Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Michael Guiney challenged a superior court declaratory judgment ruling the road between Guiney’s house and barn became a public highway by prescription. Guiney also appealed the trial court’s decision on his cross-claim against appellees David Nault, Joshua Nault, and Leigh Nault (the Naults), which upheld boundary lines and a 50-foot wide right-of-way (50-foot ROW) that appeared in a 1988 boundary line agreement (BLA) under the doctrines of boundary by acquiescence and estoppel by recitals in instruments. The relevant properties and Kelsea Road were located in Dunbarton. Guiney acquired his property (Lot 5) by deed dated March 30, 1999. David Nault purchased three lots (Lots 7, 8, and 9) to the west and north of Lot 5 between 1990 and 1998, and had a home on Lot 7. When Guiney purchased Lot 5, the deed described the boundaries of the property using the language that appeared in the BLA, including the 50-foot ROW in favor of Lot 7. In 2015, Guiney recorded a plan which illustrated the boundary lines of his property as they were described in the BLA. Nault was also aware of the BLA prior to purchasing Lot 7 and understood it to be binding upon him and all future owners of the affected pieces of property. Although he observed very little traffic near his house, Guiney observed plow trucks for the Town of Dunbarton (Town) plowing the disputed area during the winter and using space next to his barn to turn around and go back down Kelsea Road. Although Town trucks never graded the disputed area between Guiney’s house and barn, they used the space next to the barn to turn their trucks around when grading Kelsea Road. The present action was set in motion in 2006, when Guiney filed a petition against Nault to quiet title to a “driveway” Nault had constructed over Lot 5, and outside of the disputed area, to access Lots 8 and 9. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the evidence presented to the trial court supported a finding of public use, but not adverse public use, therefore, insufficient to support a finding of a public highway by prescription. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s finding that Kelsea Road spurred west between Guiney’s house and barn; affirmed the trial court’s finding that the boundaries between Lot 5 and Lot 7 were established by acquiescence; and affirmed the trial court’s finding that Guiney was judicially estopped from denying the existence of the 50-foot ROW outlined in the BLA. View "Town of Dunbarton v. Guiney" on Justia Law

In 2007, defendant Jason Candello was sentenced on two felonies pursuant to a negotiated plea. On one felony conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a stand-committed sentence of two and one-half to nine years (sentence 1). The maximum of that sentence was subsequently reduced to seven years. On the other felony, the trial court imposed a three-and-one-half-to-seven year sentence that was to run consecutively to the stand-committed sentence on the first felony (sentence 2). The court suspended sentence 2 for ten years subject to conditions. At some point before November 12, 2012, defendant was paroled on sentence 1. On November 12, 2012, defendant committed second degree assault. Defendant’s parole was revoked, and, on November 18, 2012, he resumed serving sentence 1. Sentence 1 ended on March 9, 2014. On March 6, 2013, the trial court set defendant’s bail on the second degree assault charge at $10,000 cash, which he was unable to pay. In February 2014, a jury convicted the defendant of the second degree assault charge. He was sentenced on that charge on May 6, 2014 (sentence 3). Sentence 3 was to run consecutively to sentence 2. On that day, the trial court also imposed sentence 2 (which had previously been suspended for ten years). In December 2018, defendant filed a motion requesting that the trial court amend sentences 2 and 3 so that they ran concurrently, instead of consecutively. The court denied his motion, and defendant appealed. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the sentencing. View "New Hampshire v. Candello" on Justia Law

Claimant Elizabeth Doody worked for the Laconia School District as an elementary school speech assistant for over a decade. Her job required her to accompany students from their location to a special services room as well as to supervise a locked side entrance door at the beginning of the school day when students arrive and at the end of the school day when they depart. Of the school’s 300 students, approximately 125 students typically used the side entrance, which consisted of an outside concrete area, an exterior door that accessed a small atrium with a floor mat, and an interior door that accessed the corridor. In winter weather, the outside concrete area was treated with sand and ice melt product. On April 18, 2017, Claimant fell twice while walking down the corridor toward the side entrance, once at approximately 8:30 a.m. and again at approximately 3:00 p.m. Both falls occurred in the same location. The morning fall did not injure Claimant, but the afternoon fall fractured her right arm, which had to be repaired surgically. Claimant was taken out of work by one of her doctors the day after the injury and was released to part-time work with modifications. Because the District was unable to accommodate the restrictions, Claimant remained out of work until school resumed in the fall. Despite the surgery and a subsequent course of physical therapy, Claimant remained unable to lift her right hand over her head and continued to experience pain. Claimant appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision to deny her claim for indemnity benefits and payment of medical bills. The parties disputed whether Claimant’s injury arose out of her employment. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the CAB misapplied the applicable law with respect to on-the-job injuries, and because applying that test required further fact-finding, it vacated the CAB’s decision and remanded for further factual findings and for the correct application of the “increased-risk test” to those facts. View "Appeal of Elizabeth Doody" on Justia Law

Plaintiff James Boyle, individually and as Trustee of the 150 Greenleaf Avenue Realty Trust, appealed, and defendant City of Portsmouth (City), cross-appealed, after a jury awarded Boyle damages for trespass and nuisance arising from the City’s sewer line on his property. On appeal, Boyle contended the trial court erred in: (1) determining as a matter of law that the City’s trespass began in 2013; and (2) excluding all evidence of future lost profits after 2016. The City argued the trial court erred in: (1) permitting Boyle’s lost profits claims to go to the jury and refusing to set aside the jury’s award; and (2) determining that the City did not have permanent rights in the sewer line. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the City had only a revocable license in the sewer line, reversed, in part, the court’s rulings concerning the timing of Boyle’s damages, reversed the court’s ruling on Boyle’s lost profits claim and vacated the jury award, and remanded. View "Boyle v. City of Portsmouth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff City of Portsmouth (City) appealed a superior court ruling that the City’s taking by eminent domain of 4.6 acres of land owned by defendants 150 Greenleaf Avenue Realty Trust and Minato Auto, LLC, was unlawful. On appeal the City argued the trial court erred in: (1) setting aside the taking based on a finding that the City did not set forth statutory authority for taking the wetlands; (2) determining that the City failed to demonstrate a reasonable present public need for taking the wetlands; (3) finding that the City’s taking of the sewer line in fee simple was improper and that the burden on the condemnee outweighed the public necessity; and (4) finding that the City’s purported improper motivation to end litigation with the defendants was a basis to set aside the taking. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Portsmouth v. 150 Greenleaf Avenue Realty Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ventas Realty Limited Partnership (Ventas), appealed a superior court order denying its request for an abatement of the real estate taxes it paid defendant City of Dover (City), for the 2014 tax year. The subject real estate consists of a 5.15-acre site containing a skilled nursing facility serving both short-term and long-term patients, two garages, and a parking lot. At issue was the City’s April 1, 2014 assessment of the real estate at a value of $4,308,500. Ventas alleged that it timely applied to the City for an abatement of its 2014 taxes. The City presumably denied or failed to act upon the request, and Ventas, thereafter, petitioned the superior court for an abatement pursuant to RSA 76:17 (Supp. 2018), alleging that the City had unlawfully taxed the property in excess of its fair market value. Expert witnesses for both sides opined the property’s highest and best use was as a skilled nursing facility. The experts also agreed that the most reliable method for determining the property’s fair market value was the income capitalization method, although the City’s expert also completed analyses under the sales comparison and cost approaches. Both experts examined the same comparable properties and they also used similar definitions of “fair market value.” The main difference between the approaches of the two experts is that the City's expert used both market projections and the property’s actual income and expenses from 2012, 2013, and 2014 to forecast the property’s future net income, while Ventas' expert did not. Ventas' expert used the property’s actual income and expenses for the 11 months before the April 1, 2014 valuation date, without any market-based adjustments. Despite their different approaches, the experts gave similar estimates of the property’s projected gross income for tax year 2014. The experts differed greatly in their estimates of the property’s projected gross operating expenses for tax year 2014. All of Ventas’ arguments faulted the trial court for finding the City's expert's valuations more credible than its own expert's valuations. The New Hampshire found the trial court made numerous, specific findings which were supported by the record as to why it rejected Ventas' expert's appraisal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determination that Ventas' expert's appraisal failed to meet Ventas’ burden of proof. View "Ventas Realty Limited Partnership v. City of Dover" on Justia Law

Defendant Mohammad Salimullah was convicted by jury on one count of attempted murder, two counts of first degree assault, one count of second degree assault, and one count of reckless conduct. He appealed: (1) a superior court order denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds that the State failed to comply with RSA 135:17-a (2015) (amended 2019) in bringing indictments against him in 2016; (2) another superior court order denying his motion for a competency determination prior to sentencing; and (3) a third superior court order imposing a no-contact condition on a stand-committed sentence. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the imposition of the no-contact condition, but otherwise affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Salimullah" on Justia Law

Defendants James Folley and his wife, Karen Folley, appealed their convictions after a joint jury trial on two counts of theft by unauthorized taking as a principal or accomplice, and as to James, an additional count of financial exploitation of an elderly adult. They also appealed the trial court’s restitution order requiring that they pay restitution to an assisted living facility where the victim resided at the time of the crimes. To the New Hampshire Supreme Court they argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions; and (2) the trial court erred by ordering them to pay restitution to the facility because it is not entitled to compensation under RSA 651:62 (2016). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendants’ convictions but reversed the restitution order because the economic loss claimed by the facility was not a direct result of the defendants’ criminal conduct. View "New Hampshire v. Folley" on Justia Law

Defendant Ernest Jones appealed a superior court order denying his motion to suppress evidence that led to his conviction on one count of possession of a controlled drug. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) concluding that he was not seized during his encounter with two Concord police officers; and (2) refusing to consider his race in its seizure analysis. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded because the State failed to meet its burden of showing that defendant was not seized. Furthermore, the Court concluded that race was one circumstance that courts may consider in conducting the totality of the circumstances seizure analysis. View "New Hampshire v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Steve and Pamela Zannini, appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendant Phenix Mutual Fire Insurance Company, on plaintiffs’ breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims. In March 2016, the plaintiffs’ Ashland, New Hampshire residence sustained “significant flooding” as the result of burst pipes. The house was insured by defendant, and plaintiffs filed a claim for water damage. Defendant sent an adjuster to investigate, who instructed plaintiffs to remove the floor of the house so that he could investigate the area underneath. After they did so, the house began to collapse, and plaintiffs repaired its framing to prevent it from collapsing completely. As a result of removing the floor, plaintiffs “suffered a complete loss [of the house] and direct physical loss of [their] personal property and use of the [house] for a substantial amount of time.” On May 3, 2016, defendant sent the plaintiffs a letter denying coverage of the damage caused by the collapse. Plaintiffs argued on appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court that: (1) a provision in the insurance policy at issue requiring that suits be brought within one year of the date of loss was unenforceable because it violated public policy; and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether defendant’s communications tolled the one-year period, and defendant was estopped from asserting or waived it as a defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the one-year limitation period did not violate the public policy underlying statutes of limitations. Further, the communications between the parties did not create issues of material fact as to whether the one- year period was tolled or whether the defendant waived or was otherwise estopped from asserting the provision as a defense. View "Zannini v. Phenix Mutual Fire Insurance Company" on Justia Law