Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent, mother of a minor child, appealed a circuit court order terminating her parental rights over the child. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred by: (1) granting the petition brought by the petitioner, the New Hampshire Division of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), to terminate her parental rights while the direct appeal of her underlying criminal conviction was pending; and (2) finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the consequences of interpreting the termination statute to permit termination of the parent-child relationship while an appeal of the underlying judgment of conviction was pending was “troubling.” The lack of finality of a conviction that was being appealed raised the question whether DCYF satisfied the heightened requirement of proving the grounds for termination beyond a reasonable doubt. “Taking into consideration the interests of both parents and children that are at stake in termination proceedings, and the heightened standards we apply to such proceedings, we concluded that the legislature intended the terms ‘convicted’ and ‘conviction’ as used in RSA 169-C:24-a, I, and RSA 170-C:5, VI and VII, to mean an affirmance of guilt following a direct appeal as of right to [the Supreme Court] that raises an issue of innocence or guilt.” Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it terminated the mother’s parental rights while her direct appeal of the conviction that formed the statutory ground for the termination was pending. View "In re S.T." on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Milton was convicted by jury on one count of second degree murder, one count of assault by a prisoner, and one count of falsifying physical evidence. The charges against defendant stemmed from a 2010 incident at the State Prison in which both defendant and the victim were incarcerated. Defendant was a member of a prison gang, the leader of which instructed defendant to assault the victim. The victim died from multiple blows to the head. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to properly limit the introduction of evidence relating to his alleged membership in the prison gang. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Milton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William Weaver (individually and as administrator of the estate of his wife, Marceline Weaver) and James Sousa, appealed superior court decisions granting summary judgment in favor of defendants the Town of Pelham (Town), Pelham Police Chief Joseph Roark, Pelham Police Officer Derek Gioia (collectively, the Pelham defendants), and Woody’s Auto Repair & Towing, Inc. This case stemmed from an automobile accident allegedly caused by Randall Stewart, the owner and driver of a vehicle that collided with plaintiffs. With respect to the Pelham defendants, the superior court concluded they were not immune from suit under RSA chapter 507-B (2010) or under the common law, they were entitled to summary judgment because of the lack of evidence that they proximately caused the motor vehicle collision that resulted in the plaintiffs’ injuries. After review of that decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence that the Pelham defendants proximately caused the accident. Accordingly, the Court did not address the Pelham defendants’ cross-appeal on immunity. With regard to Woody's, the superior court granted summary judgment, concluding that: (1) because Stewart’s vehicle had been towed the night before the collision pursuant to RSA 262:32 (2014), rather than impounded pursuant to RSA 262:40 (2014), Woody’s was not required to obtain authorization from the police or a court prior to releasing the vehicle the next day to its owner; (2) Woody’s could not be liable for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle because of the lack of evidence that a Woody’s employee knew, or should have known, that the owner was impaired when he picked up his vehicle from impound; and (3) given the absence of evidence demonstrating that Woody’s breached a duty owed to plaintiffs, it was not liable for negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed that judgment too. View "Weaver v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Respondent Kenneth Geraghty appealed a final Circuit Court order in his divorce from petitioner Paula Geraghty. He argued that the trial court erred in: (1) applying New Hampshire law to his petition for annulment of the marriage; (2) denying his petition; (3) finding certain testimony proffered by the petitioner credible without explanation; (4) equally dividing the marital estate; and (5) ordering him to transfer to the petitioner one-half of a certain retirement account without affording him the opportunity to address possible adverse tax consequences of that transfer. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "In the Matter of Paula & Kenneth Geraghty" on Justia Law

In 2011, the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (department) determined that, while receiving unemployment benefits in 2010, petitioner Annelie Mullen had “knowingly failed to report [her] work and earnings” and, thus, the department had overpaid her benefits. As a result, the department informed petitioner that she was required to repay the overpaid benefits. petitioner appealed the department’s determination to the tribunal, which upheld the determination. Petitioner then requested that the commissioner reopen the record before the tribunal. The commissioner granted her request and ordered the tribunal to conduct a de novo hearing. In January 2012, the tribunal found that the petitioner was overpaid benefits in 2010, but that she was “without fault in creating the overpayment.” As a result, the tribunal determined that petitioner was not required to repay the state unemployment benefits. In March, the commissioner, on her own initiative, informed the parties that she was again reopening the record before the tribunal because she believed that the tribunal had mistakenly excluded the testimony of a particular witness. Petitioner appealed this second re-opening, arguing it deprived her of due process. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal. Subsequently, the tribunal held a third de novo hearing. In April 2014, the tribunal issued a decision upholding the initial determination that petitioner was overpaid benefits and requiring the petitioner to repay them. Petitioner appealed to the board, but the board declined to accept jurisdiction because the petitioner had not first requested that the commissioner reopen the tribunal decision. petitioner then requested that the commissioner reopen the case, reverse the tribunal’s April 2014 decision, and reinstate the January 2012 decision in her favor. Pending a decision on her request, the petitioner also appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no error in the tribunal's 2014 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Annelie Mullen" on Justia Law

Defendant Amadou Diallo appealed the extended term of imprisonment imposed by the Superior Court after his conviction for felonious sexual assault. He argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the State provided sufficient notice of its intent to seek an extended sentence, and because of that lack of notice, he asked the Supreme Court to vacate his sentence and remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. Finding no reversible error in the Superior Court's judgment, the Supreme Court denied his request and affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Diallo" on Justia Law

Appellants N.C. and Alethea Young, Ph.D., appealed superior court orders denying Dr. Young’s motion to quash a subpoena for N.C.’s psychological records issued by appellee, the New Hampshire Board of Psychologists (Board), and dismissing N.C.’s petition for a declaratory judgment to prevent the Board from obtaining the records. N.C. has been a patient of Young for many years, attending at least two therapy sessions per week since the age of two. In August 2013, when N.C. was still a minor, she informed Young that her father, S.C., had physically and emotionally abused her. According to Young, throughout her treatment of N.C., she witnessed what she described as S.C.’s aggressive and humiliating treatment of his daughter, both in public as well as in therapy sessions. In September, S.C. filed a written complaint against Young with the Board. The complaint alleged that Young had breached her professional obligations by: (1) becoming personally over-involved with N.C., thus sacrificing her objectivity; (2) providing counseling to both S.C. and his daughter, thus creating an insurmountable conflict of interest; (3) violating RSA 169-C:29 (2014) by failing to timely report suspected abuse of a child to DCYF; (4) violating RSA 633:1, I-a (2007) and 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012) by detaining and concealing N.C., who was a minor at the time, from S.C. when she drove N.C. to Vermont without S.C.’s knowledge or consent; and (5) failing to respect S.C.’s wishes that she no longer treat his daughter. On appeal, appellants argued that the trial court erred in enforcing the subpoena because the Board failed to establish that it had just cause to issue the subpoena. Appellants also contended that, even if just cause existed to issue the subpoena, once they objected, the subpoena could not be enforced by the court because the Board failed to sustain what, in their view, was the additional burden necessary to pierce the patient’s privilege by showing that there was a reasonable probability the records were relevant and material and that the Board had an essential need for them. Furthermore, appellants argued that, even if the Board met the burden necessary to pierce the privilege, the court erred in not conducting an in camera review of the records before ordering compliance with the subpoena in order to limit the scope of disclosure. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with appellants that the statute required a court order to obtain a patient’s records when there was an objection to compliance with a subpoena based upon a claim of privilege. However, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err in finding that, under the circumstances of this case, the privilege must yield to the Board’s proper exercise of its regulatory responsibilities with regard to its licensee, Dr. Young. View "N.C. v. New Hampshire Board of Psychologists" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Boyle, as trustee of the 150 Greenleaf Avenue Realty Trust, appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Transportation Appeals Board (TAB) affirming the denial of his application for a permit to construct a driveway onto a state highway. The TAB based its decision upon sections 7(a) and 7(e) of the New Hampshire Department of Transportation’s (DOT) “Policy for the Permitting of Driveways and Other Accesses to the State Highway System.” Although the TAB concluded that petitioner’s proposed driveway would adequately protect the safety of the traveling public, because it also determined that there was sufficient support for the hearings examiner’s conclusion that the proposed driveway would cause an unreasonable hazard to the traveling public, it upheld the hearings examiner’s denial of the petitioner’s permit application. On appeal, petitioner challenged the finding of an unreasonable hazard, arguing that it was impossible for a driveway to adequately protect the safety of the traveling public and simultaneously cause an unreasonable hazard to the traveling public. Thus, petitioner argued that the TAB erred in denying his permit application. The Supreme Court agreed with petitioner, and, therefore, reversed. View "Appeal of Boyle" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority (NHHFA), appealed a superior court decision to grant summary judgment in favor of respondent Pinewood Estates Condominium Association (Pinewood), and to award attorney’s fees to Pinewood. The trial court ruled that, pursuant to Pinewood’s condominium declaration, NHHFA was responsible for paying condominium assessments that were accrued by the previous owner of a unit NHHFA purchased at a foreclosure sale, and that Pinewood was not obligated to provide common services to the unit until all assessments were paid. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the Condominium Act, RSA chapter 356-B (2009 & Supp. 2015), operated to bar Pinewood’s claim for unpaid pre-foreclosure condominium assessments, it reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority v. Pinewood Estates Condominium Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Maher Mahmoud appealed a superior court order granting defendants Winwin Properties, LLC (Winwin), Gary T. Shulman, Anita S. Shulman, Aaron Katz, and Jeremy Gavin's motion for summary judgment, and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff acquired title to an approximately 17-acre parcel of land in Thornton, and subsequently received subdivision approval from the Thornton Planning Board to create Lot 1, a 1.06-acre parcel; he recorded the subdivision as Plan 11808 at the Grafton County Registry of Deeds (registry of deeds). In July 2006, plaintiff mortgaged Lot 1 to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) by mortgage deed, recorded in the registry of deeds. The mortgage deed described the property as Lot 1 as depicted on Plan 11808. Plaintiff received approval from the Thornton Planning Board to further subdivide the 17-acre parcel into a total of eight lots; he recorded the subdivision as Plan 12600 at the registry of deeds. As part of this subdivision approval, the southerly boundary of Lot 1 was relocated. Plan 12600 showed both the original Lot 1 lot line and the new southerly lot line, and shows Lot 1 as consisting of 2.40 acres. Plaintiff ultimately defaulted on his loan, and MERS foreclosed on Lot 1. MERS conveyed Lot 1, pursuant to a foreclosure deed under power of sale to defendant Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-15 (Bank of New York). Then Bank of New York conveyed Lot 1 to Winwin by quitclaim deed. The deed from the Bank of New York to Winwin included the same description as that contained in the mortgage deed, with the additional phrase, “[s]ubject to any and all matters, including setbacks if any, as shown on Plan No. 11808 and Plan No. 12600 recorded in [the registry of deeds].” Winwin conveyed the property in May 2009 to defendants Gary and Anita Shulman, and the Shulmans conveyed the property in April 2014 to defendants Aaron Katz and Jeremy Gavin. In 2015, plaintiff sued defendants, asserting several claims relating to the size of Lot 1. Winwin moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s petition to quiet title to Lot 1, asserting that it had previously held record title to the lot, which included the approximately 1.34 acres added to Lot 1 by the lot line adjustment (the disputed land), because the description of the property in the mortgage deed included any additions to the land. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error in the superior court's grant of defendants' summary judgment, and affirmed. View "Mahmoud v. Town of Thornton" on Justia Law