Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Darlene Washburn was convicted by jury of possession of a schedule II controlled drug. On appeal, she argued the Trial Court erred when it: (1) denied her motion to suppress evidence seized in warrantless searches of her purse, vehicle, and home; and (2) instructed the jury on a lesser-included offense that did not ensure jury unanimity and failed to protect her against double jeopardy. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Washburn" on Justia Law

Defendant James Bazinet was convicted by a jury of negligent homicide for driving a motor vehicle while he was intoxicated and causing a fatal collision. He appealed the rulings of the Superior Court denying his motions to suppress the results of testing done by the State on a blood draw sample taken by the hospital after he arrived there unconscious. The court ruled that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hospital blood draw sample, and that the State acted lawfully in obtaining and testing it for blood alcohol content without a warrant. Citing a case discussing the emergency exception to consent in the civil context, the court found that the defendant implicitly consented to medical treatment. The court further concluded that “no ‘search’ occurred within the meaning of [the federal and New Hampshire] constitutions when the police later tested the defendant’s blood for DNA.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concurred with the Superior Court’s judgment, noting in particular to the admission of the DNA evidence that given the other evidence presented by the State to establish that the defendant was the driver, the DNA evidence was cumulative. View "New Hampshire v. Bazinet" on Justia Law

Respondent Lauren DiGiulio appealed a circuit court order granting petitioner Gregory Neal's petition to rescind a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. Respondent also appealed the trial court’s denial of a hearing on her request for attorney’s fees. In July 2009, the respondent gave birth to a child (the child or the first child). Although the parties lived in New Hampshire, the child was born in Portland, Maine. The day after the birth, the parties executed a Maine voluntary acknowledgment of paternity form, acknowledging that petitioner was the child’s “natural father.” The parties lived together for approximately three years, and, in 2011, they had a second child (the second child). The parties separated after the birth of the second child. In 2012, the parties voluntarily underwent paternity testing to determine the paternity of both children. The test results revealed that the petitioner was the second child’s biological father, but that he was not the biological father of the first. Despite the test results, the petitioner continued to try to have a relationship with the child and had substantial parenting time with the child until March 2014 when the child’s biological father was released from prison. At that point, respondent severed petitioner’s contact with the child in favor of the child’s biological father. Thereafter, petitioner made a number of requests to see the child, all of which were denied. However, at no time did petitioner file a parenting petition with respect to the child. In 2015, petitioner filed a parenting petition with respect to the second child, without identifying the first child as also being one of the parties’ children. In November, in that same proceeding, petitioner filed a “Motion to Rescind Paternity” of the first child, seeking to rescind the acknowledgment of paternity he executed with respect to the child and requesting that the court “[a]cknowledge that [he] is not the biological father of” the child and “order and declare that [he] is not the legal father of” the child. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, rescinding the petitioner’s acknowledgment of paternity of the first child. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, under the specific circumstances of this case, the record established an objective basis sufficient to sustain the trial court’s ruling that, despite petitioner’s delay in filing the motion, it was fair to allow petitioner’s motion for rescission of paternity. View "In the Matter of Gregory Neal and Lauren DiGiulio" on Justia Law

Respondent Lauren DiGiulio appealed a circuit court order granting petitioner Gregory Neal's petition to rescind a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. Respondent also appealed the trial court’s denial of a hearing on her request for attorney’s fees. In July 2009, the respondent gave birth to a child (the child or the first child). Although the parties lived in New Hampshire, the child was born in Portland, Maine. The day after the birth, the parties executed a Maine voluntary acknowledgment of paternity form, acknowledging that petitioner was the child’s “natural father.” The parties lived together for approximately three years, and, in 2011, they had a second child (the second child). The parties separated after the birth of the second child. In 2012, the parties voluntarily underwent paternity testing to determine the paternity of both children. The test results revealed that the petitioner was the second child’s biological father, but that he was not the biological father of the first. Despite the test results, the petitioner continued to try to have a relationship with the child and had substantial parenting time with the child until March 2014 when the child’s biological father was released from prison. At that point, respondent severed petitioner’s contact with the child in favor of the child’s biological father. Thereafter, petitioner made a number of requests to see the child, all of which were denied. However, at no time did petitioner file a parenting petition with respect to the child. In 2015, petitioner filed a parenting petition with respect to the second child, without identifying the first child as also being one of the parties’ children. In November, in that same proceeding, petitioner filed a “Motion to Rescind Paternity” of the first child, seeking to rescind the acknowledgment of paternity he executed with respect to the child and requesting that the court “[a]cknowledge that [he] is not the biological father of” the child and “order and declare that [he] is not the legal father of” the child. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, rescinding the petitioner’s acknowledgment of paternity of the first child. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, under the specific circumstances of this case, the record established an objective basis sufficient to sustain the trial court’s ruling that, despite petitioner’s delay in filing the motion, it was fair to allow petitioner’s motion for rescission of paternity. View "In the Matter of Gregory Neal and Lauren DiGiulio" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Brian and Nancy Langevin appealed a superior court order denying their motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to defendant, Travco Insurance Company (Travco). The trial court ruled that plaintiffs were not entitled to payment from Travco under their medical payments coverage to pay a lien asserted by the plaintiffs’ health insurer because such payment would constitute a “duplicate payment” contrary to the language of both RSA 264:16, IV (2014) and plaintiffs’ automobile insurance policy with Travco. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded. "Although our interpretation does not allow the plaintiffs to retain the benefit of payment from both a health insurer and an automobile insurer for the same medical expense, we recognize that it does leave open the possibility that the plaintiffs will receive a double benefit in a different sense — they may receive and retain the benefit of medical payments coverage, and a recovery from the third-party tortfeasor. This type of double benefit is not prohibited by RSA 264:16, IV." The Court found the plain language of RSA 264:16, IV prohibited duplicate payments for the same medical expense from only two sources: “medical payments coverage and a health insurance policy.” It does not address payments, duplicate or otherwise, from a tortfeasor or a tortfeasor’s liability insurer. Because the statute expressly prohibited “duplicate payment” only from medical payments coverage and a health insurance policy, with no reference to payments from the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s liability policy, the Court construed the prohibition on “duplicate payment” as applying only to medical payments from health insurers and automobile insurers. View "Langevin v. Travco Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff XTL-NH, Inc. (XTL), appealed a superior court order that defendant New Hampshire State Liquor Commission (Commission) did not breach its obligation to provide a competitive bidding process that complied with New Hampshire law. The Commission cross-appealed the trial court’s ruling that sovereign immunity did not bar XTL’s promissory estoppel claim. In March 2012, the Commission issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) soliciting 20-year contract proposals for liquor warehousing services from private vendors. An Evaluation Committee (EC) reviewed five proposals and solicited “Best and Final Offers” from four of the vendors, including XTL. Thereafter, the Commission authorized the EC to negotiate a contract with defendant Exel Inc. (Exel), who was ultimately awarded the contract in November 2012. XTL sued the Commission, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and attorney’s fees and costs. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the Commission, it vacated and remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "XTL-NH, Inc. v. New Hampshire State Liquor Com'n" on Justia Law

Defendant Dominick Stanin, Sr. appealed after a jury convicted him for first degree assault, robbery, and being a felon in possession of a deadly weapon. On appeal he argued the evidence was insufficient to convict him of robbery, and that the trial court erred when it did not individually question each juror about the impact that a photograph (which had not been admitted into evidence, but which was visible in the defense counsel’s file) had on that juror’s ability to render an impartial verdict. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Stanin" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) sought to challenge a circuit court order closing a child protection case. In November 2014, DCYF filed a petition for neglect under RSA chapter 169-C against the respondent-mother alleging that she neglected her child by engaging in drug use and exposing the child to domestic violence in the home. The child was found to be neglected; in January 2015, the trial court held a dispositional hearing and issued orders requiring, among other things, that the mother: attend and meaningfully participate in substance abuse and/or mental health counseling; attend and meaningfully participate in visits with the child; follow the terms of her release from incarceration and remain free from incarceration; and obtain and maintain a home free from untreated substance abuse, mental health issues, and/or domestic violence. At a three-month review hearing in April, the mother was found to be in “partial compliance.” At a six-month review hearing in August, the mother failed to appear and was found to be “not in compliance.” At a permanency hearing in December, the mother was again found to be “not in compliance,” at which time DCYF recommended and the court ordered a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption and that DCYF file a termination of parental rights petition under RSA chapter 170-C to enable adoption to occur. In October 2016, a hearing was held on DCYF’s petition for termination of parental rights, but the court denied it, finding DCYF did not present evidence of the mother’s failure to correct the conditions that led to the finding of neglect despite DCYF’s provision of reasonable efforts. In February, however, the court, sua sponte, issued an order concluding that “the New Hampshire legislature has determined that guardianship should be awarded for a child, pursuant to RSA 170-C:11, IV, when a termination proceeding fails, but the Court nonetheless believes that the child’s parental care requires substitution or supplementation.” The court found the language of the statute mandatory, and that “[n]o discretion is provided in this context, assuming that the Court finds a need for substitution or supplementation.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court held the circuit court erred as a matter of law in ruling that RSA 170-C:11, IV mandated closure of the child’s RSA chapter 169-C child protection case and guardianship with DHHS as the child’s permanency plan. Accordingly, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth & Families" on Justia Law

This appeal arose in the wake of the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in In the Matter of Mortner & Mortner, 168 N.H. 424, 429 (2015), in which the Court held that the death of Theodore Mortner (Husband) prior to issuance of a divorce decree abated the divorce action instituted by his then-wife, defendant Lindsay Thompson (Wife). The Supreme Court declined on preservation grounds in that case to address whether a property settlement agreement entered into by Husband and Wife during the divorce action’s pendency survived the action’s abatement as an independently enforceable contract. Following that decision, plaintiffs Husband’s estate (the “Estate”) and his daughter Judith Mortner (“Judith”), filed this action against Wife, alleging breach of the property settlement agreement and unjust enrichment. The Estate and Judith appealed the superior court’s dismissal of their claims. Finding no reversible error in that dismissal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Theodore R. Mortner v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Wendy White (Mother) appealed a trial court order finding respondent Michael White (Father) was entitled to a retroactive modification of his support obligation based upon the emancipation of the parties’ older child. The terms of the divorce were set out in the parties’ permanent stipulation, which provided that Father was to pay child support for the two children. In June 2014, the parties’ older child became emancipated upon graduation from high school. In 2016, the Father petitioned for “a three year review” of the support order. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order ruling that “modification [was] required to be made as of the date of emancipation [of the parties’ older child], which in this case means the modification should take place as of August 2014.” The court found that RSA 461-A:14, IV “requires termination of the child support [for the older child] without further legal action” and, therefore, that “there can be no arrearages accrued in connection with child support calculated for [the child] after July 2014 because no further child support for [the parties’ child] could be ordered after July 2014.” As a result, the court recalculated the Father’s child support obligation “from July 2014 through December 2016, using the income and expenses in effect at that time based on one minor child . . . rather than two.” Based upon this recalculation, the court reduced the total amount of arrearages owed by the Father dating back to July 2014. The court also issued a new support order based upon the three-year review as requested by the Father, which reduced his child support obligation to $500 per month. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the trial court erred by retroactively modifying the Father’s support obligation and thereby reducing the total amount of arrearages owed by the Father dating back to July 2014. The matter was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Wendy S. White and Michael L. White" on Justia Law