Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Rodric Reinholz was convicted by jury on two counts of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), two counts of ASFA by individual acts, and one count of felonious sexual assault (FSA). On appeal, defendant argued the superior court erred when it admitted into evidence an "affidavit" written by the victim. He also argued that his convictions on the two pattern AFSA charges should have been vacated under the rule of mandatory joinder that the New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted in "New Hampshire v. Locke," (166 N.H. 344 (2014)). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Reinholz" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jonathan Wolfgram appealed a superior court order affirming a decision by respondent the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS), to retain notations on petitioner’s motor vehicle record referring to his certification and decertification as a habitual offender, despite the fact that the convictions that led to his habitual offender certification had been annulled. Petitioner argued that, because the habitual offender notations revealed the fact of his annulled criminal convictions, allowing DOS to retain the notations on his motor vehicle record defeated the purpose of the annulment statute. The Supreme Court agreed with petitioner, reversed and remanded. View "Wolfgram v. New Hampshire Department of Safety" on Justia Law

Defendant City of Concord (City) appealed a Superior Court order requiring it to issue demolition permits to plaintiff Everett Ashton, Inc. so that Everett Ashton could remove three abandoned, valueless manufactured homes from its manufactured housing park. The court also ruled that the City could not place a lien on Everett Ashton’s park for the unpaid water bills of the former residents of the abandoned homes, and that, by withholding demolition permits, the City engaged in a regulatory taking, entitling Everett Ashton to compensation and attorney’s fees. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the court’s ruling that the City had to issue the demolition permits, reversed its rulings concerning the unpaid bills and the regulatory taking, vacated the award of attorney’s fees, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Everett Ashton, Inc. v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Kuchman appealed decisions related to his conviction by a jury on one count of first degree assault. Defendant and his friend, Joshua Texeira, were at a Rochester bar. While there, defendant and Texeira became loud and eventually asked to leave. Following an argument with the victim and the manager of the bar, defendant and Texeira were escorted outside, where defendant threatened the victim and stated that he was going to come back for him. Eventually, the defendant and Texeira walked away. A few minutes later, the victim went out of the back door of the bar to take out the trash and to smoke. The victim saw defendant and Texeira standing near one of the dumpsters, and said something to them. Neither responded, but both defendant and Texeira approached the victim. Texeira then took out an expandable baton that had been in his truck, and hit the victim with it. The victim fell down, and was kicked several times. The victim later identified, by way of photographic lineups, both defendant and Texeira as his attackers. Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a bill of particulars, denied his multiple motions for a mistrial, and admitted evidence of a telephone conversation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Kuchman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Donna Green appealed a superior court decision to enter judgment in favor of defendants School Administrative Unit #55 (SAU), Timberlane Regional School District, Nancy Steenson, and Earl F. Metzler, II. This matter arose out of Green's request for documents under the Right to Know law; the trial court concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to receive electronic copies of documents that she had requested from defendants. Responding to her request for documents, Steenson, the chair of the school board, told plaintiff could make an appointment to “see the documents” that she had requested. Plaintiff replied, “in that case, give me the file electronically and we will all save money and time”; in response to this communication, the SAU stated that it had already responded to plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff noted that her “request is for an electronic file . . . or a paper report, whichever suits the district,” and she declined to make an appointment to view the documents. Plaintiff explained that “[a]ll of the documents requested could have been emailed or copied in the time it has taken to answer these excuses for not providing [them]. . . . This isn’t that difficult.” In response, the SAU stated that the documents that she requested were immediately “available for public inspection.” After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court found that both proffered interpretations of RSA 91-A:4, V were reasonable. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Right-to-Know statute was ambiguous. "In light of the purpose of the Right-to-Know Law, and our broad construction of it, we conclude that the trial court erred when it determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to the requested documents in electronic format. Although the SAU notified the plaintiff that the documents that she requested were available for inspection, there is no evidence in the record that the paper documents made available constituted 'original records' as contemplated by RSA 91-A:4, V." Accordingly, the Court concluded plaintiff was entitled to the requested documents in electronic format. View "Green v. School Administrative Unit #55" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-client James Yager appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendant-attorney K. William Clauson on the client’s legal malpractice claim and dismissing that claim as to defendant-law firm Clauson, Atwood & Spaneas. The client’s legal malpractice claim stems from the defendants’ representation of him in two timber trespass actions. In the first action, summary judgment was granted to Mighty Oaks, in part, because the client failed to prove that Mighty Oaks was the entity that cut the timber. In the second action, summary judgment was granted to D.H. Hardwick & Sons, Inc. because the action had been filed more than three years after the timber cutting had ceased and, thus, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The client filed the instant malpractice action against the defendants alleging that the applicable standard of care was breached because the Hardwick action was not timely filed. In this case, the trial court concluded that a legal expert was necessary for the plaintiff to prove “what result should have occurred” had the Hardwick action been timely filed. The client argues that this was error because he could have used the “trial-within-a-trial” method to prove this. After review, the Supreme Court held that, to the extent that the trial court determined that the trial-within-a-trial method was unavailable to the client, as a matter of law, the trial court erred. The Court found no error with regard to dismissal of claims against the defendant law firm. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Yager v. Clauson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kathleen Nawn-Benoit and Thomas Benoit appealed a superior court order granting the summary judgment motion filed by defendants Ronald and Rita Delude, and denying plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment. In July 2014, over the objections of several lot owners in the parties' subdivision, plaintiffs obtained a variance to build a single-family residence on property designated as Common Land in their original 1974 plans. A "Declaration of Covenants" was recorded with the development plan, making all lots in the development subject to the Declaration, and the intention of the Developer to create "open spaces and other common facilities for the benefit of [that] community." In January 2015, plaintiffs brought a petition against the residents of the subdivision seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that the Declaration was unenforceable; (2) an order that they acquired title to the Common Land “free and clear of the Declaration through adverse possession”; and (3) to the extent that the Declaration was deemed enforceable, an order requiring defendants to form a homeowners' association, purchase the Common Land from plaintiffs “at its fair market value,” and reimburse them for their “out-of-pocket expenses . . . , including real estate taxes.” The trial court concluded that “[b]ecause the undisputed material facts and the applicable law apply equally to the [plaintiffs’] claims asserted against all of the other [defendant]-lot owners, they are likewise entitled to summary judgment.” The court subsequently denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Benoit v. Cerasaro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff CBDA Development, LLC (CBDA) appealed a superior court order affirming a decision of the Planning Board (Board) of defendant, Town of Thornton not to consider CBDA’s second site plan application for a proposed recreational campground. The Board decided that it could not consider CBDA’s second application because it did not materially differ in nature and degree from CBDA’s initial application. CBDA argued that the trial court erred when it: (1) upheld the Board’s decision to apply the "Fisher v. City of Dover" doctrine to applications before a planning board; and (2) found that the Board reasonably concluded that CBDA’s second application did not materially differ from its first application. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "CBDA Development, LLC v. Town of Thornton" on Justia Law

Farmington School District appealed a Board of Education (state board) decision reversing the decision of the Farmington School Board (local board) not to renew the employment contract of Demetria McKaig, a guidance counselor at Farmington High School. In November 2012, a student (Student A) and her boyfriend told McKaig and another guidance counselor that Student A was pregnant and that she wanted to terminate her pregnancy. Student A was fifteen years old at the time. McKaig suggested that Student A tell her mother about the pregnancy, but Student A refused. The principal expressed his view that the school should inform Student A’s mother about the pregnancy. McKaig disagreed, asserting that Student A had a right to keep the pregnancy confidential. McKaig spoke with Attorney Barbara Keshen of the New Hampshire Civil Liberties Union about Student A’s situation. Keshen’s opinion was that the judicial bypass law protected the confidentiality of Student A’s pregnancy and the fact that she was contemplating an abortion. McKaig relayed this opinion to Student A, and Student A made an appointment with a health center and another attorney to assist her with the judicial bypass proceedings. Meanwhile, the principal instructed the school nurse to meet with Student A to tell her that the school would inform her mother about her pregnancy. McKaig told the principal about her conversation with Keshen and urged him to contact Keshen to discuss Student A’s rights. The principal did not contact Keshen; however, Keshen contacted him. He told Keshen that the parental notification and judicial bypass laws did not prevent him from telling Student A’s mother about the pregnancy. Keshen instituted a petition for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the principal to prevent him from contacting Student A’s mother. McKaig was named as the petitioner “ON BEHALF OF [Student A]”; she was not named in her individual capacity. The TRO was ultimately granted. Months later, McKaig received a notice of nonrenewal from the superintendent; in the written statement of the reasons for non-renewal, the superintendent listed three reasons: insubordination, breach of student confidentiality, and neglect of duties. After the hearing, the local board upheld McKaig’s nonrenewal on those grounds. McKaig appealed to the state board, which found, pursuant that the local board’s decision was “clearly erroneous.” The state board reversed the local board’s decision to uphold McKaig’s nonrenewal, but it did not order McKaig’s reinstatement or any other remedy. McKaig cross-appealed the state board’s decision and argued that she was entitled to reinstatement with back pay and benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed the state board’s reversal of the local board’s decision, and ordered that McKaig be reinstated to her former job. The case was remanded to the state board for further proceedings to determine whether she was entitled to additional remedies. View "Appeal of Farmington School District" on Justia Law

Petitioner Thomas Todd, a Massachusetts resident, is a member of the New Hampshire Chapter of the Appalachian Mountain Club (AMC). He was a member of the AMC’s paddling committee since 1989 and was the committee’s co-chair in 2009 and 2010. Sally Leonard was also a member of the AMC’s paddling committee. In January 2014, Leonard filed a stalking petition against Todd, alleging Todd "hacked" her computer and broke her vehicle’s window after she had voiced her opinion at an AMC meeting that Todd should not be allowed to participate in a paddling committee event "due to his history of aggressive behavior toward females." Todd was insured under a homeowner’s insurance policy and an umbrella liability policy issued to him by Vermont Mutual Insurance Company. After the stalking petition was filed, Todd notified Vermont Mutual of the action and requested that it provide a defense under one or both of the policies. Vermont Mutual declined. The AMC was insured by Hanover Mutual Insurance Company under an employment practices liability (EPL) policy and a nonprofit directors, officers and organizations liability (D & O) policy. Todd informed the AMC of the stalking petition and requested that it notify Hanover to provide him with a defense. Hanover declined too. In March 2014, the Circuit Court ultimately found that Leonard “failed to sustain [her] burden of proof,” and, therefore, the court did not issue a restraining order against Todd. Todd incurred approximately $18,000 in attorney’s fees and costs in defending against the stalking petition. In June 2014, Todd filed this declaratory judgment proceeding, seeking a declaration that Vermont Mutual and Hanover owed a duty to defend him against the stalking petition and to reimburse him for the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending against the stalking petition. In addition, he sought attorney’s fees and costs for bringing the declaratory judgment proceeding. Todd appealed when cross-motions for summary judgment and summary judgment were granted favor of the insurance companies. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Todd v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law