Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Polonsky v. Town of Bedford
Plaintiff Richard Polonsky appealed, and defendant Town of Bedford (Town) cross-appealed a superior court order on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s petition for injunctive and declaratory relief and to quiet title to residential property that the Town acquired by tax deed in 2011. In 2008, plaintiff inherited residential property in Bedford New Hampshire that, at that time, was assessed at approximately $300,000. Because plaintiff failed to pay his real estate taxes in 2008, 2009, and 2010, tax liens were imposed on his property for each of those years. The Town notified plaintiff before each lien was imposed. In April 2011, the Town notified plaintiff that a tax deed was to be issued. In May 2011, a tax deed for the property was issued to the Town. Plaintiff continued to reside on the property without paying taxes. In 2013, plaintiff offered to pay back taxes, but requested the Town forgive additional charges. In July 2013, the Town rejected plaintiff’s request and decided to sell the property. In December 2013, the Town notified plaintiff of its decision to sell the property and of his right to repurchase it. Plaintiff received that notice, but did not act on it. In April 2015, the Town again notified plaintiff of its intent to sell the property and of his right to repurchase. Plaintiff proposed he purchase the property for only the amount he owed in taxes and that the Town waive the remaining amounts. The Town rejected the plaintiff’s proposal. The Town then asserted that plaintiff’s right to repurchase the property had terminated because more than three years had passed since the tax deed had been recorded. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff brought this lawsuit. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court erred in ruling that the Town’s failure to provide timely statutory notice to him of its July 2013 “offering for sale,” as required by RSA 80:89, I (2012), did not invalidate the tax deed. Plaintiff also argued the trial court erred by failing to find that the penalty the Town may recover pursuant to RSA 80:90, I(f) (2012) (amended 2016) constituted “double taxation” in violation of the State Constitution. In its cross-appeal, the Town argued the trial court misinterpreted the three-year period set forth in RSA 80:89, VII (2012) when it determined that, although the tax deed was recorded more than three years ago, plaintiff could bring a claim for any amount the Town recovered from the property’s eventual sale in excess of the outstanding taxes, interest, costs, and statutory penalty owed (“excess proceeds”). The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that the tax deed was invalid, reversed its ruling construing the statutes as permitting plaintiff to recover excess proceeds from any future sale of the property, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Polonsky v. Town of Bedford" on Justia Law
New Hampshire v. Surrell
Defendant Jeremy Surrell appealed a superior court order denying his petition to suspend his sentence under RSA 651:20, I (2016). Defendant was indicted on four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA). These indictments alleged that, on four occasions, the defendant engaged in fellatio with a child under the age of thirteen. In May 2013, defendant pleaded guilty to two of the AFSA charges and the State entered a nolle prosequi on the other two. The trial court sentenced defendant to a stand committed sentence of seven and one-half to fifteen years and to a suspended sentence of ten to twenty years. On appeal, defendant argued RSA 651:20, I, prohibited a trial court from denying “a petition on the basis, even in part, of the nature of the offense conduct” and, therefore, the trial court erred when it denied his petition on that basis. He also argued that, even if pursuant to RSA 651:20, I, a trial court can take account of the nature of the offense, the court erred when it denied the petition to suspend solely on that basis without “weigh[ing] [his] rehabilitative success against the need for further punishment.” In affirming the superior court's decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined it was evident the trial court, after considering both the defendant’s rehabilitative efforts and the punitive purpose of his sentence, simply reached a conclusion opposite of that desired by the defendant. View "New Hampshire v. Surrell" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Loon Valley Homeowner’s Association v. Pollock
Plaintiff Loon Valley Homeowner’s Association (the Association), appealed a superior court order denying its petition to quiet title to land owned by defendant Lewis Pollock and the decedent, Norman Wallack, based upon a claim of adverse possession. Pollock testified at trial that he and Wallack retained Lot 12 hoping to add it to the Association’s property to offset their loss. Pollock explained that after unsuccessfully seeking direct compensation from the members in exchange for adding Lot 12 to the Association, he and Wallack agreed to allow the members of the Association to use Lot 12 on the condition that the Association maintain the lot, pay the property taxes, and relocate the fence dividing Lots 11 and 12 to its current location, where it marked the approximate boundary between Lots 12 and 13. Following trial, the court found that the Association’s use of Lot 12 was permissive and that, even if the court were to assume that the Association’s use of Lot 12 was such that Pollock and Wallack should have known that the Association had repudiated their permission, it had failed to demonstrate that such use was exclusive for a twenty-year period. On appeal, the Association argued the trial court erred: (1) when it found “a permissive arrangement between Lewis Pollock and the Association, and thus that the Association’s use of Lot 12 was not adverse”; and (2) when it ruled that the Association “had not established that it had utilized Lot 12 exclusively” during the twenty-year prescriptive period. Finding no error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Loon Valley Homeowner's Association v. Pollock" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Real Estate & Property Law
Town of Pembroke v. Town of Allenstown
This case presented two questions arising out of the operation of the Suncook Wastewater Treatment Facility (the “Facility”) in Allenstown, New Hampshire, for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's review. First, under an intermunicipal agreement, must defendant Town of Allenstown, share any of the profits generated from septage haulers who discharge their waste at the Facility with the plaintiff, Town of Pembroke? And second, after Allenstown used a portion of those profits to increase the Facility’s wastewater treatment capacity, must Allenstown allocate any of that increased capacity to Pembroke? Because the Supreme Court, as did the Superior Court, answered both questions “no,” the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Pembroke v. Town of Allenstown" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
In re Search Warrant for 1832 Candia Road, Manchester, New Hampshire
Richard Exline appealed a circuit court order denying his motion for the immediate return of seized property on the ground that the affidavit supporting the search warrant under which the seizure occurred failed to establish probable cause. In March 2017, a warrant was issued to search “any computer, computer system, mobile digital device, camera, router, wi-fi device, cellular telephone, smart phone, [and] commercial software and hardware” located at 1832 Candia Road in Manchester, New Hampshire (Exline’s residence). The warrant stated that there was probable cause to believe that the property so described was relevant to the crimes of identity fraud, and tampering with public or private records. The affidavit submitted in support of the warrant application avers that, on August 5, 2016, the affiant, a state police detective, received an e-mail message from the assistant commissioner for the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) regarding e-mail messages that had been received by State of New Hampshire officials and employees. The assistant commissioner was concerned that there had been a “cyber-attack.” Based upon the totality of the circumstances as reflected in the circuit court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the affidavit afforded the magistrate a substantial basis for believing that there was a fair probability that Exline’s residence and the objects seized contained evidence of the crime of identity fraud. View "In re Search Warrant for 1832 Candia Road, Manchester, New Hampshire" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Appeal of Nicole Collins
Petitioner Nicole Collins appealed a New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (board) decision upholding the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) decision to dismiss her from employment. Prior to her termination, she was given letters of warning in April, October, and November 2015, for failing to meet various work standards and working unauthorized overtime. On April 7, 2016, pursuant to New Hampshire Administrative Rules, petitioner attended an “intent to discipline” meeting with her regional manager and the chief of operations. At this meeting, the regional manager read from prepared notes outlining evidence, including the precise case files, dates, and instances, that she believed supported a decision to dismiss petitioner. Petitioner had an opportunity to refute this evidence at the meeting. According to petitioner, at the meeting, she also requested the documentation that HHS was relying upon in making its decision to terminate her, but HHS did not provide her with the documents at that time. On April 20, HHS issued a letter of dismissal, which included over 100 pages of evidence supporting the decision. Petitioner appealed this decision to the board. In her appeal to the board, petitioner argued HHS violated Per 1002.08(d) and the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in Appeal of Boulay, 142 N.H. 626 (1998), when HHS did not provide her with the documents to support its dismissal decision at the meeting. The board conducted a hearing and found that petitioner’s dismissal was lawful. The Supreme Court, after its review, determined petitioner failed to demonstrate that the board’s affirmation of HHS’ dismissal decision was unreasonable or unlawful, and affirmed. View "Appeal of Nicole Collins" on Justia Law
Vention Medical Advanced Components, Inc. v. Pappas
Defendants, Nikolaos Pappas and Ascend Medical, Inc. (Ascend), appealed multiple orders of the Superior Court ruling that they misappropriated trade secrets of plaintiff Vention Medical Advanced Components, Inc. d/b/a Advanced Polymers, a Vention Medical Company (Vention), in violation of the New Hampshire Uniform Trade Secrets Act, RSA chapter 350-B (2009) (UTSA). Vention cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney’s fees. Vention is a medical components manufacturer in the medical device industry. Vention makes medical balloons, medical tubing, and heat shrink tubing (HST). Pappas began working at Vention after he graduated from the University of Massachusetts Lowell with a bachelor of science degree in plastics engineering and a master’s degree in innovative and technological entrepreneurship. Prior to working at Vention, Pappas had neither specifically studied HST nor had any experience working with HST. In December 2013, after working for Vention for about ten years, Pappas resigned from the company. During his employment, Pappas was exposed to Vention’s confidential HST technology and information. He also had knowledge of Vention’s business and marketing information and strategies, including the sales volumes for Vention’s various products. At the time he resigned, he was serving as the engineering manager of the HST department. At some point before Pappas resigned, he consulted with an attorney about his obligations under the confidentiality agreement. Almost immediately after leaving Vention, Pappas established Ascend. In late December 2013 and January 2014, the defendants began working with a website developer, communicated with one equipment vendor, and provided an initial machine design to a second equipment vendor. This design included extensive detail and critical specifications of the equipment they wanted built. By August 2014, the defendants began actively marketing HST. After the defendants launched their HST line, Vention requested information about the products. The defendants sent Vention samples of their HST in August and September 2014. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found the trial court determined that the defendants neither willfully and maliciously misappropriated Vention’s trade secrets nor made a bad-faith claim of misappropriation, and there was support in the record for these determinations. Based upon its review of Vention’s arguments and the record, the Supreme Court could not say it was “clearly untenable” or “clearly unreasonable” for the trial court to decline to award fees for bad faith litigation. Accordingly, the Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Vention Medical Advanced Components, Inc. v. Pappas" on Justia Law
In re J.H.; In re A.H.
Father challenged the Circuit Court’s authority to hold a hearing to determine his parental fitness to regain custody of his children, J.H. and A.H., following the dismissal of the neglect petitions filed by the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) against him. Father also appealed the trial court’s dispositional order imposing conditions on him before his children could be returned to his custody, after finding that the children were neglected by Mother but not by Father. Father asserted that, upon the dismissal of the neglect petitions against him, he was presumed to be a fit parent. Because he was not found to have abused or neglected his children in the adjudicatory phase of the RSA chapter 169-C proceedings, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed that Father was a presumptively fit parent at that stage of the proceedings. The Court disagreed, however, that the court was required to immediately return the children to Father’s custody. Instead, the Court concluded that holding an additional hearing to determine Father’s parental fitness did not violate his constitutionally protected fundamental right to parent. Although Father regained his presumption of fitness once the neglect petitions against him were dismissed, “parental rights are not absolute, but are subordinate to the State’s parens patriae power, and must yield to the welfare of the child.” Here, the neglect finding against Mother and the fact that Father and Mother lived together constituted “unusual and serious” circumstances that justified the court’s continued intervention in the relationship between Father and his children. The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment. View "In re J.H.; In re A.H." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
In the Matter of Vivian Silva and Robert Silva
In consolidated appeals, petitioner Vivian Silva appealed two circuit court orders in her divorce from respondent Robert Silva. She argued the trial court erred when it: (1) deviated from the child support guidelines; (2) inequitably divided the marital estate; and (3) did not find the respondent in contempt for withdrawing funds from an education savings account, or “529 account,” established for their daughter’s benefit, during the pendency of the divorce, and did not consider the 529 account in its division of the marital estate. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with petitioner with respect to child support, and found the trial court record unclear with respect to the 529 account. The Court vacated the distribution of property decision altogether and remanded this case for the trial court to clarify its disposition of the 529 account, and if necessary, the adjust the division of marital property. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "In the Matter of Vivian Silva and Robert Silva" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
New Hampshire v. Burris
Defendant David Burris was indicted on three counts of felony reckless conduct. The indictment alleged defendant engaged in reckless conduct when, during a home visit to a probationer he was supervising, he discharged a firearm three times at a motor vehicle operated by the probationer. The Superior Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges but approved an interlocutory appeal. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded defendant was not entitled to transactional immunity under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, it affirmed and remanded. View "New Hampshire v. Burris" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law