Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Holloway Automotive Group (Holloway) appealed a circuit court order ruling that the liquidated damages clause contained in the parties’ contract was unenforceable. Holloway was an authorized franchisee of Mercedes-Benz North America. Defendant Steven Giacalone purchased a new vehicle from Holloway. At the time of the purchase, the defendant signed an “AGREEMENT NOT TO EXPORT:” “MBUSA prohibits its authorized dealers from exporting new Mercedes-Benz vehicles outside of the exclusive sales territory of North America and will assess charges against [Holloway] for each new Mercedes-Benz vehicle it sells . . . which is exported from North America within one (1) year.” By signing the agreement, defendant promised “not [to] export the Vehicle outside North America . . . for a period of one (1) year” from the date of the Agreement and, if he did so, to pay Holloway $15,000 as liquidated damages. The vehicle was subsequently exported within the one-year period. Holloway sued claiming breach of contract and misrepresentation and seeking liquidated damages in the amount of $15,000, plus interest, costs, and attorney’s fees. The trial court found that the Agreement was entered into “between the parties to protect [Holloway] from a claim by [MBUSA],” but that MBUSA did not, in fact, charge Holloway any fees despite the vehicle having been exported. The trial court declined to enforce the liquidated damages clause in the agreement. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the $15,000 liquidated damages provision was enforceable because Holloway’s damages resulting from the breach were not “easily ascertainable.” Accordingly, the Court held the trial court’s determination that the liquidated damages provision in the parties’ Agreement was unenforceable was not supported by the record and was erroneous as a matter of law. View "Holloway Automotive Group v. Giacalone" on Justia Law

The decedent, Kathleen Mullin, a resident of Hancock, New Hampshire, died intestate in 2014. Her heirs at law were her three siblings: Michael Mullin, J. Stanley Mullin, Jr., and appellant Patricia Jackle. All of the heirs at law were California residents, as was the appellee Laura Bushley, a trustee. From 2008 until her death, the decedent lived in Hancock and owned real property there. She also owned real property in California, where she had lived for many years prior to 2008. Although the decedent did not have a will, in 2012, while in California, she executed a trust document (Trust) that had been drafted by a California attorney. The Trust contained a choice of law provision, stating that the laws of California governed the validity, construction, and administration of the Trust, except that all matters relating to real property were governed by the laws of the situs of that real property. Appellant filed an Inventory of Fiduciary listing the decedent’s estate as consisting of approximately $2.5 million worth of real estate and personal property. In August, the appellee filed an objection to the Inventory, claiming that it listed property that was owned by the Trust. Appellee filed suit in California seeking to transfer title to the decedent’s property to the Trust. Appellant objected to the transfer, challenging the suit on multiple procedural and jurisdictional grounds. The circuit court denied appellant’s motion, ruling: (1) that the court was “unable to make a ruling on the requests of the [appellant] regarding the legal and equitable title to the property or to declare that the situs of the property . . . is New Hampshire without appropriate testimony and evidence”; (2) that jurisdiction over the Trust was “properly before” the California court, and that California law must apply except with respect to the New Hampshire real estate; and (3) that the California court was “a more convenient forum” to hear the matter because “[e]vidence and witnesses would more easily be available” there, the decedent “lived in California for many years and utilized services of a California attorney and California financial advisor,” the Trust “was drafted in California,” and the “trustee and all three heirs-at-law, including the [appellant], are residents of California.” This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court’s denial of appellant’s motion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Estate of Kathleen Mullin" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Smith was convicted by jury for possession of heroin. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress; and (2) excluding the testimony of a defense investigator. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Remi Gross-Santos appealed his convictions on two counts of second degree assault and one charge of transportation of alcoholic beverages by a minor. He argued on appeal that the Trial Court erred in: (1) allowing the State to introduce evidence that there was a marijuana grinder in the back seat of his vehicle at the time of the accident (grinder evidence); and (2) ruling that the police had probable cause to arrest him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Gross-Santos" on Justia Law

Defendant William Edic appealed his conviction by jury on one count of second degree murder and one count of falsifying physical evidence. On appeal, defendant challenged various evidentiary rulings made at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Edic" on Justia Law

On January 30, 2016, the Town of Deerfield held a deliberative session. During the session, two petitioned warrant articles, titled Article 16 and Article 17, were considered and amended. Following the amendment of the two articles, petitioner Harriet Cady filed a petition for injunctive relief against the Town requesting an immediate hearing on the grounds that the alterations violated RSA 40:13, IV(c). The Town objected and moved to dismiss. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition, concluding that the amendments to Articles 16 and 17 did not “remove or eradicate the subject matter of the original articles” and thus did not violate RSA 40:13, IV(c). Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cady v. Town of Deerfield" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kelly Hagenbuch challenged the termination of her food stamp benefits by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (department). The department terminated the benefits because it found that her income exceeded the maximum amount permitted by the program. In calculating petitioner’s income, the department included distributions from an irrevocable trust, of which petitioner was the sole beneficiary, that had been made by the trustee to third parties. These distributions included payments for trust expenses and for legal fees that the petitioner had incurred to obtain public benefits. This case presented an issue of first impression in New Hampshire: whether a distribution made by the trustee of an irrevocable trust to third parties counted as income to the trust beneficiary for the purpose of determining food stamp benefits. The narrow question before the New Hampshire Supreme Court was whether the trust distributions were “owed” to the petitioner. The Court did not decide the validity of the premise underlying the department’s argument—that because the money used to establish the Trust was derived from the settlement of the petitioner’s personal injury lawsuit, the Trust was established with the petitioner’s “own funds.” Even assuming that the premise was correct, the Court concluded that the vendor payment exclusion applied to the trust distributions because the regulations do not recognize the distinction that the department attempts to draw regarding trusts originally funded by the household. In this case, given that the distributions made by the trustee to third parties were not owed to the petitioner—and therefore, were excluded vendor payments—the department should have excluded the trust distributions from the petitioner’s income. Accordingly, the Court reversed the presiding officer’s decision that the department properly counted the trust distributions as income. View "Petition of Kelly Hagenbuch" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial based upon stipulated facts, defendant Sean McInnis was convicted of two counts of possession of a controlled drug. On appeal, he challenged his convictions, arguing that the Superior Court erroneously denied his motion to suppress. After review of the record and finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. McInnis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Reid appealed a superior court decision that denied his petition under the Right-to-Know Law, to compel defendant, New Hampshire Attorney General Joseph Foster, to produce unredacted records of the Attorney General’s investigation into alleged wrongdoing by former Rockingham County Attorney James Reams. On appeal, plaintiff argued: (1) the trial court’s ruling violated Part I, Article 8 of the New Hampshire Constitution; (2) that the trial court erred in determining that the investigative records at issue were “[r]ecords pertaining to internal personnel practices,” because the attorney general’s investigation cannot be considered “internal”; and (3) the trial court erred in finding that the attorney general’s investigation of Reams was “conducted jointly with Rockingham County.” “Because we decide cases on constitutional grounds only when necessary,” the New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed plaintiff’s second argument, which raised an issue of statutory interpretation. In it, plaintiff argued that the trial court erroneously “applied a subject matter exemption contrary to the plain language of RSA 91-A:5[,] IV.” Fundamentally, plaintiff’s argument was that records of the defendant’s investigation of Reams did not “pertain[] to internal personnel practices,” because “[t]he Attorney General is simply not the County Attorney’s employer.” The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff’s statutory interpretation and, therefore, vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reid v. New Hampshire Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jeffrey Oligny appealed an order recommended by a Hearing Officer and approved by the Circuit Court, enforcing the college contribution provision contained in the parties’ 2003 divorce decree, based upon a finding that petitioner’s offer to co-sign loans with his children did not meet his obligation under the decree to equally contribute to their college expenses. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Jeffrey Oligny & Paula Oligny" on Justia Law