Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant David Aldrich appealed after a jury convicted him on two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Defendant argued the trial court erred by preventing him from cross-examining the victim about three of four allegedly false allegations of sexual assault that she had made against other men. He also challenged the court’s failure to disclose material following an in camera review. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Aldrich" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned a 105-acre tract of land in Wakefield. Approximately 68 acres of the tract was used for recreational vehicle campsites. In 1994, plaintiff obtained approval from the planning board to build 16 seasonal cabins on the remaining 37 acres of the tract. Each approved cabin was to be built on two acres. In 2001, the planning board decided that each cabin could be 600 square feet. Plaintiff then began creating the cabin development and as of 2007 it had constructed four cabins. In 2007, plaintiff consulted with the planning board about increasing the size of the remaining 12 cabins to approximately 850 square feet. Plaintiff’s request was denied and, despite the previous approval of 600 square feet per cabin, the permissible size of each of plaintiff’s remaining cabins was reduced to a maximum of 400 square feet. The matter was litigated and the Trial Court ordered that, because the plaintiff had relied upon the planning board’s prior approval in creating the cabin development, plaintiff was allowed to construct 600-square-foot cabins. In April 2011, plaintiff sought permission from the planning board to increase the size of the remaining 12 cabins to approximately 850 square feet. The request was again denied, and plaintiff appealed to the superior court. When the superior court upheld the planning board's decision, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) nothing in the language of RSA chapter 216-I precluded it from constructing “890 square foot” cabins; (2) the planning board lacked the authority to enforce compliance with RSA chapter 216-I; and (3) its rights to procedural due process were violated by confusion about which town entity defendant's attorney represented at a May 2011 planning board hearing. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in ruling that, to comport with RSA chapter 216-I, the plaintiff’s “cabins must be less than 400 square feet.” The case was remanded for the superior court to vacate the planning board’s decision and for the planning board to address plaintiff’s request to increase the size of the remaining cabins. View "Lake Forest R.V. Resort, Inc. v. Town of Wakefield" on Justia Law

Defendant Terry Adams, Jr. appealed his convictions of reckless conduct, and simple assault. Defendant argued that the trial court erred by: (1) recalling the jury to correct an error in the verdict on the reckless conduct charge; (2) denying his motion to introduce exculpatory evidence at trial; and (3) prohibiting him from introducing evidence of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Adams" on Justia Law

Respondent Christopher Ross appealed a circuit court order dismissing his petition for a fault-based divorce and the final divorce order from petitioner Danielle Ross. He argued that the trial court erred: (1) in granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss based upon the defense of recrimination; (2) in failing to award him more than half of the marital estate; and (3) in failing to retroactively modify temporary support orders based upon petitioner’s allegedly understated income. Because the Supreme Court held that a party’s actions after the divorce petition has been filed could be used as a basis for the defense of recrimination, and that respondent withdrew his request to modify the temporary support orders, the Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Ross" on Justia Law

This case centered on defendants’ alleged entitlement to travel across several properties in Salem in order to access Route 28. Defendants owned the property located at 16 Garabedian Drive, and claimed to have a deeded right-of-way to travel from their property eastward, across State-owned railroad tracks and continuing across the southernmost section of two parcels of land owned by Cumberland Farms, Inc. and 392 South Broadway, LLC respectively. The Cumberland Farms property abutted the railroad on its western boundary and 392 South Broadway’s property to the southeast. 392 South Broadway’s property was bounded on the north and west by the Cumberland Farms property and Route 28 on the east. Travel across these properties is known as Cuomo Drive. Plaintiffs 412 South Broadway Realty, LLC and Salem Rockingham, LLC, which owned property located just to the south of Cuomo Drive, filed suit against defendants and Cumberland Farms. Defendants appealed multiple superior court orders ruling that their property was not benefited by a deeded right-of-way over several other properties and finding them liable for abuse of process. Third-party defendant, Emmett Horgan, Trustee of the FUN Trust (FUN Trust), cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that defendants had not committed slander of title and in calculating the damages award for the trust’s abuse of process claim. After review, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment on FUN Trust’s abuse of process claim and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "412 South Broadway Realty, LLC v. Wolters" on Justia Law

John Doe appealed a superior court ruling in favor of Elizabeth Canner. Canner requested access to records relating to Doe’s arrest and prosecution under the New Hampshire Right-to-Know Law. Prior to the filing of Canner’s Right-to-Know requests, Doe had filed a petition for annulment under RSA 651:5 (2016). While Canner’s request was pending, Doe’s annulment petition was granted. The trial court concluded that, notwithstanding the fact that Doe’s petition for annulment had been granted, records relating to Doe’s arrest and prosecution were not categorically exempt from public inspection under the Right-to-Know Law. This case presented an issue of first impression in New Hampshire for the New Hampshire Supreme Court: whether records maintained by arresting and prosecuting agencies pertaining to an annulled arrest and the related prosecution are categorically exempt from public inspection under the Right-to-Know Law. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the superior court's decision and affirmed. View "Grafton County Attorney's Office v. Canner" on Justia Law

Seventeen of the 20 plaintiffs to this case were Somali Bantu refugees who were resettled to the United States in 2004. Three of the plaintiffs were born in the United States to Somali Bantu refugees. Plaintiffs lived in the defendants’ apartments during 2005-2006, and those apartments were contaminated by lead paint, a known health hazard. Plaintiffs had elevated levels of lead in their blood. In their complaints, which were consolidated for discovery and trial, plaintiffs, through their parents, alleged that they were injured by their exposure to lead paint while living in defendants’ apartments. In this interlocutory appeal, plaintiffs challenged a superior court order granting the motion to exclude the expert testimony of Peter Isquith, Ph.D. After evaluating the 20 plaintiffs, Isquith, a clinical neuropsychologist, determined that 17 of them suffered from neurological deficits and opined that lead exposure was, more likely than not, a substantial factor in causing those deficits. The superior court excluded Isquith’s testimony based upon its determination that his testimony was not “the product of reliable principles and methods,” and its finding that he did not apply “the principles and methods reliably to the facts” of this case. The superior court certified a question to the Supreme Court: whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the expert's testimony. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's order, and affirmed. View "Osman v. Lin" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with aggravated felonious sexual assault. Before trial, he filed a motion asking the trial court to order, among other things, “the State to take whatever steps are necessary to preserve all cell phone activity of [complainant] including voice mails, text messaging, e-mails, social media postings and photographs by making a mirror image of all cell phones utilized by [complainant].” Defendant also requested that the court order the State to “mak[e] immediate preservation and production requests of all service providers including, but not limited to cell phone[] carriers, Facebook and any other social media or communication provider with which [the complainant] had an account.” The State objected, arguing, among other things, that “[d]efendants generally do not have the legal authority to direct an investigation or demand that the State investigate, obtain, and preserve specific evidence.” Defendant responded in his motion that he was “not seeking discovery . . . but rather the preservation of” the records and communications. At the time the defendant filed his motion, the State did not possess any of the records or communications that defendant was seeking. The trial court granted defendant's proposed order, which compelled the State to obtain and produce the records for in camera inspection. The State appealed when its motion for reconsideration was denied. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that there were other procedural means through which defendant could obtain the records, and that the trial court did not have authority to grant the motion to compel them as it did. View "Petition of State of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Long appealed a superior court order imposing a portion of his previously-suspended sentences based on findings that he violated the "no-contact" provision of those sentences by filing a petition to establish a parenting plan for his and the victim's child. Long had kidnapped the victim who had been at the time, pregnant with Long's child. Long pled guilty to six criminal charges for which prison sentences were imposed. All sentences included the provision. In August 2014, Long filed a petition in the circuit court to establish a parenting plan for his and the victim’s child. In the petition, Long wanted a "[m]ediator [a]ppointed to help [him and the victim] to create a Parenting Plan." Long also averred that he had had no contact with the child and that there was "currently a restraining order in full effect." He requested that the court send the victim “[a]ll copies of Motions, Notification[s], [and] Financial Affidavits” on his behalf. He did not mention the no-contact provision of his sentences. According to Long (and apparently not disputed by the State), the victim accepted service of the petition at the courthouse, after having been contacted by the court. Thereafter, she filed a petition to terminate the defendant’s parental rights. Thereafter, the State moved to impose portions of Long's suspended sentences. The trial court found that the no-contact provisions were clear and unambiguous and that by filing the parenting petition, Long willfully violated them. Accordingly, the trial court granted the State's motion. The Supreme Court reversed: "On the surface, the disposition of this case might appear straightforward. [. . .] But we cannot simply say 'end of story' and resolve the case on this basis because there are broader constitutional principles at stake. Here, the sentencing order did not give the defendant fair warning that filing the parenting petition constituted 'contact' such that his suspended sentences could be imposed." The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Long" on Justia Law

Respondent Coralee Beal appealed a circuit court order awarding petitioner Deborah Munson what Beal contended to be eighty-eight percent of the value of the marital estate. The court awarded Beal the remaining twelve percent and alimony. Beal argued that the circuit court erred by failing to consider the parties’ approximately fifteen-year period of premarital cohabitation when it determined the provisions of the decree. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court could consider premarital cohabitation when formulating an equitable distribution of marital property. Accordingly, the Court vacated both the property distribution and alimony award and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Munson and Beal" on Justia Law