Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Timothy Bobola appealed a superior court decision denying his petition to annul a criminal conviction for second degree assault and a second degree assault charge that did not result in a conviction. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by denying his petition to annul on the basis that he had a conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) on his record that was ineligible for annulment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Bobola" on Justia Law

Respondent Steven Allen appealed a superior court order granting a petition to partition real property and for other equitable relief filed by petitioner Renee Brooks, and denying respondent’s cross-petition to partition. Petitioner and respondent lived together for approximately twenty years from 1993 to 2013, except for an 18-month period of separation in 2006-2007. From 1998 through early 2013, the parties lived together in a home in Atkinson. In 2003, the parties, as joint borrowers, entered into a home equity credit agreement secured by a mortgage on the Atkinson property. The November 1998 mortgage in respondent’s name alone was discharged. Under the terms of the credit agreement, each party was individually liable for the full amount of the credit line. Respondent, however, was in control of the credit line and he alone withdrew funds from it. In 2007, the parties, as joint tenants, purchased a property in Northwood, New Hampshire. Respondent obtained a mortgage on the property in his name only. The parties refinanced the Northwood property several times. In 2013, petitioner moved out of the Atkinson property when she received a letter from respondent’s attorney notifying her that if she did not leave she would be evicted. Upon the advice of his attorney, respondent withdrew the remaining balance of approximately $59,000 on the 2012 Atkinson credit line so that petitioner could not access those funds. In March 2013, petitioner filed a two-count petition to partition. In count one, petitioner requested that the trial court order that the Northwood property be sold and that the net proceeds from the sale be distributed equally between the parties. In count two, petitioner requested, among other things, that the trial court “[e]quitably determine” each party’s interest and rights in the Atkinson property, each party’s liability for any debts or loans jointly entered into, and each party’s liability for any debts or loans entered into by the petitioner, whose funds were used by the respondent “individually, or by the parties jointly, to invest in or maintain real estate.” Respondent cross-petitioned, requesting that the trial court assign the Northwood property to him, and dismiss count two of petitioner’s petition. After review of the superior court's order, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Brooks v. Allen" on Justia Law

The parties divorced in January 2010. They had two minor children at that time. They entered into a stipulation, which was incorporated into the divorce decree that the trial court approved; in the stipulation, they agreed upon, among other things, the amount of monthly alimony and child support to be paid by Husband. Husband and Wife both appealed after the trial court issued orders modifying Husband's child support obligation. Wife argued that the trial court erred by: (1) including foster care payments that she received in her gross income for the purpose of modifying Husband’s child support and alimony obligations; (2) terminating Husband’s ongoing alimony obligation; and (3) concluding that it, a family division court, lacked jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ agreement to share equally in certain litigation costs. After review, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's determination of Wife's gross income figure. Because the Court vacated for redetermination of Wife’s gross income for child support purposes, and because the trial court relied, in part, upon that gross income figure when deciding to eliminate Husband’s ongoing alimony obligation, the Court also vacated the alimony award and remand for redetermination of whether and to what extent ongoing alimony is warranted. The Court found the family division court had jurisdiction to enforce the parties' litigation cost agreement. The case was affirmed in all other respects, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Holly & William Doherty" on Justia Law

Defendant Vic Washington was charged with a number of offenses that arose from his “alleged use and attempted use of fraudulent credit cards, as well as his possession of the allegedly fraudulent credit cards and credit card numbers.” He was indicted on three counts of identity fraud. Each of these indictments charged that he “pose[d] as Eli Watts with the purpose to defraud in order to obtain merchandise” from a specific merchant. He was also indicted on several counts of receiving stolen property. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss all charges, arguing that the State had failed to “provide proof of the validity of the credit card numbers” and proof that Eli Watts was a “bona fide person.” At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the State conceded that Eli Watts was “a person that the Defendant fabricated . . . . a fictitious person.” After the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss with the exception of the three identity fraud charges. As to those charges, the court ruled that the plain language of the applicable statute required the State to prove, among other things, that defendant posed as a natural person. Because the State did not dispute that Eli Watts was “a fictitious person,” the court ruled that the indictments charging that defendant “pose[d] as Eli Watts” were insufficient to allege that he posed as another person. The State filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s ruling, arguing, in part, that “the State did not intend to concede that Eli Watts is, in fact, a fictitious person. Rather, the State’s argument has always been that it didn’t matter whether Mr. Watts was a fictitious person or not.” The trial court denied the motion, and the State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Washington" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Eric Cable for negligent homicide - driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). He appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he caused the victim’s death and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of certain evidence and to certain statements by the prosecutor in his opening statement and closing argument. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Cable" on Justia Law

Respondents Northridge Environmental, LLC and Arch Insurance Company (carrier), appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) granting a request by petitioner John Nicholson for reimbursement for home health care services provided to him by his wife, Angela Nicholson. Petitioner was seriously injured on the job while working for Northridge. After a period of hospitalization, petitioner was discharged but prescribed medication and follow-up care, which included home health services. Following the petitioner’s release from the hospital, he had multiple open wounds that required daily cleaning, and he “needed 24/7 care, due to balance problems, short term memory loss, and inability to perform certain regular activities of daily living.” Although petitioner’s wife did not have any formal medical training, she provided the required care, including cleaning his wounds, bathing him, dressing him, aiding him in the use of the bathroom, helping him move around, and constantly supervising him. Petitioner sought reimbursement at a rate of $15 per hour, 16 hours per day, between the date of his release from the hospital, and June 4, 2012, the date of the Department of Labor (DOL) hearing. The DOL denied the request for reimbursement. On remand to the CAB, respondents argued that because petitioner’s wife did not fall within the definition of a “health care provider” as used in RSA 281-A:2, XII-b (2010), her services were not reimbursable. Petitioner conceded that his wife was not a “doctor, chiropractor, or rehabilitation provider” as listed in RSA 281-A:2, XII-b, but he still asserted that her services were, nonetheless, reimbursable. The CAB first concluded that petitioner was entitled to reimbursement for his wife’s services. Regarding the amount of reimbursement, the CAB observed that petitioner’s wife offered inexact dates, times, and durations of various treatments that she provided and also lacked written records of her care. Nonetheless, the CAB concluded that it was reasonable to reimburse the petitioner for 12 hours per day at $15 per hour for the period between August 25, 2010, and June 4, 2012. The parties filed motions for reconsideration, which were denied. Finding no reversible error in the CAB's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Northridge Environmental, LLC" on Justia Law

Pro-se plaintiff Deborah Sumner appealed a superior court order denying her Right-to-Know Law request put to the New Hampshire Secretary of State. The order also granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Sumner sought to inspect ballots cast in the town of Jaffrey during the 2012 general election. The Secretary denied her request, citing RSA 659:95, II (Supp. 2015), which exempted ballots which have been cast from the Right-to-Know Law. On appeal, Sumner argued that RSA 659:95, II, along with RSA 660:16, II (2008) and RSA 669:33, II (2008) (collectively, “the ballot exemption statutes”), violated several articles of the New Hampshire Constitution. After review, the Supreme Court held that the ballot exemption statutes did not violate the State constitution, and, therefore, affirmed. View "Deborah Sumner v. New Hampshire Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Officer John Gantert appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendants the City of Rochester, the Rochester Police Department, and the Rochester Police Commission, on plaintiff’s claims of tortious interference with prospective advantageous business relations, violations of his procedural due process rights, and damage to his reputation. All of his claims stemmed from defendants’ alleged wrongful placement of plaintiff on a so-called “Laurie List” without affording him sufficient procedural due process. After review, the Supreme Court found that the procedures afforded to plaintiff in this case were adequate. As such, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Gantert v. City of Rochester" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Gregory and Sonia Riso appealed a superior court order dismissing their negligence claim against defendants Attorney Maureen C. Dwyer and Barradale, O’Connell, Newkirk & Dwyer, P.A., on grounds that defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs to promptly execute Gregory’s mother’s will. Because the Supreme Court found this case indistinguishable from "Sisson v. Jankowski," (148 N.H. 503 (2002)), the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Riso v. Dwyer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lynette Maryea was an inmate at the Strafford County House of Corrections. In January 2011, the County was transporting Maryea from the House of Corrections to the Federal District Court in Concord in an inmate transport van. Maryea rode handcuffed and shackled in the van’s back compartment, which was designated for inmates. The compartment had no seatbelts. During the drive, the van collided with Thomas Velardi’s vehicle, and Maryea sustained injuries. Maryea then brought negligence claims against Velardi and the County. In her negligence claim against the County, Maryea alleged that the County was liable for her injuries because the transport van was not equipped with seatbelts in the back compartment where she was required to be seated. Maryea appealed a Superior Court order ruling that defendant Strafford County was entitled to discretionary function immunity and granting the County’s motion for summary judgment in an action for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Maryea and Velardi eventually settled. The principal issue in this case was whether the provisions in RSA chapter 507-B waiving governmental immunity from tort liability arising out of, among other things, the operation of motor vehicles, abrogated the County’s common law discretionary function immunity. After review, the Supreme Court held that they do not, and, accordingly, affirmed. View "Maryea v. Velardi" on Justia Law