Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Whitman Operating Co., LLC d/b/a Camp Walt Whitman, Wicosuta Operating Co., LLC d/b/a Camp Wicosuta, and Winaukee Operating Co., LLC d/b/a Camp Winaukee (collectively, the Camps), challenged a decision of respondent the Governor’s Office for Emergency Relief and Recovery (the Office for Emergency Relief), to deny their applications for money from the New Hampshire General Assistance and Preservation (GAP) Fund. In July 2020, the Governor authorized the allocation and expenditure of $30 million of CARES Act funds for the GAP Fund “to provide emergency financial relief to New Hampshire businesses and nonprofit organizations impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.” The Camps applied for GAP funding at the end of July 2020. Their applications were denied on September 10, 2020. The form letters notifying the Camps that their applications had been denied stated that “having high liquid assets both personal and business” was one of “[t]he most common reasons” for denying an application. The Camps argued: (1) denying their applications violated their state and federal constitutional rights to equal protection; and (2) the Office for Emergency Relief’s decision deprived them of their state and federal rights to procedural and substantive due process. Finding no deprivation of petitioners' rights, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the Office for Emergency Relief. View "Petition of Whitman Operating Co., LLC d/b/a Camp Walt Whitman et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Elizabeth Seibel appealed after she was convicted at a superior court bench trial on one count of financial exploitation of an elderly person, and two counts of theft by unauthorized taking. The victim was defendant's widowed mother-in-law. Defendant and the victim's son added their names to one of the victim's checking accounts without her knowledge. Defendant and the son withdrew money, and used the victim's funds to purchase a house and pay personal debts. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on all three convictions. Because the State presented sufficient evidence to support each of the defendant’s convictions, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Seibel" on Justia Law

Defendant Volodymyr Zhukovskyy appealed a superior court order denying his third motion for an evidentiary bail hearing. Because it concluded that RSA 597:2, III-IV did not require the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing when the parties disputed facts relevant to dangerousness, and that the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Zhukovskyy" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the Towns of Chester and Hudson (collectively, Towns), appealed a Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) order granting respondent Public Service Company of New Hampshire d/b/a Eversource Energy (PSNH) abatements of taxes assessed against its property located in Chester for tax years 2014 and 2016 and in Hudson for tax years 2014, 2015, and 2016. PSNH submitted an appraisal report prepared by its expert, Concentric Energy Advisors, Inc., setting forth the expert’s opinion of the aggregate fair market value of PSNH’s taxable property located in each municipality for each tax year. Two appraisers employed by the Towns’ expert, George E. Sansoucy, P.E., LLC (GES), used a substantially similar methodology in appraising the fair market value of the land interests. The BTLA compared the equalized market value to the aggregate assessed value for each municipality for each tax year. The BTLA concluded that an assessment was unreasonable and granted an abatement when it determined that the difference between the equalized market value and the aggregate assessed value was greater than five percent. The Towns argued that because both GES and Concentric relied upon the assessed value of PSNH’s land interests in reaching their opinions of fair market value, the values that the BTLA incorporated into its analysis “were already proportionate” and “should not have had the equalization ratio[s] applied to them.” The BTLA denied the Towns’ motion for reconsideration, noting that it based its calculations upon values that “were supplied by the [Towns] themselves in the stipulations agreed to by them” and adopting the arguments PSNH raised in its objection. Finding no reversible error in the BTLA's order, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Town of Chester et al." on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court order granting defendant Seth Hinkley's motion to suppress his confession and subsequent statements made during an interview with the police. On appeal, the State argued the trial court erred in finding that the defendant’s confession was involuntary because the police officer’s statements constituted a promise of immunity and the defendant’s confession was induced by the officer’s statements. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no error, judgement was affirmed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Hinkley" on Justia Law

Three defendants, Charles Richards, Chairman’s View, Inc. (Chairman’s View), and CoreValue Holdings, LLC (CoreValue), appealed a superior court order denying their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, this action brought by plaintiff, Christine Seward. Plaintiff filed suit against defendants for claims related to the transfer of a patent. Plaintiff was a New Hampshire resident and was a former employee of Chairman's View; Chairman’s View was a Delaware corporation registered with the New Hampshire Secretary of State to do business in New Hampshire as a foreign corporation. Its principal office was located in White River Junction, Vermont. CoreValue was a Nevada limited liability company registered to do business in Vermont and has the same principal office address in White River Junction as Chairman’s View. Richards resided in Norwich, Vermont, and was the president, sole director, and majority shareholder of Chairman’s View and was the managing member, and either the sole or majority member, of CoreValue. In 2014, plaintiff loaned Chairman’s View $312,500 and an additional $58,000 at Richard’s request. In 2016, plaintiff made a formal demand for payment on both notes. Chairman’s View failed to honor the demands, constituting an event of default on both notes. To secure the payment of both notes, the parties entered into a Security Agreement which pledged all of Chairman’s View’s assets. The pledged assets included U.S. Patent No 960727842 for proprietary software (the Patent), which, the complaint alleged, on “knowledge and belief, . . . constitutes Chairman’s View’s nearly only—but significantly valuable—asset.” Due to continued nonpayment, plaintiff filed suit in superior court to collect on the notes. After a judgment in this suit was issued and became final, and without plaintiff’s knowledge or consent, Chairman’s View recorded an assignment of the Patent to CoreValue at the United States Patent and Trademark Office. In 2018, the superior court granted plaintiff permission to attach the Patent, but it had already been assigned. Plaintiff contended defendants continued to receive license fees, and they continued to receive revenue from marketing the software covered by the Patent. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in denying defendants' motion to dismiss. View "Seward v. Richards et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert St. Onge appealed a circuit court order dismissing his claim brought under RSA chapter 540-A against defendant Oberten, LLC, on the ground that the sober living facility it operated, and in which the plaintiff lived, was a “group home” under RSA 540:1-a, IV(c) and, therefore, exempt from RSA chapter 540-A.Plaintiff was one of 12 residents at defendant’s Manchester, New Hampshire location. All program participants agreed to certain rules for living at the home. The contract plaintiff signed explicitly provided that it was not a lease and that “residents of Live Free Structured Sober Living have no tenant rights.” Despite being aware of, and agreeing to, the home's rules, plaintiff violated them and, as a result, was discharged from the program and required to vacate the sober living facility. He subsequently filed a petition alleging defendant violated RSA chapter 540-A by using “self-help” to evict him. Defendant moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that because its facility was a “group home,” it was not a “landlord” required to bring an eviction proceeding under RSA chapter 540, and plaintiff was not a “tenant” entitled to the protections of RSA chapter 540-A. The trial court agreed with defendant. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "St. Onge v. Oberten, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Chad and Kelly Short (Buyers) appealed a superior court order denying their requests for specific performance and attorney’s fees and costs in connection with an alleged contract to purchase real estate from defendants John and Lori LaPlante, as trustees of the LaPlante Family Revocable Trust (Sellers). Buyers visited the Sellers’ Concord home for the first time on May 24, 2018, and that day submitted an offer to purchase it for $690,000. After negotiations, but before the purchase and sale agreement (P&S) was executed, the parties agreed that the Buyers would purchase the property for $690,000 and would submit $10,000 as a deposit, and the Sellers would furnish up to $7,250 in closing costs. On June 1, the Sellers located a property in Stratham that they thought would suit their needs. They submitted an offer on that property on June 3. Also, on June 3, the parties fully executed the final P&S for the Sellers’ Concord property, which included the following provision (the Disputed Provision): “This agreement is subject to Sellers finding suitable housing no later than July 14, 2018.” On June 5, the Sellers sent an email apologizing to the Buyers “for wanting to cancel the P&S . . . at this stage.“ Buyers interpreted the Sellers’ attempt to cancel the P&S as an indication the Sellers received a better offer; Buyers subsequently brought this action. The trial court found that the P&S was not “a binding and enforceable contract” because “[t]here was no meeting of the minds regarding the Disputed Provision.” The Buyers unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and this appeal followed. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error in the superior court’s order and affirmed. View "Short v. LaPlante" on Justia Law

Juvenile J.S. appealed a circuit court’s finding of delinquency based on petitions alleging criminal mischief, simple assault and attempted simple assault. The petitions were filed after a series of events in September 2020 at the Mount Prospect Academy, a non-secure detention facility whose students are placed there due to behavioral issues. At the close of the State’s case at the adjudicatory hearing, the court granted the juvenile’s motion to dismiss one of the petitions for insufficiency of evidence, and denied his motions to dismiss the remaining petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The latter motions argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the State failed to comply with RSA 169- B:6, III and IV. On appeal, the juvenile argued the trial court “erred as a matter of law in determining that, on the undisputed facts in the record here, Mount Prospect Academy is not a school.” Accordingly, he contended the court erred by failing to dismiss the delinquency petitions. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determination on the facts presented in this case, that Mount Prospect was not a “school” for purposes of RSA 169-B:6, III and IV. Accordingly, the Court upheld the trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss and affirm the finding of delinquency. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Anna Carrigan filed suit against defendants, the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services and the Department’s commissioner, alleging they were failing to meet their statutory and constitutional duties as a result of their “irresponsible” spending decisions. She asserted standing under Part I, Article 8 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which provided New Hampshire taxpayers who were eligible to vote with standing to seek a declaration that the State or a local government “has spent, or has approved spending, public funds” in violation of the law. The Superior Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for want of standing, and plaintiff appealed. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed because plaintiff failed to challenge any specific spending action or spending approval, by the Department, as necessary to maintain standing under Part I, Article 8. View "Carrigan v. New Hampshire Dept. of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law