Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Jeffrey Smith appealed a circuit court granting judgment to defendant Milko Pesa d/b/a Auto Milko, on plaintiff’s small claim action seeking damages and other relief on the grounds that he validly revoked acceptance of the used motor vehicle the defendant sold him and that, by selling him the vehicle, the defendant violated RSA chapter 358-F. In February 2014, plaintiff purchased a 2004 Subaru from defendant “as is as seen.” Before purchasing it, he signed and/or initialed four documents, namely a receipt from defendant’s car dealership stating that plaintiff purchased the motor vehicle “as is as seen,” and containing statements in which defendant, as the seller of the motor vehicle, disclaimed “ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.” After purchasing the motor vehicle, the plaintiff had it inspected by a Subaru dealership, and the vehicle failed inspection. Thereafter, the parties agreed that the vehicle would be inspected by an independent mechanic. According to plaintiff, the independent mechanic corroborated the opinion of the Subaru dealership that the vehicle was beyond repair. According to defendant, the independent mechanic opined that the vehicle required only the replacement of a missing part. Plaintiff subsequently brought a small claim action against the defendant, seeking damages and rescission of the sale. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Smith v. Pesa" on Justia Law

Petitioner City of Concord appealed a New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) decision that a grievance filed by respondent, the Concord Police Supervisor[s’] Association (Union), and a retired bargaining unit member was arbitrable pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The City and the Union were parties to a CBA that expired on December 31, 2012. Lieutenant Paul Leger retired on January 31, 2013, while negotiations for a successor CBA were ongoing. Negotiations for the successor CBA culminated in an agreement signed on December 19, 2013, nearly eleven months after Leger retired. In March 2014, more than a year after Leger retired, he and the Union filed a grievance with the City because he did not receive the cost of living wage adjustment effective January 1, 2013. The City denied the grievance, and the Union subsequently demanded arbitration. Finding no reversible error in the PELRB's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of City of Concord " on Justia Law

Respondent Alexander Nizhnikov appealed a final order in his divorce from petitioner Marianna Nizhnikov. He argued that the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to enforce the parties’ prenuptial agreement; (2) awarding alimony to the petitioner; (3) ordering him to pay for the petitioner’s health insurance; (4) ordering him to pay for the lease of the petitioner’s vehicle; (5) issuing a mutual restraining order; (6) issuing a parenting plan that allowed the petitioner to eventually have “near equal” parenting time; (7) ordering him to pay 100 percent of the children’s uninsured medical expenses and co-parenting counseling; (8) refusing to require the parties to live a certain geographical distance from one another; and (9) admitting into evidence a New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) administrative appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that the parties’ prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, and not the product of duress or obtained through non-disclosure of material fact. Additionally, the Court declined to consider petitioner’s argument that respondent still “got a fair deal” despite the trial court’s ruling that the agreement was unenforceable: Respondent was entitled to enforce the terms of a valid agreement. Given this conclusion, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s property distribution and remanded for the court to distribute the property consistent with the parties’ agreement. Because the case was remanded on this issue, the Court did not address respondent’s specific arguments regarding alimony, payment of the petitioner’s health insurance, or the leased vehicle. Finding no other reversible error, the Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Nizhnikov" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified two questions of New Hampshire law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In April 2007, plaintiff Joseph Castagnaro executed a promissory note in favor of Regency Mortgage Corporation and a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for Regency (the lender) and Regency’s successors and assigns. From that point forward, the mortgage and the note traveled different routes. MERS assigned the mortgage to BAC Home Loan Servicing. BAC subsequently assigned the mortgage to defendant, The Bank of New York Mellon (Bank). The record contained two versions of the note. The first showed an undated indorsement from Regency to American Residential Mortgage, and the second included an undated assignment from Regency to American, an undated indorsement from American to Countrywide Bank FSB, an undated assignment from Countrywide Bank FSB to Countrywide Home Loans, and an undated indorsement in blank. After plaintiff failed to make certain mortgage payments, the Bank sought to foreclose. Once in federal court, the plaintiff amended his complaint, and the Bank moved to dismiss it. The federal district court granted the Bank’s motion, concluding that the parties’ intent to separate the mortgage and note at the outset of the transaction trumped any common law rule requiring unity. The federal district court ruled that because the Bank was the mortgagee, it could proceed with the foreclosure under RSA 479:25, which authorized a “mortgagee” to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure when, as in this case, the mortgage contained a clause allowing it. Plaintiff appealed to the First Circuit and requested that the First Circuit certify questions of law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The First Circuit asked whether New Hampshire common law and/or RSA 479:25 required a foreclosing entity to hold both the mortgage and note at the time of a nonjudicial foreclosure. If so, could an agency relationship between the note holder and the mortgage holder meet that requirement, and did language in the mortgage naming the mortgagee “nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns” suffice on its own to show an adequate agency relationship? In addition, assuming that the common law and/or RSA 479:25 required a unity of the mortgage and note at the time of a nonjudicial foreclosure, and that an agency relationship between the note holder and the mortgage holder did not satisfy such a requirement, could the parties’ intent to separate the two overcome the unity rule? The New Hampshire Court determined it did not have to answer whether New Hampshire common law or RSA 479:25 (2013) (amended 2015) required a foreclosing entity to hold both the mortgage and note at the time of a non-judicial foreclosure because an agency relationship between the noteholder and the mortgage holder met any such requirement and language in the mortgage naming the mortgagee “nominee for lender and lender’s successors and assigns” sufficed on its own to show an adequate agency relationship. View "Castagnaro v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeffrey Roy appealed a circuit court order approving a recommendation of the Judicial Referee that judgment be entered in favor of defendant Quality Pro Auto, LLC on plaintiff’s small claim action. Plaintiff bought a used motor vehicle from defendant for $1,895. The bill of sale indicated that the vehicle was sold “As is As seen.” The sale also included a form from the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) titled “NOTICE OF SALE OF UNSAFE MOTOR VEHICLE.” In his small claims suit, plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the defendant had breached the implied warranty of merchantability when it sold the vehicle to him. Agreeing with the trial court that plaintiff waived this implied warranty, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Roy v. Quality Pro Auto, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Michelle Willette appealed a circuit court decision issuing a writ of possession in favor of plaintiff, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). In February 2013, Freddie Mac purchased Willette's property through a foreclosure sale. Freddie Mac subsequently filed a landlord and tenant writ in the district division seeking possession of the premises. After a hearing, Willette filed the required recognizance with the district division and then filed a title action in superior court. In April 2014, Freddie Mac removed the title action from the superior court to the federal district court. The federal district court granted Freddie Mac’s motion to dismiss Willette’s title action. Afterward, Freddie Mac filed a motion in superior court for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was denied. Freddie Mac then requested a hearing in the district division on the merits of its possessory action. At the hearing, Willette argued that the district division lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession. The district division disagreed and issued the writ. On appeal, Willette argued that the district division erred in issuing the writ of possession because: (1) it lacked jurisdiction over the possessory action; and (2) Freddie Mac failed to obtain judgment pertaining to its possessory action in both the superior court and the federal district court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Willette" on Justia Law

THI is a subsidiary of THI of New Hampshire, LLC, itself a subsidiary of a parent company that owns nursing home operators throughout the country. In approximately 2003, THI purchased and began operating a nursing home, Pleasant Valley Nursing Center (Pleasant Valley), in Derry. In 2012, THI had an opportunity to expand when Exeter Healthcare, Inc. closed its nursing home in Exeter and offered to sell its 109 licensed nursing beds. THI and Exeter Healthcare entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the beds in 2013, and THI made deposit payments to Exeter Healthcare in accordance with the agreement. The following month, THI requested that the Board grant approval for the transfer of the beds from Exeter Healthcare to THI. Because the Pleasant Valley building would not accommodate all of the beds to be transferred, THI also requested permission to apply for a Certificate of Need (CON) to construct a new building to house the beds in a different location. THI selected a site in Londonderry for the new building, which it planned to operate under the name Traditions at Londonderry. In its application, THI explained that the transfer would occur in the same nursing home region in Rockingham County, such that the number of beds in the region would not increase. THI also informed the Board that its contract conditioned its obligation to buy the beds from Exeter Healthcare upon the Board’s approval of the CON for Traditions at Londonderry. In this appeal of the Health Services Planning and Review Board's (Board) order, THI argued that the Board incorrectly interpreted RSA 151-C:4, III(a) as preventing the Board from granting a certificate of need (CON) to THI for the construction of the Pleasant Valley nursing home. Although the Board found that THI’s proposed facility would satisfy regulatory requirements for services offered, quality of care, and financial feasibility, among other criteria, the Board nevertheless denied THI’s application because the Pleasant Valley facility was not an “existing facility.” Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision. View "Appeal of THI of New Hampshire at Derry, LLC " on Justia Law

Defendant Roland Dow appealed after a jury convicted him on two counts of first degree assault, one count of second degree assault, five counts of endangering the welfare of a child, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of unlawful interception and disclosure of oral communications or telecommunications. Dow argued the Superior Court erred by: (1) admitting detailed evidence that he physically abused his former girlfriend, Jessica Linscott; and (2) allowing the State’s expert witness to testify regarding the effects of domestic violence on a victim. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Dow" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Oscar Grande of armed robbery. On appeal, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to contest the admission of evidence concerning an uncharged robbery. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Grande" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, petitioners Deere & Company, CNH America LLC (CNH), AGCO Corporation (AGCO), Kubota Tractor Corporation (Kubota), and Husqvarna Professional Products, Inc. (Husqvarna), all appealed superior court orders that granted summary judgment to the State on their constitutional challenges to Senate Bill (SB) 126. SB 126 was enacted in 2013, amending RSA chapter 357-C to define "motor vehicle" as including "equipment," which "means farm and utility tractors, forestry equipment, industrial equipment, construction equipment, farm implements, farm machinery, yard and garden equipment, attachments, accessories, and repair parts." Like its federal counterpart and similar state statutes, RSA chapter 357-C, "the so-called ‘dealer bill of rights,''" was enacted "to protect retail car dealers from perceived abusive and oppressive acts by the manufacturers." RSA chapter 357-C regulated, among other things, a manufacturer's delivery and warranty obligations and termination of dealership agreements. RSA chapter 357-C also defines unfair methods of competition and deceptive practices. Violation of any provision of RSA chapter 357-C constitutes a misdemeanor. Petitioners manufactured agricultural, construction, forestry, industrial, lawn, and garden equipment, including commercial mowers, wheel loaders, backhoes, and agricultural tractors. Their complaint alleged that: (1) retroactive application of SB 126 substantially impaired their existing dealership agreements in violation of the State and Federal Contract Clauses; and (2) SB 126 violated the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution because it voided or otherwise rendered unenforceable mandatory binding arbitration clauses in existing dealership agreements, thereby conflicting with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In sum, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld SB 126 against petitioners' claims that it violated the State and Federal Contract Clauses. The Court agreed with the trial court that the preempted provisions were severable from the remaining provisions of RSA chapter 357-C as applied to petitioners. The Court rejected Husqvarna's argument that SB 126 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Court also rejected Husqvarna's contention that SB 126 had either a discriminatory purpose or effect within the meaning of the dormant Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, the Court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the State on Husqvarna's dormant Commerce Clause claim and remanded for the trial court to consider, in the first instance, whether SB 126 was unconstitutional under the "Pike" balancing test. View "Deere & Co. v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law