Justia New Hampshire Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Defendant Daswan Jette appealed his conviction by jury on one count of reckless manslaughter. Defendant argued the trial court: (1) erred by excluding evidence that, more than one month before her death, the victim sold drugs to an individual who paid her with counterfeit money; and (2) may have erred by failing to order the disclosure of certain records submitted for in camera review. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, even if the victim’s prior drug sale was relevant to defendant’s self-defense claim, the trial court properly excluded evidence of the previous sale pursuant to New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 403. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err by withholding certain records that it reviewed in camera. View "New Hampshire v. Jette" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire (ACLU) and the Concord Monitor, appealed a superior court order which ruled that portions of a contract between an equipment vendor and defendant City of Concord, for the purchase of “covert communications equipment,” were exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. Plaintiffs argued the City failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that redacted portions of the contract were exempt from disclosure, and that the trial court erred when it held an ex parte in camera hearing, during which the City presented evidence supporting exemption. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err when it conducted the hearing, and that it properly determined that most of the redacted information was exempt from disclosure. However, the Court also concluded that it erred by not disclosing one provision of the agreement. That provision was ordered disclosed on remand. View "American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire & a. v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Maia Magee (tenant) appealed a circuit court order in favor of defendant Vita Cooper (landlord) on the tenant’s claim that the landlord willfully violated her right to quiet enjoyment of residential property. Tenant alleged that in retaliation for the August 4 continuance of an eviction proceeding, the landlord: (1) played “loud” rock music on an outdoor stereo system early in the morning and during the day from 8:30 a.m. on Friday, August 7 until 8:30 p.m. on Sunday, August 9, and “for several hours” after 6:00 p.m. on Monday, August 10; (2) yelled “GET OUT OF MY HOME!” loudly from her property on August 10; (3) either shot a gun or ignited firecrackers during the evening of August 9 and between 7:00 a.m. and 8:30 p.m. on August 10; and (4) had an unknown and unidentified man, carrying a camera, trespass on the leased property on August 9. Additionally, Tenant alleged that the landlord breached a term of her lease prohibiting the tenant from playing a “musical instrument, radio, television, or other like device in the leased premises in a manner offensive to other occupants of the building” or during certain hours. She assertet that, in finding to the contrary, the trial court improperly failed to consider the timing of the alleged “bad actions,” and misconstrued and mischaracterized certain items of evidence. Furthermore, Tenant contended the trial court erred by: (1) considering each of the landlord’s alleged “bad actions” individually, rather than considering whether, collectively, such actions violated her right to quiet enjoyment; (2) not considering whether the landlord’s alleged “bad actions” violated the parties’ lease; and (3) relying upon Tenant’s failure to submit evidence of a local sound ordinance. Finding that Tenant failed to meet her burden to establish that there was a question of law warranting reversal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Magee v. Cooper" on Justia Law

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Defendant Carley Williams appealed a circuit court decision to impose a portion of her suspended sentence. In 2016, defendant reported to police that a customer at work had exposed himself to her. This report was false, and, in 2017, she pleaded guilty to unsworn falsification and making a false report to law enforcement. For these offenses, the defendant received a 12-month correctional sentence, deferred for one year on the condition of good behavior, and then suspended for one year on the same terms. In April 2019, defendant was arrested for theft by unauthorized taking. She was later convicted on this charge, and there was no dispute that her conviction violated the terms of her suspended sentence. In June 2019, the State moved to impose the 12-month suspended sentence. At a November hearing on the motion, defendant claimed to be her brother’s primary caretaker and argued that imposition of the 12-month suspended sentence would deprive him of necessary care. As a result, the trial court imposed only 10 days of the 12-month sentence. The State moved to reconsider that decision, arguing that defendant had lied to the court about the extent of her brother’s medical problems and her role caring for him. Defendant subsequently filed a police report claiming that, on November 4, M.P., the daughter of her brother’s girlfriend, had stolen from her. Later, defendant called the Milford Police Department, posing as M.P., and asked whether there was a warrant for M.P.’s arrest. In February 2020, the State filed a second motion to impose, asserting that defendant committed identity fraud by “posing as another individual in an attempt to obtain confidential information.” Following a multi-day, in-person, evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found defendant violated the suspended sentence’s condition of good behavior, in part, by committing identity fraud, and that the violation warranted imposing “a reasonable portion of the suspended sentence.” On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by finding that she committed identity fraud and by holding the hearing telephonically, at which it imposed 70 days (less 10 days of time served) of the 12-month suspended sentence. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Williams" on Justia Law

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Petitioner appeals a circuit court order denying her petition for guardianship of her great-nephew, a minor child, pursuant to RSA chapter 463 (2018 & Supp. 2020). On appeal, petitioner challenged the circuit court’s determination that she could not obtain guardianship because the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) already had legal custody of the child as a result of ongoing abuse and neglect proceedings. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that an award of legal custody pursuant to RSA chapter 169-C did not preclude the appointment of a guardian pursuant to RSA chapter 463. Accordingly, judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of B.C." on Justia Law

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Defendant Roger Roy appealed his convictions after a jury found him guilty on one count of felony domestic violence–criminal threatening with a deadly weapon, and four counts of misdemeanor domestic violence–simple assault. On appeal, defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to convict him of felony domestic violence, and that the trial court erred by precluding him from questioning the victim about sexually explicit text messages and by redacting the sexually explicit content from the messages before publishing them to the jury. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Roy" on Justia Law

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Defendant Daniel Davis appealed his conviction for one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, challenging a superior court order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless entry into the enclosed porch of his residence and subsequent warrantless entry into the interior. He also argued the trial court erred when it did not suppress evidence seized during a subsequent search of his residence pursuant to a search warrant because the warrant was predicated upon evidence obtained during the two prior unlawful intrusions. The State contended that both entries were lawful and, therefore, the later warrant search of the defendant’s residence was also lawful. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with defendant that the evidence obtained during the two warrantless entries was unlawfully acquired, and that the search warrant’s reliance on that evidence renders it invalid, it reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire v. Davis" on Justia Law

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The New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) appealed a New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) order finding that DOT committed an unfair labor practice when it implemented a new commercial driver’s license (CDL) medical card requirement for certain current DOT employees. In early April 2019, DOT unilaterally revised the minimum qualifications necessary for certain positions so that they now require an employee to have a CDL medical card. DOT notified the Union that the new minimum qualifications apply to new hires and to current employees only upon being promoted (even temporarily), demoted, or transferred to a position that now required a CDL medical card. Thus, a current employee occupying a position that now required a CDL medical card need not obtain a card to remain in his or her current position. The employee had to obtain a CDL medical card only if he or she wqw promoted, demoted, or transferred to a different position requiring a CDL medical card. The Union filed an unfair labor practice complaint against DOT asserting that, by adopting the medical card requirement for current employees, DOT failed to negotiate a mandatory subject of bargaining and improperly implemented a unilateral change in the terms and conditions of employment for affected employees. The Union did not challenge the new CDL requirement for new hires. DOT opposed the complaint, arguing that requiring certain current DOT employees to obtain CDL medical cards in connection with a position change was a matter of managerial prerogative and a prohibited subject of bargaining. Following a hearing, the PELRB ruled in favor of the Union. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court Affirmed the PELRB's order. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Merrimack Premium Outlets, LLC and Merrimack Premium Outlets Center, LLC, appealed, and defendant Town of Merrimack (Town), cross-appealed superior court orders in an action challenging the Town’s reassessment of taxable property. Merrimack Premium Outlets, LLC owned a large property in Merrimack (the Property) that it leased to Merrimack Premium Outlets Center, LLC. The latter entity operated a retail outlet shopping mall, known as the Merrimack Premium Outlets, on the Property. In 2016, the Town conducted a revaluation of all taxable property within the municipality. As a result, the Property was assessed at $86,549,400. Later that year, the Town became aware that the Property had been used in or about 2013 as collateral for a loan and had been valued for that purpose at $220,000,000. Based on this information, the Town believed that it had severely undervalued the Property. Accordingly, the Town reassessed the Property for the 2017 tax year at $154,149,500 (the 2017 reassessment). Plaintiffs then brought this action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging there were no changes in either the Property or the market that justified the 2017 reassessment. The superior court ruled in favor of the Town. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in ruling that the Town had the authority to correct its undervaluation of the Property by adjusting its assessment pursuant to RSA 75:8. Given this disposition, the Court did not address the parties' remaining arguments. View "Merrimack Premium Outlets, LLC et al. v. Town of Merrimack" on Justia Law

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Defendant Mark Boulton was convicted by jury on four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault, and one count of misdemeanor sexual assault. HE argued on appeal that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his request to enter portions of the transcript of his interview with police into the record; and (2) allowing a witness for the State to offer expert testimony while testifying as a lay witness. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Boulton" on Justia Law