Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Gabriel Chalpin, was convicted of first-degree assault, enhanced for manifesting exceptional cruelty or depravity, and second-degree assault for recklessly causing bodily injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. The incidents occurred on February 2, 2018, when Chalpin assaulted the victim, his romantic partner, causing multiple injuries including collapsed lungs, fractured ribs, a broken nose, and a fractured spine.The Superior Court (Brown, J.) held a jury trial in March 2019, where the jury convicted Chalpin on multiple counts of first and second-degree assault. The court sentenced him on two counts of enhanced first-degree assault and two counts of second-degree assault – extreme indifference. Chalpin moved to dismiss all but one charge based on double jeopardy, which the court initially denied. However, after further motions, the court reconsidered and found that the events could be divided into two separate assaults, reducing the convictions to one count of enhanced first-degree assault and one count of second-degree assault – extreme indifference.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court's jury instruction on the definition of "cruelty" was sustainable. The court also found sufficient evidence to sustain both the enhanced first-degree assault and second-degree assault – extreme indifference convictions. Additionally, the Supreme Court determined that there was sufficient evidence to support four separate assault convictions, reversing the trial court's unit of prosecution ruling. The case was remanded for entry of the four convictions and reinstatement of the original sentences. View "State v. Chalpin" on Justia Law

The case involves the Union Leader Corporation (Union Leader) and the New Hampshire Department of Safety (Department). Union Leader sought to compel the Department to disclose records under the Right-to-Know Law, specifically records related to the response by New Hampshire State Police to the Sununu Youth Services Center (SYSC) on October 7 and 8, 2022. The Department refused to disclose the records, arguing that they were confidential law enforcement investigative records pertaining to juvenile delinquency.The Superior Court dismissed Union Leader's suit, siding with the Department. The court found that the requested records contained facts that underlie the basis for juvenile delinquency proceedings. Therefore, based on a previous decision in Petition of State of New Hampshire (Disclosure of Juvenile Records), the court concluded that the release of the records Union Leader requested was prohibited.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case. The Supreme Court found that the term "court records" in RSA 169-B:35 should not be read so expansively as to shield a broad category of otherwise public records from a request made pursuant to the Right to Know Law, even if that record is related to alleged unlawful conduct by unidentified minors. The court concluded that it is conceivable that information in the Department’s possession could answer Union Leader's questions without interfering with the rehabilitation of the minors against whom juvenile petitions were filed. It is also conceivable that responsive records could be redacted so as to ensure that their disclosure neither conflicts with nor compromises the rehabilitative purpose of RSA chapter 169-B. The case was remanded for the lower court to make those determinations. View "Union Leader Corp. v. N.H. Dep't of Safety" on Justia Law

The defendant, Avram M. Niebling, was arrested for driving under the influence. During the arrest, the officer conducted a pat-down search and removed a wallet from the defendant's pocket. The wallet was not searched at the scene but was placed in an evidence bag and taken to the police station. At the station, during the booking process, the officers counted the cash in the wallet and looked inside for the defendant's driver's license. In doing so, they discovered two white pills identified as oxycodone. The defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled drug.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the wallet, arguing that there was no applicable exception to a warrantless search of the wallet during the booking process. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding that the search of the wallet constituted a search incident to arrest. The defendant appealed, arguing that the warrantless search of his wallet was neither conducted incident to arrest nor conducted pursuant to a neutral inventory policy, and was therefore unreasonable and unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that a search that may be made at the time and place of arrest also may be legally conducted when the arrested individual later arrives at a place of detention. The court found that because the defendant's wallet was seized during a lawful arrest, the officer was permitted to search it at the police station during the booking process without a warrant. The court distinguished this case from others where the property was searched at the officer's convenience after passage of appreciable time and was at all times under the exclusive control of the arresting officer. In this case, the arresting officer obtained possession of the defendant's wallet during a lawful arrest and looked inside it at the time of the defendant's booking at the police station while the defendant was present. Therefore, the court held that the trial court did not err in determining that the search of the wallet fell within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. View "State v. Niebling" on Justia Law

The New London Hospital Association, Inc. (NLH), a nonprofit corporation, appealed a decision by the Superior Court dismissing its appeals from denials by the Town of Newport of NLH’s applications for charitable property tax exemptions for tax years 2015, 2017, and 2018. NLH owns a property in Newport where it operates the Newport Health Center (NHC), an outpatient treatment center. NLH applied for a charitable tax exemption for the NHC property, which was denied by the Town. NLH appealed these denials to the superior court. The court ruled that NLH established three of the four factors necessary for the exemption, but not the fourth.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court’s rulings that NLH satisfied the second and third factors for charitable exemption. However, it reversed the trial court's ruling that NLH failed to prove that it satisfied the fourth factor, which required NLH to show that “any of [NLH’s] income or profits are used for any purpose other than the purpose for which [NLH] was established.” The court concluded that the practice of referring patients to Dartmouth-Hitchcock Health (DHH) for “appropriate medical care” that NLH cannot provide, does not confer on DHH a “pecuniary . . . benefit” prohibited under the fourth factor. The court also found that NLH was not required to show that the independent contractors to whom it made payments shared NLH’s charitable mission. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New London Hospital Association v. Town of Newport" on Justia Law

The appellant, A.G., was arraigned on four juvenile delinquency petitions for attempted robbery, attempted first degree assault, reckless conduct, and falsifying physical evidence when he was 17 years old. The Circuit Court found probable cause and determined that A.G. met the standard for secure detention, placing him at the Youth Detention Services Unit (YDSU). The State later filed a petition to certify A.G. as an adult and transfer the case to superior court, which remains pending. As A.G. was about to turn 18, a hearing was held to address his placement. The court ruled that A.G. would be transferred to the Hillsborough County House of Corrections (HOC) upon his eighteenth birthday.A.G. appealed this decision, arguing that the circuit court lacks authority to order his detention at the HOC. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed, stating that the circuit court is a court of limited jurisdiction with powers conferred upon it by statute. The court found no statutory authority for the circuit court to detain A.G. at the HOC, as he has neither been adjudicated delinquent nor certified as an adult.The State argued that the circuit court could continue A.G.’s detention at YDSU, even after his eighteenth birthday, while awaiting action on the petition to certify him as an adult. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the term "minor" in the relevant statute continues to apply to A.G. after his eighteenth birthday. The court reversed the trial court’s order transferring A.G. to the HOC and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

The case involves Chasrick Heredia, who was convicted on three counts of accomplice to contributing to the delinquency of a minor and one count of witness tampering. The charges stemmed from an incident where Heredia and another man, Matthew Hugle, provided alcohol to three underage girls who had run away from a substance abuse treatment facility. The girls later reported that they had been sexually assaulted by the two men. While in jail, Heredia wrote an encoded letter to Hugle, asking him to delete a video related to the incident, leading to additional charges of tampering with witnesses and solicitation to commit falsifying physical evidence.The Superior Court found Heredia guilty on the three charges of accomplice to intentional contribution to the delinquency of a minor, one count of witness tampering, and one count of solicitation to commit falsifying physical evidence. However, he was acquitted on charges of aggravated felonious sexual assault and felonious sexual assault.On appeal to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Heredia challenged his convictions for witness tampering and accomplice to contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The Supreme Court vacated the witness tampering conviction on double jeopardy grounds, agreeing with Heredia that his separate convictions and sentences for both witness tampering and solicitation to commit falsifying physical evidence violated the prohibition against double jeopardy under the State Constitution. The court also reversed the three convictions for accomplice to contributing to the delinquency of a minor, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove those charges. The case was remanded for consideration of resentencing. View "State v. Heredia" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorced couple, Bradley Carter (father) and Rachel Carter (mother), who have two children. Following their divorce, the mother, who had an alcohol use disorder, was granted supervised visits with her children twice a month. After two years of sobriety and the impending closure of their visitation center, the mother requested unsupervised visits and weekends with her children, which the father opposed.The Circuit Court initially sent the parties to mediation, which proved unsuccessful. At the final hearing, the mother requested two modifications of her parental rights and responsibilities: unsupervised parenting time and an expansion of her parenting time. The Circuit Court denied her request, maintaining the schedule of two, two-hour supervised visits with the mother per month with a mutually agreeable supervisor. The mother appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The mother argued that the trial court improperly narrowed its “present environment” inquiry to the children’s routine with the father and failed to consider other factors, including the infrequency of their contact with their mother. The Supreme Court agreed with the mother, stating that the children’s “present environment” is determined by assessing the surroundings or conditions in which the children now exist, which includes their daily activities, mental and emotional states, and their needs.The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order denying the mother’s request for a modification of parenting time and remanded for the trial court to reconsider her request. The Supreme Court also vacated the court’s denial of her request for unsupervised visitation, allowing the parties to clarify the statutory basis for the relief they are requesting on remand. View "In the Matter of Carter & Carter" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, John Alexander Cucchi, owns a parcel of land south of Skatutakee Lake in Harrisville, New Hampshire. His property abuts the southern edge of Skatutakee Lake Road, which runs along the southern shore of the lake. A narrow strip of land, the disputed parcel, lies between the northern edge of the roadway and the lake. Both Cucchi and Pamela Worden, who owns adjacent land, claim ownership of this disputed parcel. Cucchi's claim traces back to a 1999 deed, while Worden's claim is based on a 2002 deed from the same original owner. In 2021, the Town of Harrisville conveyed most of its rights in the disputed parcel to Worden.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Worden and the Town of Harrisville, determining that Worden owned the disputed parcel and that Cucchi therefore lacked standing to challenge the Town’s release of its interest in the right-of-way to Worden. The court applied the presumption that landowners abutting public highways have fee ownership to the center of the road and concluded that the 1999 deed conveyed a fee interest only to the center of the traveled roadway.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case. The Supreme Court applied the whole-road presumption, which states that if a deed conveys to the side of a road, the effect is to convey the entire road if the grantor owns the land under the road and does not own the land on the other side. The court concluded that the 1999 deed did not reserve the fee underneath the right-of-way, and therefore, the whole-road presumption controls. The court determined that the 1999 deed conveyed the disputed parcel, and Cucchi now owns the underlying fee. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Cucchi v. Town of Harrisville" on Justia Law

The case involves four police officers, Robert Bellenoit, Richard Brown, Gregory Ditullio, and Jacob Tyler, who were employed by the City of Manchester. Each officer was a member of a collective bargaining unit and was hired before 2008. Between 2015 and 2018, each officer was injured during their employment and filed a workers' compensation claim with the City. While these claims were being resolved, the City paid each officer accrued sick leave benefits. Once the officers were deemed eligible for workers' compensation benefits, they received payments from the City equivalent to the sick leave benefits they had previously received.In 2019, the City demanded that each officer repay the sick leave benefits they had received while their eligibility for workers' compensation was pending or being appealed. The officers argued that they had a vested right to restoration of their sick leave benefits without the requirement of repayment. The Superior Court granted the City's motions for summary judgment and denied the officers' motions, ruling that the officers did not have a vested right to restoration of sick leave benefits without the requirement of repayment.The officers appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that they did not have a vested right to the restoration of sick leave credit without the requirement of repayment. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the officers did not have a vested right to the benefits provided in the pre-2008 amendment and that the post-2008 amendment applied to them. The court reasoned that the officers did not earn the benefit set forth in the pre-2008 amendment and that the post-2008 amendment became the law of the contract, governing where the collective bargaining agreement was silent. View "City of Manchester v. Bellenoit" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Teagan David Collins, who was convicted on two counts of criminal threatening and one count of misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The charges stemmed from an incident at a nightclub where Collins was asked to leave due to his behavior. After leaving, Collins returned to the nightclub with a firearm to retrieve his debit card and jacket. The head of security testified that Collins revealed his firearm and made threatening remarks. Collins, however, denied these allegations and claimed he only revealed his firearm later when he felt threatened by two nightclub employees following him.The Superior Court convicted Collins, rejecting his request for a self-defense instruction to the jury. The court reasoned that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that Collins reasonably believed there was going to be an imminent use of unlawful, nondeadly force against him.Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Collins argued that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. He contended that the nightclub employees following him on the street constituted a threat of non-deadly force. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the lower court's decision. The court noted that the indictment alleged that Collins committed the crime when he confronted the head of security at the nightclub's entrance, not when he was followed by the employees. Furthermore, Collins denied the specific conduct alleged in the indictment, which contradicted his self-defense claim. The court concluded that Collins was not entitled to a self-defense instruction under these circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law