Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Melanie Parry was convicted by jury of possessing a controlled drug. On appeal, she argued (1) the trial court erred by denying her requested jury instruction on the voluntary-act requirement set forth in RSA 626:1 (2016); and (2) the prosecutor's statement during closing argument that voluntariness was not an element of possession and was contrary to the law. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, finding a voluntariness instruction was not necessary unless there was evidence suggesting the defendant's conduct was involuntary. Because no such evidence was presented here, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on RSA 626:1, and the prosecutor's statement was not contrary to the law. View "New Hampshire v. Parry" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christopher Dow appealed a probate court decision finding he was not a pretermitted heir under his mother’s, Marie G. Dow’s, will. He argued the probate division erred in failing to apply New Hampshire’s pretermitted heir statute to her will, and that, under New Hampshire law, he was a pretermitted heir and, thus, entitled to his intestate share of his mother’s estate. Respondent Leslie Dow, the testator’s ex-daughter-in-law and primary beneficiary of her will, countered that the probate division properly applied Massachusetts’ pretermitted heir statute to the will in accordance with the will’s provision that “[the] estate is to be administered and enforced according to the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” Following oral argument before a 3JX panel, the case was submitted to the full court for decision. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the probate division’s decision to apply the Massachusetts pretermitted heir statute in determining whether the petitioner was a pretermitted heir under the will, and reversed the probate division’s conclusion that the petitioner was not a pretermitted heir. The Supreme Court held that petitioner was a pretermitted heir under New Hampshire law, as properly applied, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Marie G. Dow" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lauren Shearer appealed, and defendants Ronald Raymond and Sandra Auvil cross-appealed a superior court order which found plaintiff had an easement across defendants’ property to access his landlocked property. The court ruled that “by operation of common law” plaintiff had an easement to access his parcel over a public highway that was discontinued by town vote in 1898. Defendants’ cross-appeal presented a question of first impression for the New Hampshire Supreme Court: whether the owner of landlocked property had an easement for ingress and egress over a public highway that was discontinued by town vote prior to the enactment of the statutory right of access. Plaintiff, in turn, appealed certain aspects of the trial court’s order relating to the width and permitted uses of the easement. The Supreme Court held that, under New Hampshire common law, an easement existed over a discontinued highway if the landowner demonstrated the easement was reasonably necessary for ingress and egress to the property. The Court vacated the trial court’s decision and remanded for the trial court to make that determination in the first instance. In the interests of judicial economy and because the issues might arise on remand, the Supreme Court also addressed the issues raised by plaintiff in his appeal. View "Shearer v. Raymond" on Justia Law

Defendant Joshua Pouliot was tried by jury and convicted on three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault, and one count of felonious sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued the superior court erred by denying his motion to exclude evidence that he answered “no comment” in response to police questioning about the sexual assaults during a non-custodial interview over the phone. He contended that, through his “no comment” response, he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. He also agued the trial court may have erred when, after conducting an in camera review of confidential records pertaining to the victim, the court ordered that only certain portions of those records be disclosed to the defendant. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. The matter was remanded for the trial court's further in camera review of the records. View "New Hampshire v. Pouliot" on Justia Law

Brenna Cavanaugh was convicted by jury of being an accomplice to first degree assault and criminal mischief. On appeal, she argued the evidence was insufficient for the jury to have convicted her and that the Superior Court erred by: (1) declining her request for a self-defense jury instruction; (2) precluding her from introducing extrinsic evidence of the victim’s prior inconsistent statements; (3) allowing certain of the victim’s statements into evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule; and (4) denying her request to recall a witness. In the very early morning hours of August 18, 2018, defendant’s teenaged daughter invited the sixteen year old victim, to a party. The victim and daughter were friends, and the victim believed that the party was at defendant’s house. Entering an unlocked door, the victim discovered there was no party, and whispered the daughter's name. Hearing no response, the victim left, but not before stepping on a creaky floorboard that woke defendant and her boyfriend. After hearing the front door shut, defendant ran down two flights of stairs to chase after the victim. Her boyfriend followed soon thereafter armed with a handgun. Once outside, the defendant saw the victim inside the truck, which had its engine running and its lights on. She crossed the street and stood approximately one foot away from the front of the truck so that she could see its license plate number. As he prepared to drive away, the victim heard the defendant yell, “shoot, shoot” or “shoot him, shoot him.” Officers involved in a traffic stop approximately 200 yards away from defendant’s home heard six gunshots. After defendant called 911 to report an intruder in her home and that her boyfriend had shot at the intruder’s vehicle, the officers responded to her residence. Meanwhile, the victim returned to the scene with some friends to speak with the officers about the incident. It was later determined the truck was damaged by three different bullets. Although the evidence was conflicting, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions, the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a self-defense instruction. The matter was remanded for a new trial. View "New Hampshire v. Cavanaugh" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeremy Mack was convicted by jury on one count of possession of a controlled drug: psilocyn and/or psilocybin (which he possessed in the form of mushrooms). On appeal, defendant argued that, because Part I, Article 5 of the New Hampshire Constitution protected his right to possess and use mushrooms as part of his religious worship, so long as he did not “disturb the public peace,” the trial court erred by denying his pre-trial motion to dismiss. This appeal required the New Hampshire Supreme Court to interpret Part I, Article 5 and interpretation of the phrase "disturb the public peace." The Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not apply the compelling interest balancing test that Part I, Article 5 required. "Nor, understandably, did it make the factual findings necessary to determine whether, under the test, the defendant’s possession and sacramental use of psilocyn and/or psilocybin mushrooms are protected under Part I, Article 5." The trial court'd order was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Mack" on Justia Law

Appellant Paul O’Neill, acting as trustee of the Lorraine R. O’Neill Revocable Trust – 2004, appealed a probate court order granting a petition for ancillary estate administration of certain New Hampshire real estate. O’Neill argued, among other things, that the probate division lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the petition because it was filed on behalf of the estate of a non-New Hampshire decedent, and the petition did not represent that a court outside of New Hampshire had made a judicial determination that the estate was insolvent. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the grant of administration and remanded all remaining issues to the probate division for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Lorraine R. O'Neill" on Justia Law

Defendant John Gates appealed his convictions for arson, attempted arson, two counts of burglary, being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon, and use of a Molotov cocktail. He challenged a superior court order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained when, without a search warrant, the police entered the vestibule and utility closet of his apartment building located on his family’s farm. At trial court, defendant argued that the warrantless search violated his rights under Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The trial court applied the two-part framework established in New Hampshire v. Goss, 150 N.H. 46 (2003), which provided that, for a warrantless search to be unlawful, an individual must have a legitimate expectation of privacy — both subjective and objective — in the place searched. The trial court found that defendant lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in both the vestibule and the utility closet and concluded that the officers’ warrantless entry into those areas was lawful. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court's conclusions was wrong as to both rulings. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with defendant that, under Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the utility closet, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Gates" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent a circuit court from joining DCYF as a party to an ongoing guardianship case and from ordering the agency to provide services for the benefit of private litigants. This petition arose from a guardianship case involving an ongoing dispute between the father of a three-year-old child and the child’s guardians, who were the child’s maternal grandparents. The father alleged the child’s guardians were willfully interfering with his rights to unsupervised parenting time and notice of his child’s medical appointments as established by previous court orders. The circuit court credited the father’s allegations and expressed concern that the case “has not progressed” since the last hearing in September 2018. The trial court was ordered to provide services on a weekly basis to father, and joined DCYF as a party to the case. DCYF contended the circuit court lacked the authority to join the agency to the private case because no statute authorized the circuit court to do so. The Supreme Court agreed and, accordingly, granted DCYF’s petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families" on Justia Law

The Rye School District (District) appealed a New Hampshire State Board of Education (State Board) decision that overturned a Rye School Board (School Board) decision. The School Board denied C.B. and E.B.'s (Parents) request to reassign their child (Student) to a school in another district pursuant to RSA 193:3 (2018) (amended 2020). According to the testimony of Student’s mother (Mother), Student had a growth hormone deficiency that hindered her physical growth and caused Student to fall behind academically and socially. Due to Student’s small size, she was often picked up and carried by other pupils, and assaulted. Parents met with the Rye Elementary School principal, but a bullying report was not filed. The school responded to this incident and a subsequent incident by promising to keep Student and the other child apart. At the start of fifth grade, Mother first requested Student's reassignment, alleging the principal did not understand Student’s 504 plan and was not aware of Student’s attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and anxiety issues. Mother requested an Individual Education Program (IEP) meeting, but the school believed that such a meeting was not necessary because the 504 plan could meet Student’s needs. During that academic year, Student was again assaulted by a peer, had issues with anxiety, and was not gaining weight. Sometime before the end of the 2016-2017 school year, Parents decided to withdraw Student from Rye Elementary School and enroll her in an elementary school in a different town. According to Mother, the new school was following the 504 plan and Student no longer needed help with homework. Student’s anxiety decreased and she was gaining weight. In addition, according to Mother, there had been no bullying at Student’s new school. A School Board hearing officer concluded Parents “failed to demonstrate that attendance at the Rye School had a detrimental or negative effect on the Student” and that “[t]here was no basis for reassignment due to Manifest Educational Hardship,” but that was overturned by the State Board. After review of the State Board's record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the District failed to show the State Board's decision was "clearly unreasonable or unlawful," and affirmed its decision. View "Appeal of Rye School District" on Justia Law