evasion. After serving his criminal sentence, plaintiff filed a breach of contract action in superior court seeking to enforce the parties' side agreement and recover the defendant's share of the parties' joint tax liability. In the alternative, plaintiff sought recovery under an unjust enrichment theory. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plain language of the agreement made plaintiff responsible for the entire tax debt. Plaintiff objected, asserting that the agreement made defendant liable for her equal share of the debt. After a hearing, the superior court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. On appeal, plaintiff argued that: (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the language of the agreement supports his interpretation and, moreover, the audit of the joint returns was not "the result" of filing his 2007 and 2008 personal tax returns; (2) the court's assumptions about the parties' intent regarding the agreement were contradicted by the parties' own affidavits; and (3) the trial court erred in rejecting his interpretation on the basis of superfluity and the pre-existing duty rule. The Supreme Court concluded because the side agreement was not presented to the Superior Court during the divorce proceedings, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over enforcing the side agreement. The case was remanded to that court for the entry of an order of dismissal. View "Maldini v. Maldini" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Scott McCarthy appealed a Superior Court decision to dismiss his defamation action against defendants, the Manchester Police Department (MPD) and MPD Sergeant Craig Rousseau, on grounds that municipal immunity barred his claim. William Socha was working on a construction site in Manchester. At around noon, Socha noticed a truck parked on the site and went to tell the driver to move the vehicle. As he approached, he saw that the man in the driver's seat had his pants down, exposing his genitalia. Socha also observed a young female in the truck's passenger seat. The passenger appeared to Socha to be about twelve years old and to have some kind of disability. Socha called the police, but, by the time an MPD officer arrived, the vehicle had left. Socha gave the officer a description of the truck, its license plate number, and a physical description of the driver. The police determined that the truck was registered to plaintiff, who resided in Allenstown. A short time later, a detective from the Allenstown Police Department observed the plaintiff arrive at his residence in a truck matching the description and license plate number Socha had provided. Plaintiff told the detective that he had been in Manchester around 12:30 p.m. that day to pick up a friend and her daughter. The MPD filed a complaint charging plaintiff with indecent exposure and lewdness, and arrested him pursuant to a warrant. The MPD had not identified the female passenger whom Socha had described. In an effort to identify her, Sgt. Rousseau posted an entry on the MPD blog, describing the incident and stating, in relevant part, that "[d]etectives of the MPD Juvenile Division now say that McCarthy, 41, was in fact the man who was exposing himself in the vehicle. McCarthy was subsequently arrested [and] charged with one count of indecent exposure." The entry then asked for information concerning the identity of the female passenger. No passenger was ever identified. On the day of plaintiff's criminal trial, Socha failed to come to court, and the State entered a nolle prosequi. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action against defendants, alleging that Rousseau's post on the MPD blog stating that plaintiff was "in fact" guilty of the crime was defamatory. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that they were immune from suits that were not authorized by RSA chapter 507-B. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "McCarthy v. Manchester Police Dept." on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Boisvert appealed his conviction for welfare fraud. Defendant was the father of Carrie Gray's two children. He and Gray moved into a Bristol apartment in 2009 or 2010. Defendant's name was removed from the lease at some point prior to late 2010. On December 31, 2010, defendant filed an application for public assistance. On January 14, 2011, he met with a department of health and human services representative and stated that he was homeless and had no resources; he was certified to receive benefits. Defendant was recertified for benefits at six-month intervals, and again reported in June 2011 and December 2011 that he was homeless. Between December 2010 and March 2012, Gray received medical, food stamp, and cash public assistance. The total amount of assistance that she received was calculated based upon a household consisting only of Gray and her children. She would not have been eligible for the same level of benefits if defendant had disclosed that he was living in the apartment. At some point, the special investigations unit of the department of health and human services received an allegation of welfare fraud concerning Gray. After interviewing witnesses and reviewing records provided by Gray and defendant, the investigator concluded that the case should be referred to the county attorney's office. Defendant was subsequently indicted on one count of welfare fraud. Because it was alleged that the value of the fraudulently obtained payments exceeded $1,000, the offense was classified as a class A felony. The case went to trial, and at the close of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the State had failed to present sufficient evidence that he was living with Gray during the relevant time period. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury found defendant guilty. This appeal followed. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Superior Court erred by denying: (1) defendant's motion to dismiss that challenged the sufficiency of the evidence; and (2) his request to give an accomplice liability jury instruction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Boisvert" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward C. Furlong, III appealed a circuit court order awarding judgment in favor of plaintiff the Town of Bartlett (Town) in a zoning enforcement action. Defendant's primary argument on appeal was that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing a fine in excess of $25,000, but he also raised various collateral claims of error. Finding his arguments lacking in merit, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Town of Bartlett v. Furlong" on Justia Law

Defendant Vincent Cooper appealed his convictions after a jury found him guilty of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Superior Court erred by allowing the State to play an audio recording of a 911 telephone call at trial, and by allowing the State, in closing argument, to comment on a fact not in evidence and to misstate the burden of proof. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Cooper" on Justia Law