Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Quentin White filed an action to quiet title against defendants Brigitte Auger (formerly Gaudreau) and Joanne Jackson (formerly Labadie). In the spring of 1968, White met Perley Swett, the “Taylor Pond Hermit,” and explained that he needed food. White and his family provided that food. White refused payment from Swett; this gesture started an enduring friendship. Over the years, White helped Swett deliver gifts of money or deeds of land to people in the community — mostly to local children. Auger was one of the local children who repeatedly benefited from Swett’s generosity; at one point, Swett told Auger that he would give her a horse and some land. Swett often attempted to pay White for, in Swett’s words, his "services." White always refused payment, feeling that it was his neighborly duty to help. At one point, Swett attempted to give White a deed for a large parcel of land. After a heated discussion, White tore up the deed. In 1972, Swett gave White the deed at issue in this appeal in exchange for White’s services. White accepted the deed but did not intend to record it. Swett died in 1973, and had appointed White as executor of his will, which included several bequests to White, including part of Swett's "home farm." The probate proceedings became contentious, and White resigned as executor. Prior to resignation, however, White recorded the 1972 deed and entered into a Stipulation with Swett’s estate and heirs, thereby relinquishing any of his claims under Swett’s will and in connection with any unrecorded deeds. In 2016, White attempted to sell the land in the 1972 deed; the sale fell through because the prospective buyer, having become aware of the references to Auger and Jackson in the 1972 deed, was concerned that White might not hold the title free and clear of Auger’s and Jackson’s interests. White then brought an action to quiet title against Auger and Jackson. Jackson defaulted; Auger contested the action and brought counterclaims against White. The trial court ruled in favor of Auger in the quiet title action, reasoning that the deed, properly interpreted, contemplated transferring ownership of the land to Auger in the event that White did not live on or build on the land within ten years. The trial court also ruled in favor of Auger on her declaratory judgment and specific performance counterclaims. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's interpretation of the 1972 deed, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed quiet title in favor of Auger. View "White v. Auger" on Justia Law

Defendant George Colbath was convicted by jury on 17 charges of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA). On appeal, he argued the Superior Court erred by admitting evidence of certain uncharged conduct pursuant to New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b). He also argued the Superior Court erred by allowing two witnesses to testify about statements that he allegedly made about the victim’s appearance. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Colbath" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs David and Katherine Dietz appealed a superior court order that upheld a zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) decision for defendant Town of Tuftonboro, which granted intervenor Sawyer Point Realty, LLC (collectively with Sawyer Point Realty Trust, its predecessor in interest, Sawyer Point), two equitable waivers related to two additions Sawyer Point constructed on its house in violation of the Town’s zoning ordinance requiring a fifty-foot setback from Lake Winnipesaukee. Sawyer Point’s house was located along the shore of Lake Winnipesaukee and within the Town’s Lakefront Residential Zoning District (District); the Dietzes owned the abutting property, also within the District. In 1999, Sawyer Point added a second floor addition over the eastern portion of the first floor of its house, aware that the existing structure was located within the setback, and that a second floor addition would also be within the setback. Prior to construction, Sawyer Point submitted a building permit application to the Town containing a rough sketch of the existing house, which also showed that the house was situated less than fifty feet from the lake. The Town’s building inspector granted the building permit, noting the addition would cause “no change in footprint.” In 2008-2009, Sawyer Point constructed a second addition to its house, again receiving permission from the Town to construct. In February 2014, Sawyer Point commissioned a survey which revealed, in regard to the 2008 Addition, more of the new structure was within the setback than had been represented to the ZBA. In December 2014, the Dietzes, after learning of this discrepancy, sought injunctive relief against Sawyer Point, claiming that Sawyer Point had built within the setback without obtaining the required approvals, and requesting that the court order the removal of the unlawful construction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err when it sustained the ZBA and declined to weigh the cumulative effect of building within the lakefront setback throughout the Town. Moreover, relying on the evidence before it, the trial court agreed with the ZBA that there was little or no public benefit to be gained by correcting the violations. Because the Dietzes have failed to show that this finding was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence, the trial court's decision was upheld. View "Dietz v. Town of Tuftonboro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff T.P. appealed circuit court devisions to deny her motion to extend her domestic violence final order of protection against the defendant, B.P. Plaintiff had applied for multiple one-year extensions to a restraining order that was issued against B.P. After one such extension, the trial court issued a narrative order on January 27, 2017, finding that plaintiff had “met her burden to establish good cause to support the extension of the Restraining Order for an additional year.” A year later, believing that the restraining order had been extended to January 27, 2018, plaintiff filed for a five-year extension of the order on January 19. Defendant objected, arguing that plaintiff “failed to timely file her request for an extension under RSA 173-B” and that she could not “seek extension of a restraining order that [had] expired 35 days prior to her request.” Defendant contended that the January 2017 narrative order “simply confirmed the extension until December 15, 2017.” Plaintiff argued her motion for the five-year extension was timely filed. The New Hampshire Supreme Court fond the the trial court issued the final order of protection on December 17, 2015. That order was effective until December 15, 2016. A year later, the trial court extended the final order; by statute, that extension was necessarily for “one year after the expiration of the first order,” or until December 15, 2017. By definition, a final order of protection cannot be “extended” if it has “expired.” Therefore, for the plaintiff to timely file for a five-year extension, the plain language of the statute mandated that she file by December 15, 2017. Because the plaintiff did not do so, her request was untimely. The Court therefore affirmed denial of plaintiff's motion for a five-year extension. View "T.P. v. B.P." on Justia Law

Respondent, the father of H.J. (child), appealed a circuit court order terminating his parental rights. The parenting plan allowed for supervised visitation, but that the mother could exercise discretion in refuse such visits. After one such refusal, mother expressed concern that visitation would be emotionally disruptive to the child because the father’s frequent incarcerations would not allow him to become a consistent part of the child’s life. The father appears to have done nothing to challenge the mother’s decision. He argued on appeal of the decision to terminate his parental rights that the evidence did not support the circuit court’s findings that: (1) he had abandoned the child; (2) he had not paid sufficient support; and (3) termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re H.J." on Justia Law

Defendant Joel Martin appealed his convictions for second degree murder, second degree assault, and being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon. Charges arose from a 2015 fight outside a Manchester, New Hampshire nightclub. He argued the Superior Court erred when it: (1) failed to inquire how he wanted to proceed if his motion to discharge his counsel were granted; and (2) denied his request to instruct the jury to consider the effect of alcohol intoxication on eyewitness identification testimony. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Martin" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the dismissal of a medical malpractice action filed by plaintiff Nicole Alward against defendants Emery Johnston, M.D., Gary Fleischer, M.D., Tung Thuy Nguyen, M.D., Elliot Hospital, and Southern New Hampshire Medical Center. Following a second back surgery, plaintiff consulted with two different attorneys about a potential medical malpractice claim. Ultimately, both attorneys advised the plaintiff that they were unwilling to represent her in a medical malpractice action against the treating physicians and hospitals. As a result, plaintiff believed that her potential claim had no value. Plaintiff then consulted with a bankruptcy attorney, Mark Cornell, in April 2015. She informed Cornell about her potential medical malpractice claim and that other attorneys had declined to pursue it. When Cornell drafted the plaintiff’s petition for chapter 7 bankruptcy, he did not list the potential medical malpractice claim on the plaintiff’s schedule of assets. Cornell also failed to advise plaintiff that she needed to disclose this potential claim to the bankruptcy trustee. At her ex-husband’s suggestion, in February 2016, plaintiff consulted with a third law firm, Swartz & Swartz, P.C., which agreed to represent her and pursue the medical malpractice claim. Plaintiff filed the underlying medical malpractice action against defendants in June 2016. The bankruptcy court issued its order discharging her case in July 2016. In October, defendants moved to dismiss the medical malpractice action, arguing plaintiff should have been judicially estopped from pursuing her medical malpractice claim because she failed to disclose it on her schedule of assets in the bankruptcy case. Plaintiff immediately consulted with new bankruptcy counsel, who moved to reopen her bankruptcy case to "administer a potential asset" and appoint a new trustee. The bankruptcy court granted the motion and appointed a new trustee. Plaintiff then resisted defendants' motion to dismiss, which was denied by the trial court. The trial court ultimately dismissed the case, holding plaintiff was judicially estopped from bringing her medical malpractice claim. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in applying judicial estoppel to this matter, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alward v. Johnston" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kyle Guillemette challenged a determination by the Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) that the notice requirements set forth in RSA 171-A:8, III (2014) and New Hampshire Administrative Rules, He-M 310.07 did not apply when Monadnock Worksource notified Monadnock Developmental Services of its intent to discontinue providing services to petitioner because that act did not constitute a “termination” of services within the meaning of the applicable rules. Petitioner received developmental disability services funded by the developmental disability Medicaid waiver program. MDS was the “area agency,” which coordinated and developed petitioner’s individual service plan. Worksource provides services to disabled individuals pursuant to a “Master Agreement” with MDS. Worksource began providing day services to the petitioner in August 2012. On March 31, 2017, Worksource notified MDS, in writing, that Worksource was terminating services to petitioner “as of midnight on April 30.” The letter to MDS stated that “[t]he Board of Directors and administration of . . . Worksource feel this action is in the best interest of [the petitioner] and of [Worksource].” Petitioner’s mother, who served as his guardian, was informed by MDS of Worksource’s decision on April 3. The mother asked for reconsideration, but the Board declined, writing that because the mother “repeatedly and recently expressed such deep dissatisfaction with our services to your son, the Board and I feel that you and [petitioner] would be better served by another agency . . . .” Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint with the Office of Client and Legal Services alleging that his services had been terminated improperly and requesting that they remain in place pending the outcome of the investigation of his complaint. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the AAU’s ruling was not erroneous, it affirmed. View "Petition of Kyle Guillemette" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Keenan appealed his conviction for driving a motor vehicle while his vehicle registration privileges were suspended. Because defendant’s conviction was based upon his lawful operation of a vehicle owned and registered to his son, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed. “The State’s interpretation would also prohibit this same individual from renting and operating a vehicle owned, properly registered, and insured by a car rental agency. Indeed, this interpretation equates the suspension of an individual’s registration privileges with a suspension of his or her driving privileges, despite the fact that these two privileges are distinct and are governed by separate statutes. We do not find that these results are either logical or just.” View "New Hampshire v. Keenan" on Justia Law

Defendant Hjalmar Bjorkman was convicted by jury on one count of using computer services for a prohibited purpose. He challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, contending that jury selection did not fulfill the requirement under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) that a defendant be “brought to trial” within 180 days of filing a request for final disposition. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed Bjorkman’s conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Bjorkman" on Justia Law