Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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This case arose out of the termination of petitioner James Cole by the New Hampshire Department of Information Technology (DOIT). One of Cole’s initial assignments was overhauling an Account Security Form (ASF). This was intended to be a short-term project. Although some aspects of Cole’s work on this project were satisfactory, his incorrect processing of other aspects of the overhaul resulted in audits being conducted on the forms to ensure accuracy. Cole was also initially assigned a “Wireless Access Point” Project (WAP). This project required communication with customers who were requesting installation of a WAP, and coordination with the persons who were to install the WAPs. However, Cole’s communications were inadequate. This resulted in customers not knowing how to use the WAPs after they were installed, or even that the WAPs had been installed. Cole was given three warnings over the course of his employment. The New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (PAB) upheld Cole’s termination. On appeal, Cole argued his termination did not comply with New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Per 1002.08 because he did not receive the three letters in accordance with New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Per 1002.04 for the same or substantially similar conduct or offense. DOIT argued the New Hampshire Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide this case, and, in the alternative, that Cole’s termination complied with Per 1002.08 and Per 1002.04. Finding that it had jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed the PAB’s decision. View "Appeal of James Cole" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff San-Ken Homes, Inc. (San-Ken) appealed a superior court decision requiring it to apply for registration or exemption with defendant New Hampshire Attorney General, Consumer Protection and Antitrust Bureau (Bureau), under the Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (Act), and to make certain improvements to Old Beaver Road in the Oakwood Common subdivision in New Ipswich. The Act allows for exemptions from registration under certain circumstances. In October 2006, the Bureau granted a certificate of exemption to the development in which Old Beaver Road was located, 112 Chestnut, “as to the offer and sale of” the 16 lots “because of the limited character of the offering and because the subdivision is adequately regulated by municipal ordinances.” In June 2014, San-Ken, which had no relationship to 112 Chestnut, purchased nine undeveloped lots at a foreclosure sale and recorded title to the property. The New Ipswich Planning Board held a hearing on San-Ken’s application for modification of the Board’s original conditions for Old Beaver Road. As an alternative to the Board revoking the subdivision approval, Town counsel recommended that it entertain a motion to waive the prior road completion requirements and specifications on the condition that San-Ken complete certain improvements to the road at its own expense. San-Ken satisfied all of the Board’s requirements. San-Ken later appealed to the trial court challenging the Bureau's authority under the Act to require it to be registered or exempted and to require it to make improvements to Old Beaver Road. When that challenge was unsuccessful, San-Ken appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) applying a mistaken standard of review; (2) finding San-Ken to be a successor subdivider under the Act; and (3) determining that the Bureau was within its authority to require San-Ken to further improve Old Beaver Road as a condition of obtaining a certificate of exemption. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the Act authorized the Bureau to require San-Ken to complete Old Beaver Road to the standard promised by 112 Chestnut as a condition of obtaining a certificate of exemption. View "San-Ken Homes, Inc. v. New Hampshire Attorney General" on Justia Law

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Petitioner State Employees’ Association of New Hampshire, Inc., SEIU, Local 1984 (Union), appealed a New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) order finding respondent State of New Hampshire did not commit an unfair labor practice by prospectively eliminating salary enhancements for newly hired Sununu Youth Services Center (SYSC) employees under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Based on its review of the PELRB record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, as a matter of law, the Union’s withdrawal of a proposal during the mediation phase that led to the adoption of the 2015-2017 CBA established that elimination of the salary enhancements was a bargained-for result of the new CBA. View "Appeal of State Employees' Association of New Hampshire, Inc., SEIU, Local 1984" on Justia Law

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The State appealed a superior court order granting defendant Foad Afshar a new trial following his convictions on one count of simple assault, two counts of unlawful mental health practice, and one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, the State argued the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion when, during a post-verdict hearing on the defendant’s motion for a new trial, it failed to apply the proper legal analysis in evaluating the potential biases of two jurors. Finding no such error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Afshar" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Steven Hoyt appealed a circuit court order reinstating his alimony obligation to respondent Lesley Hoyt, and granting an upward adjustment to his child support payments. The parties had three children. Two were over age 18. The oldest child withdrew from college and moved back in with the respondent due to a medical condition. The middle child attends college but lives with the respondent while school is not in session. The parties’ youngest child was in high school, and primarily resided with respondent. Petitioner filed a request seeking a reduction to his child support obligation because the middle child had recently turned 18. However, in June 2016, prior to receiving approval from the trial court, petitioner reduced the amount of his monthly child support payment. Thereafter, respondent requested alimony. Prior to the final hearing, respondent filed a one-page proposed order seeking to increase child support for the youngest child to $1,100 per month and requesting alimony in the amount of $600 per month. Petitioner requested that the current child support payment be reduced to $982 per month. Accompanying petitioner’s proposed order was a detailed request for factual findings along with legal citation in support of his position. The trial court ultimately renewed alimony and upwardly adjusted the child support obligation. Based on the record, the New Hampshire found no abuse of discretion in its judgment, and affirmed. View "In the Matter of Steven Hoyt and Lesley Hoyt" on Justia Law

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Petitioners Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC and FairPoint Logistics, Inc. (collectively, “FairPoint”), appealed the final decision of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (NHES), claiming that it erred in rulings that: (1) upheld the decision of the commissioner of NHES to reopen the ruling of the appeal tribunal which found (a) certain unionized employees of FairPoint (claimants) were not entitled to collect unemployment benefits during the period they were on strike against the company because the strike resulted in a “stoppage of work” and (b) strike pay received by some of the workers constituted income deductible from their benefits; (2) affirmed a subsequent order of a second appeal tribunal which found that benefits were payable because the strike did not result in a stoppage of work; and (3) reversed the second tribunal’s determination that strike pay was deductible from benefits. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the appellate board’s decision, reinstated in part the order of the first appeal tribunal, and found it unnecessary to address the issue of strike pay. The Court found the commissioner erred in his determination that the first tribunal’s decision resulted from a mistake of law. Contrary to the commissioner’s view that the tribunal based its decision merely on what he described (but did not define) as a “negative impact” analysis, the Court concluded the tribunal had sufficient evidence before it from which it could find that the strike resulted in a substantial curtailment of FairPoint’s operations and thus constituted a stoppage of work under RSA 282-A:36. For the same reason, the Court also concluded the appellate board erred as a matter of law insofar as it ultimately upheld the commissioner’s decision to reopen and did not affirm the decision of the first tribunal with respect to the stoppage of work issue. Because the stoppage of work disqualified claimants from receiving unemployment benefits during the period when they were on strike, it was unnecessary to address the issue of whether the strike pay received by some of the claimants constituted deductible wages. View "Appeal of FairPoint Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, the Grand Summit Hotel Condominium Unit Owners’ Association (Association), filed claims against defendant, L.B.O. Holding, Inc. d/b/a Attitash Mountain Resort (Attitash), arising from Attitash’s alleged failure to maintain a cooling tower at the Grand Summit Hotel and Conference Center (Condominium). Attitash moved to dismiss the Association’s claims, arguing that they were barred by a provision, which required arbitration of certain disputes, in a management agreement (the Agreement) between the parties. The trial court denied Attitash’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the Association’s claims fall outside of the scope of the provision. The trial court subsequently approved this interlocutory appeal. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Grand Summit Hotel Condominium Unit Owners' Association v. L.B.O. Holding, Inc.. d/b/a Attitash Mountain Resort" on Justia Law

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In 1985, petitioner Edward White was convicted in Massachusetts on two counts of indecent assault and battery arising from allegations that he sexually assaulted an eight-year-old female. He served three years in prison and then was paroled. At the evidentiary hearing, he represented that, during his parole, he successfully completed a sex offender treatment program. In January 1994, as a New Hampshire resident, the petitioner became subject to lifetime registration as a sex offender for his Massachusetts convictions. Following an evidentiary hearing on the merits, petitioner appealed a superior court order denying his petition to be relieved of the obligation to register as a sex offender in New Hampshire. Finding that the superior court properly applied the pertinent New Hampshire statute mandating petitioner's registration, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the order. View "White v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

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Defendant John Brawley was charged with two criminal offenses in Circuit Court that were transferred to Superior Court for a jury trial. Because defendant was indigent, the trial court appointed a public defender to represent him. At that time, the trial court issued an order requiring defendant to reimburse the OCC for the costs and expenses associated with his public defense and directed him to contact the OCC, within 5 days of the court’s order, to verify his mailing address and to make payment arrangements. The jury acquitted the defendant of both charges following trial. The State alleged that the OCC attempted to contact defendant prior to and following his trial to arrange for his reimbursement of these costs, but to no avail. Consequently, the OCC filed a motion with the trial court alleging that defendant did not comply with his payment obligations or provide any cause for his non-compliance. The trial court scheduled a show cause hearing, but defendant failed to appear. In response, the trial court issued an arrest warrant for defendant and set bail at $50. Defendant was subsequently arrested pursuant to the warrant and paid the $50 bail as a condition of his release. When he posted his bond payment, defendant attested to having the same address he initially provided to the OCC and to the trial court. The bail payment was remitted to the OCC, thereby reducing the defendant’s reimbursement obligation. Thereafter, the OCC requested a further hearing on its show cause motion alleging that defendant made no other payments toward his obligation. The trial court scheduled a second show cause hearing and defendant again failed to appear. In response, the OCC requested that the trial court issue a warrant for defendant’s arrest and set bail in the full amount of his reimbursement obligation, which would then be forfeited to the OCC. Alternatively, the OCC requested that defendant be jailed for three days before being permitted a bail hearing. This request was denied, the trial court finding defendant was "unconditionally discharged" from the criminal case, and that it lacked jurisdiction to require defendant to show cause or be required to reimburse the OCC for the costs of his defense. Finding that the trial court erred in denying the second bench warrant, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire. v. Brawley" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Plaintiff Anthony Franciosa, as father and next friend of Vaneesa Franciosa, appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment filed by the defendants, Jessica Elliott and Hidden Pond Farm, Inc. a/k/a Hidden Pond Farm, and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court ruled that, pursuant to RSA 508:19 (2010), defendants were entitled to immunity from liability for the injuries Vaneesa sustained in a horseback riding accident. Vaneesa was thirteen at the time of the accident; she had been riding horses for eight years and taking weekly riding lessons from Elliott, an expert equestrian, for almost two years. Approximately once a week, Vaneesa went on a "free ride," one that did not involve a lesson. On free rides, Elliott was not always present, and she rode unsupervised. After riding for approximately 30 minutes, Vaneesa fell off her horse trying to dismount. She was seriously injured when the horse stepped on Vaneesa. In its order, the trial court concluded that Vaneesa’s injuries resulted from the “inherent risks of equine activities.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the superior court order. View "Franciosa v. Hidden Pond Farm, Inc." on Justia Law