Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Laryssa Benner appealed a superior court decision imposing a deferred sentence. Defendant was originally sentenced to twelve months in the house of corrections for misdemeanor theft by deception. The sentence was deferred for two years with the trial court retaining jurisdiction up to and after the deferred period to impose or terminate the sentence. On appeal, defendant argued the procedures the trial court used in imposing her sentence violated her due process rights, and further erred in finding there was sufficient evidence she violated certain conditions of her deferred sentence. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Benner" on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven Silva appealed a New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (PAB) decision that upheld decisions of respondent, the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), to suspend and subsequently terminate the petitioner’s employment. Petitioner began working at the New Hampshire Hospital in 1999. He was terminated from employment in 2015 for violating the hospital’s sexual harassment policy. In 2016, the PAB found that the petitioner’s 2015 termination did not comply with New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Per 1002.08(d) because DHHS did not provide the petitioner, prior to termination, with all of the evidence it relied upon to justify his termination, and, consequently, he was not given an opportunity to refute the evidence that led to his dismissal. For that reason, the PAB ordered DHHS to reinstate the petitioner retroactively to the date of his termination and award him back pay and benefits. Following the PAB’s order, DHHS resumed paying the petitioner but simultaneously placed him on suspension so that it could conduct a new investigation into the same sexual harassment allegations that formed the basis for the 2015 termination. In 2017, after completing its investigation, DHHS terminated the petitioner again. The petitioner appealed his suspension as well as his 2017 termination to the PAB, arguing that the PAB’s decision overturning his prior termination prevents DHHS from terminating or suspending him for the same conduct. After a hearing on the merits, the PAB upheld the suspension and subsequent termination. On appeal, petitioner argued the statutory reinstatement requirement in the Administrative Rules precluded DHHS from terminating him a second time for the same conduct which gave rise to his 2015 termination. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that because the PAB’s decision overturning the 2015 termination was based upon DHHS’s failure to satisfy the requirements of Per 1002.08(d) prior to termination, it was not a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes. Therefore Silva's argument failed and the Supreme Court affirmed the PAB's decision. View "Appeal of Steven Silva" on Justia Law

In 2016, petitioners Kenneth T. Riso and Rocco R. Riso, Jr. filed a petition requesting the partition of property in Raymond, New Hampshire that was held by them and their siblings as tenants in common following the death of their mother. The petition also sought relief against respondent Gregory Riso individually for money allegedly converted by respondent from his mother’s estate. Specifically, the petition asserted breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and fraudulent misrepresentation. These claims stemmed from two checks written in 2012 that respondent drew from his mother’s personal account under authority of a durable power of attorney she executed prior to her death. Respondent answered the lawsuit on August 29, 2016, in which he asserted, among other things, that petitioners’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court ultimately concluded respondent forfeited his right to the statute of limitations defense. After review of the trial court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed and affirmed denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration. View "Riso v. Riso" on Justia Law

Defendant Katlyn Gage Marin was convicted in a bench trial of the second degree murder of her three-year-old daughter, Brielle Gage. Before trial, she moved to suppress statements she made to the police prior to being advised of her Miranda rights. The pre-Miranda statements at issue consisted of three sets of statements: given at her home, in a police cruiser, and in a family waiting room at the police station - each of which contained a different version of the circumstances giving rise to Brielle’s fatal injuries. She also argued that other statements that she made after she had been advised of her Miranda rights should be suppressed because they were tainted by the illegally-obtained pre-Miranda statements. After concluding that defendant was not in custody until after she was advised of her Miranda rights, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Marin" on Justia Law

After a bench trial on stipulated facts, defendant Jean Claude Mfataneza was convicted of aggravated driving while intoxicated. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred in concluding that RSA 265-A:8 (2014) (amended 2016) required only that the Administrative License Suspension (ALS) warnings be reasonably conveyed by reasonable methods in order to satisfy the statute and be admissible at trial, rather than that the warnings be subjectively understood by the individual driver. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Mfataneza" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pro Done, Inc. appealed a superior court order dismissing its amended complaint against defendants Teresa Basham, individually and as non-independent trustee of the Paul R. Hooper 1998 GST Exempt Trust, Terrence Hooper, Timothy Hooper, and John Ransmeier, trustee of the Paul R. Hooper 1997 Trust, for breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual relations, and civil conspiracy. Specifically, plaintiff challenged the trial court’s ruling that an alleged violation of a certain contractual provision did not provide a basis for plaintiff’s claims. After their father's death, defendant each received a portion of their father’s one-third ownership interest in three companies known as the Pro-Cut entities, to be held in trust by John Ransmeier. In 2012, the sibling defendants negotiated with Joseph Willey, another owner of the Pro-Cut entities, to sell their ownership interests. They eventually agreed upon a sale price, and in November 2013, Ransmeier, on the sibling defendants’ behalf, executed fifteen Securities Redemption Agreements (SRAs) with the Pro-Cut entities, the terms of which were stated to be binding upon “the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties.” After these transactions, one of the Pro-Cut entities, Brake Solutions, Inc., acquired another Pro-Cut entity. It then changed its name to Pro-Cut International, Inc. In May 2014, three unrelated companies, collectively known as Snap-on, purchased the Pro-Cut entities. Pro-Cut was renamed Pro Done, Inc. Plaintiff alleged it was a successor to the Pro-Cut entities. After Snap-on’s purchase of the Pro-Cut entities, the sibling defendants filed a lawsuit, with the assistance of Ransmeier, in federal district court, against Willey and trustees of trusts that were members of the Pro-Cut entities at the time of the Snap-on transaction. Plaintiff thereafter filed the underlying lawsuit to this appeal. Its central arguments were mainly the trial court erred by ignoring express terms of the release agreements - in which the defendants “covenant[ed] not to sue and otherwise agree[d] not to enforce any claim” against the plaintiff - and denied the plaintiff the opportunity to seek consequential damages for breach of the contract, contrary to New Hampshire law. The parties’ arguments presented a question of first impression for this the New Hampshire Supreme Court: whether New Hampshire law recognized a cause of action for breach of contract based upon a covenant not to sue where the contract did not expressly provide that the non-breaching party was entitled to consequential damages for breach of the covenant. The Court held that it did, reversed the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pro Done, Inc. v. Basham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Wayne Sabato appealed, and defendant Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) cross-appealed a trial court order in a suit brought by plaintiff to establish his homestead right in the subject property. Plaintiff’s wife, Cheryl Sabato, acquired the subject property, taking title by warranty deed that acknowledged she was a “married person,” and granted a purchase money mortgage to a party not identified in the record (the original mortgage), which plaintiff did not sign. Both Cheryl and plaintiff resided at the property since 2001. In January 2002, Cheryl refinanced the original mortgage, executing a new mortgage to HomeVest Mortgage Corporation (the first mortgage). Plaintiff did not sign the first mortgage, which was immediately assigned to CitiMortgage, Inc. In 2005, Cheryl granted a mortgage to National City Bank to secure a home equity line of credit; both Cheryl and plaintiff signed this, the second mortgage. National City Bank was acquired by PNC Bank National Association, which assigned the second mortgage to Situs Investments, LLC (Situs) in 2013. Meanwhile, in 2011, the first mortgage was assigned by CitiMortgage, Inc. to FNMA. In 2014, Situs foreclosed its mortgage, and purchased the property at the foreclosure auction for $64,872.01, taking title subject to the first mortgage. Situs then sold its interest in the property to FNMA. Accordingly, FNMA held title to the property and the first mortgage. In 2016, FNMA notified the Sabatos that they might be evicted from the property. Plaintiff then filed the underlying suit, seeking to establish his homestead right in the property. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff contended that foreclosure of the second mortgage did not affect his homestead right because he had not waived that right in the first mortgage. FNMA argued that, because plaintiff waived his homestead interest in the second mortgage, he could not now assert any homestead right. The trial court denied both motions, ruling that the second mortgage was a home equity line of credit, and that some portion of plaintiff's homstead exemption still existed and had to be set-off before FNMA owned the property free and clear. The trial court determined plaintiff was entitled to $120,000 less the amount owed on the note secured by the second mortgage at the time of the foreclosure sale. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sabato v. Federal National Mortgage Association" on Justia Law

Defendant Katherine Saintil-Brown was convicted by jury for negligent homicide,criminal neglect of an elderly adult, and failure to report adult abuse. Defendant’s convictions were based upon her failure to call for help while her elderly mother, the victim, lay in her own waste on the floor of their shared home for multiple days. On appeal, defendant argued the evidence was insufficient for the jury to have convicted her of the three charges. She also argued the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the criminal neglect of an elderly adult charge and that this error required reversal of her conviction on that charge. As to the jury instruction issue, the State agreed the trial court’s instruction was erroneous and that the error was plain, but asserted the error did not require reversal. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire .v Saintil-Brown" on Justia Law

In December 2007, Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia) and TS & A Motors, LLC d/b/a Kia of Somersworth (Somersworth) entered into a Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (Dealer Agreement), which governed the franchise relationship between the parties. Under this agreement, Somersworth was required to employ certain parts and service personnel. In 2011 and Kia sent a series of letters notifying Somersworth of perceived staffing and training deficiencies. These letters referenced Somersworth’s failure to meet technician training requirements in 2009 and 2010, to adequately staff and train personnel in its parts and service department, and to meet the minimum number of technicians required to participate in Kia’s “Optima Hybrid Program.” During Somersworth’s tenure as a dealer, Kia employees overseeing Somersworth made note of its high employee turnover rates. The Board determined that over the course of its operations as a dealer, Somersworth violated the provision of the Dealer Agreement that required certain parts and service personnel “on an almost constant basis.” Kia management worked with Somersworth to remedy its staffing deficiencies. It sent numerous written notifications to Somersworth referencing the inadequacy of its parts and service staffing, met with Somersworth to discuss its concerns over staffing, and gave Somersworth the “benefit of the doubt” when the dealer promised to hire the appropriate number of staff members. Somerset appealed a superior court decision to affirm a New Hampshire Motor Vehicle Industry Board ruling that Kia properly terminated its franchise agreement with Somersworth. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision. View "TS & A Motors, LLC v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Edward F. Hayes, Jr., as trustee of the Survivor’s Trust A, certified under the Hayes Family Trust dated January 20, 2000 (Hayes Trust), appealed a superior court order in an action to partition real property. The property at issue was owned in equal shares by respondent James Connolly, co-trustee of the Ann D. Connolly Living Trust (Connolly Trust), and the Hayes Trust. The Hayes Trust argued that the trial court erred by specifically enforcing the terms of a contract the parties had abandoned. It further argued the trial court erred in ordering a private sale based on appraisals because the Hayes family needed to maximize the liquidation value of the property. Therefore, it argues that the only “reasonable and fair remedy . . . was [a] private auction.” The Hayes Trust further contended the court erred in impermissibly penalizing it for seeking partition, and by excluding certain testimony regarding a witness’s interest in purchasing the property. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hayes v. Connolly" on Justia Law