Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Kenneth Geraghty appealed a final Circuit Court order in his divorce from petitioner Paula Geraghty. He argued that the trial court erred in: (1) applying New Hampshire law to his petition for annulment of the marriage; (2) denying his petition; (3) finding certain testimony proffered by the petitioner credible without explanation; (4) equally dividing the marital estate; and (5) ordering him to transfer to the petitioner one-half of a certain retirement account without affording him the opportunity to address possible adverse tax consequences of that transfer. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "In the Matter of Paula & Kenneth Geraghty" on Justia Law

In 2011, the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (department) determined that, while receiving unemployment benefits in 2010, petitioner Annelie Mullen had “knowingly failed to report [her] work and earnings” and, thus, the department had overpaid her benefits. As a result, the department informed petitioner that she was required to repay the overpaid benefits. petitioner appealed the department’s determination to the tribunal, which upheld the determination. Petitioner then requested that the commissioner reopen the record before the tribunal. The commissioner granted her request and ordered the tribunal to conduct a de novo hearing. In January 2012, the tribunal found that the petitioner was overpaid benefits in 2010, but that she was “without fault in creating the overpayment.” As a result, the tribunal determined that petitioner was not required to repay the state unemployment benefits. In March, the commissioner, on her own initiative, informed the parties that she was again reopening the record before the tribunal because she believed that the tribunal had mistakenly excluded the testimony of a particular witness. Petitioner appealed this second re-opening, arguing it deprived her of due process. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal. Subsequently, the tribunal held a third de novo hearing. In April 2014, the tribunal issued a decision upholding the initial determination that petitioner was overpaid benefits and requiring the petitioner to repay them. Petitioner appealed to the board, but the board declined to accept jurisdiction because the petitioner had not first requested that the commissioner reopen the tribunal decision. petitioner then requested that the commissioner reopen the case, reverse the tribunal’s April 2014 decision, and reinstate the January 2012 decision in her favor. Pending a decision on her request, the petitioner also appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no error in the tribunal's 2014 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Annelie Mullen" on Justia Law

Defendant Amadou Diallo appealed the extended term of imprisonment imposed by the Superior Court after his conviction for felonious sexual assault. He argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the State provided sufficient notice of its intent to seek an extended sentence, and because of that lack of notice, he asked the Supreme Court to vacate his sentence and remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. Finding no reversible error in the Superior Court's judgment, the Supreme Court denied his request and affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Diallo" on Justia Law

Appellants N.C. and Alethea Young, Ph.D., appealed superior court orders denying Dr. Young’s motion to quash a subpoena for N.C.’s psychological records issued by appellee, the New Hampshire Board of Psychologists (Board), and dismissing N.C.’s petition for a declaratory judgment to prevent the Board from obtaining the records. N.C. has been a patient of Young for many years, attending at least two therapy sessions per week since the age of two. In August 2013, when N.C. was still a minor, she informed Young that her father, S.C., had physically and emotionally abused her. According to Young, throughout her treatment of N.C., she witnessed what she described as S.C.’s aggressive and humiliating treatment of his daughter, both in public as well as in therapy sessions. In September, S.C. filed a written complaint against Young with the Board. The complaint alleged that Young had breached her professional obligations by: (1) becoming personally over-involved with N.C., thus sacrificing her objectivity; (2) providing counseling to both S.C. and his daughter, thus creating an insurmountable conflict of interest; (3) violating RSA 169-C:29 (2014) by failing to timely report suspected abuse of a child to DCYF; (4) violating RSA 633:1, I-a (2007) and 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012) by detaining and concealing N.C., who was a minor at the time, from S.C. when she drove N.C. to Vermont without S.C.’s knowledge or consent; and (5) failing to respect S.C.’s wishes that she no longer treat his daughter. On appeal, appellants argued that the trial court erred in enforcing the subpoena because the Board failed to establish that it had just cause to issue the subpoena. Appellants also contended that, even if just cause existed to issue the subpoena, once they objected, the subpoena could not be enforced by the court because the Board failed to sustain what, in their view, was the additional burden necessary to pierce the patient’s privilege by showing that there was a reasonable probability the records were relevant and material and that the Board had an essential need for them. Furthermore, appellants argued that, even if the Board met the burden necessary to pierce the privilege, the court erred in not conducting an in camera review of the records before ordering compliance with the subpoena in order to limit the scope of disclosure. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with appellants that the statute required a court order to obtain a patient’s records when there was an objection to compliance with a subpoena based upon a claim of privilege. However, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in finding that, under the circumstances of this case, the privilege must yield to the Board’s proper exercise of its regulatory responsibilities with regard to its licensee, Dr. Young. View "N.C. v. New Hampshire Board of Psychologists" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Boyle, as trustee of the 150 Greenleaf Avenue Realty Trust, appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Transportation Appeals Board (TAB) affirming the denial of his application for a permit to construct a driveway onto a state highway. The TAB based its decision upon sections 7(a) and 7(e) of the New Hampshire Department of Transportation’s (DOT) “Policy for the Permitting of Driveways and Other Accesses to the State Highway System.” Although the TAB concluded that petitioner’s proposed driveway would adequately protect the safety of the traveling public, because it also determined that there was sufficient support for the hearings examiner’s conclusion that the proposed driveway would cause an unreasonable hazard to the traveling public, it upheld the hearings examiner’s denial of the petitioner’s permit application. On appeal, petitioner challenged the finding of an unreasonable hazard, arguing that it was impossible for a driveway to adequately protect the safety of the traveling public and simultaneously cause an unreasonable hazard to the traveling public. Thus, petitioner argued that the TAB erred in denying his permit application. The Supreme Court agreed with petitioner, and, therefore, reversed. View "Appeal of Boyle" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority (NHHFA), appealed a superior court decision to grant summary judgment in favor of respondent Pinewood Estates Condominium Association (Pinewood), and to award attorney’s fees to Pinewood. The trial court ruled that, pursuant to Pinewood’s condominium declaration, NHHFA was responsible for paying condominium assessments that were accrued by the previous owner of a unit NHHFA purchased at a foreclosure sale, and that Pinewood was not obligated to provide common services to the unit until all assessments were paid. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the Condominium Act, RSA chapter 356-B (2009 & Supp. 2015), operated to bar Pinewood’s claim for unpaid pre-foreclosure condominium assessments, it reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority v. Pinewood Estates Condominium Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Maher Mahmoud appealed a superior court order granting defendants Winwin Properties, LLC (Winwin), Gary T. Shulman, Anita S. Shulman, Aaron Katz, and Jeremy Gavin's motion for summary judgment, and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff acquired title to an approximately 17-acre parcel of land in Thornton, and subsequently received subdivision approval from the Thornton Planning Board to create Lot 1, a 1.06-acre parcel; he recorded the subdivision as Plan 11808 at the Grafton County Registry of Deeds (registry of deeds). In July 2006, plaintiff mortgaged Lot 1 to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) by mortgage deed, recorded in the registry of deeds. The mortgage deed described the property as Lot 1 as depicted on Plan 11808. Plaintiff received approval from the Thornton Planning Board to further subdivide the 17-acre parcel into a total of eight lots; he recorded the subdivision as Plan 12600 at the registry of deeds. As part of this subdivision approval, the southerly boundary of Lot 1 was relocated. Plan 12600 showed both the original Lot 1 lot line and the new southerly lot line, and shows Lot 1 as consisting of 2.40 acres. Plaintiff ultimately defaulted on his loan, and MERS foreclosed on Lot 1. MERS conveyed Lot 1, pursuant to a foreclosure deed under power of sale to defendant Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-15 (Bank of New York). Then Bank of New York conveyed Lot 1 to Winwin by quitclaim deed. The deed from the Bank of New York to Winwin included the same description as that contained in the mortgage deed, with the additional phrase, “[s]ubject to any and all matters, including setbacks if any, as shown on Plan No. 11808 and Plan No. 12600 recorded in [the registry of deeds].” Winwin conveyed the property in May 2009 to defendants Gary and Anita Shulman, and the Shulmans conveyed the property in April 2014 to defendants Aaron Katz and Jeremy Gavin. In 2015, plaintiff sued defendants, asserting several claims relating to the size of Lot 1. Winwin moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s petition to quiet title to Lot 1, asserting that it had previously held record title to the lot, which included the approximately 1.34 acres added to Lot 1 by the lot line adjustment (the disputed land), because the description of the property in the mortgage deed included any additions to the land. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error in the superior court's grant of defendants' summary judgment, and affirmed. View "Mahmoud v. Town of Thornton" on Justia Law

Defendant David Aldrich appealed after a jury convicted him on two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Defendant argued the trial court erred by preventing him from cross-examining the victim about three of four allegedly false allegations of sexual assault that she had made against other men. He also challenged the court’s failure to disclose material following an in camera review. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Aldrich" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned a 105-acre tract of land in Wakefield. Approximately 68 acres of the tract was used for recreational vehicle campsites. In 1994, plaintiff obtained approval from the planning board to build 16 seasonal cabins on the remaining 37 acres of the tract. Each approved cabin was to be built on two acres. In 2001, the planning board decided that each cabin could be 600 square feet. Plaintiff then began creating the cabin development and as of 2007 it had constructed four cabins. In 2007, plaintiff consulted with the planning board about increasing the size of the remaining 12 cabins to approximately 850 square feet. Plaintiff’s request was denied and, despite the previous approval of 600 square feet per cabin, the permissible size of each of plaintiff’s remaining cabins was reduced to a maximum of 400 square feet. The matter was litigated and the Trial Court ordered that, because the plaintiff had relied upon the planning board’s prior approval in creating the cabin development, plaintiff was allowed to construct 600-square-foot cabins. In April 2011, plaintiff sought permission from the planning board to increase the size of the remaining 12 cabins to approximately 850 square feet. The request was again denied, and plaintiff appealed to the superior court. When the superior court upheld the planning board's decision, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) nothing in the language of RSA chapter 216-I precluded it from constructing “890 square foot” cabins; (2) the planning board lacked the authority to enforce compliance with RSA chapter 216-I; and (3) its rights to procedural due process were violated by confusion about which town entity defendant's attorney represented at a May 2011 planning board hearing. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in ruling that, to comport with RSA chapter 216-I, the plaintiff’s “cabins must be less than 400 square feet.” The case was remanded for the superior court to vacate the planning board’s decision and for the planning board to address plaintiff’s request to increase the size of the remaining cabins. View "Lake Forest R.V. Resort, Inc. v. Town of Wakefield" on Justia Law

Defendant Terry Adams, Jr. appealed his convictions of reckless conduct, and simple assault. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by: (1) recalling the jury to correct an error in the verdict on the reckless conduct charge; (2) denying his motion to introduce exculpatory evidence at trial; and (3) prohibiting him from introducing evidence of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Adams" on Justia Law