Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Father appealed a circuit court order terminating his parental rights over his minor child, R.H., on the ground that he failed to correct, within 12 months, the conditions that led to the circuit court’s finding under RSA chapter 169-C that R.H. was neglected by R.H.’s mother (Mother), who had sole physical custody of the child. This appeal presented a narrow question for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's review: when does the 12-month period to correct the conditions of neglect or abuse under RSA 170-C:5, III begin to run against a non-accused, non-custodial parent? On appeal, Father argued the 12-month period did not begin until a non-accused, non-custodial parent was provided actual notice of the neglect or abuse finding. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) countered that the 12-month statutory period begins to run from the date of that finding, regardless of actual notice. Because the Supreme Court agreed with Father that the 12-month period begins when a non-accused, non-custodial parent receives constitutionally-adequate notice of both the abuse or neglect finding and the possible impact on parental rights of a failure to correct the conditions leading to that finding, it vacated and remanded. View "In re R.H." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the mother of S.A., B.T., and A.G., the father of A.G., and the father of S.A. appealed a circuit court order terminating their parental rights over their children because they each failed to correct the conditions that led to a finding of neglect within twelve months of that finding. The Vermont Supreme Court determined the trial court erred with respect to the termination of the father of S.A.'s parental rights: under the circumstances presented, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by finding that the father failed to correct the conditions that led to the neglect finding within twelve months of that finding. That judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The trial court's orders with respect to the other parents was affirmed. View "In re S.A." on Justia Law

M.M.’s (juvenile) Father challenged the superior court’s refusal of his appeal of a circuit court decision on a neglect petition brought by the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). Father argued that the amendment to RSA 169-C:28 (effective July 1, 2020), eliminating the right to appeal final dispositional orders in abuse and neglect proceedings to the superior court for de novo review, did not apply to his case. Father also appealed the circuit court’s final dispositional order directly to the New Hampshire Supreme Court pursuant to that amended statute, arguing that the circuit court should not have considered and issued orders on DCYF’s neglect petition and, alternatively, that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of neglect. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the July 2020 amendment to RSA 169-C:28 applied to Father’s case, barring his appeal to the superior court for de novo review. In its direct review of Father’s appeal of the circuit court’s final dispositional order, the Court concluded the circuit court did not err in considering and issuing orders on DCYF’s neglect petition. The circuit court’s finding of neglect against Father was also affirmed. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust (SAE) appealed a superior court order ruling that the Town of Hanover Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) had subject matter jurisdiction to hear SAE’s administrative appeal in the related case of New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover, 172 N.H. 69 (2019) (SAE I). Defendant Town of Hanover (Town) cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney’s fees. Dartmouth College notified the Planning and Zoning Office that the chapter of the New Hampshire Alpha Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon was suspended by the national organization. The College officially derecognized the fraternity, which meant the facility became ineligible to operate as an “I” district student residence. Continued use of the property as a residence would have been a violation of the zoning ordinance. In subsequent proceedings, SAE challenged the ZBA’s jurisdiction to hear SAE’s appeal in the first instance. The Town argued it was entitled to attorney’s fees because SAE’s challenge in this case was frivolous with no good faith basis in fact or law, and asserted that it was only intended to waste time and needlessly delay final judgment in this matter. Finding no reversible error in the superior court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed judgment to SAE’s appeal and the Town’s cross-appeal. View "New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover" on Justia Law

The State appealed filed an interlocutory appeal of certain superior court rulings which held: (1) the State had to prove, as an element of the offense of driving after suspension pursuant to RSA 263:64, IV, that defendant’s prior driving under the influence (DUI) conviction was the basis of her prior license suspension; (2) the certified case summary offered by the State was admissible, but not dispositive, evidence of the defendant’s prior DUI conviction; and (3) denial of the State’s motion to continue. In December 2018, defendant, Teresa Mercon was arrested and subsequently charged pursuant to RSA 263:64, IV for driving while her license was suspended as a result of a 1997 DUI conviction. In August 2019, she was convicted at circuit court and sentenced to serve a mandatory seven-day jail sentence as required by RSA 263:64, IV. Defendant then appealed to the superior court for a jury trial de novo. Finding no error in the superior court’s rulings, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Mercon" on Justia Law

Defendant Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), appealed a superior court order denying her motion to dismiss and granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by plaintiff “Jane Doe.” Plaintiff’s petition sought her release from New Hampshire Hospital (NHH) on the ground that she failed to receive a probable cause hearing within three days of her involuntary emergency admission, as required by RSA 135-C:31, I (2015). The trial court ruled in her favor, and finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jane Doe v. New Hampshire Dept. of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Soulia was convicted by jury on three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. He appealed, arguing the superior court erred in denying his motions to strike for cause three prospective jurors, in violation of his right to an impartial jury under the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions. He also argued the trial court may have erred when it failed to disclose certain confidential records following in camera review of those records. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Soulia" on Justia Law

Respondent Ryanne Earley appealed a final divorce decree awarding petitioner Wm. Michael Earley part of her interest in an irrevocable life insurance trust established by her parents. She argued the trial court erred by classifying her interest in the trust as marital property subject to equitable division under RSA 458:16-a (Supp. 2020). Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s decision was contrary to RSA 564-B:5-502 (2019), it reversed in part, vacated the remainder of the property division determination, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Wm. & Ryanne Earley" on Justia Law

Defendant Bryan Luikart appealed a circuit court order which imposed a portion of his suspended sentence. Defendant argue the trial court erred in finding that the State met its burden of proving he violated the good behavior condition of his suspended sentence by committing witness tampering. In 2018, defendant pled guilty to various charges and was sentenced to 90 days’ incarceration, suspended for a period of two years. Conditions on defendant’s suspended sentence included that defendant “complete [a] batterer’s intervention program and be of good behavior.” Following his sentencing, defendant enrolled in his first batterer’s intervention program, but his participation in the program ended on January 24, 2019, for reasons irrelevant to this appeal. As a result of defendant’s departure from the program, the State moved to impose defendant’s suspended sentence on February 8. Defendant enrolled in a second batterer’s intervention program on February 19, and the State withdrew its motion to impose. Three days later, defendant sent an e-mail to his ex-wife. On March 7, the State filed a new motion to impose defendant’s suspended sentence. After a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion to impose, finding the evidence before it “sufficient to grant the State’s motion, at least generally.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence adduced at the motion hearing failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant committed witness tampering. Witness tampering was the only theory advanced by the State in support of its motion alleging that defendant violated his condition to be of good behavior, and Supreme Court did not interpret the trial court’s ruling as having independently found, from the evidence before it, that the defendant’s behavior amounted to another type of criminal conduct which violated the good behavior condition. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Luikart" on Justia Law

Defendant Eduardo Lopez, Jr. committed murder at age 17. Following his conviction, defendant received a statutorily-mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), ruling that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Accordingly, in 2017, the trial court held a two-day resentencing hearing at which it heard testimony from the arresting police officer, several members of the murder victim’s family, an addiction psychiatrist, a forensic psychologist, several members of the defendant’s family, and the defendant. Following the hearing, taking into consideration the record before it, “the nature and circumstances of the underlying crime, the characteristics of the defendant, and the traditional sentencing factors,” the court imposed a sentence of 45 years to life. Defendant appealed that sentence, arguing 45-year-to-life constituted a de facto equivalent of of lifetime imprisonment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held the trial court did not err in determining that the 45-year-to-life sentence it imposed, under which defendant had an opportunity to be considered for parole when he reached 62 years of age, was not a de facto life sentence under the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lopez, Jr." on Justia Law