Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1992, brothers Mark, Matthew, and Patrick McDonough established TASC, a corporation that provided technical engineering services. In September 1995, the brothers converted TASC to a Limited Liability Company (LLC). The brothers had a falling out. As a result, Mark sued the defendants seeking a declaration that TASC must dissolve by September 30, 2015, pursuant to its certificate of formation and operating agreement. Both parties moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that: (1) an August 7 dissolution and revocation had no effect on TASC’s governing documents; and (2) TASC was not required to dissolve because its operating agreement permits a majority of its members to continue the company. Consequently, it denied summary judgment to Mark and granted summary judgment to defendants. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "McDonough v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The City of Rochester’s Department of Public Works owned and operated the Rochester Water System, which provided water to residents of the City. The City operated three water storage tanks, one of which is the Rochester Hill Water Storage Tank (the Tank). Whitman & Howard n/k/a AECOM Technical Services, Inc. (AECOM) designed the Tank and oversaw its construction by Chicago Bridge & Iron n/k/a CB&I, Inc. (CB&I). CB&I completed the Tank in 1985, and it was placed into service that same year. In June 2009, the City contracted defendant Marcel A. Payeur, Inc. (Payeur) to service the Tank by recoating the Tank’s interior and exterior, installing a mixer, and modifying the Tank to accommodate the mixer. Defendant Wright-Pierce performed the engineering and design work for the modification project. Payeur substantially completed the modification, under Wright-Pierce’s supervision, in November 2009. In December 2011, the Tank developed a leak. The City had to evacuate nearby residents, drain the Tank, and remove it from service. The City inspected the Tank and discovered that Payeur had failed to properly construct the modifications in accordance with Wright-Pierce’s design. The City filed suit against Payeur in November 2012, alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and unjust enrichment. In April 2014, the City named CB&I, AECOM, and Wright-Pierce as additional defendants. The City’s amended complaint alleged that Wright-Pierce had failed to properly supervise Payeur’s 2009 modification work; it also alleged that, in 1985, CB&I had failed to properly construct the Tank in accordance with AECOM’s design, and AECOM had failed to adequately monitor CB&I. CB&I and AECOM moved to dismiss the City’s claims against them, arguing that the claims were time-barred. The superior court dismissed the City’s claims against CB&I and AECOM pursuant to a six year statute of limitations in effect when CB&I and AECOM substantially completed their contract with the City. The City appealed, arguing the superior court erred in refusing to apply the doctrine of “nullum tempus occurrit regi (“time does not run against the king”). Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Rochester v. Marcel A. Payeur, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Katherine Streeter appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (board) order denying her request for attorney’s fees under New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 207.01(a)(4). In 2013, Streeter injured her left shoulder at work. She notified her employer and the employer filed a First Report of Injury with its insurance carrier the next day. Streeter would ultimately be diagnosed with tendonitis and referred for physical therapy. She received a steroid injection and was unable to work for two weeks, during which time the employer’s insurance carrier paid indemnity benefits. Streeter was awarded “payment of her medical treatment associated with this case, including, but not limited to, her surgery and physical therapy treatment . . . [and] indemnity benefits at the temporary total disability rate” from May through August 2014. Streeter’s attorney was awarded 20% of the retroactive indemnity award, pursuant to New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 207.01(a)(1). Thereafter, her attorney requested additional fees. The hearing officer denied the request, finding that Streeter’s attorney was entitled only to 20% of the retroactive award and, thus, her “request for legal fees relative to the award of medical benefits [was] inappropriate under these circumstances.” On appeal, Streeter argued that “by paying benefits voluntarily after 21 days after notification of the claim,” the employer’s insurance carrier made a “de facto” determination pursuant to New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 506.02 that her injury was compensable. After review, the Supreme Court determined that Streeter’s attorney was entitled only to “20% of the retroactive indemnity benefits payable out of the benefit received.” N.H. Admin. Rules, Lab 207.01(a)(1). View "Appeal of Katherine Streeter" on Justia Law

Defendant Seth Mazzaglia appealed after he was convicted by jury of first degree murder. The central disputed issue at trial concerned the circumstances of the victim’s death. The State contended that defendant, enraged by the victim’s refusal to participate in a sexual encounter with him and his girlfriend, attacked the victim from behind while she was watching a movie, strangling her with a rope. The State further asserted that, after the victim had died, defendant sexually assaulted her. By contrast, the defense theory contended the victim died during a consensual sexual encounter with defendant and his girlfriend. According to that theory, the victim allowed defendant and his girlfriend to put a “harness” around her and then had consensual sexual intercourse with defendant, while his girlfriend accidentally smothered her. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it excluded evidence alleging that the victim had expressed to her prior partners an interest in bondage-related sexual activities. Finding no reversible error from the trial court’s exclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Mazzaglia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, The Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese in New Hampshire, A Corporation Sole, d/b/a St. George’s Episcopal Church (Church), appealed a superior court order denying its summary judgment motion and granting that of the defendant, Town of Durham (Town), based upon a finding that 24 spaces in the Church’s parking lot that are leased to University of New Hampshire (UNH) students were taxable. Until 2013, the Church received a religious tax exemption under RSA 72:23, III for its entire parking lot. In early 2013, the Town learned that the Church leased spaces to UNH students. At that time, the Town believed students leased 30 of the 37 parking spaces. Accordingly, after determining that the leased parking spaces were no longer exempt from taxation, the Town issued the Church a tax bill. After review of the Church’s arguments on appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the Church did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the leased spaces were exempt. The Court affirmed the superior court order. View "Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese in New Hampshire v. Town of Durham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Jesurum was a resident of Rye since 1990. Defendants WBTSCC Limited Partnership and William H. Binnie, trustee of the Harrison Irrevocable Trust, owned property located on Wentworth Road in Rye, the majority of which was used as a golf course. At issue in this case was a small, parabolic-shaped area on the northeastern corner of the defendants’ property, referred to by the trial court as “Sanders Point.” Wentworth Road abutted the property’s northern border. To the southeast, Sanders Point connected to Little Harbor Beach via a five-foot wide sandy walking path. Little Harbor Beach was on an inlet to the Atlantic Ocean and formed the southeastern border of the golf course. In the 1990s, usage of Sanders Point increased. Tensions between the public and the defendants rose concomitantly with the increase in the public’s use of Sanders Point. In 2013, plaintiff brought this action seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that both the plaintiff and the public had the right to a prescriptive easement over Sanders Point for parking and to access Little Harbor Beach. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied defendants’ motion, ruling that the public possessed a prescriptive easement over Sanders Point. The trial court did not, however, determine the scope of the public’s easement rights because the parties had not briefed that issue. Instead, the court scheduled a hearing on the “scope” issue, which was held in June 2015. Following the hearing, the court ruled that the public was entitled to use Sanders Point to park and to access Little Harbor Beach, subject to certain restrictions. Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the trial court erred in its award of attorney’s fees to plaintiff. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Jesurum v. WBTSCC, L.P." on Justia Law

Defendant Jamie Letarte appealed after he was convicted by jury on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault, and one count of felony indecent exposure. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred when it precluded him from introducing extrinsic evidence to impeach the victim’s testimony on a collateral matter during her cross-examination by defense counsel, and when it denied his motion to vacate the verdict and schedule a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Letarte" on Justia Law

Respondent, mother of a minor child, appealed a circuit court order terminating her parental rights over the child. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred by: (1) granting the petition brought by the petitioner, the New Hampshire Division of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), to terminate her parental rights while the direct appeal of her underlying criminal conviction was pending; and (2) finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the consequences of interpreting the termination statute to permit termination of the parent-child relationship while an appeal of the underlying judgment of conviction was pending was “troubling.” The lack of finality of a conviction that was being appealed raised the question whether DCYF satisfied the heightened requirement of proving the grounds for termination beyond a reasonable doubt. “Taking into consideration the interests of both parents and children that are at stake in termination proceedings, and the heightened standards we apply to such proceedings, we concluded that the legislature intended the terms ‘convicted’ and ‘conviction’ as used in RSA 169-C:24-a, I, and RSA 170-C:5, VI and VII, to mean an affirmance of guilt following a direct appeal as of right to [the Supreme Court] that raises an issue of innocence or guilt.” Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it terminated the mother’s parental rights while her direct appeal of the conviction that formed the statutory ground for the termination was pending. View "In re S.T." on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Milton was convicted by jury on one count of second degree murder, one count of assault by a prisoner, and one count of falsifying physical evidence. The charges against defendant stemmed from a 2010 incident at the State Prison in which both defendant and the victim were incarcerated. Defendant was a member of a prison gang, the leader of which instructed defendant to assault the victim. The victim died from multiple blows to the head. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to properly limit the introduction of evidence relating to his alleged membership in the prison gang. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Milton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William Weaver (individually and as administrator of the estate of his wife, Marceline Weaver) and James Sousa, appealed superior court decisions granting summary judgment in favor of defendants the Town of Pelham (Town), Pelham Police Chief Joseph Roark, Pelham Police Officer Derek Gioia (collectively, the Pelham defendants), and Woody’s Auto Repair & Towing, Inc. This case stemmed from an automobile accident allegedly caused by Randall Stewart, the owner and driver of a vehicle that collided with plaintiffs. With respect to the Pelham defendants, the superior court concluded they were not immune from suit under RSA chapter 507-B (2010) or under the common law, they were entitled to summary judgment because of the lack of evidence that they proximately caused the motor vehicle collision that resulted in the plaintiffs’ injuries. After review of that decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence that the Pelham defendants proximately caused the accident. Accordingly, the Court did not address the Pelham defendants’ cross-appeal on immunity. With regard to Woody's, the superior court granted summary judgment, concluding that: (1) because Stewart’s vehicle had been towed the night before the collision pursuant to RSA 262:32 (2014), rather than impounded pursuant to RSA 262:40 (2014), Woody’s was not required to obtain authorization from the police or a court prior to releasing the vehicle the next day to its owner; (2) Woody’s could not be liable for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle because of the lack of evidence that a Woody’s employee knew, or should have known, that the owner was impaired when he picked up his vehicle from impound; and (3) given the absence of evidence demonstrating that Woody’s breached a duty owed to plaintiffs, it was not liable for negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed that judgment too. View "Weaver v. Stewart" on Justia Law