Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Scott McCarthy appealed a Superior Court decision to dismiss his defamation action against defendants, the Manchester Police Department (MPD) and MPD Sergeant Craig Rousseau, on grounds that municipal immunity barred his claim. William Socha was working on a construction site in Manchester. At around noon, Socha noticed a truck parked on the site and went to tell the driver to move the vehicle. As he approached, he saw that the man in the driver's seat had his pants down, exposing his genitalia. Socha also observed a young female in the truck's passenger seat. The passenger appeared to Socha to be about twelve years old and to have some kind of disability. Socha called the police, but, by the time an MPD officer arrived, the vehicle had left. Socha gave the officer a description of the truck, its license plate number, and a physical description of the driver. The police determined that the truck was registered to plaintiff, who resided in Allenstown. A short time later, a detective from the Allenstown Police Department observed the plaintiff arrive at his residence in a truck matching the description and license plate number Socha had provided. Plaintiff told the detective that he had been in Manchester around 12:30 p.m. that day to pick up a friend and her daughter. The MPD filed a complaint charging plaintiff with indecent exposure and lewdness, and arrested him pursuant to a warrant. The MPD had not identified the female passenger whom Socha had described. In an effort to identify her, Sgt. Rousseau posted an entry on the MPD blog, describing the incident and stating, in relevant part, that "[d]etectives of the MPD Juvenile Division now say that McCarthy, 41, was in fact the man who was exposing himself in the vehicle. McCarthy was subsequently arrested [and] charged with one count of indecent exposure." The entry then asked for information concerning the identity of the female passenger. No passenger was ever identified. On the day of plaintiff's criminal trial, Socha failed to come to court, and the State entered a nolle prosequi. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action against defendants, alleging that Rousseau's post on the MPD blog stating that plaintiff was "in fact" guilty of the crime was defamatory. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that they were immune from suits that were not authorized by RSA chapter 507-B. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "McCarthy v. Manchester Police Dept." on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Boisvert appealed his conviction for welfare fraud. Defendant was the father of Carrie Gray's two children. He and Gray moved into a Bristol apartment in 2009 or 2010. Defendant's name was removed from the lease at some point prior to late 2010. On December 31, 2010, defendant filed an application for public assistance. On January 14, 2011, he met with a department of health and human services representative and stated that he was homeless and had no resources; he was certified to receive benefits. Defendant was recertified for benefits at six-month intervals, and again reported in June 2011 and December 2011 that he was homeless. Between December 2010 and March 2012, Gray received medical, food stamp, and cash public assistance. The total amount of assistance that she received was calculated based upon a household consisting only of Gray and her children. She would not have been eligible for the same level of benefits if defendant had disclosed that he was living in the apartment. At some point, the special investigations unit of the department of health and human services received an allegation of welfare fraud concerning Gray. After interviewing witnesses and reviewing records provided by Gray and defendant, the investigator concluded that the case should be referred to the county attorney's office. Defendant was subsequently indicted on one count of welfare fraud. Because it was alleged that the value of the fraudulently obtained payments exceeded $1,000, the offense was classified as a class A felony. The case went to trial, and at the close of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the State had failed to present sufficient evidence that he was living with Gray during the relevant time period. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury found defendant guilty. This appeal followed. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Superior Court erred by denying: (1) defendant's motion to dismiss that challenged the sufficiency of the evidence; and (2) his request to give an accomplice liability jury instruction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Boisvert" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward C. Furlong, III appealed a circuit court order awarding judgment in favor of plaintiff the Town of Bartlett (Town) in a zoning enforcement action. Defendant's primary argument on appeal was that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing a fine in excess of $25,000, but he also raised various collateral claims of error. Finding his arguments lacking in merit, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Town of Bartlett v. Furlong" on Justia Law

Defendant Vincent Cooper appealed his convictions after a jury found him guilty of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Superior Court erred by allowing the State to play an audio recording of a 911 telephone call at trial, and by allowing the State, in closing argument, to comment on a fact not in evidence and to misstate the burden of proof. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Cooper" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, petitioner Diana Wolters, and respondent John Wolters, appealed circuit court orders pertaining to their divorce proceeding. Diana argued the original trial judge erred by denying her motion to recuse the trial judge and that all orders issued by that judge should have been vacated; and erred by considering tax consequences when determining the value of the parties' property. John argued the subsequent trial judge erred by denying his motion to dismiss the petitioner's motion to correct property distribution and by awarding a certain percentage of eminent domain litigation proceeds to Diana. Diana cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred by not awarding her a greater percentage of the eminent domain litigation proceeds. Upon review of the parties' arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Supreme Court concluded that because sale or transfer of the properties at issue was neither required by the trial court's order, nor certain to occur within a short time after the divorce decree, the trial court erred to the extent that, when valuing the properties for distribution, it reduced the value of those properties to account for estimated taxes that would be due by the parties in the event of a sale or transfer of the properties. Accordingly, the trial court's distribution order was vacated and the case remanded for distribution of assets consistent with the Court's opinion. Because the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's entire property distribution, it did not address other arguments made about the eminent domain proceeds. View "In the Matter of Diana Wolters & John Wolters" on Justia Law

While riding on a school bus, Morgan Graveline was involved in an altercation with a another student, A.M. A.M. punched Morgan in the face. The bus driver reported the incident three days later. The school principal, Barry Albert, downloaded the bus driver’s report on February 8 and met with Morgan the next day. Morgan minimized the incident, told Albert she did not know the name of the other student involved in the altercation, and asked Albert not to notify her mother. Although Albert informed Morgan that he would have to notify her mother, he did not do so. Albert met with A.M. ten days after the incident whereby A.M. admitted to hitting Morgan. A.M. received a three-day suspension. Meanwhile, Morgan received threatening Facebook messages from another student, A.A., days before A.M.'s suspension. On the day Albert learned about the messages, he went to the cafeteria to ask A.A. to see him after lunch. After Albert left the cafeteria, a fight broke out. Morgan was hit several times, sustaining injuries to her head, face, and mouth. She was transported to the emergency room. Albert met with Morgan’s mother, plaintiff Danielle (Graveline) Gauthier, in the emergency room and, for the first time, told her about the bus incident and the threatening Facebook messages. Plaintiff brought suit to recover for Morgan's injuries. The trial court granted Albert's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiff argued that Albert was negligent for failing to notify plaintiff on the alleged bullying. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gauthier v. Manchester School District, SAU #37" on Justia Law

Respondent Frank Ball appealed a circuit court order denying his motion to terminate his child support obligation as to his and Glenda Ball's eldest child. Respondent argued as grounds for termination the child having turned 18 and graduating from high school. In July 2005, the parties entered into a separation agreement in Massachusetts requiring respondent to pay petitioner weekly child support until the "emancipation" of the parties' children. The agreement's definition of "emancipation," consistent with Massachusetts law, required child support to continue after a child had attained the age of 18 or had graduated from high school provided that certain conditions were met. Under the agreement, respondent was obligated to pay support for a child until the child reached age 23 if the child was "attending a post-secondary accredited educational training school or a two-year or four-year accredited college program as a full-time student" and was "domiciled in the home of a parent and . . . principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance due to enrollment in the educational program." According to respondent (and not disputed by petitioner), the parties and their children relocated from Massachusetts to New Hampshire in 2008, and the Massachusetts divorce decree was registered in New Hampshire. At that time, the parties requested the New Hampshire court to approve a partial stipulation modifying their Massachusetts decree. In the modification, they agreed that the definition of "emancipation" contained in the Massachusetts decree was "stricken" and that New Hampshire law would apply. The parties also agreed that the respondent's child support obligation would "be payable in accordance with New Hampshire law . . . until the parties' youngest child reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school whichever is later." In her argument before the Supreme Court, petitioner relied upon RSA 546-B:49, III, which provided in pertinent part: "A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state." Petitioner contended that, pursuant to this provision, because Massachusetts law would not shorten the duration of the respondent's child support obligation under these circumstances, the New Hampshire court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that petitioner waived the alleged error by entering into the 2008 stipulation and by not arguing in the 2008 proceedings that applying New Hampshire law to the duration of the respondent's child support obligation was error. Because the 2008 New Hampshire order was not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and because the petitioner waived any legal error in the 2008 order approving the parties' stipulation, the trial court erred by not extinguishing respondent's obligation to support the parties' eldest child as required by the court's 2008 order. View "In the Matter of Glenda J. Ball and Frank A. Ball " on Justia Law

Plaintiff-landlord, Mountain View Park, LLC appealed a circuit court decision in which the court declined to approve an agreement concerning, in part, rent arrearages owed by defendant-tenant Gerald Robson, Jr., and issued a writ of possession. In June 2013, the parties entered into a rental agreement, whereby defendant rented a mobile home owned by plaintiff. Defendant eventually fell behind in his rent payments. In May 2014, plaintiff served defendant with a demand for rent and an eviction notice. When defendant failed to pay the rent arrearages, plaintiff filed this possession action. In June 2014, the parties entered into an agreement to cure defendant’s arrearages and avoid eviction. The agreement was submitted to the trial court for approval; however, the court declined to approve it. In its denial of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the court explained that the “agreement provides for issuance of a writ of possession for an indefinite period of time in the future for the nonpayment of future rent not yet due, in addition to the unpaid rent which forms the basis of this eviction action,” and that RSA 540:13-c, II (2007) “does not include authority of the court to issue a writ of possession at some indefinite time in the future for the nonpayment of future rent not yet due.” Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Mountain View Park, LLC v. Robson" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Derry appealed a Superior Court decision granting the motion for summary judgment filed by petitioners, Accurate Transport, Inc. and 41 Ashleigh Drive, LLC (Ashleigh Drive), on the basis that an abutter’s appeal to the Derry Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) was untimely. In November 2012, Accurate Transport submitted a preliminary site plan application to the Derry Planning Board for approval to operate a “Dumpster Depot” business on property owned by Ashleigh Drive. The property is located within the Town’s Industrial III zoning district, which permits, among other uses, contractor’s yards and freight and trucking terminals. The Technical Review Committee (TRC) held a meeting to evaluate the proposed site plan and approved the proposed plan. Thereafter, petitioners filed a formal site plan application with the Planning Board. After numerous public meetings, the Planning Board ultimately approved the plan application. Several months later, an abutter to the property at issue, John O'Connor, appealed Planning Board's approval a few weeks after the Board's decision was issued. district, The ZBA concluded that the Town’s zoning ordinance did not permit the proposed use under any classification. After unsuccessfully moving for rehearing, petitioners appealed to the trial court and, subsequently, moved for summary judgment. Both parties moved for reconsideration, agreeing that the court erred by misapplying the time standards contained in the Town’s zoning ordinance. Observing that the written decision of the Planning Board was released on August 28, the court noted that O’Connor’s appeal (filed September 13) would be timely if he was appealing the final Planning Board site plan approval. However, the court concluded that O’Connor’s appeal did not challenge the Planning Board’s approval. Rather, the court found that O’Connor’s appeal challenged only the code enforcement officer’s determination that the proposed use of the subject property was permitted as a contractor’s yard. The court decided that the Planning Board accepted the code enforcement officer’s interpretation on June 19 when it voted to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. Because that vote was published on July 19, the court concluded that O’Connor had 20 days from July 19 to appeal to the ZBA. Given that his appeal was filed in September, the court determined that it was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the ZBA did not err by treating O’Connor’s appeal as an appeal of the August 21 decision. The trial court found, and the parties did not dispute, that the zoning ordinance provided a 20-day appeal period that began on the date of a written decision. Accordingly, the 20-day appeal period as to the August 21 decision began to run upon the issuance of the written decision on August 28. Because O’Connor’s appeal was filed September 13, it was within 20 days of August 28 and was, thus, timely. View "Accurate Transport, Inc. v. Town of Derry" on Justia Law

Petitioners Robert and Katherine Michele, trustees of the Robert C. Michele Revocable Trust (Micheles), appealed a Wetlands Council decision to uphold a decision of the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) to issue a permit allowing respondents Joseph and Linda Bremner to install a seasonal dock in water adjacent to the Micheles’ pond-front property over which the Bremners had an easement. The Supreme Court affirmed. "Contrary to the Micheles’ argument that the legislature could not have intended easement holders to be able to apply for a permit under the statute, we see no evidence that the purpose of the statute was to change the balance of property rights between fee owners and easement holders from what it was under the common law. [. . .] possession is not a requirement of an 'ownership' interest in land. [. . .] when there is an express grant of an easement, 'a grantee takes by implication whatever rights are reasonably necessary to enable it to enjoy the easement beneficially. This includes the right to make improvements that are reasonably necessary to enjoy the easement.'" View "Appeal of Robert Michele" on Justia Law