Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Petition of Willeke
A maternal great-grandmother and a maternal step great grandfather appealed after a circuit court dismissed their petition for visitation with their minor great-grandchild. The circuit court found, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed, that the great-grandparents lacked standing to bring suit. View "Petition of Willeke" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Family Law
New Hampshire v. Wilson
Defendant Max Wilson was convicted by jury on four counts of violating RSA 632-A:10 (2016), which prohibited persons convicted of certain offenses from providing child care services. At issue was whether “help[ing the victim] out” and “do[ing] some [Bible] devotions with [the victim] and possibly help him with his schooling” were “child care services” as contemplated by the statute. According to her testimony, the victim’s mother noticed the victim “had an uneasiness that [she] could not put [her] finger on” regarding defendant’s and the victim’s relationship. The victim’s mother shared her concerns with her two older daughters; one of them searched defendant’s background on her computer and discovered that he was a registered sex offender. The victim’s father then terminated defendant’s contact with the victim. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence; (2) denying his motion to dismiss on grounds that “RSA 632-A:10, I, is void for vagueness, either facially or as applied”; and (3) “entering multiple convictions or imposing multiple punishments.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence and on the alternative ground that RSA 632-A:10, I, was unconstitutionally vague, reversed its order on defendant’s double jeopardy motion, and remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate three of defendant’s convictions and resulting sentences. View "New Hampshire v. Wilson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Dartmouth Corp. of Alpha Delta v. Town of Hanover
Plaintiff Dartmouth Corporation of Alpha Delta (Alpha Delta) appealed a Superior Court order affirming a Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) decision in favor of defendant Town of Hanover (Town). The ZBA determined that the use of Alpha Delta’s property at 9 East Wheelock Street (the property) violated the Town’s zoning ordinance. Alpha Delta has been a fraternity for students at Dartmouth College (College) since the 1840s. In 1931, the Town enacted its first zoning ordinance. At that time, Alpha Delta’s property was located in the “Educational District” in which an “[e]ducational use, or dormitory . . . incidental to and controlled by an educational institution” was permitted as of right. Between 1931 and the mid- 1970s, the property was located in various zoning districts where its use by Alpha Delta as a fraternity was allowed as of right. In 1976, the Town enacted its current zoning ordinance, under which the property was located within the “Institution” district. A student residence in the Institution district was allowed only by special exception. In 2015, the College notified Alpha Delta by letter that, due to the fraternity’s violation of the school’s standards of conduct, it had revoked recognition of the fraternity as a student organization. “Derecognition” revoked certain privileges, pertinent here was recognition as a ‘college approved’ residential facility; and use of College facilities or resources. The College notified Alpha Delta that it would be removed from the College’s rooming system under which student room rents are paid through the College, and would no longer be under the jurisdiction or protection of the College’s department of safety and security. Furthermore, the College notified the Town that Alpha Delta no longer had a relationship with Dartmouth College, and notified Alpha Delta that it was the College’s “understanding that under the Town zoning ordinance no more than three unrelated people will be allowed to reside on the property.” The Town’s zoning administrator subsequently notified Alpha Delta by letter that use of the property violated the zoning ordinance. Alpha Delta appealed, but finding none of its arguments availing, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dartmouth Corp. of Alpha Delta v. Town of Hanover" on Justia Law
New Hampshire v. Czekalski
Defendant Jason Czekalski appealed his convictions on two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), and one count of pattern AFSA. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence related to a January 2013 telephone call between the defendant and the victim, recorded by the police with the victim’s consent. He claimed suppression was warranted because the recording was not “done in such way as [would] protect the recording from editing or other alterations.” In a supplemental brief, defendant argued the trial court also erred when it denied his motion to continue the trial, and under the “plain error” rule, the trial court should have dismissed two of his indictments because they were defective and the trial court erred when it allowed a juror to be seated who allegedly failed to complete a juror questionnaire. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Czekalski" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Appeal of Kadle Properties Revocable Realty Trust
Petitioner Kadle Properties Revocable Realty Trust (Trust), challenged the dismissal of the Trust’s appeal to the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA), filed after respondent, the City of Keene (City), denied the Trust’s application for an educational use tax exemption. The Trust owned property in Keene that included an office building. A separate, for-profit corporation, Config Systems, Incorporated (Config Systems), rented a portion of the Trust’s office building, where it offered computer classes. The Trust did not own or operate Config Systems, but Daniel Kadle, in addition to serving as trustee for the Trust, was a beneficiary of the Trust and the sole shareholder of Config Systems. The Trust sought the exemption based upon Config Systems’s use of part of the property as a school. The Trust appealed the City’s denial of its request to the BTLA. During the BTLA hearing on the Trust’s appeal, the City moved to dismiss the appeal. The BTLA granted the City’s motion, reasoning that the property owner, the Trust, was not a school, and that Config Systems, the entity operating the school which the Trust claims qualified the property for an exemption, did not own the property. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Kadle Properties Revocable Realty Trust" on Justia Law
New Hampshire v. Morrill
Defendant Jessica Morrill appealed her conviction by jury on three counts of possession of a controlled drug (oxycodone, alprazolam, and lisdexamfetamine), and one count of possession of a controlled drug with intent to sell or distribute (cocaine). On appeal, defendant did not dispute that the arresting police officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for the initial stop of her vehicle. Instead, she argued that the trial court erred in finding that the requirements of "New Hampshire v. McKinnon-Andrews" (151 N.H. 19 (2004)) for permissibly expanding the initial scope of the stop had been met. The Supreme Court agreed with defendant after its review of the trial court record, reversed defendant's convictions and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Morrill" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Hampshire v. Santamaria
Defendant Paul Santamaria appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for a writ of coram nobis. In 1998, defendant was convicted of first degree assault. His trial counsel filed a motion to set aside the verdict, which the court denied. Subsequently, the court sentenced the defendant to incarceration for twelve months. Defendant’s trial counsel withdrew from the case and, through appellate counsel, defendant appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at trial and the trial court’s decision to permit a police officer to testify as an expert witness. At that time, the Court affirmed his conviction. On December 30, 2014, defendant filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis seeking to have his conviction vacated for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied defendant’s petition, ruling that he was procedurally barred because he "could have, and should have, raised this claim earlier either on direct appeal, in a motion for a new trial, or in a habeas corpus petition," and because he failed to show "sound reasons" for failing to seek proper relief earlier. A common threshold requirement to bringing a petition for a writ of coram nobis is that "sound reasons exist[] for fail[ing] to seek appropriate earlier relief." Here, the Supreme Court found defendant failed to meet that requirement. Defendant argued he could not have brought his ineffective assistance claim earlier in a direct appeal, a motion for a new trial, or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. "Even if we assume without deciding that the defendant’s claim could not have been brought in a direct appeal, we conclude that he could have brought his claim in a motion for a new trial or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." View "New Hampshire v. Santamaria" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
New Hampshire v. Lynch
Defendant Kevin Lynch appealed his conviction, following a jury trial, of misdemeanor simple assault. He argued that the Superior Court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to police allegedly obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. He also argued that the Superior Court erred by permitting hearsay testimony from a pediatrician at trial. The State cross-appealed the trial court’s order dismissing two indictments post-trial on double jeopardy grounds. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lynch" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Clay v. City of Dover
Defendants, the City of Dover (City) and its city council, school board, school board superintendent search committee, ethics commission, and city council ethics sub-committee, appealed a Superior Court order requiring them to disclose to plaintiff Jeffrey Clay, the written rubric forms completed by members of the superintendent search committee when evaluating applicants for the superintendent position. On appeal, defendants argued that the trial court erred when it determined that the completed rubrics were not exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law as “[r]ecords pertaining to internal personnel practices.” After review, the Supreme Court reversed: the completed rubric forms pertained to “internal personnel practices” and were exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. View "Clay v. City of Dover" on Justia Law
Cluff-Landry v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester
Plaintiff Beverly Cluff-Landry appealed a Superior Court order dismissing her case against defendant Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester d/b/a St. Christopher School (the school). Two new students enrolled in the Pre-K program at the beginning of the 2011-2012 academic year, each of whom exhibited defiant behaviors, including “daily kicking, hitting, slapping, punching, spitting, biting, screaming, throwing things, and verbal abuse. Plaintiff reported to the principal “her concerns that the school was not adequately set up to handle [one of the students] due to his unsafe behaviors and the school’s inability to keep the other students safe, and that the behavior was in violation of the student-parent handbook.” In response to the plaintiff’s concerns, the principal “simply laughed.” The plaintiff continued to complain to the principal about the student, but the principal took no action. After the parents of a student complained that the defiant student was bullying their daughter, the principal expelled the defiant student. Thereafter, the principal’s alleged retaliation toward the plaintiff “escalated.” The principal ultimately placed the plaintiff on a “Teacher Improvement Plan.” She was given notice of the school’s intent to not renew her contract for the following school year in April; plaintiff’s last day of work was June 15, 2012. Plaintiff filed suit against the school alleging: (1) violations under the New Hampshire Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, by failing to renew her contract after she reported violations of school and public policies; (2) wrongful discharge, for failing to renew her contract; and (3) slander, based upon the principal’s comments to A&T. The school moved to dismiss, arguing that: (1) plaintiff’s factual allegations were insufficient to support a violation of the Act; (2) the wrongful discharge claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and also failed because the plaintiff’s employment was governed by a one-year contract; and (3) the alleged defamatory statements were not actionable because plaintiff consented to their publication. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the school’s motion. Finding no reversible error in the Superior Court’s judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cluff-Landry v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester" on Justia Law