Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Christina Thomas was convicted by jury of first degree assault for knowingly causing serious bodily injury to a person under 13 years of age. In 2002, E.A. moved in with defendant and her family. In August 2003, E.A. gave birth to D.A. and continued living with defendant, who promised to help take care of the child. E.A. and D.A. lived with the defendant until 2010, when D.A. was removed from the home and E.A. left. When E.A. first moved in, she got along well with defendant. Over time, and specifically after D.A. was born, the relationship deteriorated. After giving birth, E.A. weighed close to 400 pounds and was told by a doctor that she needed to lose weight. Defendant promised to help in this endeavor, and the two went on a diet and exercised together. Eventually, defendant stopped being supportive and instead used forced exercise and the denial of food to punish E.A. D.A. was hit or spanked, often with a board or a spatula. E.A. participated in the abuse of her son, often at defendant's direction. If E.A. did not do as she was directed, she was beaten. For the first year of his life, D.A. was fed formula and grew normally. Around the time he turned two years old, D.A. began “ruminating” (he would regurgitate food into his mouth, chew it, and swallow it again). He would also vomit food out of his mouth. These behaviors occurred almost every time he ate, at least several times per day. He also began eating such things as diesel fuel, his own feces, or animal feces. Defendant, who had assumed primary responsibility for feeding D.A., tried feeding him different foods to stop the ruminating and vomiting, but the problem continued. D.A.’s behaviors, particularly his ruminating, disgusted everyone at the house. The defendant believed that the behavior was intentional and began punishing D.A. for it, by hitting him or withholding food, occasionally for days at a time. D.A. was constantly hungry, but would not be fed if he screamed for food or cried about being hungry. D.A. barely grew or gained weight. In April 2010, when he was about six and one half years old, D.A. weighed 23 pounds, six ounces — only four ounces more than he weighed when he was 10 months old. He was also developmentally delayed. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) eventually intervened, leading to charges against defendant. Defendant argued on appeal of her conviction that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting evidence of “other bad acts” committed against the victim and the victim’s mother; and (2) not striking other testimony that she contended was inadmissible and prejudicial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Towns of Salem, Temple, Auburn, Bennington, Meredith, Northfield, Peterborough, and Plainfield (the Towns) appealed an order of the presiding officer of the New Hampshire Bureau of Securities Regulation (Bureau) denying their motion to share in the distribution of approximately $17.1 million in excess earnings and surplus by one of the respondents, Health Trust, Inc. (Health Trust), in an administrative action brought by the Bureau against: Health Trust; Local Government Center, Inc. and several other entities (collectively, the administrative respondents). The Towns and the City of Concord (collectively, plaintiffs) appealed a superior court order granting a motion to dismiss filed by, among others, defendants Local Government Center, Inc. and additional parties (collectively, the civil action defendants). The plaintiffs were municipalities that were members of pooled risk management programs run by several of the defendants. In 2011, the secretary of state commenced an adjudicative proceeding prompted by a petition filed by the Bureau alleging that the administrative respondents had violated RSA chapters 5-B and 421-B. The resulting Order required that Health Trust and Property Liability Trust return excess funds of $33.2 million and $3.1 million, respectively, to those political subdivisions that were members of those programs. The Order also directed the Bureau and the administrative respondents to enter into an “agreed-upon plan” to distribute excess funds to members that had participated in the program at any time after June 10, 2010; however, if those parties failed to reach an agreement, the order required distribution only to Health Trust’s and Property Liability Trust’s current members. The parties failed to reach agreement, and the excess funds were ordered to be distributed to current members. The administrative respondents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated portions of the order not relevant here, and remanded for further proceedings. Thereafter, the Bureau filed a motion for entry of default order against the administrative respondents alleging noncompliance with the Order. The issues related to that motion were resolved by a consent decree incorporated into the presiding officer’s order. Their motion proposing distribution was denied, and the Towns appealed. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs filed suit against the civil action defendants in superior court. The civil action defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court found, in resolution of these appeals, that a common law contractual claim for the return of surplus funds as alleged by the plaintiffs was inextricably entwined with RSA chapter 5-B and could not exist alongside the administrative mechanism created in that chapter. Thus, to the extent the presiding officer concluded that he lacked the authority to penalize a violation of RSA 5-B:5, I(c) by ordering payment to former members of a pooled risk management program as either restitution or disgorgement, he committed an error of law. Accordingly, the Court vacated the presiding officer’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The case was affirmed in all other respects and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Town of Salem" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from two consolidated actions brought by plaintiffs Kelly Sanborn, Trustee of the 428 Lafayette, LLC Realty Trust, Donald and Rosemarie Folk, Heather Hancock, and Andrew Cotrupi, against defendants, 428 Lafayette, LLC and John Roberge, relating to their respective ownership of condominium units at Village Square of Hampton Condominium. Defendants appealed superior court rulings that: (1) Village Square of Hampton Condominium Association was governed by RSA chapter 292 (Voluntary Corporations Act), rather than RSA chapter 356-B (the "Condominium Act"); and (2) Cotrupi had the right to use certain commercial parking spaces at the Condominium. In affirming in part and reversing in part the superior court's order, the Supreme Court found: neither the Condominium Act nor the Voluntary Corporations Act contained language making it the exclusive Act governing condominium associations that incorporate. Because neither Act contained exclusivity language, the Court concluded that condominium associations that voluntarily incorporate, as here, were subject to both Acts, including on matters of governance. "Regardless of the provisions of the bylaws, however, the bylaws cannot negate the applicability of the Voluntary Corporations Act." The trial court erred in ruling that the Association was governed solely by the Voluntary Corporations Act. Because the court issued specific governance-related orders concerning the election of directors and voting allocation based upon its conclusion that only the Voluntary Corporations Act applied, those orders were vacated and the case remanded for consideration of issues raised by the parties pertaining to both Acts. The trial court did not err when it ruled that Cotrupi had the right to use his exclusively owned commercial parking spaces and the right to shared use of the remaining commercial parking spaces on the condominium property. View "Sanborn v. 428 Lafayette, LLC" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Circuit Court order granting defendant Tyler Boyer's motion to suppress evidence obtained when, without a warrant, the police entered the apartment that he shared with his girlfriend and arrested him. The trial court found that defendant had standing to object to the search despite the fact that, at the time of the search, he was present with his girlfriend in violation of a court order that prohibited him from having contact with her. The State argued that the defendant did not have standing to challenge the search because, given his presence in the apartment in violation of the order, he could not have an expectation of privacy in the apartment that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, and, therefore, reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire v. Boyer" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Town of Grafton's three-member selectboard reviewed and discussed the 36 warrant articles to be placed on the ballot for the annual Town meeting scheduled for March 10, including 20 articles that plaintiffs had petitioned to include on the ballot. At the January 20 meeting, one selectboard member moved that the ballot include the phrase “the Selectmen do not recommend this article” relative to each of the plaintiffs’ warrant articles. The motion passed unanimously. On March 5, the plaintiffs filed their petition for injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court held a final hearing on offers of proof and, on March 9, denied the petition, concluding that RSA 32:5, V-a authorized the Town to place recommendations on any warrant article. Plaintiff Jeremy Olson appealed a superior court order denying a petition he and co-plaintiffs, Thomas Ploszaj, Christopher Kairnes, and Howard Boucher filed for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Town. On appeal, Olson argued that the trial court erroneously determined that it was lawful for the Town to include on the official ballot for the annual Town meeting the phrase, “The Selectmen do not recommend this article,” below each of the plaintiffs’ 20 warrant articles, which the plaintiffs had petitioned to include on the ballot. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Olson v. Town of Grafton" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified a question of New Hampshire law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The question arose from a dispute between Old Republic Insurance Company and Stratford Insurance Company as to their respective coverage and defense obligations arising out of a motor vehicle accident involving their insureds. Old Republic and Stratford each provided insurance coverage for a tractor-trailer that collided with a passenger vehicle. The owner of the tractor, Ryder Truck Rentals, had purchased an insurance policy from Old Republic. DAM Express, a for-hire motor company, had leased the tractor from Ryder. Although, pursuant to the lease agreement, Ryder was responsible for obtaining liability insurance for the tractor, DAM also purchased a separate insurance policy from Stratford. When the collision occurred, the driver of the tractor-trailer was employed by DAM, and the trailer was owned by Coca-Cola. The question posed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court was whether, under New Hampshire law, when was an excess insurer’s duty to defend triggered? Did New Hampshire follow the general rule that the excess insurer’s duty to defend is triggered only when the primary insurer’s coverage is exhausted? If not, what rule as to allocation of defense costs and timing of payment did New Hampshire follow? The New Hampshire Court responded that under New Hampshire law, the excess insurer’s duty to defend is triggered only when the primary’s insurer’s coverage is exhausted. View "Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Stratford Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeffrey Smith appealed a circuit court granting judgment to defendant Milko Pesa d/b/a Auto Milko, on plaintiff’s small claim action seeking damages and other relief on the grounds that he validly revoked acceptance of the used motor vehicle the defendant sold him and that, by selling him the vehicle, the defendant violated RSA chapter 358-F. In February 2014, plaintiff purchased a 2004 Subaru from defendant “as is as seen.” Before purchasing it, he signed and/or initialed four documents, namely a receipt from defendant’s car dealership stating that plaintiff purchased the motor vehicle “as is as seen,” and containing statements in which defendant, as the seller of the motor vehicle, disclaimed “ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.” After purchasing the motor vehicle, the plaintiff had it inspected by a Subaru dealership, and the vehicle failed inspection. Thereafter, the parties agreed that the vehicle would be inspected by an independent mechanic. According to plaintiff, the independent mechanic corroborated the opinion of the Subaru dealership that the vehicle was beyond repair. According to defendant, the independent mechanic opined that the vehicle required only the replacement of a missing part. Plaintiff subsequently brought a small claim action against the defendant, seeking damages and rescission of the sale. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Smith v. Pesa" on Justia Law

Petitioner City of Concord appealed a New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) decision that a grievance filed by respondent, the Concord Police Supervisor[s’] Association (Union), and a retired bargaining unit member was arbitrable pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The City and the Union were parties to a CBA that expired on December 31, 2012. Lieutenant Paul Leger retired on January 31, 2013, while negotiations for a successor CBA were ongoing. Negotiations for the successor CBA culminated in an agreement signed on December 19, 2013, nearly eleven months after Leger retired. In March 2014, more than a year after Leger retired, he and the Union filed a grievance with the City because he did not receive the cost of living wage adjustment effective January 1, 2013. The City denied the grievance, and the Union subsequently demanded arbitration. Finding no reversible error in the PELRB's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of City of Concord " on Justia Law

Respondent Alexander Nizhnikov appealed a final order in his divorce from petitioner Marianna Nizhnikov. He argued that the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to enforce the parties’ prenuptial agreement; (2) awarding alimony to the petitioner; (3) ordering him to pay for the petitioner’s health insurance; (4) ordering him to pay for the lease of the petitioner’s vehicle; (5) issuing a mutual restraining order; (6) issuing a parenting plan that allowed the petitioner to eventually have “near equal” parenting time; (7) ordering him to pay 100 percent of the children’s uninsured medical expenses and co-parenting counseling; (8) refusing to require the parties to live a certain geographical distance from one another; and (9) admitting into evidence a New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) administrative appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that the parties’ prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, and not the product of duress or obtained through non-disclosure of material fact. Additionally, the Court declined to consider petitioner’s argument that respondent still “got a fair deal” despite the trial court’s ruling that the agreement was unenforceable: Respondent was entitled to enforce the terms of a valid agreement. Given this conclusion, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s property distribution and remanded for the court to distribute the property consistent with the parties’ agreement. Because the case was remanded on this issue, the Court did not address respondent’s specific arguments regarding alimony, payment of the petitioner’s health insurance, or the leased vehicle. Finding no other reversible error, the Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Nizhnikov" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified two questions of New Hampshire law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In April 2007, plaintiff Joseph Castagnaro executed a promissory note in favor of Regency Mortgage Corporation and a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for Regency (the lender) and Regency’s successors and assigns. From that point forward, the mortgage and the note traveled different routes. MERS assigned the mortgage to BAC Home Loan Servicing. BAC subsequently assigned the mortgage to defendant, The Bank of New York Mellon (Bank). The record contained two versions of the note. The first showed an undated indorsement from Regency to American Residential Mortgage, and the second included an undated assignment from Regency to American, an undated indorsement from American to Countrywide Bank FSB, an undated assignment from Countrywide Bank FSB to Countrywide Home Loans, and an undated indorsement in blank. After plaintiff failed to make certain mortgage payments, the Bank sought to foreclose. Once in federal court, the plaintiff amended his complaint, and the Bank moved to dismiss it. The federal district court granted the Bank’s motion, concluding that the parties’ intent to separate the mortgage and note at the outset of the transaction trumped any common law rule requiring unity. The federal district court ruled that because the Bank was the mortgagee, it could proceed with the foreclosure under RSA 479:25, which authorized a “mortgagee” to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure when, as in this case, the mortgage contained a clause allowing it. Plaintiff appealed to the First Circuit and requested that the First Circuit certify questions of law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The First Circuit asked whether New Hampshire common law and/or RSA 479:25 required a foreclosing entity to hold both the mortgage and note at the time of a nonjudicial foreclosure. If so, could an agency relationship between the note holder and the mortgage holder meet that requirement, and did language in the mortgage naming the mortgagee “nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns” suffice on its own to show an adequate agency relationship? In addition, assuming that the common law and/or RSA 479:25 required a unity of the mortgage and note at the time of a nonjudicial foreclosure, and that an agency relationship between the note holder and the mortgage holder did not satisfy such a requirement, could the parties’ intent to separate the two overcome the unity rule? The New Hampshire Court determined it did not have to answer whether New Hampshire common law or RSA 479:25 (2013) (amended 2015) required a foreclosing entity to hold both the mortgage and note at the time of a non-judicial foreclosure because an agency relationship between the noteholder and the mortgage holder met any such requirement and language in the mortgage naming the mortgagee “nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns” sufficed on its own to show an adequate agency relationship. View "Castagnaro v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law