Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Lisa Tagalakis Fedor was convicted by jury of knowingly keeping or maintaining a common nuisance. Defendant lived in Manchester with her boyfriend and her two children. In January 2013, the boyfriend approached defendant about allowing Robert Doane to move in with them. Doane was an acquaintance of the boyfriend’s from whom the boyfriend had purchased heroin. Defendant agreed to allow Doane to move into a spare bedroom. Defendant knew that Doane sold drugs and allowed him to continue to do so after he moved in, but asked him not to sell drugs inside the house. After moving in, Doane began selling heroin on the street outside of the residence. Inside the residence, Doane installed a padlock on his bedroom door, but defendant had witnessed Doane in his bedroom, packaging heroin into “individual baggies.” Doane, despite being a convicted felon, also obtained a stolen firearm that he kept in the house. Defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit the sale of a controlled drug and one count of knowingly keeping or maintaining a common nuisance. Defendant moved for JNOV, or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict. The trial court denied her requests for relief, and this appeal followed. Defendant argued on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion for JNOV, specifically, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that her residence was “used for the selling of the controlled drug heroin” because “drugs were not sold from inside the residence”; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that she “maintained a common nuisance under RSA 318-B:16” because she “did not control or ‘maintain’ Doane’s padlocked room.” The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict was supported by the evidence at trial, and did not constitute an unsustainable exercise of discretion. View "New Hampshire v. Fedor" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action, the State appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff STIHL Incorporated (individually, and d/b/a Northeast STIHL). STIHL is a corporation that manufactures, distributes, and sells an array of handheld power and non-power tools such as chain saws, leaf blowers, hedge trimmers, axes, pruners, and mauls. Although many of its products have engines, none has wheels, engine and transmission, or is capable of transporting a person from one location to another. In 1981, the legislature enacted RSA chapter 357-C, the so-called “dealer bill of rights,” to regulate, among others, automotive manufacturers and dealers. the legislature increased the level of regulation it imposed. As the legislature expanded RSA chapter 357-C, it also enacted RSA chapter 347-A, a similar but less comprehensive regulatory scheme providing protections to equipment dealers. After the enactment of SB 126, STIHL sought a declaratory judgment that RSA chapter 357-C, as amended, did not apply to it. The State countered that, as a “forestry” and “yard and garden” equipment manufacturer, STIHL was subject to regulation under RSA chapter 357-C. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that RSA chapter 347-A, before it was repealed, regulated STIHL’s agreements with its dealers because, under that statutory scheme, the legislature chose to broadly define the term “equipment.” Nevertheless, the court concluded that because STIHL produces only handheld, not ground-supported or wheeled, equipment, it falls outside of the purview of amended RSA chapter 357-C. Finding no reversible error in the superior court’s judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "STIHL, Inc. v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) required that owners of underground storage tanks demonstrate their ability to pay cleanup costs and compensate third parties for bodily injury and property damage arising out of releases of petroleum products from their tanks. New Hampshire’s Oil Discharge and Disposal Cleanup Fund (ODD Fund) was an EPA-approved program that complied with the federal requirement. In 2003, the State sued several gasoline suppliers, refiners, and chemical manufacturers seeking damages for groundwater contamination allegedly caused by methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). In 2012, petitioners sought a declaratory judgment and equitable relief against the State. Each petitioner was a “distributor” of oil under RSA chapter 146-D and paid fees into the ODD Fund. They alleged that “[t]o date, the costs of MTBE remediation in the State of New Hampshire has been paid for primarily through” the ODD Fund, and that that fund was financed, in part, through fees that they paid. Petitioners sought a declaration that those fees “are unconstitutional as the [State] has recovered and/or will recover funds from the MTBE Lawsuit for the cost of MTBE remediation,” and that those fees should be reimbursed to them from: (1) “the settlement proceeds the [State] has received and will receive through the MTBE Litigation”; (2) “any future recovery the [State] receives through the MTBE Litigation”; and (3) “[a]dditionally, or in the alternative, . . . from the funds recovered, and/or to be recovered in the future in the MTBE Litigation, . . . under principles of equitable subrogation and/or unjust enrichment.” On appeal, the petitioners argue that the trial court erred in ruling that they lacked standing to seek reimbursement of their fees from the settlement funds. They also argued that the trial court erred in ruling that their equitable claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Find View "Aranosian Oil Co., Inc. v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, defendant Samuel Pennock, appealed his conviction by a jury of felony simple assault, and the superior court’s denial of his post-conviction motion to vacate his sentence and for a new trial. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by: (1) substantively admitting the victim’s pretrial oral and written statements under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule (N.H. R. Ev. 803(2)); (2) denying his motion to dismiss the simple assault charge; (3) denying his post-conviction motion to reduce that charge to a class B misdemeanor and to resentence him accordingly; and (4) denying his post-conviction motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Pennock" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant James Houghton was convicted on 23 charges of possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) 15 of the charges involved depictions of individuals under the age of 18; and (2) one of the charges involved a depiction of “sexually explicit conduct.” After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, as to nine of the charges, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individuals depicted in the photographs were under the age of 18. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. View "New Hampshire v. Houghton" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the court denied plaintiff Celestica, LLC’s request for a declaration that defendant Communications Acquisitions Corporation d/b/a Whaleback Managed Services (CAC) was obligated to pay the balance of a judgment that Celestica had obtained against another business, the assets of which CAC had purchased at public auction. Specifically, the trial court ruled that, when CAC purchased the assets of Whaleback Systems Corporation, the transaction did not amount to a de facto merger between the two companies. On appeal, Celestica argued that the trial court erred by not imposing successor liability upon CAC under the de facto merger doctrine. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Celestica, LLC v. Communications Acquisitions Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant was a Michigan-based company that “assists corporations in complying with regulations associated with the conduct of corporate business by supplying annual corporate consent documents” by way of direct mail. Defendant mailed solicitations to potential customers. Its New Hampshire mailing address was “a private mailbox used as a clearinghouse to receive and bundle orders from New Hampshire customers.” According to defendant, as a result of these direct mailings, it made sales in New Hampshire totaling $12,625. A grand jury indicted defendant on 27 felony violations of the Consumer Protection Act, encompassing three sets of nine charges, all stemming from defendant’s allegedly deceptive use of the New Hampshire mailing address in 2013. The State appealed a Superior Court order dismissing the 27 indictments, ruling that the indictments were defective because they alleged that the defendant acted with the mental state of “knowingly,” and not “purposely.” Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Merriam Farm, Inc. appealed a superior court decision dismissing its appeal of a Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) decision of the respondent, Town of Surry (Town), on the basis that the appeal was barred by claim preclusion. Under the Town's zoning ordinance, to build on its property, petitioner had to establish that the property has at least 200 feet of frontage on a public street, which was defined, in pertinent part, as a Class V or better road. In 2009, petitioner applied to the Town's selectboard for a building permit to construct a single-family home on its property. The selectboard denied the application because the property lacked frontage on a Class V or better road. In 2013, petitioner applied to the ZBA for a variance from the frontage requirement in the Town's zoning ordinance in order to build a single-family residence on the property. The ZBA denied the application. After unsuccessfully moving for rehearing, the petitioner appealed to the trial court. The Town asserted, among other things, that petitioner's application for a variance was barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion and preemption. Petitioner argued, among other things, that the Town waived its claim preclusion argument and that the ZBA improperly applied the statutory criteria governing variances under RSA 674:33, I(b). "If, based upon res judicata, we were to bar a subsequent application for a variance after the denial of a building permit application, we would, as the petitioner notes, effectively require landowners to simultaneously apply for all potentially necessary land use permits, variances, and exceptions. Such would be costly and inefficient, and burden the zoning process by adding complexity to an already complicated process." Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the denial of petitioner's application for a building permit gave rise to a cause of action different from the denial of its variance application, and, thus, res judicata did not preclude petitioner's variance application. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's ruling. View "Merriam Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry " on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Gilley was convicted on one count of class A felony burglary. The burglary statute elevated the offense from a class B to a class A felony when it was "perpetrated in the dwelling of another at night." Before trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the class A felony indictment, arguing that the house he had burglarized was not the dwelling of another and, therefore, did not trigger the felony enhancement under that statute. He contended that the house had ceased to be the "dwelling of another" because its resident had moved out and listed the house for sale. The Superior Court denied the motion. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the house did not lose its character as a dwelling when left vacant and listed for sale, it affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Gilley" on Justia Law

The parties were married in 1985, and defendant filed for divorce in late September 2007. As relevant here, the parties filed joint personal income tax returns for the tax years 2004, 2005, and 2006, and filed separately for the tax year 2007. During their divorce mediation, the parties recognized that tax liabilities might result from returns they jointly filed while married. The parties therefore entered into a separate "side agreement" on October 6, 2008, to allocate any yet-to-be-assessed tax liabilities for their joint tax returns in the event of an audit. The agreement was signed by the parties and their attorneys. The parties did not notify the family division about the side agreement, even though it was formed contemporaneously with the divorce proceedings, and the court thus did not consider the agreement in dividing the marital estate. Following the parties' divorce, plaintiff was audited and found to have a delinquent federal tax obligation in excess of $900,000. As a result, he was prosecuted criminally and pleaded guilty to multiple counts of federal tax evasion. After serving his criminal sentence, plaintiff filed a breach of contract action in superior court seeking to enforce the parties' side agreement and recover the defendant's share of the parties' joint tax liability. In the alternative, plaintiff sought recovery under an unjust enrichment theory. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plain language of the agreement made plaintiff responsible for the entire tax debt. Plaintiff objected, asserting that the agreement made defendant liable for her equal share of the debt. After a hearing, the superior court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. On appeal, plaintiff argued that: (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the language of the agreement supports his interpretation and, moreover, the audit of the joint returns was not "the result" of filing his 2007 and 2008 personal tax returns; (2) the court's assumptions about the parties' intent regarding the agreement were contradicted by the parties' own affidavits; and (3) the trial court erred in rejecting his interpretation on the basis of superfluity and the pre-existing duty rule. The Supreme Court concluded because the side agreement was not presented to the Superior Court during the divorce proceedings, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over enforcing the side agreement. The case was remanded to that court for the entry of an order of dismissal. View "Maldini v. Maldini" on Justia Law