Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) sought to challenge a circuit court order closing a child protection case. In November 2014, DCYF filed a petition for neglect under RSA chapter 169-C against the respondent-mother alleging that she neglected her child by engaging in drug use and exposing the child to domestic violence in the home. The child was found to be neglected; in January 2015, the trial court held a dispositional hearing and issued orders requiring, among other things, that the mother: attend and meaningfully participate in substance abuse and/or mental health counseling; attend and meaningfully participate in visits with the child; follow the terms of her release from incarceration and remain free from incarceration; and obtain and maintain a home free from untreated substance abuse, mental health issues, and/or domestic violence. At a three-month review hearing in April, the mother was found to be in “partial compliance.” At a six-month review hearing in August, the mother failed to appear and was found to be “not in compliance.” At a permanency hearing in December, the mother was again found to be “not in compliance,” at which time DCYF recommended and the court ordered a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption and that DCYF file a termination of parental rights petition under RSA chapter 170-C to enable adoption to occur. In October 2016, a hearing was held on DCYF’s petition for termination of parental rights, but the court denied it, finding DCYF did not present evidence of the mother’s failure to correct the conditions that led to the finding of neglect despite DCYF’s provision of reasonable efforts. In February, however, the court, sua sponte, issued an order concluding that “the New Hampshire legislature has determined that guardianship should be awarded for a child, pursuant to RSA 170-C:11, IV, when a termination proceeding fails, but the Court nonetheless believes that the child’s parental care requires substitution or supplementation.” The court found the language of the statute mandatory, and that “[n]o discretion is provided in this context, assuming that the Court finds a need for substitution or supplementation.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court held the circuit court erred as a matter of law in ruling that RSA 170-C:11, IV mandated closure of the child’s RSA chapter 169-C child protection case and guardianship with DHHS as the child’s permanency plan. Accordingly, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth & Families" on Justia Law

This appeal arose in the wake of the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in In the Matter of Mortner & Mortner, 168 N.H. 424, 429 (2015), in which the Court held that the death of Theodore Mortner (Husband) prior to issuance of a divorce decree abated the divorce action instituted by his then-wife, defendant Lindsay Thompson (Wife). The Supreme Court declined on preservation grounds in that case to address whether a property settlement agreement entered into by Husband and Wife during the divorce action’s pendency survived the action’s abatement as an independently enforceable contract. Following that decision, plaintiffs Husband’s estate (the “Estate”) and his daughter Judith Mortner (“Judith”), filed this action against Wife, alleging breach of the property settlement agreement and unjust enrichment. The Estate and Judith appealed the superior court’s dismissal of their claims. Finding no reversible error in that dismissal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Theodore R. Mortner v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Wendy White (Mother) appealed a trial court order finding respondent Michael White (Father) was entitled to a retroactive modification of his support obligation based upon the emancipation of the parties’ older child. The terms of the divorce were set out in the parties’ permanent stipulation, which provided that Father was to pay child support for the two children. In June 2014, the parties’ older child became emancipated upon graduation from high school. In 2016, the Father petitioned for “a three year review” of the support order. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order ruling that “modification [was] required to be made as of the date of emancipation [of the parties’ older child], which in this case means the modification should take place as of August 2014.” The court found that RSA 461-A:14, IV “requires termination of the child support [for the older child] without further legal action” and, therefore, that “there can be no arrearages accrued in connection with child support calculated for [the child] after July 2014 because no further child support for [the parties’ child] could be ordered after July 2014.” As a result, the court recalculated the Father’s child support obligation “from July 2014 through December 2016, using the income and expenses in effect at that time based on one minor child . . . rather than two.” Based upon this recalculation, the court reduced the total amount of arrearages owed by the Father dating back to July 2014. The court also issued a new support order based upon the three-year review as requested by the Father, which reduced his child support obligation to $500 per month. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the trial court erred by retroactively modifying the Father’s support obligation and thereby reducing the total amount of arrearages owed by the Father dating back to July 2014. The matter was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Wendy S. White and Michael L. White" on Justia Law

Defendant Meghan Sage appealed her conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), second offense. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred by: (1) denying her motion to suppress evidence derived from expansion of the underlying traffic stop; (2) declining to exclude breathalyzer test results, or alternatively dismiss her charge, for an alleged violation of her due process rights under Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution; and (3) enhancing her sentence under RSA 265-A:18, IV based upon a 2008 conviction from Maine for operating under the influence (OUI). Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Sage" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Banking Department (Department) initiated an adjudicative proceeding against CashCall, Inc. (CashCall), WS Funding, LLC (WS Funding), and John Paul Reddam, for violations of RSA chapter 399-A (2006 & Supp. 2012) (repealed and reenacted 2015). Reddam is the president and chief executive officer of CashCall, a lending and loan services corporation headquartered and incorporated in California. Reddam owned all of CashCall’s corporate stock. Reddam was also the president of WS Funding, a wholly owned subsidiary of CashCall. WS Funding was a Delaware limited liability company with a principal place of business in California. CashCall appeared to be engaged in the business of purchasing and servicing small loans or “payday loans” in association with Western Sky Financial. Neither Reddam, CashCall, nor WS Funding was licensed under RSA chapter 399-A to issue small loans in New Hampshire. In June 2013, after analyzing and reviewing CashCall’s responses to an administrative subpoena duces tecum and reviewing the business relationships among CashCall, WS Funding, and Western Sky Financial, the Department issued a cease and desist order to CashCall, WS Funding, and Reddam. In the cease and desist order, the Department found that either CashCall, or WS Funding, was the “actual” or “de facto” lender for the payday and small loans, and that Western Sky Financial was a front for the respondents’ unlicensed activities. Reddam challenged the Department’s denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the Department made a prima facie showings that: (1) Reddam’s contacts related to the Department’s cause of action; (2) he purposefully availed himself of the protection of New Hampshire law; and (3) it was fair and reasonable to require him to defend suit in New Hampshire. The Court therefore found no due process violation in the Department’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Reddam. View "Petition of John Paul Reddam" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs were four companies with common owners and operators: Halifax-American Energy Company, LLC; PNE Energy Supply, LLC (PNE); Resident Power Natural Gas & Electric Solutions, LLC (Resident Power); and Freedom Logistics, LLC d/b/a Freedom Energy Logistics, LLC (collectively, the “Freedom Companies”). The defendants were three companies and their owners: Provider Power, LLC; Electricity N.H., LLC d/b/a E.N.H. Power; Electricity Maine, LLC; Emile Clavet; and Kevin Dean (collectively, the “Provider Power Companies”). The Freedom Companies and the Provider Power Companies were engaged in the same business, arranging for the supply of electricity and natural gas to commercial and residential customers in New Hampshire and other New England states. The parties’ current dispute centered on a Freedom Company employee whom the defendants hired, without the plaintiffs’ knowledge, allegedly to misappropriate the plaintiffs’ confidential and proprietary information. According to plaintiffs, defendants used the information obtained from the employee to harm the plaintiffs’ business by improperly interfering with their relationships with their customers and the employee. A jury returned verdicts in plaintiffs’ favor on many of their claims, including those for tortious interference with customer contracts, tortious interference with economic relations with customers, tortious interference with the employee’s contract, and misappropriation of trade secrets. The jury awarded compensatory damages to plaintiffs on each of these claims, except the misappropriation of trade secrets claim, and included in the damages award attorney’s fees incurred by plaintiffs in prior litigation against the employee for his wrongful conduct. Subsequently, the trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs under the New Hampshire Uniform Trade Secrets Act (NHUTSA). On appeal, defendants challenged: (1) the jury’s verdicts on plaintiffs’ claims for tortious interference with customer contracts and the employee’s contract; (2) the jury’s award of damages for tortious interference with customer contracts and tortious interference with economic relations, and its inclusion in that award of the attorney’s fees incurred in the plaintiffs’ prior litigation against the employee; and (3) the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to plaintiffs under the NHUTSA. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Halifax-American Energy Company, LLC v. Provider Power, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Felix Ruiz was convicted by jury of misdemeanor receipt of stolen property; namely, a United States passport belonging to someone else. Defendant was suspected of helping others forge identity papers for others. The defendant told a New Hampshire State Trooper that he was paid to perform “backgrounds” on individuals and that the information he obtained was then given to someone else who would generate the false identity documents. During an interview with policy, defendant was “extremely cooperative” with and “polite” to the troopers. As a result, officers offered to release him provided that he produce the minimum amount of cash bail for a misdemeanor charge. The defendant had no cash available, but claimed that his girlfriend could bring it. The troopers allowed him to text his girlfriend, who agreed to come to the DMV with the money. However, the girlfriend never arrived and, after a few hours of waiting, the police decided to transport the defendant to jail and allow his girlfriend to meet him there. Police asked defendant if he would consent to a search of his vehicle. Defendant readily agreed, signing a handwritten consent form that the officer drafted. Police conducted a full search of the vehicle, during which he found a black bag containing, among other items, the passport at issue in this case. On appeal of his eventual conviction, defendant argued the Superior Court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress certain evidence, including his post-Miranda confession; and (2) denied his motion to dismiss based upon insufficiency of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Ruiz" on Justia Law

Defendant-landowner Carl Casagrande appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to plaintiff Town of Goshen. The issue before the trial court was whether a section of road abutting Casagrande’s property was an unmaintained town road, or whether, as Casagrande contended, it was private property because the residents of Goshen voted at a town meeting in 1891 to discontinue the road. After reviewing the record of the 1891 town meeting, including the language of the warrant article, the trial court concluded that the town had not voted to discontinue the road, and, therefore, the abutting road was a public highway. View "Town of Goshen v. Casagrande" on Justia Law

Defendant Gedeon Karasi appealed his conviction after a jury found him guilty of attempted murder, first degree assault, armed robbery, and resisting arrest or detention. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the attempted murder charge because the evidence was insufficient to prove a purpose to kill, and that it committed plain error by allocating all of the defendant’s presentence confinement credit to his misdemeanor sentence. The State agreed the trial court erred when it sentenced the defendant and that defendant should have been resentenced. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s attempted murder conviction, vacated the sentences imposed, and remanded for resentencing. View "New Hampshire v. Karasi" on Justia Law

The Town of Bow (town) appealed a superior court order granting plaintiff Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH) an abatement of taxes on its property in the town for tax years 2012 and 2013. PSNH owns certain special-purpose utility property in the town, including Merrimack Station, two combustion turbines, and a high-voltage regional electric transmission and distribution network. Merrimack Station consists of two coal-fired units that produce steam to rotate turbines and generators to produce electricity. The combustion turbines cannot be remotely turned on and, instead, must be physically turned on in a control room at the Merrimack Station site. At trial, the sole issue was the determination of the proper value of this special-purpose utility property for the tax years in question. Following a six-day bench trial, the trial court found PSNH's expert “testimony [to be] more credible than” the town's and, therefore, ruled that PSNH had met its burden of demonstrating that it was entitled to an abatement for tax years 2012 and 2013 with respect to the disputed property. The town moved for reconsideration, which the court denied, and this appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Public Service Company of New Hampshire v. Town of Bow" on Justia Law