Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Tammy Cole was the biological grandmother of N.B. and J.B. In May 2012, DCYF filed a petition alleging that N.B. and J.B. had been neglected by their biological parents. The court appointed CASA to serve as the children’s guardian ad litem. After the court made a finding of neglect and awarded DCYF legal custody, DCYF removed N.B. and J.B. from their parents’ home and placed them in Cole’s physical custody. In November 2013, the biological parents sexually abused N.B. and J.B. during an unsupervised visit. The court subsequently terminated the biological parents’ parental rights, and the abuse and neglect case was closed. In May 2014, Cole and her husband adopted the children. In July, Cole filed a motion in the circuit court seeking to copy the court’s records relating to the children’s abuse and neglect case. Cole also notified DCYF and CASA that N.B. and J.B. had potential negligence claims against these agencies based upon the abuse that occurred while the children were in the legal custody of DCYF. DCYF and CASA objected to Cole’s motion and each requested a protective order. DCYF and CASA argued that Cole was not entitled to make a copy of the court record, and CASA requested that the court grant a protective order limiting Cole’s inspection of the records to review at the courthouse and limiting disclosure of the court file. After a hearing, the court granted Cole’s motion to copy records and also granted CASA’s request for a protective order, in part. Cole only appealed the part of the circuit court's order required that any future case be filed as confidential and the pleadings filed under seal. She argued that this constituted a prior restraint on free speech that violated her rights under the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions because it was neither narrowly tailored nor did it serve a compelling State interest. Further, she asserted that it impermissibly placed the burden upon her, instead of on the parties seeking nondisclosure, and that it unfairly restricted her disclosure while allowing others to disclose the same information. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the court’s ruling constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, it reversed this part of the order. View "In re N.B." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's review called for the Court to determine the constitutionality of New Hampshire Administrative Rules, He-W 654.04(c). The rule required DHHS to include a child’s federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in the calculation of a family’s eligibility for benefits under the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF), as administered by the State’s Financial Assistance to Needy Families program (FANF). Plaintiffs Carrie Hendrick and Jamie Birmingham were mothers whose children received SSI and FANF benefits, and whose benefits were ultimately cut by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and their children, seeking a declaratory judgment that DHHS’s “inclusion of children’s SSI in FANF assistance group income is unlawful and void” pursuant to applicable federal law. In addition, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Rule He-W 654.04 “is invalid because it impairs [their] legal rights.” Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction enjoining DHHS from including children’s SSI in FANF assistance group income and an award of attorney’s fees “because this litigation will result in a substantial benefit to the public.” After requesting that the Solicitor General of the United States file an amicus brief in this matter, and after reviewing that brief, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the Supremacy Clause did not permit the State to redirect federal benefits as required by Rule He-W 654.04(c). The rule, by counting a disabled child’s SSI benefits as income available to the child’s “assistance group,” treated the child’s benefits as a source of income for the entire household. The rule, thereby, reduced a household’s TANF benefit by one dollar for every dollar in SSI that was received by a disabled child in the household. Because the rule “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” the New Hampshire Court held that Rule He-W 654.04(c) was preempted by federal law and, thus, invalid to the extent that it required inclusion of children’s SSI as income to the TANF assistance group for the purpose of determining eligibility for TANF benefits. View "Hendrick v. New Hampshire Dept. of Health & Human Svcs." on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Gay was convicted by jury of second degree murder and conspiracy to commit robbery. He appealed the convictions, arguing the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure. Furthermore, he argued that the Trial Court erred in excluding evidence of an “alternative perpetrator” and in allowing the State’s expert witness to testify regarding certain footwear impressions. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Gay" on Justia Law

Defendant Dominick Stanin, Sr. appealed a Superior Court decision to impose his two previously suspended sentences. In June 2014, defendant was arrested for loitering (a violation-level offense), and resisting arrest (a misdemeanor). Those charges were tried in September 2014. The trial court acquitted the defendant of the loitering charge and placed the resisting arrest matter “on file without a finding.” In August 2014, defendant was charged with first degree assault, robbery, and being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon, for his involvement in a stabbing incident. He was subsequently also charged with misdemeanor resisting arrest in connection with the August incident. In October 2014, the State moved to impose the defendant’s two consecutive three-and-one-half-to-seven-year sentences on the ground that his June and August charges established that he had violated the condition of good behavior. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion in limine seeking to limit the State’s cross-examination of him or, alternatively, to “sever” the bases for the motion to impose. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Stanin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Estate of Thea Braiterman filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging a final decision of the Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), that upheld the determination that applicant Thea Braiterman was ineligible for Medicaid-Old Age Assistance (Medicaid-OAA) benefits because her assets exceeded the eligibility threshold. On appeal, petitioner argued that the AAU erroneously found that the Thea G. Braiterman Irrevocable Trust (the Trust) was includable as an asset for the purpose of determining applicant’s eligibility for Medicaid-OAA benefits. Petitioner argued, and DHHS did not dispute, that petitioner’s challenge was not moot even though applicant had died prior to the conclusion of this matter. Given the facts of this case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court could not say that there were no circumstances under which payments from the Trust could be made “for the benefit” of the applicant. “Finally, we take this opportunity to stress that we have no doubt that self-settled, irrevocable trusts may, if so structured, so insulate trust assets that those assets will be deemed unavailable to the settlor.” The Trust in this case was not such a vehicle. In the Supreme Court's view, the Trust, as structured, allowed applicant “a degree of discretionary authority that would . . . permit [her] to enjoy her assets, preserve those assets for her heirs, and receive public assistance, to, in effect, have her cake and eat it too." As such, the Court denied certiorari. View "Petition of Estate of Thea Braiterman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Signal Aviation Services, Inc. (Signal) appealed a superior court grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant City of Lebanon (City) in this action by Signal for, among other things, breach of contract. The City cross-appealed a portion of the trial court’s order interpreting the contract. Signal leased 8.91 acres at the Lebanon Municipal Airport (airport) as assignee of a Lease and Operating Agreement (LOA). The City owned the airport and was the lessor under the LOA. The LOA granted Signal the nonexclusive right and obligation to provide fixed based operator (FBO) services at the airport. In granting this nonexclusive right, the City agreed in paragraph 3M(2) of the LOA that “[a]ny other operator of aeronautical endeavors or activities will not be permitted to operate on the Airport under rates, terms [or] conditions which are more favorable than those set forth in this Agreement.” In 2006, the City increased the assessed value of the land leased by Signal, not including the improvements, resulting in a corresponding increase in Signal’s property tax liability. Signal applied for an abatement of taxes for the years 2006 and 2007. The City’s assessors denied abatement, and Signal appealed to the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA). The BTLA dismissed the appeals because Signal failed to present evidence of the property’s market value. Signal did not appeal that decision, bringing instead this suit, claiming, among other things, breach of contract. Its writ alleged that the City “materially breached its obligations under the [LOA] by providing more favorable and disproportionate tax assessments and taxation schemes under agreements with other entities at the Airport providing commercial aeronautical services there.” After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, having concluded that paragraph 3M(2), so far as it concerned taxation, merely obligated the City to require all other operators to pay all lawfully levied or assessed taxes. View "Signal Aviation Services, Inc. v. City of Lebanon" on Justia Law

Defendants, Markel Corporation, Markel Services, Inc. (Markel Services), and Essex Insurance Company (Essex), appealed a superior court order denying their motions for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to plaintiff Michael Newell, in this insurance coverage action. Newell was allegedly injured in a slip and fall accident at a property owned by Brames, Inc. (Brames) in Laconia. Brames was insured under an Amusement Park General Liability Policy issued by Essex. Essex was a subsidiary of Markel Corporation and Markel Services was Markel Corporation’s claims handling branch. Newell filed two personal injury actions arising from his slip and fall. The first action against Brames' co-owner and treasurer, was settled out-of-court. In the second lawsuit, Newell sued Ivy Banks, the person who allegedly cleaned the floor upon which Newell slipped and injured himself. Defendants received notice of the Banks action, but declined to defend Banks or intervene. Banks, although properly served, filed neither an appearance nor an answer and was defaulted. A default judgment was entered against Banks for $300,000, the full amount of damages sought by Newell. Newell brought suit against defendants to recover the amount of the default judgment, arguing he was a third party beneficiary under the insurance contract between Brames and Markel/Essex. On appeal, defendants argued the trial court erred in determining that the language of the Policy was ambiguous and that Banks was a “volunteer worker” under the Policy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Newell v. Markel Corporation" on Justia Law

Defendant Eugene Dowgiert appealed a superior court order dismissing his plea of title, which he filed in response to a possessory action brought in the circuit court by plaintiff Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the superior court erred in ruling that the plea was time-barred under RSA 479:25, II (Supp. 2015) and RSA 479:25, II-a (2013). After review, the Court held that it did not, and, accordingly, affirmed. View "The Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee v. Dowgiert" on Justia Law

Petitioner Thomas Phillips appealed a Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision denying his request for attorney’s fees in the amount of one-third of the value of workers’ compensation benefits awarded to him, as provided in a contingent fee agreement that he entered into with counsel. Petitioner argued that the CAB erred when it failed to award: (1) the contingent fee in accordance with the fee agreement; or (2) at least a “generous fee” under the circumstances of this case. The CAB ruled that, although contingent fee agreements in workers’ compensation cases were not per se unreasonable, the contingent fee requested in this case, which included one-third of all future benefits, was unreasonable. It stated that it was “not inclined to award fees based upon the hypotheticals counsel posed as to the gross amounts of indemnity or medical benefits the claimant may or may not receive over his lifetime.” The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. "[I]t appears that the CAB did not consider the merits of the petitioner’s proposed future cost estimate, but, rather, rejected the notion that any claimant could ever provide a reasonable estimate of the amount of future benefits. However, a blanket rule that future medical benefits are always speculative and, therefore, cannot be demonstrated, is contrary to our case law." Because the Court remanded to the CAB to make a new determination regarding counsel fees, the Court reserved ruling on the amount of fees to which petitioner was entitled in connection with the prior appeal and the appeal to the Supreme Court. View "Appeal of Thomas Phillips" on Justia Law

Petitioner Carlos Marti appealed a Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision to dismiss his claim for reinstatement to his job with respondent Nashua Foundries, Inc. Petitioner injured his elbow at work. He informed respondent’s president of his injury, was given an over-the-counter medication, and returned to work. Petitioner’s pain grew worse and, after approximately thirty minutes, he asked the president for permission to go to the local emergency room. The president refused the request, referring petitioner to an occupational health clinic pursuant to company policy and the collective bargaining agreement governing petitioner’s employment. Against the president’s directive, petitioner clocked out of work and went to the emergency room. He returned later with a doctor’s note for a four-day work absence, but was instead terminated for insubordination. Petitioner did not grieve his termination under the collective bargaining agreement. Respondent’s workers’ compensation insurer accepted the claim and paid petitioner’s medical bills. Petitioner requested a hearing on his claims for reinstatement and back pay; respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The CAB found that petitioner failed to challenge his termination by grieving it pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Respondent contended that because petitioner failed to grieve his termination, he could not challenge its legitimacy. The Supreme Court, after review, disagreed with respondent's contention: "[i]f this were correct, the petitioner would be considered to have been legitimately terminated for cause, and, under our interpretation of the statute herein, would not be an “employee” eligible for reinstatement under RSA 281-A:25-a, I. We cannot determine, however, whether the petitioner’s failure to grieve forecloses a challenge to his termination because the collective bargaining agreement is not contained in the record before us." Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded for a determination on that issue and for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Carlos Marti" on Justia Law