Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted of three counts of domestic violence simple assault following a jury trial. The incidents occurred during two altercations between the defendant and the complainant on October 12 and October 15, 2019. The complainant recorded a video of the October 12 altercation on her cell phone. The defendant moved to exclude excerpts of this video, arguing that he had not received the entire video despite multiple discovery requests. The trial court granted this motion.Before the trial began, the State intended to have a detective testify about the content of the excluded video excerpts. The defendant objected, arguing that this would undermine the court’s prior ruling. The trial court allowed the detective’s testimony and instructed the jury that it could consider the absence of the rest of the video in determining whether the State had met its burden of proof. The jury convicted the defendant on the October 12 charges but acquitted him on the October 15 charge.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in admitting the detective’s testimony about the excluded video excerpts. The court held that this ruling was inconsistent with the trial court’s prior decision to exclude the video excerpts and that the inconsistency prejudiced the defendant’s case. The court noted that the detective’s testimony corroborated the complainant’s account and bolstered her credibility, which was crucial in a case that hinged on the complainant’s credibility.The Supreme Court concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the erroneously admitted testimony likely influenced the jury’s verdict. Therefore, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Voight" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of five counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) involving a minor, including two counts of cunnilingus, two counts of vaginal intercourse, and one count of a pattern of sexual assaults causing severe mental anguish or trauma. The assaults occurred between December 2017 and December 2020, and the victim disclosed them in April 2021. The defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the pattern sexual assault charge and errors in the trial court's handling of certain records.The Superior Court conducted a jury trial in November 2022. The trial court reviewed the victim's DCYF and counseling records in camera, disclosing some DCYF records but none of the counseling records. The defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments for insufficient evidence was denied, and the jury found him guilty on all counts.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court first addressed the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly regarding the "extreme mental anguish or trauma" element of the pattern AFSA charge. The court found that the victim's testimony about her emotional distress, nightmares, and difficulty trusting people, along with her demeanor during testimony and interviews, provided sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find extreme mental anguish or trauma. Thus, the court concluded there was no plain error.The court also reviewed the trial court's handling of the in camera review of the victim's records. It determined that the trial court applied the correct standard and that its decisions regarding the disclosure of the records were not clearly unreasonable or untenable. Consequently, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court's decisions and the defendant's convictions. View "State v. Hodges" on Justia Law

The defendant, Otto Keller, was involved in a car accident after falling asleep while driving, resulting in a collision with an unoccupied car and a house. He admitted to using heroin and being involved in a methadone clinic. A blood test revealed multiple drugs in his system. Keller was charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated (ADWI) for causing a collision resulting in serious bodily injury, specifically a broken right humerus.The Superior Court denied Keller's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Colleen Scarneo, the State’s expert in human performance forensic toxicology, and his motion to dismiss the ADWI charge for insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury. The court found Scarneo’s methodology reliable under RSA 516:29-a and Daubert standards. At trial, Scarneo testified that Keller exhibited signs of impairment consistent with the drugs found in his system. The jury found Keller guilty of ADWI.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in admitting Scarneo’s testimony because her methodology was not sufficiently reliable. The court found that her methodology had not been tested, subjected to peer review, had no known error rate, and was not generally accepted in the scientific community. Additionally, the court determined that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Keller’s broken arm constituted a serious bodily injury as defined by RSA 625:11, VI.The Supreme Court reversed Keller’s ADWI conviction due to insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury and the prejudicial admission of unreliable expert testimony. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion, specifically for a new trial on the lesser-included charge of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DWI). View "State v. Keller" on Justia Law

Gail Andersen appealed a decision rejecting her challenges to her mother Barbara Colanton's will and trust. Barbara had two daughters, Andersen and Brenda Grant, who had a falling out after their father's death in 2000. Barbara revised her estate plan multiple times, with significant changes in 2015 that favored Grant. Andersen alleged that Barbara was cognitively impaired and that Grant exercised undue influence over her when the 2015 revisions were made.The Circuit Court (Weaver, J.) found that Barbara had the legal capacity to execute the will and trust documents. It also determined that Grant, being in a fiduciary relationship with Barbara, had the burden to show a lack of undue influence. The court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard, concluding that Grant met her burden. However, it also noted that Grant did not meet the burden by clear and convincing evidence, anticipating a possible appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether the trial court erred in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard. The court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate, aligning the burden of proof for undue influence with that for testamentary capacity. The court reasoned that this standard strikes a balance between respecting the decedent’s wishes and protecting against undue influence. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that the legislature could establish a different burden of proof if it disagreed with this standard. View "In re Estate of Colanton" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorce proceeding between Gregory Landgraf (husband) and Natasha Landgraf (wife), who have two minor children. The wife challenges the Circuit Court's determination of the husband's temporary child support obligation, specifically regarding whether the husband's irregular income should be considered for child support purposes. The husband receives irregular income from New England Industries (NEI), a subchapter S corporation, to offset his shareholder tax liability and for succession insurance premiums.Initially, the trial court issued a final divorce decree in 2018, which included a child support award. The wife appealed, and the higher court vacated and remanded the trial court's determination regarding the husband's irregular income. On remand in 2020, the circuit court issued a new temporary child support order, requiring the husband to pay a percentage of his irregular income, which was less than the applicable percentage set forth in the child support formula. Both parties moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The court treated NEI's distributions to the husband as "gross income" and invited the parties to prepare an interlocutory appeal statement.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The court addressed two questions: whether cash distributions received by a corporate shareholder to pay personal tax liability and distributions for succession insurance premiums are available for child support purposes. The court answered both questions affirmatively, concluding that these distributions are dividends and bonuses, respectively, and are available for child support purposes. The court also clarified that "net income" for child support purposes is calculated using standard deductions published by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, regardless of actual employer withholding.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Landgraf" on Justia Law

The defendant, Benjamin Sargent, was the chief of the Litchfield Police Department (LPD) and was convicted of official oppression for violating the sexual harassment policies of LPD and the Town of Litchfield. The conviction stemmed from his communications with a probationary police officer on December 31, 2021, and January 1, 2022, during which he made suggestive comments, expressed romantic interest, and implied that she could advance in her career if she "stuck with him."The Circuit Court (Derby, J.) found Sargent guilty, concluding that he sought to benefit himself by obtaining emotional support and validation from the complainant. The court also denied Sargent's motion to dismiss, which argued that the statute was void for vagueness and overbreadth.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the trial court had interpreted the phrase "to benefit himself" too broadly. The Supreme Court concluded that the term should be understood to mean seeking a specific advantage or gain, rather than a momentary personal, emotional, or psychological benefit. The court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sargent sought such a specific benefit in his communications with the complainant.As a result, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court's interpretation of "to benefit himself" was incorrect and that the evidence did not support the conclusion that Sargent acted with the purpose of obtaining a specific benefit as required by RSA 643:1. View "State v. Sargent" on Justia Law

David and Amy LeFevre own a residential property in Deering, New Hampshire, adjacent to a property owned by Tiffany and James Hogan. In 2002, a deed (the Spragg-McEwan deed) conveyed the LeFevre property and included a reservation for a 30-foot-wide easement for the benefit of the Hogan property. This easement was intended to provide access and utility purposes. The Hogans began using this easement, leading the LeFevres to file a lawsuit seeking to quiet title and for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the easement was invalid.The Superior Court initially granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the LeFevres. However, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court ruled in favor of the Hogans, finding that the 2002 Spragg-McEwan deed validly created an easement over the LeFevre property. The court denied the LeFevres' motion for reconsideration and clarification, leading to the current appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the Spragg-McEwan deed clearly intended to create an easement for the benefit of the Hogan property. The court rejected the "stranger to the deed" doctrine, which would have invalidated the easement because it was reserved for a third party not named in the deed. The court emphasized that modern principles of deed interpretation prioritize the intent of the parties over archaic formalistic requirements. The court also found that the deed was properly delivered and accepted, as evidenced by its recording and the clear intent expressed in a confirmatory deed. Thus, the easement was validly created, and the Hogans were entitled to use it. View "LeFevre v. Hogan" on Justia Law

Eight New Hampshire employers sought a writ of mandamus to compel the New Hampshire Department of Labor (DOL) to hold department-level hearings. These employers had their applications for reimbursement from the Special Fund for Second Injuries denied. The employers argued that they were entitled to a hearing under RSA 281-A:43, I(a). The DOL had denied their requests for such hearings, stating that the disputes were more appropriately heard by the Compensation Appeals Board (CAB).The employers initially appealed to the CAB and requested department-level hearings from the DOL. The DOL denied these requests, leading the employers to file a petition for original jurisdiction with the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The proceedings before the CAB were stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision.The New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed whether the DOL is statutorily required to grant a request for a department-level hearing when an employer’s request for reimbursement from the Fund is denied. The court held that RSA 281-A:43, I(a) grants employers the right to a department-level hearing before an authorized representative of the commissioner when they have been denied reimbursement from the Fund. The court found that the statute's language supports the employers' right to such a hearing and that this interpretation aligns with the statutory scheme's purpose of encouraging employers to hire or retain employees with permanent impairments. Consequently, the court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, compelling the DOL to hold the requested hearings. View "Petition of City of Manchester" on Justia Law

The defendant, Gabriel Chalpin, was convicted of first-degree assault, enhanced for manifesting exceptional cruelty or depravity, and second-degree assault for recklessly causing bodily injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. The incidents occurred on February 2, 2018, when Chalpin assaulted the victim, his romantic partner, causing multiple injuries including collapsed lungs, fractured ribs, a broken nose, and a fractured spine.The Superior Court (Brown, J.) held a jury trial in March 2019, where the jury convicted Chalpin on multiple counts of first and second-degree assault. The court sentenced him on two counts of enhanced first-degree assault and two counts of second-degree assault – extreme indifference. Chalpin moved to dismiss all but one charge based on double jeopardy, which the court initially denied. However, after further motions, the court reconsidered and found that the events could be divided into two separate assaults, reducing the convictions to one count of enhanced first-degree assault and one count of second-degree assault – extreme indifference.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court's jury instruction on the definition of "cruelty" was sustainable. The court also found sufficient evidence to sustain both the enhanced first-degree assault and second-degree assault – extreme indifference convictions. Additionally, the Supreme Court determined that there was sufficient evidence to support four separate assault convictions, reversing the trial court's unit of prosecution ruling. The case was remanded for entry of the four convictions and reinstatement of the original sentences. View "State v. Chalpin" on Justia Law

The case involves the Union Leader Corporation (Union Leader) and the New Hampshire Department of Safety (Department). Union Leader sought to compel the Department to disclose records under the Right-to-Know Law, specifically records related to the response by New Hampshire State Police to the Sununu Youth Services Center (SYSC) on October 7 and 8, 2022. The Department refused to disclose the records, arguing that they were confidential law enforcement investigative records pertaining to juvenile delinquency.The Superior Court dismissed Union Leader's suit, siding with the Department. The court found that the requested records contained facts that underlie the basis for juvenile delinquency proceedings. Therefore, based on a previous decision in Petition of State of New Hampshire (Disclosure of Juvenile Records), the court concluded that the release of the records Union Leader requested was prohibited.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case. The Supreme Court found that the term "court records" in RSA 169-B:35 should not be read so expansively as to shield a broad category of otherwise public records from a request made pursuant to the Right to Know Law, even if that record is related to alleged unlawful conduct by unidentified minors. The court concluded that it is conceivable that information in the Department’s possession could answer Union Leader's questions without interfering with the rehabilitation of the minors against whom juvenile petitions were filed. It is also conceivable that responsive records could be redacted so as to ensure that their disclosure neither conflicts with nor compromises the rehabilitative purpose of RSA chapter 169-B. The case was remanded for the lower court to make those determinations. View "Union Leader Corp. v. N.H. Dep't of Safety" on Justia Law