Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Raymond Cover appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board order denying his request for reinstatement to his former part-time position with the respondent, the New Hampshire Liquor Commission (Commission). Cover was a part-time employee of the Commission. In late May 2013, he sustained a work-related injury. The Commission sent him workers’ compensation forms on June 5 and warned him that he faced termination if he did not provide medical documentation by June 14 to justify his absence from work. On June 6, Cover gave the forms to his physician, who submitted them to the Commission on June 17, three days after the Commission’s deadline. Cover acknowledged that he did not submit any medical documentation to the Commission by June 14. On June 13, the Commission’s insurance carrier denied Cover’s workers’ compensation claim, stating that it had not received medical documentation concerning his injury. On June 17, the Commission terminated Cover’s employment. The board based its denial upon New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 504.05(b)(3), which stated that part-time employees were ineligible for reinstatement under the Workers’ Compensation Law. On appeal, Cover argued that Lab 504.05(b)(3) conflicted with RSA 281-A:25-a and was therefore invalid. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of RSA 281-A:25-a supported Cover’s argument that the right of reinstatement extended to part-time employees. "By stripping part-time employees of the right to reinstatement provided by RSA 281-A:25-a, the rule cannot be characterized as a rule that merely 'fill[s] in the details to effectuate the purpose of the statute.' Rather, the rule impermissibly modifies the statute and is therefore invalid." The Court vacated the board’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Raymond Cover" on Justia Law

Petitioners Pamela and Robert Lundquist appealed a circuit court order that approved a Judicial Referee's recommendation that their petition for visitation with their grandchildren be dismissed for lack of standing. Petitioners are the parents of respondent, and the natural grandparents of respondent’s three minor children. Respondent’s husband, and natural father of the minor children, died in August 2010. In June 2014, petitioners filed a petition for grandparent visitation in the trial court. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute “contemplates grandparent visitation rights when a child’s nuclear family is absent due to ‘divorce, death, relinquishment or termination of parental rights, or other cause,’” but that “[t]he nuclear family here is intact” because “[t]he Mother is entirely capable of raising her three boys and has done so.” Respondent asserted that “[t]he Paternal grandparents may have standing since the death of their son in 2010 but maternal grandparents have no standing to bring forth this petition.” Petitioners objected, arguing, among other things, that they “have stated a claim for relief based upon the death of Respondent’s husband as well as ‘other cause.’” On appeal, petitioners argued that the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because “the Grandparents are the natural grandparents of the minor children and the nuclear family was not intact." The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding, contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language, that petitioners lacked standing to petition for grandparent visitation rights. View "Petition of Pamela & Robert Lundquist" on Justia Law

Defendant Albert Boutin, III appealed after a jury convicted him on one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. At trial, the State did not produce the marijuana seized from defendant’s apartment, but rather relied upon photographs and other documentary evidence, and the testimony of the police and the state laboratory worker who analyzed a sample of the seized marijuana. After the State rested its case, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge for possession of marijuana, arguing that “the state hasn’t proven a prima facie case because there is no marijuana . . . in evidence.” The trial court denied the motion. Defendant again moved to dismiss at the close of his case, and the trial court again denied the motion. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in: (1) allowing a laboratory analyst to testify about a substance that was not introduced at trial; and (2) failing to dismiss the marijuana charge for insufficiency of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Boutin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Nichole Wilkins and Beverly Mulcahey sued their former employer, Fred Fuller Oil Company, Inc. (Fuller Oil), for sexual harassment and retaliation. Plaintiffs also sued Frederick J. Fuller, an employee of Fuller Oil, individually Prior to trial, defendant sought to prohibit plaintiffs from asserting claims against him under RSA chapter 354-A in his individual capacity. The district court thereafter informed the parties that it would not allow plaintiffs to assert such claims. Subsequently, Fuller Oil filed for bankruptcy protection and, therefore, the case against Fuller Oil was stayed; the case was reopened as to claims against defendant. Because the questions of whether an employee could recover damages from another employee for aiding and abetting sexual harassment or for retaliation under RSA chapter 354-A concerned unresolved issues of New Hampshire law, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire certified two questions of New Hampshire law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court: (1) whether sections 354-A:2 and 354-A:7 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes imposed individual employee liability for aiding and abetting discrimination in the workplace; and (2) whether section 354-A:19 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes imposed individual employee liability for retaliation in the workplace. The New Hampshire Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative. View "U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Fred Fuller Oil Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Christina Thomas was convicted by jury of first degree assault for knowingly causing serious bodily injury to a person under 13 years of age. In 2002, E.A. moved in with defendant and her family. In August 2003, E.A. gave birth to D.A. and continued living with defendant, who promised to help take care of the child. E.A. and D.A. lived with the defendant until 2010, when D.A. was removed from the home and E.A. left. When E.A. first moved in, she got along well with defendant. Over time, and specifically after D.A. was born, the relationship deteriorated. After giving birth, E.A. weighed close to 400 pounds and was told by a doctor that she needed to lose weight. Defendant promised to help in this endeavor, and the two went on a diet and exercised together. Eventually, defendant stopped being supportive and instead used forced exercise and the denial of food to punish E.A. D.A. was hit or spanked, often with a board or a spatula. E.A. participated in the abuse of her son, often at defendant's direction. If E.A. did not do as she was directed, she was beaten. For the first year of his life, D.A. was fed formula and grew normally. Around the time he turned two years old, D.A. began “ruminating” (he would regurgitate food into his mouth, chew it, and swallow it again). He would also vomit food out of his mouth. These behaviors occurred almost every time he ate, at least several times per day. He also began eating such things as diesel fuel, his own feces, or animal feces. Defendant, who had assumed primary responsibility for feeding D.A., tried feeding him different foods to stop the ruminating and vomiting, but the problem continued. D.A.’s behaviors, particularly his ruminating, disgusted everyone at the house. The defendant believed that the behavior was intentional and began punishing D.A. for it, by hitting him or withholding food, occasionally for days at a time. D.A. was constantly hungry, but would not be fed if he screamed for food or cried about being hungry. D.A. barely grew or gained weight. In April 2010, when he was about six and one half years old, D.A. weighed 23 pounds, six ounces — only four ounces more than he weighed when he was 10 months old. He was also developmentally delayed. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) eventually intervened, leading to charges against defendant. Defendant argued on appeal of her conviction that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting evidence of “other bad acts” committed against the victim and the victim’s mother; and (2) not striking other testimony that she contended was inadmissible and prejudicial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Thomas" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Towns of Salem, Temple, Auburn, Bennington, Meredith, Northfield, Peterborough, and Plainfield (the Towns) appealed an order of the presiding officer of the New Hampshire Bureau of Securities Regulation (Bureau) denying their motion to share in the distribution of approximately $17.1 million in excess earnings and surplus by one of the respondents, Health Trust, Inc. (Health Trust), in an administrative action brought by the Bureau against: Health Trust; Local Government Center, Inc. and several other entities (collectively, the administrative respondents). The Towns and the City of Concord (collectively, plaintiffs) appealed a superior court order granting a motion to dismiss filed by, among others, defendants Local Government Center, Inc. and additional parties (collectively, the civil action defendants). The plaintiffs were municipalities that were members of pooled risk management programs run by several of the defendants. In 2011, the secretary of state commenced an adjudicative proceeding prompted by a petition filed by the Bureau alleging that the administrative respondents had violated RSA chapters 5-B and 421-B. The resulting Order required that Health Trust and Property Liability Trust return excess funds of $33.2 million and $3.1 million, respectively, to those political subdivisions that were members of those programs. The Order also directed the Bureau and the administrative respondents to enter into an “agreed-upon plan” to distribute excess funds to members that had participated in the program at any time after June 10, 2010; however, if those parties failed to reach an agreement, the order required distribution only to Health Trust’s and Property Liability Trust’s current members. The parties failed to reach agreement, and the excess funds were ordered to be distributed to current members. The administrative respondents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated portions of the order not relevant here, and remanded for further proceedings. Thereafter, the Bureau filed a motion for entry of default order against the administrative respondents alleging noncompliance with the Order. The issues related to that motion were resolved by a consent decree incorporated into the presiding officer’s order. Their motion proposing distribution was denied, and the Towns appealed. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs filed suit against the civil action defendants in superior court. The civil action defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court found, in resolution of these appeals, that a common law contractual claim for the return of surplus funds as alleged by the plaintiffs was inextricably entwined with RSA chapter 5-B and could not exist alongside the administrative mechanism created in that chapter. Thus, to the extent the presiding officer concluded that he lacked the authority to penalize a violation of RSA 5-B:5, I(c) by ordering payment to former members of a pooled risk management program as either restitution or disgorgement, he committed an error of law. Accordingly, the Court vacated the presiding officer’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The case was affirmed in all other respects and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Town of Salem" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from two consolidated actions brought by plaintiffs Kelly Sanborn, Trustee of the 428 Lafayette, LLC Realty Trust, Donald and Rosemarie Folk, Heather Hancock, and Andrew Cotrupi, against defendants, 428 Lafayette, LLC and John Roberge, relating to their respective ownership of condominium units at Village Square of Hampton Condominium. Defendants appealed superior court rulings that: (1) Village Square of Hampton Condominium Association was governed by RSA chapter 292 (Voluntary Corporations Act), rather than RSA chapter 356-B (the "Condominium Act"); and (2) Cotrupi had the right to use certain commercial parking spaces at the Condominium. In affirming in part and reversing in part the superior court's order, the Supreme Court found: neither the Condominium Act nor the Voluntary Corporations Act contained language making it the exclusive Act governing condominium associations that incorporate. Because neither Act contained exclusivity language, the Court concluded that condominium associations that voluntarily incorporate, as here, were subject to both Acts, including on matters of governance. "Regardless of the provisions of the bylaws, however, the bylaws cannot negate the applicability of the Voluntary Corporations Act." The trial court erred in ruling that the Association was governed solely by the Voluntary Corporations Act. Because the court issued specific governance-related orders concerning the election of directors and voting allocation based upon its conclusion that only the Voluntary Corporations Act applied, those orders were vacated and the case remanded for consideration of issues raised by the parties pertaining to both Acts. The trial court did not err when it ruled that Cotrupi had the right to use his exclusively owned commercial parking spaces and the right to shared use of the remaining commercial parking spaces on the condominium property. View "Sanborn v. 428 Lafayette, LLC" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Circuit Court order granting defendant Tyler Boyer's motion to suppress evidence obtained when, without a warrant, the police entered the apartment that he shared with his girlfriend and arrested him. The trial court found that defendant had standing to object to the search despite the fact that, at the time of the search, he was present with his girlfriend in violation of a court order that prohibited him from having contact with her. The State argued that the defendant did not have standing to challenge the search because, given his presence in the apartment in violation of the order, he could not have an expectation of privacy in the apartment that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, and, therefore, reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire v. Boyer" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Town of Grafton's three-member selectboard reviewed and discussed the 36 warrant articles to be placed on the ballot for the annual Town meeting scheduled for March 10, including 20 articles that plaintiffs had petitioned to include on the ballot. At the January 20 meeting, one selectboard member moved that the ballot include the phrase “the Selectmen do not recommend this article” relative to each of the plaintiffs’ warrant articles. The motion passed unanimously. On March 5, the plaintiffs filed their petition for injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court held a final hearing on offers of proof and, on March 9, denied the petition, concluding that RSA 32:5, V-a authorized the Town to place recommendations on any warrant article. Plaintiff Jeremy Olson appealed a superior court order denying a petition he and co-plaintiffs, Thomas Ploszaj, Christopher Kairnes, and Howard Boucher filed for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Town. On appeal, Olson argued that the trial court erroneously determined that it was lawful for the Town to include on the official ballot for the annual Town meeting the phrase, “The Selectmen do not recommend this article,” below each of the plaintiffs’ 20 warrant articles, which the plaintiffs had petitioned to include on the ballot. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Olson v. Town of Grafton" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified a question of New Hampshire law to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The question arose from a dispute between Old Republic Insurance Company and Stratford Insurance Company as to their respective coverage and defense obligations arising out of a motor vehicle accident involving their insureds. Old Republic and Stratford each provided insurance coverage for a tractor-trailer that collided with a passenger vehicle. The owner of the tractor, Ryder Truck Rentals, had purchased an insurance policy from Old Republic. DAM Express, a for-hire motor company, had leased the tractor from Ryder. Although, pursuant to the lease agreement, Ryder was responsible for obtaining liability insurance for the tractor, DAM also purchased a separate insurance policy from Stratford. When the collision occurred, the driver of the tractor-trailer was employed by DAM, and the trailer was owned by Coca-Cola. The question posed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court was whether, under New Hampshire law, when was an excess insurer’s duty to defend triggered? Did New Hampshire follow the general rule that the excess insurer’s duty to defend is triggered only when the primary insurer’s coverage is exhausted? If not, what rule as to allocation of defense costs and timing of payment did New Hampshire follow? The New Hampshire Court responded that under New Hampshire law, the excess insurer’s duty to defend is triggered only when the primary’s insurer’s coverage is exhausted. View "Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Stratford Insurance Co." on Justia Law