Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Robert St. Onge appealed a circuit court order dismissing his claim brought under RSA chapter 540-A against defendant Oberten, LLC, on the ground that the sober living facility it operated, and in which the plaintiff lived, was a “group home” under RSA 540:1-a, IV(c) and, therefore, exempt from RSA chapter 540-A.Plaintiff was one of 12 residents at defendant’s Manchester, New Hampshire location. All program participants agreed to certain rules for living at the home. The contract plaintiff signed explicitly provided that it was not a lease and that “residents of Live Free Structured Sober Living have no tenant rights.” Despite being aware of, and agreeing to, the home's rules, plaintiff violated them and, as a result, was discharged from the program and required to vacate the sober living facility. He subsequently filed a petition alleging defendant violated RSA chapter 540-A by using “self-help” to evict him. Defendant moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that because its facility was a “group home,” it was not a “landlord” required to bring an eviction proceeding under RSA chapter 540, and plaintiff was not a “tenant” entitled to the protections of RSA chapter 540-A. The trial court agreed with defendant. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "St. Onge v. Oberten, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Chad and Kelly Short (Buyers) appealed a superior court order denying their requests for specific performance and attorney’s fees and costs in connection with an alleged contract to purchase real estate from defendants John and Lori LaPlante, as trustees of the LaPlante Family Revocable Trust (Sellers). Buyers visited the Sellers’ Concord home for the first time on May 24, 2018, and that day submitted an offer to purchase it for $690,000. After negotiations, but before the purchase and sale agreement (P&S) was executed, the parties agreed that the Buyers would purchase the property for $690,000 and would submit $10,000 as a deposit, and the Sellers would furnish up to $7,250 in closing costs. On June 1, the Sellers located a property in Stratham that they thought would suit their needs. They submitted an offer on that property on June 3. Also, on June 3, the parties fully executed the final P&S for the Sellers’ Concord property, which included the following provision (the Disputed Provision): “This agreement is subject to Sellers finding suitable housing no later than July 14, 2018.” On June 5, the Sellers sent an email apologizing to the Buyers “for wanting to cancel the P&S . . . at this stage.“ Buyers interpreted the Sellers’ attempt to cancel the P&S as an indication the Sellers received a better offer; Buyers subsequently brought this action. The trial court found that the P&S was not “a binding and enforceable contract” because “[t]here was no meeting of the minds regarding the Disputed Provision.” The Buyers unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and this appeal followed. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error in the superior court’s order and affirmed. View "Short v. LaPlante" on Justia Law

Juvenile J.S. appealed a circuit court’s finding of delinquency based on petitions alleging criminal mischief, simple assault and attempted simple assault. The petitions were filed after a series of events in September 2020 at the Mount Prospect Academy, a non-secure detention facility whose students are placed there due to behavioral issues. At the close of the State’s case at the adjudicatory hearing, the court granted the juvenile’s motion to dismiss one of the petitions for insufficiency of evidence, and denied his motions to dismiss the remaining petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The latter motions argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the State failed to comply with RSA 169- B:6, III and IV. On appeal, the juvenile argued the trial court “erred as a matter of law in determining that, on the undisputed facts in the record here, Mount Prospect Academy is not a school.” Accordingly, he contended the court erred by failing to dismiss the delinquency petitions. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determination on the facts presented in this case, that Mount Prospect was not a “school” for purposes of RSA 169-B:6, III and IV. Accordingly, the Court upheld the trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss and affirm the finding of delinquency. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Anna Carrigan filed suit against defendants, the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services and the Department’s commissioner, alleging they were failing to meet their statutory and constitutional duties as a result of their “irresponsible” spending decisions. She asserted standing under Part I, Article 8 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which provided New Hampshire taxpayers who were eligible to vote with standing to seek a declaration that the State or a local government “has spent, or has approved spending, public funds” in violation of the law. The Superior Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for want of standing, and plaintiff appealed. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed because plaintiff failed to challenge any specific spending action or spending approval, by the Department, as necessary to maintain standing under Part I, Article 8. View "Carrigan v. New Hampshire Dept. of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

Defendant, W.C. appealed a domestic violence final order of protection, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that his conduct constituted a credible, present threat to the safety of plaintiff, L.C., because one of the incidents of abuse upon which the trial court relied was directed at her aunt. Defendant also argued the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion by issuing protective orders that were broader than necessary to bring about cessation of the abuse. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the order. View "L.C. v. W.C." on Justia Law

Respondent Jeffrey Bart (Husband) appealed, and petitioner Lura Sanborn (Wife) cross-appealed, a final decree of divorce. Husband also appealed the trial court’s order, issued after this appeal was filed, granting Wife’s motion to enforce the temporary decree as to the payment of property taxes on the marital home. The parties were married in 2005 and had one child. Wife worked as a librarian at a private school; Husband was involved in the operation of a family-owned candy business (GSCS) established by his grandfather in 1927. At the time the final decree was issued, Husband was the controlling member of two limited liability companies that owned and operated GSCS and the property on which one of its stores was located. CMJ Associates, LLC (CMJ) was the entity that owned the real property housing one of GSCS’s stores and several residential apartments. Husband argued the trial court erred in: (1) issuing a child support order that provided for “automatic modifications of child support in the future”; (2) adjusting the property distribution to account for marital funds used by Husband for his legal fees, but failing to make the same adjustment for Wife; and (3) modifying the final decree after an appeal had been filed. Wife argued the trial court erred in: (1) determining Husband’s gross income for purposes of child support; (2) dividing the marital estate unequally in favor of Husband; and (3) awarding final alimony with an amount and duration inconsistent with its own findings. After review of Husband's arguments, the New Hampshire Supreme Court: (1) affirmed as to the "escalation clause" allowing automatic modifications of child support; (2) vacated the property settlement for reconsideration; and (3) agreed with Wife that the order was a "was a status quo preservation ruling" within the trial court’s jurisdiction. As to Wife's arguments, the Supreme Court: (1) affirmed as to the calculation of Husband's income; (2) affirmed as to the division of the marital estate; and (3) concurred that the alimony award appeared to be inconsistent with some of the trial court's factual findings. Judgment was therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Lura Sanborn & Jeffrey Bart" on Justia Law

Defendants, the New Hampshire Secretary of State (Secretary) and the Attorney General (collectively, the State), appealed a superior court order ruling that Laws 2017, chapter 205, also known as Senate Bill 3 (SB 3), was unconstitutional because it unreasonably burdened the right to vote in violation of Part I, Article 11 of the New Hampshire Constitution and violated the equal protection guarantees of the New Hampshire Constitution. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that SB 3 violated Part I, Article 11 of the State Constitution. Because the Court determined that SB 3 had to be stricken in its entirety, it did not address the State’s assertion that the trial court erred in determining that SB 3 also violated the equal protection guarantees of the State Constitution. View "New Hampshire Democratic Party v. New Hampshire Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Father appealed a circuit court order terminating his parental rights over his minor child, R.H., on the ground that he failed to correct, within 12 months, the conditions that led to the circuit court’s finding under RSA chapter 169-C that R.H. was neglected by R.H.’s mother (Mother), who had sole physical custody of the child. This appeal presented a narrow question for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's review: when does the 12-month period to correct the conditions of neglect or abuse under RSA 170-C:5, III begin to run against a non-accused, non-custodial parent? On appeal, Father argued the 12-month period did not begin until a non-accused, non-custodial parent was provided actual notice of the neglect or abuse finding. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) countered that the 12-month statutory period begins to run from the date of that finding, regardless of actual notice. Because the Supreme Court agreed with Father that the 12-month period begins when a non-accused, non-custodial parent receives constitutionally-adequate notice of both the abuse or neglect finding and the possible impact on parental rights of a failure to correct the conditions leading to that finding, it vacated and remanded. View "In re R.H." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the mother of S.A., B.T., and A.G., the father of A.G., and the father of S.A. appealed a circuit court order terminating their parental rights over their children because they each failed to correct the conditions that led to a finding of neglect within twelve months of that finding. The Vermont Supreme Court determined the trial court erred with respect to the termination of the father of S.A.'s parental rights: under the circumstances presented, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by finding that the father failed to correct the conditions that led to the neglect finding within twelve months of that finding. That judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The trial court's orders with respect to the other parents was affirmed. View "In re S.A." on Justia Law

M.M.’s (juvenile) Father challenged the superior court’s refusal of his appeal of a circuit court decision on a neglect petition brought by the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). Father argued that the amendment to RSA 169-C:28 (effective July 1, 2020), eliminating the right to appeal final dispositional orders in abuse and neglect proceedings to the superior court for de novo review, did not apply to his case. Father also appealed the circuit court’s final dispositional order directly to the New Hampshire Supreme Court pursuant to that amended statute, arguing that the circuit court should not have considered and issued orders on DCYF’s neglect petition and, alternatively, that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of neglect. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the July 2020 amendment to RSA 169-C:28 applied to Father’s case, barring his appeal to the superior court for de novo review. In its direct review of Father’s appeal of the circuit court’s final dispositional order, the Court concluded the circuit court did not err in considering and issuing orders on DCYF’s neglect petition. The circuit court’s finding of neglect against Father was also affirmed. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law